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The purpose of the present study is to make a comparative evaluation of the legislative 
controls on unfairness in the context of B2B, B2C and small businesses contracts in 
England and Brazil. This work will focus on the examination of statutes and relevant case 
law which regulate exemption clauses and terms on the basis of their ‘unfairness’. 
 
The approach adopted by legislation and courts towards the above controls may vary 
according to the type of contract. Business contracts are more in line with the classical 
model of contract law according to which parties are presumably equals and able to 
negotiate terms. As a consequence interventions should be avoided for the sake of 
freedom of contract even if harmful terms were included. Such assumption of equality 
however is not applicable to small businesses contracts because SMEs are often in a 
disadvantageous position in relation to their larger counterparties.  
 
Consumer contracts in their turn are more closely regulated by the English and Brazilian 
legal systems which recognised that vulnerable parties are more exposed to unfair terms 
imposed by the stronger party as a result of the inequality of bargaining power. For this 
reason those jurisdictions adopted a more interventionist approach to provide special 
protection to consumers which is in line with the modern law of contract. 
 
The contribution of this work therefore consists of comparing how the law of England and 
Brazil tackles the problem of ‘unfairness’ in the above types of contracts. This study will 
examine the differences and similarities between rules and concepts of both jurisdictions 
with references to the law of their respective regional trade agreements (EU and the 
Mercosul). Moreover it will identify existing issues in the English and Brazilian legislation 
and recommend lessons that one system can learn from the other. 
 
 
 
 
 
COMPARATIVE LAW - ENGLAND AND BRAZIL - CONTRACT LAW - 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Context of the research 
 
Contracts are an inevitable part of the daily relations of the members of a society and 
they play a vital role of providing a minimum stability to agreements since they operate as 
means to regulate and enforce those agreements.1 Where parties to contract are in an 
equal position and are able to negotiate terms (generally in contracts between 
businesses), interferences should be avoided and the freedom of contract should prevail.2 
 
However such equality between parties is not present in all contractual relationships (e.g., 
consumer and small business contracts) and the party who retains a predominant 
bargaining strength often abuses its relative superior position to impose terms, such as 
unreasonable exemption clauses, which benefit its own interests to the detriment of the 
interests of the other party. 
 
A number of jurisdictions including England and Brazil recognised the need to interfere in 
those contracts where the imbalance between parties may give rise to the exploitation of 
the weaker party. As a consequence they have enacted legislative controls which purport 
to prevent the inclusion or invalidate terms that may be regarded as ‘unfair’ on the basis 
that those terms may harm the interests of one of the parties or frustrate his legitimate 
expectations. 
 
Presently the law has to find a balance between the need to prevent this unfairness in 
contractual relations and the ‘demands of certainty and stability’ in contracts which may 
be affected by excessive interventions.3 This balance will tilt differently towards one side 
(freedom of contract) or the other (intervention) in business and consumer contracts.  
 
 
 
                                                 
1 The law of contracts provide remedies in case obligations voluntarily assumed are broken. See Laurence 
Koffman and Elizabeth Macdonald, The Law of Contract (7th edn, Oxford University Press 2010) 1. 
2 This non-interventionist approach can be found in Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] AC 
827 (HL) and Watford Electronics Ltd v Sanderson CFL Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 317, [2001] 1 All ER (Comm) 
696. 
3 Mindy Chen-Wishart, Contract Law (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2010) 461. 
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1.1.1. Objective of the research 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine those legislative controls on exemption clauses 
and unfair terms in B2B, B2C and small businesses contracts in a comparative analysis of 
the English and Brazilian legal systems.  
 
This work will focus on pieces of legislation which exert a ‘direct statutory control’4 over 
exemption clauses and terms on the basis of their ‘unfairness’. It will be carried out in the 
light of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 and the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
Regulations 1999 which according to Macdonald ‘are probably the two single most 
significant pieces of legislation in the field of contract law in the UK. Together they 
provide a powerful weapon against unfair terms’.5 As the criterion of application of UCTA 
and UTCCR is the unfairness of terms, they are not limited to the ‘legislative regulation of 
specific terms (e.g., the consumer credit legislation)’6 or particular types of contracts.7 
This will allow a comparative analysis with the Brazilian Federal Constitution, Civil Code 
and Consumer Protection Code which also prescribe rules against unfairness applicable to 
terms in general.8  
 
The research therefore will examine pieces of legislation which deal with the unfairness of 
terms through the use of ‘general clauses’ such as good faith and significant imbalance in 
the UTCCR and reasonableness in UCTA.9 The Brazilian law in its turn adopts principles 
such as good faith and the social function of the contracts. Special attention will be drawn 
to good faith because it is a concept which highlights the differences between the legal 
systems in question and it is an important way of controlling unfairness in Brazil and the 
EU. 
 
                                                 
4 Ibid. According to Chen-Wishart in addition to these direct statutory controls there are also indirect controls 
over terms because before the validity of a term can be challenged it is necessary to determine whether the 
‘contested statement’: is a term of the contract, is incorporated into the contract and covers the events in 
question. 
5 Elizabeth Macdonald, 'Unifying Unfair Terms Legislation' (2004) 67(1) MLR 69, 69. 
6 Jill Poole, Textbook on Contract Law (10th edn, Oxford University Press 2010) 244. 
7 As opposed to statutes which regulate particular types of contracts to ‘counter unfairness’ such as Sale of 
Goods Act 1979, Landlord and Tenant Act 1985, Employment Rights Act 1996, Defective Premises Act 1972 
and so forth. See Chen-Wishart (n 3) 501-502. 
8 The provisions of the Consumer Protection Code are in principle limited to consumer contracts, but they 
have been applied by analogy to other types of contracts (such as small businesses contracts). 
9 Chris Willett, 'General Clauses and the Competing Ethics of European Consumer Law in the UK' (2012) 71(2) 
CLJ 412 
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In addition reference to other statutes and regulations will be made when appropriate, 
including the law of the regional trade agreements from which England and Brazil are 
Member States (European Union and Mercosul respectively) in view of the influence of the 
latter over the domestic contract law of those countries.  
 
The above comparison between the law of England and Brazil aims to examine similarities 
and differences in how different legal systems which adopt distinct legal traditions 
(common law and civil law respectively) deal with the same legal problem (unfairness in 
B2B and B2C contracts). This study will also diagnose unresolved issues which permeate 
the relevant legislation and case law of both jurisdictions and compare problems that 
affect their law. A comparative evaluation between the English and Brazilian legal systems 
will ultimately allow the identification of the best solutions which have been applied by 
one legal system and that can be incorporated by the other in order to improve the way 
that this system deals with the problem of unfairness. 
 
1.1.2. Relevance of the research 
 
As seen previously this comparative study will allow English and Brazilian comparatists, 
legislators and courts to find ‘models of law’ in the other legal system which they may 
consider worth enacting in their own jurisdiction (e.g., to develop or reform the law).10 
They may also use the comparison to fill gaps in the legislation or case law of their 
country.11 For instance the adoption of good faith as a general clause similar to the one 
which has been efficiently applied by the Brazilian legal system could potentially allow 
British courts to protect parties in more cases of unfairness, in particular at the 
negotiation stage where currently there is no such protection. 
 
This comparison can also be of practical significance in the context of transnational 
transactions. Exchanges involving businesses and consumers of different countries have 
led to an increasing interaction between the contract law of distinct jurisdictions. 
Comparative studies therefore have become essential to facilitate those interactions in a 
globalised world. 
 
                                                 
10 Peter De Cruz, Comparative Law in a Changing World (3rd edn, Routledge-Cavendish 2007) 20. 
11 Ibid. 21. See also Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2002] UKHL 22. 
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This work will tackle an important aspect of contractual relations which has a significant 
impact over the establishment of trust between parties (including businesses), stability of 
the agreements and consumer confidence in cross-borders transactions. Furthermore this 
study will involve the law of England and Brazil which are among the largest economies in 
the world. In fact ‘the Brazilian economy has overtaken the UK economy in 2011 to 
become the world’s 6th largest economy’.12  
 
The UK government has supported the development of a ‘stronger trading relationship 
with Brazil’ to explore commercial opportunities arising from the economic growth of the 
latter which includes negotiations on an ‘EU-Mercosul Free-Trade Agreement’.13 This is an 
indication that the volume of contractual relations between English and Brazilian parties is 
likely to increase significantly in the forthcoming years; therefore comparative studies 
such as the present one will be of great utility to assist negotiations or guide national 
courts in legal disputes involving both jurisdictions. De Cruz noted that ‘in the 
ascertainment and application of foreign law in national courts, the comparative method is 
not just a requirement, but a necessity’.14 
 
Consequently the fact that presently there are no studies comparing the legal systems of 
England and Brazil in this context means that this work may offer some guidance and 
reassurance to English businesses or individuals who are willing to negotiate with a 
Brazilian party, or vice versa, but are unsure how the legislation of the other legal system 
will protect their interests and whether they will be exposed to terms that can harm their 
interests.15 
 
1.1.3. The English and Brazilian legal systems: a comparison 
 
The present work will involve the comparison of English and Brazilian contract law which 
adopt respectively two of the main legal traditions: the civil law and common law.16 A 
                                                 
12 See the latest World Economic League Table published in December 2011 by the Centre for Economics and 
Business Research (CEBR) <http://www.cebr.com/wp-content/uploads/Cebr-World-Economic-League-Table-
press-release-26-December-2011.pdf> accessed 18 July 2012. 
13 See Foreign Affairs Committee, UK-Brazil Relations: Ninth Report of Session 2010-12 (HC 2010-12, 949) 
paras 1-11 and Foreign Affairs Committee, UK-Brazil Relations: Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs (Cm 8237, 2011) paras 3-31. 
14 De Cruz (n 10) 22-23. 
15 For instance before setting up an international company, the latter need to acquire ‘a good understanding 
of the legal requirements with which the company will have to comply and the legal framework within which 
the company will have to transact its business’. See Ibid. 23.  
16 René David and John E. C. Brierley, Major Legal Systems in the World Today: An Introduction to the 
Comparative Study of Law (3rd edn, Stevens & Sons 1985). 
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comparative study involving contrasting legal systems will provide a distinctive perspective 
on the analysis of their rules, concepts and legal problems.  
 
Brazil adopts the civil law tradition also known as ‘Romano-Germanic family’,17 which is 
based on the Roman ‘ius civiles’ and has its origin in Europe. Civil law is nowadays one of 
the most widespread legal traditions in the world and its concepts and rules are quite 
abstract and general. It applies a ‘deductive style of reasoning’ (of general principles to 
specific cases).18 By comparison, England is a member of the common law family which 
applies an inductive reasoning (from particular cases to more general principles).19 
Originally, this family was based on judicial decisions and was more concerned to provide 
a concrete solution for a problem than create general and systematic rules as the civil 
law.  
 
Those differences between the legal systems of England and Brazil may enrich a 
comparison between them, enabling the identification of unexpected similarities or distinct 
ways to deal with a common problem or situation.  
 
1.1.3.1. The English legal system 
 
Although common law is England’s legal system, legislation enacted by Parliament is 
currently its ‘predominant method of law-making.20 Consequently the significance of 
statutory controls over unfair terms has been increasing, but courts still play an important 
role in the interpretation of statutes through case law. Although in England there are 
various pieces of legislation and common law rules that aim to control the unfairness of 
terms,21 this study will focus on UCTA and the UTCCR 1999 for the reasons examined 
above. 
 
English law has been increasingly influenced by European law through Treaties22 (primary 
EU legislation) and secondary EU legislation which includes regulations, directives, 
                                                 
17 See René David, Major Legal Systems in the World Today (4th edn, Martins Fontes 2002) 111. 
18 Chen-Wishart (n 3) 6-7. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Gary Slapper and David Kelly, The English Legal System (11th edn, Routledge 2010-2011) 78. 
21 For instance, in the context of consumers: Consumer Credit Act 1974, Sale of Goods Act 1979, Supply of 
Goods and Services Act 1982, Consumer Protection Act 1987, Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) 
Regulations 2000 (SI 2000/2334). There are also common law rules regarding incorporation and construction 
of exemption clauses. 
22 Section 2(1) of the European Communities Act 1972. 
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decisions, recommendations and opinions.23 Such influence is due the fact that England is 
a member of the European Union and has to comply with its law. The EU in its turn is a 
supranational organisation composed of 27 Member States24 and was established by the 
Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty)25 in 1992 based on a community of political 
and economic interests.26 
 
Consumer protection is one area which has been significantly affected by the EU law.27 
For instance, important changes were introduced by the Directive on Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts28 and more recently the Directive on Consumer Rights29 aims to 
enhance the protection of consumers within the common market.  
 
1.1.3.2. The Brazilian legal system 
 
The Brazilian legal system adopts the civil law tradition; thus its primary source is the law 
lato sensu.30 The most authoritative law is the Federal Constitution, followed by Codes 
and other federal statutes.  
 
The understanding of the current contractual regimes applied in Brazil will require a brief 
overview of significant changes which occurred in the Brazilian law of contracts. Until 
1991 there were basically two main regimes: the ‘civil’ and the ‘commercial’.31 The civil 
                                                 
23 Article 288 (ex article 249 TEC) of the Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
24 Trevor C. Hartley, European Union Law in a Global Context: Text, Cases and Materials (Cambridge 
University Press 2004) 1-14. The current EU member countries are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Ireland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom. 
25 [1992] OJ C191/01. 
26 ‘The establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in July 1952 was the first step 
towards a supranational Europe. For the first time the six Member States of this organisation relinquished part 
of their sovereignty (...) in favour of the Community’. See 
<http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/treaties_eec_en.htm> accessed 12 
October 2012. The ECSC was followed by the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) 
through the adoption of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 (which aim included the creation of a community and the 
establishment of a common market ‘by the removal of obstacles to the free movement of capital, goods, 
people and services’) and then by the establishment of the European Union (EU) through the adoption of the 
Maastricht Treaty. See Philip Waller-Thody, Historical Introduction to the European Union (Routledge 1997) 
xii. 
27 Article 169 (ex article 153 TEC) of the Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union expressly prescribes the consumer protection by the 
European Community and articles 206 and 207 (ex articles 131 and 133 TEC) establish a common commercial 
policy for the EU. 
28 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts [1993] OJ L95/29. 
29 Commission, 'Proposal for a Directive on Consumer Rights' COM (2008) 614 final. 
30 David, Major Legal Systems in the World Today (n 17) 111. 
31 Fábio  Ulhoa Coelho, Curso de Direito Comercial – volume 3 (3rd edn, Saraiva 2002)18. 
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regime was governed by the revoked Brazilian Civil Code (Act 3071 of 1916) and was 
applicable to all contracts made between private parties.32 On the other hand the 
commercial regime was applicable to contracts made between businesses and it was 
governed by the Commercial Code (Act 556 which dates back to 1850).33  
 
In 1990, the advent of the Consumer Protection Code created a third regime in private 
law called ‘consumerist’34 resulting in the coexistence of three contractual regimes: the 
commercial for B2B contracts, the consumerist for B2C contracts and the civil for 
contracts between non-businesses.  
 
This classification lasted until the enactment of the new Civil Code in 2002 (Act 10406)35 
which promoted the legislative unification of the private law and the rules of contracts; 
hence it revoked the first part of the Act 556/1850 that dealt with commercial contracts 
and its own predecessor (Act 3071/1916) as a whole. As a consequence presently there 
are only two regimes of contracts. The first one is the ‘consumerist’ that is regulated by 
the Consumer Protection Code and deals with all contracts involving consumers and 
sellers or suppliers. The second is the ‘civil’ that is applied to the remaining contractual 
relations, civil or commercial, under the provisions of the new Civil Code.36 
 
This internal legislation of Brazil may be influenced by the regulations of the Mercosul (or 
Mercosur)37 which is a Regional Trade Agreement with an intergovernmental nature38 that 
this country is a Member State alongside Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay and more recently 
                                                 
32 Except for employment contracts that had special rules. This Civil Code was substantially influenced by the 
German Civil Code (‘Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch’ or BGB of 1900). Ibid. 
33 The Commercial Code was based on the Codes of Portugal, France and Spain. 
34 Article 48 of the Federal Constitution Transitional Provisions prescribed that the National Congress had to 
draw the Consumer Protection Code up within 120 days of the Constitution’s promulgation. The constituent 
opted for a Code rather than a statute to provide a more comprehensive protection to consumer rights 
(although it was formally enacted as an Act). See Ada Pellegrini Grinover and others, Código Brasileiro de 
Defesa do Consumidor - Direito Material (Arts 1º a 80 e 105 a 108) - Vol. I (10th edn, Forense 2011) 6-7. 
Although this Code was published on 12/09/90, it came into force on 11/03/1991 (180 days after its 
publication according to its article 118). 
35 The Civil Code was published on 10/01/02, but it came into force on 13/01/03 (1 year after its publication 
according to its article 2044). 
36 Martins proposed that what differs a commercial obligation from a civil obligation is the nature of the act 
that gave origin to it. See Fran Martins, Contratos e Obrigações Comerciais (16th edn, Forense 2010) 10. 
37 ‘Mercosul’ is the abbreviation for ‘Mercado Comum do Sul’ (in Portuguese) and ‘Mercosur’ is the 
abbreviation for ‘Mercado Común del Sur’ (in Spanish) that means Southern Common Market.  
38 The Mercosul differently from the EU does not intend to become a supranational organisation. Its Member-
States have ‘veto power’ and the administrative and normative decisions must be taken by unanimity. See 
Eduardo Antônio Klausner, Direito do Consumidor no Mercosul e na União Européia: Acesso e Efetividade 
(Juruá 2006) 63. 
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Venezuela.39 Mercosul was founded in 1991 by the Treaty of Asunción which was 
subsequently amended by the Treaty of Ouro Preto in 1994 and aims to achieve the 
economic integration of its members. Currently Mercosul is a customs union, but it is close 
to reach its main objective of becoming a common market.40 It purports to promote a 
‘free movement of goods, services and factors of production between countries’41 and it is 
‘seen as the most dynamic and successful regional trade organisation other than the 
EU.’42  
 
Its Members States are committed to ‘harmonize their legislation in the relevant areas in 
order to strengthen the integration process’.43 Although there are no Resolutions that deal 
expressly with unfair terms,44 the fundamental rights of the consumers in the Mercosul 
include ‘the balance of consumer relations, ensuring the respect for the values of dignity 
and loyalty, based on good faith’ and ‘the protection against abusive clauses and abusive 
commercial practices’.45  
 
In 1997 the Technical Committee number 7 (CT 7) of the Mercosul proposed a Consumer 
Protection Protocol which intended to unify the consumer legislation of all Member States. 
The latter however rejected this Protocol for various reasons. Brazil’s opposition was 
based on the fact that the level of protection offered by this Protocol was inferior to the 
protection prescribed by the Brazilian Consumer Protection Code; whereas other Member 
States (e.g., Uruguay and Paraguay) considered the level of consumer protection given 
too high as compared to their domestic legislation, especially with regard to certain 
contractual protections such as the prohibition of abusive clauses.46 
 
                                                 
39 In addition to those five full members it has also five ‘associate members’: Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador 
and Peru. Venezuela signed a membership agreement in June 2006, but its entry was pending ratification by 
the Congress of Paraguay. The fact that Paraguay is currently suspended from the Mercosul on the basis of 
the ‘interruption of its democratic order’ (due to the summary impeachment of its President) allowed 
Venezuela to become a full member in July 2012. 
40 Edgard Oliveira Lopes, 'A Tutela Consumerista na União Européia e no Mercosul' <http://www.ambito-
juridico.com.br/site/index.php?n_link=revista_artigos_leitura&artigo_id=4109> accessed 08 August 2011, 3.  
41 See article 1 of the Treaty of Asunción. 
42 Charles Grant, 'Europe, Mercosul and Transatlantic Relations: A British Perspective' in H Jaguaribe and ÁD 
Vasconcelos (eds), The European Union, Mercosul and the New World Order (Frank Cass 2003) 50. 
‘MERCOSUR is arguably the most successful and ambitious example of regional integration in Latin America’. 
See Gian Luca Gardini, 'Mercosur: What you see is not (always) what you get' (2011) 17(5) ELJ 683, 684. 
43 See article 1 of the Treaty of Asunción. 
44 See <http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/mrcsrs/resolutions/indice.asp> accessed 25 September 2012. 
45 See items ‘b’, ‘i’ and ‘j’ of the Presidential Declaration of the Fundamental Consumers’ Rights of the 
Mercosul (15/12/2000). 
46 Klausner (n 38) 68-69. 
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Consequently although consumers are adequately protected in Brazil, they cannot find the 
same level of protection in cross-border transactions involving other members of the 
Mercosul. This leaves Mercosul one step behind the European Union as the EU has 
numerous directives which purport to ensure the same level of consumer protection 
within its internal market, as will be discussed in chapter 3.  
 
1.2. Methodology: comparative law 
 
Methodology ‘amounts to a systematic procedure that a scholar applies as part of an 
intellectual enterprise’,47 which in the case of the present study is the examination of what 
are the legislative controls on ‘unfairness’ in England and Brazil, the assessment of their 
unresolved issues and the evaluation of lessons that one legal system can learn from the 
other.  
 
As this work purports to compare rules and concepts of the English and Brazilian legal 
systems the most suitable methodology to achieve its goals is comparative law which can 
be defined as ‘the comparison of the different legal systems of the world’;48 hence in a 
comparative law research ‘the obvious method is comparison; i.e., juxtaposing, 
contrasting and comparing’.49 Sacco however noted that there is not only one method of 
comparison;50 thus legal scholars should employ the ‘method of investigation and analysis 
best suited’ to ‘achieve a goal or desire to understand something’.51 In other words, an 
appropriate and feasible method should be chosen to address the research questions of 
this particular investigation.52  
 
The first step in the comparison consists of the choice of suitable legal systems which 
shall take into account the aims of the specific comparative study.53 Although there is not 
an established criterion in the selection of the best system to be used in a comparative 
                                                 
47 Elizabeth Fisher and others, 'Maturity and Methodology: Starting a Debate about Environmental Law 
Scholarship' (2009) 21 JEL 213, 226. 
48 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Research (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 
2008) 2. According to De Cruz comparative law ‘describes the systematic study of particular legal traditions 
and legal rules on a comparative basis’. De Cruz (n 10) 3. 
49 A. Esin Örücü, 'Methodology of Comparative Law' in JM Smits (ed) Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law 
(Edward Elgar Publishing 2006) 446. 
50 Rodolfo Sacco, Introdução ao Direito Comparado (Revista dos Tribunais 2001) 33. 
51 David Feldman, 'The Nature of Legal Scholarship' (1989) 52 MLR 498, 502-503. 
52 According to Cryer, Hervey and Sokhi-Bulley ‘methodology’ guides our thinking or questioning and has a 
theoretical connotation; whereas ‘method’ is the actual way in which the research project is pursued. Robert 
Cryer, Tamara Hervey and Bal Sokhi-Bulley, Research Methodologies in EU and International Law (Hart 
Publishing 2011) 5. 
53 Örücü (n 49) 443. 
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analysis with one’s own system, some comparatists may argue that the Brazilian law is 
not be the most appropriate choice for a comparison. According to them the so-called 
‘mature legal systems’ should be preferred to the ‘affiliated’ ones, because the former 
often give origin to other systems and they are in a more advanced stage of development 
which implies more perfected ways of solving legal problems.54 Those ‘mature systems’ 
are also called ‘ordinary places’ and they usually include France, Germany and Italy to 
represent civil law jurisdictions; whereas common law jurisdictions are normally 
represented by England and the United States.55  
 
In line with the above classifications the Brazilian legal system shall be regarded as an 
‘affiliated’ or ‘extraordinary place’. Such ‘extraordinariness’ of the Brazilian law however 
should not be deemed as a disadvantage; on the contrary, it may actually enrich the 
present study. For instance Örücü suggested that ‘the future of comparative legal studies 
is tied both theoretically and practically to an appreciation of diversity. In fact, (...) the 
more “extraordinary” the place, the more important comparative legal studies become’.56 
The Brazilian legislation transposed rules and principles from European jurisdictions (e.g., 
Portugal, France and Germany) and adapted them to its own reality and characteristics 
(such as geographical conditions and population distribution).57 As a result the inclusion of 
this legal system in the present comparative analysis may provide distinct insights into 
how and why the legislative controls on unfairness were developed and applied in the way 
they are today in England and Brazil as ‘hidden understandings are uncovered when we 
try to find out why foreign legal rules, approaches and the like are different from ours.’58  
 
Following the choice of the relevant legal systems, comparatists should determine 
whether the comparison will be at macro or micro-level.59 The proposed research will be a 
micro-comparison limited to the analysis of a specific topic (legislative controls on 
unfairness) in certain types of contracts (B2B, B2C and small businesses contracts) as it 
                                                 
54 Zweigert and Kötz (n 48) 41. 
55 See A. Esin Örücü, 'Comparatists and Extraordinary Places' in P Legrand and R Munday (eds), Comparative 
Legal Studies: Traditions and Transitions (Cambridge University Press 2003) 468. 
56 Ibid. 470. See also Colin R. Baxter and Kingsley T.W. Ong, 'A Comparative Study of the Fundamental 
Elements of Chinese and English Company Law' (1999) 48(1) ICLQ 88, 89. 
57 David and Brierley, Major Legal Systems in the World Today: An Introduction to the Comparative Study of 
Law (n 16) 23-24. For instance the Brazilian Consumer Protection Code was influenced by EU Directives 
(84/450/EEC and 85/374/EEC), the French ‘Projet de Code de la Consommation’, the Portuguese Executive 
Order 446/85 and the German AGB Gesetz (1976). See Grinover and others (n 34) 7-8.  
58 Mark Warrington and Mark Van Hoecke, 'Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal Doctrine: Towards a 
New Model for Comparative Law' (1998) 47(3) ICLQ 495, 497. 
59 Macro-comparison ‘refers to the study of two or more entire legal systems’ whereas micro-comparison 
‘generally refers to the study of topics or aspects of two or more legal systems’. See De Cruz (n 10) 233. 
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would not be feasible to analyse all possible ways to control unfair terms in all types of 
contracts.  
 
Moreover the research problem could not possibly be analysed in the context of common 
law and civil law as a whole because, although they have certain characteristics which 
define them as distinct legal families, they were adopted by various countries throughout 
the globe which adapted them to their own needs and peculiarities. Consequently part of 
their rules and concepts may have some degree of variation between different 
jurisdictions, even if they are part of the same legal family. For this reason this work was 
circumscribed to the examination of the English and Brazilian legal systems which were 
used as examples of common law and civil law jurisdictions respectively. 
 
In the context of a micro-comparison ‘it has been widely argued that the true basis of 
comparative law is “functional equivalence”’.60 The latter is advocated by Zweigert and 
Kötz who contended that ‘in law the only things that are comparable are those which fulfil 
the same function’.61 In line with this approach the proposed work will involve the analysis 
of legal provisions (and relevant case law) in England and Brazil which perform an 
equivalent function of controlling the unfairness of contractual terms.62  
 
The identification of equivalents through their function may enable a more flexible 
comparison and prevent misleading results which could occur if the analysis was limited to 
terminologies.63 For instance the English expression ‘unfair terms’ has the same function 
and meaning as ‘abusive clauses’ in Brazil, whereas ‘good faith’ has broadly the same 
meaning in both countries but a different scope.64 
 
After determining the existence of the functional equivalence of relevant rules and 
concepts, the latter should be described and examined in the context of each legal system 
separately to prevent comparatists looking at them from only the point of view of their 
                                                 
60 Örücü, 'Methodology of Comparative Law' (n 49) 443. 
61 Zweigert and Kötz (n 48) 34. 
62 The research should prioritise primary sources hence secondary sources are only used to reinforce a certain 
interpretation, highlight apparent issues and suggest solutions. See Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui, 
Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh University Press 2007) 23. 
63 Örücü, 'Methodology of Comparative Law' (n 49) 448. 
64 In Brazil good faith is applicable to B2C and B2B contracts; whereas in England it is limited to consumer 
contracts. 
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own system.65 For this reason the examination of the relevant legislative controls and 
case law in England and Brazil will precede further comparison. 
 
At the comparative stage comparatists should identify the differences and similarities of 
the relevant legal systems concerning the concepts and rules under scrutiny. They should 
also endeavour to explain the reasons behind those divergences and resemblances (e.g., 
concepts with same roots).66 It is important to take into account the characteristics of the 
legal systems involved as they provide the context for the comparison and may assist with 
the understanding of those differences and similarities (e.g., lack of a general rule or 
acceptance of pre-contractual liability in English law versus ‘culpa in contrahendo’ in civil 
law). 
 
Finally comparatists should make a critical evaluation of the solutions offered by each 
legal system to the problem in question (e.g., ‘unfairness’ of terms) and they may 
conclude that solutions from one system are more, less or equally efficient in relation to 
another.67 They may recognise issues on those solutions and may also suggest an 
alternative one.68 Therefore the final part of the thesis will identify unresolved problems in 
the current legislation and suggest contributions that one system can make to the other.  
 
1.3. Unfair terms and exemption clauses 
 
The proposed work will revolve around the concepts of unfair terms and exemptions 
clauses; hence the need to define them in this preliminary chapter to avoid 
misunderstandings about their meaning in the context of this study. 
 
Unfairness is commonly opposed to the idea of justice or equality. Each legal system has 
its own sense of fairness that may vary according to the customs and beliefs of the local 
community. Rawls contended that the basic structure of a society is composed by 
principles of fairness or justice which ‘are the result of a fair agreement or bargain’ 
between moral individuals in a symmetrical position.69 According to Rawls the legislation 
of this society shall be made in accordance with this conception of justice that was agreed 
                                                 
65 See Zweigert and Kötz (n 48) 43. 
66 Örücü, 'Methodology of Comparative Law' (n 49) 449. 
67 Zweigert and Kötz (n 48) 46-47. 
68 ‘Looking at foreign law can bring a deeper understanding of problems they face - perhaps even unexpected 
ideas for solving them’. See Basil S. Markesinis, 'Comparative law - A Subject in Search of an Audience' (1990) 
53(1) MLR 1, 21. 
69 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition (Belknap Press 1999) 10-13. 
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upon and a scheme of cooperation shall benefit all members of the society, in particular 
the ‘least advantaged’.70  
 
In the context of contracts there are two types of ‘unfairness’ or ‘fairness’: procedural and 
substantive. This dichotomy is based on the ideas of Professor Leff who made the 
distinction between the unfairness that occurs in the ‘process of contracting’ (procedural) 
and the unfairness of the content of contracts (substantive).71 In other words, whereas 
procedural unfairness ‘focuses on issues such as fraud and duress’ and ‘is concerned with 
the fairness of the contracting process’, substantive unfairness ‘is concerned with the 
fairness of the outcome of that process’.72 Discussions involving fairness in contracts will 
often make reference to this dichotomy.73 
 
As fairness and unfairness are vague concepts, each jurisdiction will define them 
according to the purpose of the statute in which they are employed. In Brazil unfair terms 
are known as abusive clauses. They can be defined ‘as those clauses which are notably 
unfavourable to the weaker party (e.g., consumer) in a contractual relationship’.74 Those 
clauses are inconsistent with good faith and equity as they allow the party economically 
dominant to exploit the vulnerable party.75 
 
In England a term which has not been individually negotiated is considered ‘unfair’ if it is 
contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ 
rights and obligations arising under the contract to the detriment of the consumer’.76 
There are discussions on whether ‘good faith’ and ‘significant imbalance’ in the context of 
this provision can be regarded as a substantial or a procedural requirement or both.77  
 
                                                 
70 Ibid. 
71 Arthur Allen Leff, 'Unconscionability and the Code – The Emperor’s New Clause' (1967) 115 U Pa L Rev 485, 
487. 
72 Stephen A. Smith, 'In Defence of Substantive Fairness' (1996) 112(Jan) LQR 138, 140. 
73 For instance, Trebilcock made reference to this dichotomy whilst examining the basis for the decision in 
Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd. v Macaulay (Formerly Instone) [1974] 1 WLR 1308. See Michael J. 
Trebilcock, 'The Doctrine of Inequality of Bargaining Power: Post-Benthamite Economics in the House of 
Lords' (1976) 26 U. Toronto L.J. 359, 369-384. 
74 Grinover and others (n 34) 570. 
75 Vidal Serrano Nunes Júnior and Yolanda A. P. S. De Matos, Código de Defesa do Consumidor Interpretado 
(4th edn, Saraiva 2009) 231. 
76 See reg. 5(1) of the UTCCR 1999. Such definition will be analysed in more detail in chapter 3. 
77 R Brownsword, G Howells and T Wilhelmsson, 'Between Market and Welfare: Some Reflections on Article 3 
of the EC Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts' in C Willett (ed) Aspects of Good Faith (Blackstone 
1995) 30. See also chapter 3 for further details. 
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The protection of the weak party against the abuse of the unequal bargaining power is 
also the basis of the doctrine of unconscionability which allows English courts to protect 
parties from procedural unfairness through the application of concepts such as duress, 
undue influence and misrepresentation (they are however outside the scope of the 
present study).78 
 
Exemption clauses may be also regarded as unfair if they were included in a contract 
where parties had no equal bargaining strength. They are defined as terms which purport 
to exclude or limit liability and may ‘undermine or totally defeat the innocent’s party’s 
expectations by depriving him of compensation for loss caused by the other party’s 
breach’.79 Consequently they are subject to legislative control and can be rendered 
unenforceable by UCTA and UTCCR 1999 even if they were incorporated as a term and 
covered the loss in question, as will be seen in chapters 2 and 3. This control is also 
justified by the fact that ‘rights and duties under a contract cannot be considered evenly 
balanced unless both parties are equally bound by their obligations’ according to the 
Office of Fair Trading.80 
 
1.4. Good faith 
 
This work will also make recurrent references to good faith. Brownsword suggested that 
this concept can be considered an eminently appropriate topic for a comparative study 
because it ‘takes us right to the heart of contract law’ as it tackles the ethics that govern 
the way that contracting parties ‘should relate to one another’.81 Indeed in the context of 
this work good faith will underline fundamental differences between the Brazilian and 
English law. 
 
Good faith is an ‘elusive’ concept to define as it can assume various meanings in different 
legal systems and types of contracts;82 thus ‘juristic views on and the legal 
conceptualization of the idea of good faith may often vary across the cultural divides and 
                                                 
78 Jill Poole, Textbook on Contract Law (11th edn, Oxford University Press 2012) 574-578. 
79 Chen-Wishart (n 3) 448. 
80 Office of Fair Trading, Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (September 2008) 13-14. 
81 Roger Brownsword, 'Individualism, Cooperativism and an Ethic for European Contract Law' (2001) 64(4) 
MLR 628, 630. 
82 Pedro Barasnevicius Quagliato, 'The Duty to Negotiate in Good Faith' (2008) 50(5) International Journal of 
Law and Management 213, 215. Cordero-Moss observed that ‘there is no uniform notion of good faith and fair 
dealing that might be valid for all types of contracts on an international level’. See Giuditta Cordero-Moss, 
'International Contracts between Common Law and Civil Law: is Non-state Law to be Preferred? The Difficulty 
of Interpreting Legal Standards Such as Good Faith' (2007) Global Jurist (Advances) 1, 30. 
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legal traditions’.83 Nonetheless, it is generally linked to the idea of honesty, loyalty and 
trust.84 This concept was originated in Roman law as bona fides and since then it has 
been incorporated in various legal systems.85  
 
In the context of contract law, good faith is applied in two different senses: subjective 
and objective.86 The subjective good faith can be described as ‘a requirement of morality 
in its intentional or psychological aspect’ to act in an honest and fair manner.87 It is based 
on the belief or will of a party to behave in conformity with the law even when the 
assumption is mistaken.88 For instance, a person may act in subjective good faith if he 
believes that his behaviour is legal and moral and he is unaware that he may be harming 
other people’s rights.89  
 
There are however objections to this subjective conception of good faith due to the 
difficulties in verifying the true intentions of the party. Additionally ‘a moral interpretation 
of good faith may be open to criticism because prescribed outcomes are implausible or 
uncertain’.90  
 
Consequently the objective good faith is arguably more in line with the need of 
predictability and certainty of contracts as it is the behaviour of a person and other 
external aspects that are evaluated, independently of his opinion or psychological 
aspects.91 It is described as a social archetype or legal standard that each person should 
                                                 
83 Lorena Carvajal-Arenas and A F M Maniruzzaman, 'Cooperation as Philosophical Foundation of Good Faith in 
International Business-Contracting: A View Through the Prism of Transnational Law' 
<http://ouclf.iuscomp.org/articles/carjaval_maniruzzaman.shtml> accessed 05 July 2012. 
84 A duty of good faith ‘will generally embrace: (1) a duty to act honestly and (2) a duty to have regard to the 
legitimate interests of the other party’. See Michael Furmston, Takao Norisada and Jill Poole, Contract 
Formation and Letters of Intent: A Comparative Assessment (John Wiley & Sons 1998) 274. 
85 ‘Good faith’ comes from the Latin fides which means: trust; promise of safe conduct; fulfilment of a 
promise; certainty, the true meaning. See P. G. W. Glare, Oxford Latin Dictionary (Oxford University Press 
1982) 697-698. Bona fides in its turn means: honesty, honour; to observe one’s obligations, sincerity; sense 
of duty towards others, loyalty, allegiance, to remain loyal. See Michiel De Vaan, Etymological Dictionary of 
Latin: And the Other Italic Languages (Leiden Indo-European Etymological Dictionary Series, Brill 2008) 218. 
86 The distinction between objective (‘Treu und Glauben’) and subjective (‘Gutter Glauben’) good faith can be 
found in the German Civil Code (BGB of 1900). Powell observed that English contract law has cases that 
contain elements of subjective or objective good faith but there is no overriding requirement of good faith. 
Raphael Powell, 'Good Faith in Contracts' (1956) 9 CLP 16, 23-24. See also Roger Brownsword, 'Good Faith in 
Contracts Revisited' (1996) 49 CLP 111, 116. 
87 Francois Diesse, 'The Requirement of Contractual Co-operation in International Trade' (1999) 7 IBLJ 737, 
763. 
88 Miguel Reale, 'A Boa-Fé no Código Civil' <http://www.miguelreale.com.br/index.html> accessed 30 
December 2010. 
89 Edilson Pereira Nobre Júnior, 'O Princípio da Boa-Fé e o Novo Código Civil' (2003) Rio de Janeiro, maio/jun, 
v. 99, f. 367 Revista Forense 69, 74. 
90 Brownsword, 'Good Faith in Contracts Revisited' (n 86) 143-144. 
91 José Roberto Castro Neves, 'Boa-fé Objetiva: Posição Atual no Ordenamento Jurídico e Perspectivas de sua 
Aplicação nas Relações Contratuais' (2000) Rio de Janeiro, jul./set, v. 96, f. 351 Revista Forense 161, 161. 
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fit in order to act with honesty, probity and loyalty.92 Therefore the objective good faith as 
a model of conduct is preferable to the subjective one because it can be objectively 
assessed by courts and parties; hence it is the one adopted by the English and Brazilian 
law. It requires negative and positive behaviours as parties should refrain from acting 
dishonestly; at the same time that they should act cooperatively in order to achieve the 
objective of the contract.93 
 
1.4.1. Good faith in negotiation, performance and enforcement 
 
Another fundamental classification involving good faith is based on the contractual stage 
in which this concept is applied: negotiation, performance or enforcement. Such 
application may vary significantly among distinct legal systems.94 
 
For instance English law does not recognise a general duty to negotiate in good faith.95 
According to common law there should not be the imposition of liability before parties are 
actually bound by a contract even if one party acts in bad faith during the bargaining 
process. 
 
On the other hand, good faith performance was incorporated into English law through the 
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999. Similarly the American law 
expressly prescribes the duty of good faith at performance and enforcement stage.96 
According to this duty parties have to behave with loyalty towards a common purpose 
that was agreed between them in order to not frustrate the legitimate expectations of the 
other party. Additionally a duty of good faith at the enforcement stage may be applicable 
to prevent the ‘innocent party’ from withdrawing in bad faith from a contract when the 
other party performs defectively.97  
                                                 
92 Reale (n 88). 
93 Renata Domingues Barbosa Balbino, 'O Princípio da Boa-Fé Objetiva no Novo Código Civil' (2002) São 
Paulo, v. 22, f. 68 Revista do Advogado 111, 114. 
94 John Carter and Michael P. Furmston, 'Good Faith and Fairness in the Negotiation of Contracts Part I' 
(1994) 8 JCL 1, 4. 
95 In principle, ‘there is no general rule in Common Law requiring the parties to negotiate in good faith’. See 
Quagliato (n 82) 217. 
96 In the words of the Uniform Commercial Code § 1-203 ‘every contract or duty within this Act imposes an 
obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement’. § 1-201 (19) ‘good faith’ means ‘honesty in fact in 
the conduct or transaction concerned’. Similarly the Restatement (Second) of Contracts prescribes in its §205 
that ‘every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its 
enforcement’. 
97 In Arcos Ltd v EA Ronaasen & Son [1933] AC 470 (HL) it was discussed whether a party could reject goods 
because they did not conform to the description in the contract even though they were still merchantable. If 
the rejection was made not because the goods were not fit for their original purpose but because the buyer 
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By comparison, in Brazil the principle of good faith is regarded as the ‘maximum paradigm 
for protection in contractual relationships’98 and it can be applied at all contractual stages 
(negotiation, performance and enforcement). In this jurisdiction a party has to exercise 
his rights within the limits imposed by such general clause, thus good faith must be 
consistently observed.99  
 
Therefore as is the case in most civil law jurisdictions, Brazil recognises an obligation of 
good faith in negotiations that ‘generally provides a remedy for a wrongful conduct 
produced by a bad faith act’ through the application of the culpa in contrahendo 
doctrine.100 On the other hand, the principle of good faith in the performance of the 
contract is expressly prescribed by the Civil Code.101 
 
The application of good faith at the enforcement stage in its turn can be inferred from the 
interpretation of the principles of contractual balance and trust that are prescribed by the 
Consumer Protection Code.102 They provide some leeway to judges decide on the fairness 
of parties’ relationships and whether the enforcement has been in accordance to parties’ 
reasonable expectations.103  
 
1.4.2. Common roots of good faith 
 
The civil law tradition had its origin in Roman law and it was in the latter that the concept 
of good faith as a model of conduct was established.104 Therefore when the civilian 
system was disseminated to countries of Continental Western Europe and later to their 
colonies throughout the world, so did its fundamental concepts.105 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
wanted to get a better deal due to changes in the market; then the supplier should be entitled to some 
protection to his reasonable expectations (although this was not the understanding of the House of Lords in 
that case). 
98 Alinne Arquette Leite Novais, 'O Princípio da Boa-Fé e a Execução Contratual' (2001) São Paulo, dez, v. 90, 
f. 794 Revista dos Tribunais 56, 71. 
99 Article 187 of the Civil Code. 
100 Quagliato (n 82) 213. 
101 Article 422 of the Civil Code. 
102 See article 4, III of the Consumer Protection Code. In addition article 42 and sole paragraph of the same 
Code provides another example of good faith enforcement when it determines that in the collection of debts, 
the debtor shall not be exposed to ridicule, nor subjected to any constraint or threat. If the creditor charges 
the consumer a debt that he does not own he will be behaving in bad faith. 
103 Novais (n 98) 71-73. See also chapter 3 for good faith at post-contractual stage. 
104 Neves (n 91) 161. 
105 According to David, civil law is a subgroup of the Western law which was developed from the Roman law. 
See David, Major Legal Systems in the World Today (n 17) 35. 
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As a former Portuguese colony, Brazil had its legal foundation based on European law, 
which continues to influence its legislative development until the present time. As a 
consequence Brazilian law contains various concepts and principles inherited from Roman 
law and from the legislation of European countries (e.g., good faith was derived from the 
German law).106  
 
On the other hand, the development of the English law started during the Anglo-Norman 
period (1066 AC) and since then it has been shaped by historical events and local 
customs of this country which resulted in an autonomous legal system called common 
law.107 The latter has spread across most English-speaking countries and members of the 
Commonwealth.108  
 
However, since the UK became a member of the European Union, the English law has 
been influenced by the EU law, which in its turn has been greatly influenced by civil law 
which is the legal system adopted by the vast majority of its Members States. For 
instance, the Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts (93/13/EEC) adopted the 
concept of good faith as a result of the influence exerted by the EU civilian jurisdictions, 
notably the German law.109 Youngs remarked that this directive is ‘an interesting example 
of European law forming a bridge by which an area of law from one system (the concept 
of good faith under §242 of the BGB (...)) becomes part of others’.110 Nevertheless the 
incorporation of this concept in England has not been as straightforward as in most EU 
Member States.  
 
Therefore it is possible to conclude that the concept of good faith applied in both England 
and Brazil has its roots in German law (which was inspired by Roman law).111 For this 
                                                 
106 See Grinover and others (n 34) 535-536 and 570. 
107 See Zweigert and Kötz (n 48) 181-182. Despite the fact that England was under the control of the Romans 
for about four centuries in the past (43 AD - 410 AD) this country did not incorporated the Roman law, but 
instead it developed its own legal system over the next centuries. 
108 David, Major Legal Systems in the World Today (n 17) 351. 
109 The Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts (93/13/EEC) was greatly influenced by the German 
Standard Contract Terms Act (AGB-Gesetz). Although this statute was repealed and replaced by §§ 305 et 
seq. of the German Civil Code (BGB) in 2002, the latter maintained the application of good faith in the context 
of pre-formulated standard contracts. See Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Contracts (Law Com CP No 166, 
2002) para 3.60.  
110 Raymond Youngs, English, French and German Comparative Law (2nd edn, Routledge-Cavendish 2007) 
622-623. 
111 See chapter 3. According to Collins one of the approaches ‘towards interpretation of the Directive could 
draw upon the traditional conceptions of good faith in contract law in civil law systems, particularly from 
German law, but ultimately from the Roman Law roots’. See Hugh Collins, 'Good Faith in European Contract 
Law' (1994) 14(2) OJLS 229, 250. 
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reason, a comparative study of the application of ‘good faith’ in the Brazilian law may 
assist a greater understanding of its meaning and scope in English law. 
 
1.5. Background and underpinning theories 
 
The understanding of why and how the regimes that govern B2B and B2C contracts were 
developed in the present way will require the examination of their underpinning contract 
law theories as well as of the social and economic background which influenced such 
development.  
 
The law of contract reflects the prevailing ‘politico-economic philosophy’ and values of a 
particular society in a certain time.112 ‘Law is embedded within society, and society oozes 
into law through every pore’.113 Consequently social changes (e.g., industrialisation) have 
shaped the development of contract law which has moved from a classical model to a 
modern approach. 
 
The classical contract theory was developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
when the individualist philosophy of laissez faire prevailed.114 At the heart of this theory 
were the freedom of contract and the adversarial ethic according to which parties have 
the autonomy to negotiate terms in conformity with their will and the pursuance of their 
self-interest. Contractual parties were assumed to have equal or equivalent bargaining 
strength and the capability to protect their own interests. In this context courts should not 
influence or adjust terms agreed by parties even if they were unfair. However they were 
supposed to enforce those terms according to parties’ intentions115 as well as to prevent 
procedural unfairness (e.g. fraud, undue influence) that could interfere with the 
voluntariness of consent.116 
 
A number of countries with industrialised economies, including England and Brazil, had 
this approach in relation to contracts changed significantly with the major economic 
                                                 
112 Poole, Textbook on Contract Law (n 78) 3. 
113 Brian Z. Tamanaha, Beyond the Formalist-Realist Divide: The Role of Politics in Judging (Princeton 
University Press 2009). 
114 According to Friedman the doctrine of the laissez faire means that ‘interference of government in business 
and economic affairs should be minimal. Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations (1776) described laissez-faire 
economics in terms of an INVISIBLE HAND that would provide for the maximum good for all, if businessmen 
were free to pursue profitable opportunities as they saw them’. See Jack P. Friedman, Dictionary of Business 
Terms (3rd edn, Barron's Educational Series, Inc. 2000) 372. 
115 Patrick S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Clarendon Press 1979) 681. See also The 
Moorcock (1889) 14 PD 64 (CA), 70. 
116  Hugh Collins, The Law of Contract (4th edn, Butterworths 2003) 271. 
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transformations caused by the development of the modern mass production and the 
consumption in large scale. In order to offer products and services to an indeterminate 
number of people, suppliers started to make use of standard form contracts as individual 
agreements became impractical.117 Although those ‘contracts of adhesion’ are not 
pernicious per se, they have facilitated the inclusion of exemption clauses and unfair 
terms.118 They have also aggravated the inequality of bargaining power between parties 
because the dominant party often draft terms in advance and do not leave room for 
negotiation.119 Moreover in some trades the standard form contracts of most sellers and 
suppliers show little variation among them, thus the options available to the weak party 
are very limited and their freedom of choice is merely apparent.120 
 
In the twentieth century those imbalances led to the recognition of the need of a more 
interventionist approach in bargains to prevent unfairness and abuses in contracts where 
one party is vulnerable in relation to the other.121 The classical contract law became 
inadequate to regulate relationships in which parties do not share equal resources, 
because in the absence of economic equality the freedom of contract ‘can be merely the 
recipe for exploitation and injustice’.122  
 
Consequently the classical principle that terms of contracts are determined by parties and 
only they can modify or suppress such terms is now limited by legislation.123 The classical 
                                                 
117 This standardisation is ‘an unavoidable result of the economic relations because it works as a decisive 
factor of the rationalisation and economy of the business activity and enable the celerity, security and stability 
of the market relations’. See Rosalice Fidalgo Pinheiro, 'Boa-fé e Equilíbrio na Interpretação dos Contratos de 
Consumo' (2007) Rio de Janeiro, mar./abr, v. 103, f. 390 Revista Forense 161, 163 
118 ‘Standard form contracts’ are also known as ‘contracts of adhesion’ because they are unilaterally 
determined by one of the parties and there is no room for negotiation; therefore in order to conclude the 
contract the other party has to adhere to the imposed terms. See Grinover and others (n 34) 528-529. 
119 Inequality of bargaining power is defined by Beale as ‘ignorance, vulnerability to persuasion, desperate 
need, lack of bargaining skill or simple lack of influence in the market place’. Hugh Beale, 'Inequality of 
Bargaining Power' (1986) 6(1) OJLS 123, 125. 
120 Paolisa Nebbia, 'Standard Form Contracts between Unfair Terms Control and Competition Law' (2006) 31 
EL Rev 102, 103. Lord Diplock observed in Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd. v Macaulay (Formerly Instone) 
[1974] 1 WLR 1308 , 1316 that as a ‘result of the concentration of particular kinds of business in relatively 
few hands’ the stronger party may include harsh terms in standard form contracts leaving the weak party with 
the limited option of ‘take it or leave it’. 
121 ‘(...) Freedom of contract is no longer the sole paradigm of Contract Law. In the 20th century, it has 
gained the company of an opposing paradigm, that of protecting the weak party’. See Ewoud Hondius, 'The 
Protection of the Weaker Party in a Harmonised European Contract Law: A Synthesis' (2004) 27(3) JCP 245, 
246. This prompted the enactment of legislative acts such as the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (as amended) 
and the UCTA 1977. In Brazil its Civil Code provides general rules applied to civil and business contracts that 
impose limits to the freedom of contract in order to avoid unfairness. Moreover, the Consumer Protection 
Code contains provisions against ‘abusive clauses’. At European level, the EU issued directives (e.g., Directive 
on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts and Doorstep Selling Directive) that aimed to protect consumers 
within the common market through the use of minimum harmonisation clauses. 
122 Koffman and Macdonald (n 1) 5. 
123 Orlando Gomes, Contratos (18th edn, Forense 1998) 22-25. 
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theory was superseded by a collective theory of contract according to which the will of the 
parties is no longer the main source of judicial interpretation.124 Courts should take into 
account the social interests and collective values involved as well as the reasonable 
expectations of the parties, especially of the weaker party.125 
 
Furthermore ideas such as inequality of bargaining power, reasonableness, 
unconscionability and good faith have been introduced to give effect to a more 
interventionist approach in the modern law of contract. It does not mean that the latter 
has rejected the freedom of contract and other classical principles altogether. They are 
still in place where parties have equivalent bargaining power, thus they are applicable to 
B2B contracts where parties are able to negotiate terms. Courts will only intervene in the 
absence of such balance between business parties as in Motours Ltd v Euroball (West 
Kent) Ltd126 where non-negotiated terms were imposed by a dominating business in a 
standard form contract. Such imbalance often can be found in small businesses contracts 
because SMEs are usually weaker in the face of large businesses. 
 
A more recent theory advocated by Adams and Brownsword incorporated the previous 
theories and proposed a framework to be used by interpreters of contract law.127 Such 
framework can be efficiently applied to explain the different approaches employed in the 
context of B2C and B2B contracts;128 thus the present work will make constant references 
to this theory in order to illustrate the distinctions between those types of contracts. 
 
According to this framework there are two competing judicial ideologies, Formalism and 
Realism, that reflect the different attitudes of judges towards the application of the so-
called ‘rule book’.129 Formalists apply the rule-book material without questioning it even if 
                                                 
124 See Poole, Textbook on Contract Law (n 78) 8-9. 
125 Claudia Lima Marques, 'Notas sobre o Sistema de Proibição de Cláusulas Abusivas no Código Brasileiro de 
Defesa Do Consumidor: Entre a Tradicional Permeabilidade da Ordem Jurídica e o Futuro Pós-Moderno do 
Direito Comparado' (2000) Porto Alegre, fev, v. 47, f. 268 Revista Jurídica 39, 60. According to this collective 
theory the expectations of a party reasonably held should be protected irrespectively of the other party’s will. 
See Johan Steyn, 'Contract Law: Fulfilling the Reasonable Expectations of Honest Men' (1997) 113 LQR 433, 
442. 
126 [2003] EWHC 614 (QB), [2003] All ER (D) 165. 
127 Roger Brownsword and John N. Adams, 'The Ideologies of Contract' (1987) 7 LS 205, 205. See also Roger 
Brownsword, Contract Law: Themes for the Twenty-first Century (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2006) and 
Roger Brownsword and John N. Adams, Understanding Contract Law (5th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2007).  
128 It can also explain some differences between civil law (more formalist) and common law (more realist). 
129 ‘Rule book’ is a general term that refers to the traditional texts considered collectively that equates the 
study of law to the study of legal terms (‘black-letter approach’). See Brownsword and Adams, Understanding 
Contract Law (n 127) 3-4. Brownsword and Adams, 'The Ideologies of Contract' (n 127) 213. 
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the result is inadequate or unfair;130 whereas realists consider the fairness of the result 
more important than the simple application of the rule-book.131 
 
It is possible to argue that the Brazilian law tends to adopt a more formalist approach 
because civilian jurisdictions normally consider their respective legal systems complete 
and comprehensive;132 thus judges are in principle limited to the application of the 
legislator’s will and should not make new law.133 This is in line with the ‘principle of 
separation of powers’ that prescribes that the Legislative, Executive and Judicial powers 
are independent and harmonious; consequently each power should be limited to its own 
function.134 Nonetheless the Brazilian legislation prescribes general clauses (e.g., good 
faith) that mitigate such formalism and allows some flexibility to judges to make decisions 
according to their understanding of fairness in individual cases. 
 
By comparison in England ‘most modern judges tend to adopt a realist approach’135 and 
courts may apply equity when the application of rules leads to an unsatisfactory or harsh 
decision. Atiyah argued that there is a willingness of courts to pursue an individualised 
justice which may favour judicial discretion over legal rules,136 but Tamanaha observed 
that this discretion is still delimited by law.137  
 
Such realist approach is underpinned by the following contractual ideologies: consumer-
welfarism and market-individualism. The consumer-welfarism ideology is more 
                                                 
130 In Butler Machine Tool Co v Ex-cell-o Corp (England) [1979] 1 WLR 401 , 405 Lawton LJ maintained in a 
discussion concerning the ‘battle of the forms’ that ‘in my judgment, the battle has to be conducted in 
accordance with set rules’. 
131 According to Devlin LJ ‘the true spirit of the common law is to override theoretical distinctions when they 
stand in the way of doing practical justice.’ See Ingram v Little [1961] 1 QB 31 (CA), 73. 
132 David, Major Legal Systems in the World Today (n 17) 111-112. 
133 Tamanaha observed that formalists jurists ‘believed that the law was comprehensive and logically ordered, 
and in new situations judges did not make law (even when declaring new rules) but merely discovered and 
applied preexisting law.’ See Tamanaha (n 113) 13. Similarly Reeves added that ‘it is not the court's place in 
the system of governance to develop the standards and policies that are to guide a state's behavior’. Anthony 
R. Reeves, 'Do Judges have an Obligation to Enforce the Law? Moral Responsibility and Judicial Reasoning' 
(2010) 29(2) Law & Phil 159, 165. 
134 The separation of powers is expressly prescribed by article 2 of the Brazilian Federal Constitution. 
Nevertheless the latter adopted the American doctrine of ‘check and balances’ according to which the 
independence of the powers is not absolute and there is a mutual interference among them that aim to 
control the exercise of their functions in order to prevent abuses and arbitrariness. See Alexandre Moraes, 
Direito Constitucional (13th edn, Atlas 2003) 187. 
135 Poole, Textbook on Contract Law (n 78) 10. 
136 Atiyah observed that many decisions made in the early 19th century may appear unjust because courts 
applied general rules to different situations irrespectively of their adequacy to the facts. See Patrick S. Atiyah, 
'From Principles to Pragmatism: Changes in the Function of the Judicial Process and the Law' (1980) 65 Iowa 
L Rev 1249, 1252-1255. 
137 This is what Tamanaha calls balanced realism because ‘skeptical realism promotes the equally unrealistic 
opposite image of human judges pursuing their personal preferences’. See Tamanaha (n 113) 194-195. 
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interventionist and prevails in the context of consumer contracts. According to this 
approach B2C contracts should be closely regulated to protect consumers from being 
exploited by a stronger party (seller or supplier) as a result of the inequality of bargaining 
power. In line with this ideology, unjust enrichment and bad faith are not tolerated 
whereas the protection of the reasonable expectations of the parties should be 
observed.138 Overall consumer-welfarism is more flexible than the market-individualism 
and promotes the application of the principles of reasonableness and fairness that can be 
found in UCTA and the UTCCR 1999 respectively. 
 
The market-individualism in its turn is the prevailing ideology in the context of B2B 
contracts. According to it the main purpose of a contract is to facilitate ‘competitive 
exchange’; thus commercial practice should be taken into account and restrictions should 
be minimal and clearly defined.139 Furthermore while on one hand parties are free to 
choose their partners and terms, on the other hand they should be held to their bargains 
(principles of freedom of contract and ‘sanctity of contracts’).140 In other words, as long 
as agreements are freely negotiated, courts can legally enforce them for the sake of the 
stability of the market. However apart from enforcing agreed terms, judicial interferences 
should be kept to a minimum and courts should give effect to the intentions of the 
parties.  
 
There are two types of market-individualism: ‘static’ and ‘dynamic’. The static market-
individualism is underpinned by an individualist ethic which is based on the idea that one 
party can pursue his own interests in disregard of the other party’s interests and there are 
hardly any excuses for the non-performance.141 The restrictions imposed on parties are 
limited to the prohibition of fraud and coercion that can undermine the reality of consent 
and affect the freedom of contract.142 
 
It is in line with the classical model, thus the function of contract law is to provide a 
framework where parties can freely agree their exchanges and maximise their individual 
utility. The adversarial ethic is still present in the English contract law especially in 
contracts between businesses parties and it was used as argument in Walford v Miles143 
                                                 
138 Brownsword and Adams, 'The Ideologies of Contract' (n 127) 210-213. 
139 Ibid. 206-210. 
140 Brownsword, Contract Law: Themes for the Twenty-first Century (n 127) 50-53. 
141 Ibid. 139. 
142 Ibid. 143. 
143 [1992] 2 AC 128. 
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for the rejection of the application of a duty to negotiate in good faith in a B2B 
contract.144 In the Brazilian law however this individualist ethic is mitigated by the 
application of the principles of the social function of the contracts and good faith which 
are applicable to contracts in general.145 
 
Additionally according to the static market-individualism the main function of the law of 
contract is to establish ‘ground rules’ to the market operation ‘in such a way that all those 
who deal in the contract-constituted market place know exactly where they stand’.146 It 
therefore promotes certainty in agreements, which is essential to B2B contracts where 
parties can freely negotiate terms in relatively equal conditions; hence it can still be found 
in English law in such a case.147  
 
Nevertheless the application of the static market-individualism approach may have harsh 
results. For instance courts may have to employ a literal interpretation of the terms which 
may not reflect the reasonable expectations of the parties according to the circumstances. 
Consequently a more flexible approach adopted by the dynamic market-individualism may 
adapt better to ‘the practice and expectations of the contracting community’ that are 
susceptible to constant changes.148 Case law has shown that courts have made decisions 
that are more consistent with the dynamic market-individualism than the static,149 such as 
in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society (No.1)150 and 
Mannai Investment Co Ltd v Eagle Star Life Assurance Co Ltd151 where the House of Lords 
                                                 
144 ‘The concept of a duty to carry on negotiations in good faith is inherently repugnant to the adversarial 
position of the parties when involved in negotiations’. Walford v Miles [1992] 2 AC 128 138. 
145 See article 421 of the Civil Code. 
146 The ground rules are: a) contract comes into existence when terms were fully specified and freely agreed 
upon; b) only parties can be benefited/ burdened by its terms; c) the innocent party’s expectation of 
performance is protected in case of breach. See Brownsword, Contract Law: Themes for the Twenty-first 
Century (n 127) 139. 
147 Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] AC 827 (HL). 
148 Brownsword, Contract Law: Themes for the Twenty-first Century (n 127) 138. 
149 In Blackpool and Fylde Aero Club v Blackpool BC [1990] 1 WLR 1195 (CA) the Court of Appeal offered 
some protection to the plaintiff before the conclusion of a contract. In Darlington Borough Council v Wiltshier 
Northern Ltd [1995] 1 WLR 68 the same court accepted that third parties may recover damages in some 
situations. 
150 Jill Poole, Casebook on Contract Law (11th edn, Oxford University Press 2012) 237-238. The contextual 
interpretation ascertains ‘the meaning which the document would convey to a reasonable person having all 
the background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the parties in the situation in 
which they were at the time of the contract’. See Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich 
Building Society (No.1) [1998] 1 WLR 896 , 912. 
151 [1997] AC 749, [1997] 2 WLR 945. 
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interpreted the words of the contract ‘in a way that a reasonable commercial person 
would construe them’.152  
 
Dynamic market-individualism therefore is in line with a more cooperativist ethic 
according to which parties are expected to take into account the other party’s interests 
and to share unforeseen risks.153 There are limits to the pursuit of self-interest and parties 
are expected to act in accordance with good faith and fair dealing.154 This approach can 
be expressly found in European initiatives such as Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts (PICC),155 Principles of European Contract Law (PECL),156 Draft of Common 
Frame of Reference (DCFR)157 and more recently in the Common European Sales Law 
(CESL).158159  
 
Brownsword suggested that the replacement of the classical adversarial ethic by an ethic 
of cooperation, through the adoption of a good faith regime, would allow the protection of 
contractors at all stages of the contracting process against exploitation and 
opportunism.160 For this reason English law may benefit from the adoption of a general 
principle of good faith as a way to prevent unfairness in contracts including at the 
negotiation stage. The Brazilian law may serve as a good example of a legal system which 
has successfully applied this overriding principle in B2B and B2C contracts. 
 
It is possible to argue that this cooperativist ethic of the dynamic market-individualism 
may have approximated the approach adopted in the context of B2B contracts with the 
approach applied in B2C contracts (consumer-welfarism) as both reject bad faith and the 
individualist ethic. Consequently both types of contracts may have an inclination to 
                                                 
152 See Mannai Investment Co Ltd v Eagle Star Life Assurance Co Ltd [1997] AC 749, [1997] 2 WLR 945 , 771. 
Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (In Liquidation) v Ali (No.1) [2001] UKHL 8, [2002] 1 AC 251, 
[2001] 2 WLR 735 also adopted a contextual interpretation. 
153 Brownsword, Contract Law: Themes for the Twenty-first Century (n 127) 67. 
154 Ibid. 143.  
155 See article 1.7 of PICC. 
156 See articles 1:102, 1:201, 1:305, 2:301, 4:110 of PECL. The application of such cooperativist ethic has 
been expressly prescribed in article 1:202 which says ‘each party owes to the other a duty to co-operate in 
order to give full effect to the contract’.  
157 See articles I. – 1:103, II. – 1:102 of the DCFR. 
158 See articles 2(b) 83 and 86 of the CESL. 
159 These Principles do not have the binding force of either national law or international treaties or 
conventions (they are so-called ‘soft law’). See Cristiano Pettinelli, 'Good Faith in Contract Law: Two Paths, 
Two Systems, The Need for Harmonisation' <http://www.diritto.it/docs/20772-good-faith-in-contract-law-two-
paths-two-systems-the-need-for-harmonisation> accessed 15 February 2012. 
160 See Brownsword, 'Good Faith in Contracts Revisited' (n 86) 113-139 and Roger Brownsword, 'Two 
Concepts of Good Faith' (1994) 7 JCL 197. Collins agreed that ‘the law must impose certain duties of co-
operation in the formation and performance of contracts, which reflect the need to secure reliable and 
worthwhile opportunities for market exchanges’. See Collins, The Law of Contract (n 116) 33. 
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protect the reasonable expectations of the parties and to promote a more balanced 
relationship between them. The principle of good faith therefore may be an effective tool 
to achieve such purposes in the Brazilian and English legal systems. 
 
1.6. Structure of the thesis 
 
The thesis consists on seven chapters. The aim of this introductory chapter is to 
contextualise the study starting with an overview of the two legal systems involved and 
the definition of concepts which are fundamental to the topic under analysis (unfair 
terms, exemption clauses and good faith). It also describes the elected methodology 
(comparative law) which will guide the research as well as the theories which underpin 
the study. 
 
The second chapter exams the legislative controls on unfairness in the context of business 
contracts in the English and Brazilian legal systems. It analyses the relevant legislation in 
both legal systems separately and then comparatively. In general those contracts are still 
consistent with the classical law of contract where there is the prevalence of the freedom 
of contract and the adversarial ethic. 
 
It moves on to the same analysis in chapter 3 but in the context of consumer contracts 
which reflects the transition from the classical model to the modern law of contract where 
concepts such as good faith, reasonableness and fairness were incorporated into pieces of 
legislation and decisions of the courts. 
 
Following the analysis of the topic in the context of B2B contracts and B2C contracts 
where the relevant legislation is clearly distinct from each other, chapter 4 tackles the 
protection afforded to small businesses which is in a grey area between the other two 
categories of contracts. Therefore for the purpose of this work, contracts involving SMEs 
are dealt separately from the other B2B contracts because small businesses do not 
negotiate in an equal position with large businesses.  
 
Subsequently the study examines in chapter 5 unresolved issues of the legislation and 
case law analysed in the previous chapters and in chapter 6 it makes an evaluative 
comparison of the legal solutions offered by the Brazilian and English law systems and 
proposes lessons that they may learn from each other. Finally the conclusion of the thesis 
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is dedicated to the contributions of the research and it includes recommendations which 
can be derived from it. 
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CHAPTER 2. ANALYSIS OF THE LEGISLATIVE CONTROLS ON UNFAIRNESS IN 
BUSINESS CONTRACTS IN ENGLAND AND BRAZIL 
 
2.1. Context 
 
Freedom of contract is generally accepted as a principle which governs agreements 
between parties as long as they are not contrary to the public policy or harmful to the 
parties’ interest.161 This principle prevailed in classical contract law and it is still applicable 
to businesses contracts where there is the assumption that parties are able to freely 
negotiate terms and agree with the inclusion of exemption clauses for allocation of risks. 
The consequences of a B2B contract are determined by the parties’ intention, thus courts 
should avoid interfering with agreed terms even if they are apparently unfair.162 
 
In practice however business parties often ‘prefer to make practical adjustments or 
compromises rather than stand on their strict legal rights’.163 Such observation is 
supported by empirical studies carried out by Macaulay164 followed by Beale and 
Dugdale.165 They suggested that businessmen are more inclined to recourse to trade 
custom because the latter is more flexible and adaptable to their needs and unforeseen 
events. Those studies also indicated the prevalence of a cooperativist ethic among 
businesses that wish to maintain long-term commercial dealings. As a consequence the 
adoption of alternative ways to solve conflicts seemed to be more advantageous than the 
use of contractual remedies that are generally costly and may damage their reputation.166 
 
Although parties may opt to not make use of the law of contract to settle disputes 
between them, they still have to observe the relevant legislation which limits their 
behaviour. Those restrictions aim to ensure that the weak party will be protected from 
exploitation in B2B contracts where there is no actual equality between parties. Such 
                                                 
161 According to Brownsword ‘term freedom’ can be limited when it is harmful to the interest of: a third party, 
one or both contracting parties or to the public interest. See Brownsword, Contract Law: Themes for the 
Twenty-first Century (n 127) 52. 
162 Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (n 115) 681. See also The Moorcock (1889) LR 14 PD 64 
(CA) 70. 
163 Brownsword, Contract Law: Themes for the Twenty-first Century (n 127) 4.  
164 Stewart Macaulay, 'Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study' (1963) 28 Am Sociolog Rev 
55. 
165 Hugh Beale and Tony Dugdale, 'Contracts between Businessmen: Planning and the Use of Contractual 
Remedies' (1975) 2 Brit J Law & Soc 45. 
166 ‘You don’t read legalistic contract clauses at each other if you ever want to do business again’. See 
Macaulay (n 164) 61. According to Atiyah there are ‘many bilateral long-term relationships’ which tend 
increasingly to ‘regulate their internal arrangements without the aid of contract’. See Atiyah, The Rise and Fall 
of Freedom of Contract (n 115) 724. 
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protection will therefore be particularly important to small businesses that are generally 
more vulnerable in the market, as will be examined in chapter 4. 
 
2.2. Legislative control on unfairness in business contracts in England 
 
In England, in the mid twentieth century, the recognition of the need for intervention in 
contracts conflicted with the classical view which was until then the prevailing approach. 
The latter embraced ideas such as freedom of contract and ‘calculability of risk allocation’ 
in business contracts;167 moreover parties could pursue their self-interest even if it 
harmed the other’s party interests.168 
 
Therefore although in Suisse Atlantique Société d'Armement Maritime S.A. v N.V. 
Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale169 the House of Lords still maintained the importance of the 
freedom of contract and the observance of the parties’ intentions, in subsequent years the 
increasing pressure on controlling contractual relationships resulted in the enactment of 
the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977.170 This Act ‘aimed at bridging the recognised gap 
between the classical theory of contract law and the social reality’.171 UCTA declares 
invalid certain provisions independently whether they were freely agreed or whether the 
protected party preferred to decline such protection in exchange for better prices or 
conditions. Its scope however is limited to the regulation of exemption clauses that are 
inserted in B2B and B2C contracts.172 
 
                                                 
167 Brownsword, Contract Law: Themes for the Twenty-first Century (n 127) 59-60. 
168 For instance Lord Cockburn remarked that ‘the question is not what a man of scrupulous morality or nice 
honour would do under such circumstances. The case put of the purchase of an estate, in which there is a 
mine under the surface, but the fact is unknown to the seller, is one in which a man of tender conscience or 
high honour would be unwilling to take advantage of the ignorance of the seller; but there can be no doubt 
that the contract for the sale of the estate would be binding’. See Smith v Hughes (1871) LR 6 QB 597 , 603-
604. 
169 ‘In my view, it is not right to say that the law prohibits and nullifies a clause exempting or limiting liability 
for a fundamental breach or breach of a fundamental term. Such a rule of law would involve a restriction on 
freedom of contract (...)’. See Suisse Atlantique Société d'Armement Maritime S.A. v N.V. Rotterdamsche 
Kolen Centrale [1967] 1 AC 361 , 392.  
170 Brownsword, Contract Law: Themes for the Twenty-first Century (n 127) 60-61. 
171 Hugh Beale, 'Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 [comments]' (1978) 5 Brit J Law & Soc 114, 114. 
172 Exemption clauses include exclusion clauses (that purport to exclude liability or remedies) and limitation 
clauses (that purport to limit the liabilities or remedies). S. 13(1) of UCTA contains an extended definition of 
exemption clauses: ‘(a) making the liability or its enforcement subject to restrictive or onerous conditions; (b) 
excluding or restricting any right or remedy in respect of the liability, or subjecting a person to any prejudice 
in consequence of his pursuing any such right or remedy; (c) excluding or restricting rules of evidence or 
procedure; and (to that extent) sections 2 and 5 to 7 also prevent excluding or restricting liability by reference 
to terms and notices which exclude or restrict the relevant obligation or duty.’ 
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Businesses are protected by this Act when they contract on the other party’s written 
standard terms (section 3).173 In this case interventions may be justified by the fact that 
parties usually are unable to freely negotiate terms which are drafted in advance and 
imposed on the weaker party. Nonetheless as UCTA does not define ‘standard form 
contract’ courts were left with the onerous task of interpreting its meaning and 
determining its application.174 Lord Dunpark in Mccrone v Boots Farm Sales Ltd175 
maintained that this phrase referred to ‘a number of fixed terms or conditions invariably 
incorporated in contracts’.176 Similarly in line with British Fermentation Products Ltd v 
Compair Reavell Ltd177 the application of UCTA to a standard form contract ‘would be 
proof that the model form is invariably or at least usually used by the party in question’.178 
 
In Salvage Association v CAP Financial Services Ltd179 the court concluded that section 3 
was not applicable to a contract that involved a certain degree of negotiation; as 
compared to St Albans City & District Council v International Computers Ltd180 where the 
application of this provision was not ruled out when the amendments were not related to 
relevant exempting terms. Watford Electronics Limited v Sanderson CFL Limited181 in its 
turn added that in order to evaluate whether or not the alterations were substantial, any 
amendment of terms should be considered against the totality of the standard 
conditions.182  
 
More recently Edwards-Stuart J in Yuanda (UK) Co Ltd v WW Gear Construction Ltd183 
contended that the existence of negotiations is not ‘itself a relevant consideration’ and 
concluded that ‘if there is any significant difference between the terms proffered and the 
terms of the contract actually made, then the contract will not have been made on one 
party’s written standard terms of business’.184 
                                                 
173 Steve Wilson and Sheila Bone, 'Businesses, Standard Terms and the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977' 
(2002) 1 JO & R 29, 36. 
174 While it is claimed that the phrase ‘other party’s written standard terms’ is considered ‘well known’ it 
creates unnecessary uncertainty. See Ibid. 38. 
175 1981 SC 68, 1981 SLT 103. 
176 McCrone v Boots Farm Sales Ltd 1981 SC 68, 1981 SLT 103 , 74. 
177 [1999] 2 All ER (Comm) 389, [1999] BLR 352. 
178 British Fermentation Products Ltd v Compair Reavell Ltd [1999] 2 All ER (Comm) 389, [1999] BLR 352. 
179 Salvage Association v CAP Financial Services Ltd [1995] FSR 654 . 
180 St Albans City & District Council v International Computers Ltd [1996] 4 All ER 481 (CA), [1995] FSR 686. 
181 Watford Electronics Ltd v Sanderson CFL Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 317, [2001] 1 All ER (Comm) 696. 
182 Ibid. [63]. 
183 [2010] EWHC 720 (TCC), [2011] Bus LR 360, [2011] 1 All ER (Comm) 550. 
184 Yuanda (UK) Co Ltd v WW Gear Construction Ltd [2010] EWHC 720 (TCC), [2011] Bus LR 360, [2011] 1 All 
ER (Comm) 550 [26]. In [21] Edwards-Stuart J maintained that ‘the conditions have to be standard in that 
they are terms which the company in question uses for all, or nearly all, of its contracts of a particular type 
without alteration’. 
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2.2.1. Exemption clauses 
 
In England the Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973 already prescribed that 
unreasonable exemption clauses could be overridden in the context of implied terms in 
the sale of goods.185 Subsequently the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 prescribed more 
general controls on the use of exclusion and limitation clauses that can be applied to a 
wider range of types of contracts.186  
 
Presently it is UCTA which offers the main protection against unfairness in the context of 
B2B contracts.187 However, as mentioned previously, this Act deals only with exemption 
clauses which are terms which may exclude or limit liability or remedies that ‘otherwise 
would be available for the breach’ of a contract by one of the parties.188 
 
In business contracts those exemption clauses may be employed to assist the allocation 
of risks between parties; but their application is not free of legislative controls as their 
misuse may cause an imbalance between parties’ rights and obligations. Macdonald 
suggested that those clauses provide a point in which the ‘tension’ between freedom of 
contract and the control of unfairness meet,189 but ‘it is still the case that individually 
negotiated contracts containing exemption clauses are generally assumed not to be 
harmful’.190 
 
Those clauses used to be treated as any other term of contract that defines the parties’ 
obligations191 ‘stating the area in which there is no liability and so no obligation’.192 
Nowadays the prevailing approach is that they operate as a defence to liability.193 The 
party who purports to rely on the exemption clause has to establish that the clause was 
                                                 
185 Poole, Textbook on Contract Law (n 78) 241. 
186 Ibid. 
187 The UTCCR is limited to B2C contracts. 
188 Poole, Textbook on Contract Law (n 78) 229. 
189 Elizabeth Macdonald, Exemption Clauses and Unfair Terms (2nd edn, Tottel 2006) v. 
190 Poole, Textbook on Contract Law  (n 78) 232. 
191 See Lord Diplock in Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] AC 827 (HL), 850. 
192 Macdonald, Exemption Clauses and Unfair Terms (n 189) 1. 
193 Howells and Brownsword suggested that an exclusion clause can have a definitional or exclusionary 
nature. It is definitional when it assists the specification of the scope of the contractual obligation and 
exclusionary when there is the derogation from rules (mandatory or default) or from other party’s reasonable 
expectations. Courts have treated exclusion clauses as exclusionary in line with UCTA (See Phillips Products 
Ltd v Hyland [1987] 1 WLR 659) and have rejected the definitional argument ‘as an attempted evasion of 
desirable legal control over unfair terms’. See Geraint G. Howells and Roger Brownsword, 'The 
Implementation of the EC Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts - Some Unresolved Questions' 
[1995] JBL 243, 248-249. 
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incorporated as a term of the contract; that on its natural and ordinary meaning it covers 
the events that have occurred and that the clause was not rendered unenforceable by 
statutory provisions (UCTA and the Regulations). 
 
The provisions of UCTA do not subject all exemption clauses to review, but only those 
which purport to exclude or restrict business liability and ‘which fall within the compass of 
ones of its “active sections”’.194 Business liability is the liability for breach of obligations or 
duties arising ‘from things done or to be done by a person in the course of a business’ or 
‘from the occupation of premises used for business purposes of the occupier’ (s. 1(3)). 
The definition of ‘business’ here is fairly broad and includes professions and activities of 
government departments or local or public authority (s. 14).195  
 
UCTA also does not cover exemption clauses of certain types of contracts which are 
excluded from its scope, such as: contract of insurance; contracts relating to interest in 
land, intellectual property, companies or interest in securities; contract for the carriage of 
goods by ship or hovercraft; contract of employment (except in favour of the employee) 
and international supply contracts (as is described in s. 26).196 
 
2.2.1.1. Assessing the reasonableness requirement 
 
UCTA renders certain exemption clauses automatically ineffective whereas other clauses 
are considered effective only if they satisfy the requirement of ‘reasonableness’.197 Such 
requirement therefore is not applicable to all sections of the Act, but only where the 
section prescribes its application (e.g., ss. 3 and 6). The determination of the 
reasonableness of a term should take into account the circumstances which were known 
or which could be foreseen by parties when the contract was made (s. 11(1))198 and the 
                                                 
194 Macdonald, 'Unifying Unfair Terms Legislation' (n 5) 70. According to Koffman and Macdonald, UCTA has 
two important types of section. The first one includes the ‘active sections’ (e.g., ss. 2, 3, 6 and 7) which ‘state 
that a clause is totally ineffective or effective only if it satisfies the requirement of reasonableness’. The 
second type is the ‘definition sections’ ‘which help to explain the meaning of the terms used within the “active 
sections” and s. 11’. See Koffman and Macdonald (n 1) 200-201. 
195 For instance, in St Albans City & District Council v International Computers Ltd [1995] FSR 686 (QBD), 
[1996] 4 All ER 481 (CA) a local authority was considered to be a ‘business’ under the definition of section 14. 
196 See Schedule 1 and s. 26. 
197 Macdonald, 'Unifying Unfair Terms Legislation' (n 5) 70. 
198 Courts should not consider posterior events even in the occurrence of change of circumstances. See Poole, 
Textbook on Contract Law (n 78) 252. 
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burden of proving the fulfilment of this requirement lies on the party who wants to rely on 
the exemption (s. 11(5)), which is normally a business.199 
 
Lord Bridge argued in George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd v Finney Lock Seeds Ltd200 that 
the reasonableness assessment made by courts is not an ‘exercise of discretion,201 but the 
result of a balancing test in which a ‘whole range of considerations’ are weighted in a pair 
of scales.202 Judges shall therefore take into account factors identified by the legislation 
and courts.203 
 
The factors identified by legislation include the provisions of section 11(4) of UCTA which 
prescribe that in the determination of whether or not a limitation clause satisfies the 
requirement of reasonableness, courts should consider the resources that the person who 
wants to rely on the clause could expect to have to meet the liability should it arise and 
whether that party could have covered himself by insurance for such liability.  
 
Furthermore Schedule 2 provides guidelines for the application of the reasonableness test 
that encompass:204 the strength of the bargaining power between parties (whether it 
would be possible to make the contract without the clause); inducement to agree to the 
clause (e.g., lower price), whether the customer knew or ought to have known the extent 
of the clause (reality of the consent to the term);205 whether it was reasonable and 
practicable to expect the compliance of a condition without which the liability would be 
excluded or limited; and whether goods were made to the customer’s special order.  
 
The scope of this Schedule 2 was in principle limited to the context of implied terms in 
sale and supply contracts (ss. 6 and 7).206 However those guidelines have been extended 
                                                 
199 By comparison according to the UTCCR 1999 the burden of proof the unfairness normally rests on the 
consumer (as it will be examined in chapter 3). 
200 [1983] 2 AC 803, [1983] QB 284. 
201 George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd v Finney Lock Seeds Ltd [1983] 2 AC 803, 815. 
202 Ibid. 816. Nonetheless as the decisions take into consideration the particularities of each contract, they 
should not ‘be treated as a binding precedent in other cases’. See Phillips Products Ltd v Hyland [1987] 1 WLR 
659 , 668. 
203 Poole, Textbook on Contract Law (n 78) 252-260. 
204 Ibid. 254. 
205 ‘What the Unfair Contract Terms Act is concerned with, and in particular Sch. 2, para. (a) and (c), is, 
among other aspects of reasonableness, the actuality or the reality of the consent of the party that it is 
sought to bind by the particular clause’. See AEG (UK) Ltd v Logic Resource Ltd [1996] CLC 265 (CA), 279. 
206 See section 11(2). Sections 6 and 7 of UCTA control exemptions in contracts of sale and supply of goods. 
Although they purport to protect mainly consumers, their provisions can also be applied to businesses. For 
instance, ss. 6(3) and 7(3) provide that the liability of sellers or suppliers for breaches of implied terms related 
to the quality of goods cannot be excluded by a contractual term against non-consumers unless the 
exemption satisfies the requirement of reasonableness. See Chen-Wishart (n 3) 472. 
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by courts to the assessment of reasonableness of exemption clauses in general.207 From 
the analysis of their provisions it is possible to argue that if a party was able to freely 
negotiate terms in equal conditions with the other party, is most likely that the contractual 
terms will be considered to be reasonable; hence UCTA will be compatible with the 
freedom of contract as long as the party could give a free and informed consent. 
 
In addition to the above factors determined by legislation in the assessment of 
reasonableness, there are also factors identified by courts. Most case law under UCTA is 
concerned with B2B contracts rather than B2C agreements.208 Among those cases there 
are two House of Lords’ decisions which used to illustrate different frameworks to the 
application of reasonableness in business contracts.209  
 
In Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd210 a defendant’s employee started a fire 
while patrolling a factory which resulted in the destruction of the premises, but Securicor 
was exempted from liability for damages as the House of Lords held effective its exclusion 
clause. By contrast in George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd. v Finney Lock Seeds Ltd211 the 
same court concluded that it would not be ‘fair and reasonable’ to allow a supplier of 
defective seeds to rely on a limitation clause which limited his liability to the ’replacement 
or refund of the price’ when the whole production was lost.212 
 
The framework adopted in George Mitchell can be considered more interventionist as it 
left the decision regarding the reasonableness of the exemption clause ‘entirely to the 
discretion of the trial judge’.213 Conversely, in Photo Production the House of Lords 
adopted a non-interventionist approach that ‘discourages judges from interfering with 
                                                 
207 In the words of Stuart-Smith L.J.: ‘section 11(2) of the Act requires the court which is determining the 
question of reasonableness for the purpose of sections 6 and 7 to have regard in particular to the matters 
specified in Schedule 2. Although Schedule 2 does not apply in the present case, the considerations there set 
out are usually regarded as being of general application to the question of reasonableness’. See Stewart Gill 
Ltd v Horatio Myer and Co Ltd [1992] 1 QB 600 , 608.  
208 Nicky Hartwell, 'The Application of the Reasonableness Test under the UCTA 1977: A Schism between 
Certainty and Fairness' HLJ <http://www.herts.ac.uk/fms/documents/schools/law/HLJ_V3I2_Hartwell.pdf> 
accessed 28 May 2011, 55. 
209 Roger Brownsword and John N. Adams, 'The Unfair Contract Terms Act: A Decade of Discretion' (1988) 
104 LQR 94, 113. See also Brownsword and Adams, Understanding Contract Law (n 127) 147-151. 
210 [1980] AC 827 (HL). 
211 George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd v Finney Lock Seeds Ltd [1983] 2 AC 803 . 
212 Ibid. 816-817. 
213 Brownsword and Adams, 'The Unfair Contract Terms Act: A Decade of Discretion' (n 209) 113. Nonetheless 
Lord Bridge proposed guidelines on the approach to reasonableness in the commercial context: the relative 
bargaining strength; whether the clause is generally accepted in a particular industry; whether it was 
negotiated by trade bodies and the availability of insurance cover to the parties. The negligence of the guilty 
party was also a relevant factor on this case. See George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd v Finney Lock Seeds Ltd 
[1983] 2 AC 803, 816-817. 
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commercial exemptions’.214 This latter approach ‘has gained prominence in more recent 
decisions’215 such as Monarch Airlines Ltd v London Luton Airport Ltd216 and Watford 
Electronics v Sanderson217 which favoured the freedom of contract between business 
parties on the grounds that they have equal bargaining power and are able to negotiate 
terms, allocate risks and opt for an insurance cover.218 In other words businessmen were 
considered to be the ‘best judge of the commercial fairness of the agreement’.219  
 
Such non-interventionist approach is currently the prevailing one in commercial cases; 
hence parties who share an equivalent bargaining power may distribute risks through the 
use of exemption clauses without courts’ intervention. Consequently courts will interfere 
only in cases where unreasonable terms were included in B2B contracts in virtue of the 
inequality of the bargaining strength (e.g., Motours Ltd v Euroball (West Kent) Ltd).220  
 
2.2.2. Good faith  
 
In line with the non-interventionist approach adopted by English law, there is no general 
duty of good faith in the context of business contracts,221 because it would be inconsistent 
with the need of certainty and predictability that those agreements require. Moreover, 
Bridge contended that this concept is too vague as opposed to other rules of contracts 
that could serve the same purpose and address more precisely a particular problem taking 
into account the diversity of commercial contracting.222  
                                                 
214 Ibid. 95. 
215 Poole, Textbook on Contract Law (n 78) 255. 
216 [1997] CLC 698. 
217 [2001] EWCA Civ 317, [2001] 1 All ER (Comm) 696.  
218 Elizabeth Macdonald, 'Watford v Sanderson: The Requirement of Reasonableness in System Supply 
Contracts and More Generally' Web JCLI <http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/2001/issue4/macdonald4.html> accessed 
25 July 2012. 
219 In the words of Chadwick LJ in Watford Electronics Ltd v Sanderson CFL Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 317, [2001] 
1 All ER (Comm) 696 [55]: ‘where experienced businessmen representing substantial companies of equal 
bargaining power negotiate an agreement, they may be taken to have had regard to the matters known to 
them. They should, in my view be taken to be the best judge of the commercial fairness of the agreement 
which they have made; including the fairness of each of the terms in that agreement. They should be taken to 
be the best judge on the question whether the terms of the agreement are reasonable. The court should not 
assume that either is likely to commit his company to an agreement which he thinks is unfair, or which he 
thinks includes unreasonable terms., Unless satisfied that one party has, in effect, taken unfair advantage of 
the other — or that a term is so unreasonable that it cannot properly have been understood or considered — 
the court should not interfere.’  
220 [2003] EWHC 614 (QB), [2003] All ER (D) 165.  
221 Giuditta Cordero Moss, 'Contracts between Consumer Protection and Trade Usages: Some Observations on 
the Importance of State Contract Law' in R Schulze (ed) Common Frame of Reference and Existing EC 
Contract Law (Sellier 2008) 70.  
222 Bridge contended that a general standard of good faith deflects the attention from the need to deal with 
different problematic areas of commercial law. See MG Bridge, 'Good Faith in Commercial Contracts' in R 
Brownsword, N Hird and G Howells (eds), Good Faith in Contract: Concept and Context (Ashgate and 
Dartmouth 1999) (n 221) 140-150. Bridge cited ‘commodities contracts’ as example of bargains where the 
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Not surprisingly the traditional view in England is that good faith is also not applicable at 
negotiation stage in B2B and B2C contracts.223 According to common law, parties should 
not be liable before they are bound by a contract; otherwise it would undermine the 
parties’ freedom to change their minds before the conclusion of the contract. 
Consequently negotiations in bad faith usually do not give rise to any liability to pay 
compensation.224 
 
In accordance with this position the House of Lords in Walford and Miles225 decided that 
an ‘agreement to agree’ was unenforceable because ‘it lacks the necessary certainty’.226 
This court rejected the argument that there was an implied duty to negotiate in good faith 
for a reasonable period of time.227 In this case it was neither possible to subjectively 
determine the existence of ‘proper reasons’ to terminate the negotiations nor the 
defendant’s bad faith.228 Lord Ackner stated that: 
 
The concept of a duty to carry on negotiations in good faith is inherently 
repugnant to the adversarial position of the parties when involved in negotiations. 
Each party to the negotiations is entitled to pursue his (or her) own interest 
(...).229  
 
His opinion reflected a concern that the ‘adoption of a broad duty of good faith would 
unsettle the commercial bargaining process.’230 Similarly in Regalian Properties Plc v 
London Docklands Development Corp231 it was held that any expenses incurred in an 
agreement ‘subject to contract’ are at a party’s own risk because parties should be free to 
withdraw from negotiations.232 It therefore rejected the argument of the Australian case 
                                                                                                                                                    
application of good faith would be inappropriate. Parties have to act opportunistically and the participants of 
the trade should be able to define their own rights and duties. ‘There is no room for a co-operative search for 
a jointly maximised profit’. Ibid. 152.  
223 See Poole, Textbook on Contract Law (n 78) 19. See also Carter and Furmston (n 94) 1. 
224 J Carter and M Furmston, 'Good Faith and Fairness in the Negotiation of Contracts Part II' (1995) 8 JCL 93, 
117-118. 
225 [1992] 2 AC 128. 
226 Walford v Miles [1992] 2 AC 128, 138. 
227 Poole, Casebook on Contract Law (n 150) 69-70. 
228 Ibid. 
229 According to Lord Ackner ‘a duty to negotiate in good faith is as unworkable in practice as it is inherently 
inconsistent with the position of a negotiating party. It is here that the uncertainty lies. In my judgment, while 
negotiations are in existence either party is entitled to withdraw from those negotiations, at any time and for 
any reason’. See Walford v Miles [1992] 2 AC 128 [138]. 
230 Carter and Furmston, 'Good Faith and Fairness in the Negotiation of Contracts Part I' (n 94) 2. 
231 [1995] 1 WLR 212. Similarly according to Stephen Donald Architects Ltd v King [2003] EWHC 1867 (TCC) 
and Carlton Communications Plc v Football League [2002] EWHC 1650 (Comm) when negotiations are 
‘subject to contract’ parties are not liable in case of withdrawal. 
232 Regalian Properties Plc v London Docklands Development Corp [1995] 1 WLR 212, 231. 
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Sabemo Pty Ltd v North Sydney Municipal Mutual Council233 which maintained that a party 
should be protected during negotiations ‘if the other party unilaterally decides to abandon 
the project, not for any reason associated with bona fide disagreement concerning the 
terms of the contract to be entered into (...)’.234  
 
It may be possible to contend that Sabemo’s position was in agreement with the dynamic 
market-individualism ideology which takes into account the expectations of the 
commercial community about legitimate or illegitimate reasons for withdrawal.235 On the 
other hand Walford and Regalian were more in line with the static market-individualism 
ideology; hence they rejected the application of a general duty of good faith in 
negotiations on the grounds that the latter is contrary to the adversarial ethic. According 
to them, parties should be able to protect their own interests and prior to the conclusion 
of the contract they are free to pursue agreements with other people or to break off 
negotiations at their convenience.  
 
Nonetheless in Petromec Inc v Petroleo Brasileiro SA Petrobras236 the Court of Appeal 
admitted the application of an express provision to negotiate in good faith concerning 
certain extra costs.237 In this case there was already a contract in place between two 
companies and the mentioned provision was considered legally enforceable in order to not 
frustrate the reasonable expectations of the parties. The good faith obligation here was 
‘limited in scope, as opposed to an abstract good faith obligation’238 which was repudiated 
in Walford; consequently the decision in Petromec did not recognise a general duty to 
negotiate in good faith.239  
 
                                                 
233 [1977] 2 NSWLR 880. 
234 Sabemo Pty Ltd v North Sydney Municipal Mutual Council [1977] 2 NSWLR 880 , 900-903. 
235 Brownsword, Contract Law: Themes for the Twenty-first Century (n 127) 151. In line with the dynamic 
market-individualism the ‘reasonableness’ of the parties’ expectations in B2B contracts can be also determined 
by the market and not only by law or by terms of contract. In other words ‘practice-based expectations are 
now in head-to-head competition with legal rule-based competition’. See Roger Brownsword, 'Maps, 
Methodologies, and Critiques: Confessions of a Contract Lawyer' in MV Hoecke (ed) Methodologies of Legal 
Research: Which Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline? (Hart Publishing 2011) 146-147. 
236 [2005] EWCA Civ 891, [2006] 1 Lloyd's Rep 121.  
237 Petromec Inc v Petroleo Brasileiro SA Petrobras (No.3) [2005] EWCA Civ 891, [2006] 1 Lloyd's Rep 121 . 
‘Express terms may, even in the context of contractual negotiations, create a duty to act both honestly and 
reasonably’. See Michael Furmston and G.J. Tolhurst, Contract Formation: Law and Practice (Oxford University 
Press 2010) 373. 
238 Poole, Casebook on Contract Law (n 150) 72. 
239 Ibid. 71. The fact that one of the parties was a Brazilian company may have influenced the inclusion of 
such clause because good faith is commonly applied in agreements in Brazil, including B2B contracts. 
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The position adopted by Walford and Miles240 is still the prevailing one and has influenced 
subsequent cases such as BBC Worldwide Ltd v Bee Load Ltd (t/a Archangel Ltd).241 For 
this reason, provisions of the Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC), 
Principles of European Contract Law (PECL) and Draft Common Frame of Reference 
(DCFR) which prescribe the application of good faith and the imposition of liability in pre-
contractual dealings appear inconsistent with the English perspective.242 According to the 
latter, prior to the conclusion of the contract ‘expecting that a party also takes into 
consideration the needs and expectations of the other party runs counter to the very 
essence of a negotiation’.243 At this stage parties should be allowed to look for better 
bargains even if they end up frustrating the other party’s expectations. 
 
Notwithstanding English law does not accept good faith in negotiations, it has expressly 
incorporated this concept in the performance of the contracts through the implementation 
of Directive 93/13/EEC;244 however the application of this directive is limited to consumer 
agreements. In the context of B2B contracts the Court of Appeal in Philips Electronique 
Grand Public SA v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd245 was willing to ‘imply a term that BSB 
should act with good faith in the performance of this contract’;246 but Brownsword 
observed that ‘it was not in fact material to imply such term’ because only terms that 
represent ‘parties’ unstated intentions’ may be implied and the latter are generally 
underlined by an ‘adversarial model’.247 
 
The influence of European law over the English law is indeed more prominent in the 
context of consumer protection than in business contracts.248 Brownsword suggested that 
the above Directive 93/13/EEC ‘in line with much EC regulation, serves to underline the 
bifurcation in English contract law between consumer contracting and commercial 
contracting’.249 He added that ‘the danger here is that English contract lawyers, unfamiliar 
                                                 
240 [1992] 2 AC 128. 
241 According to BBC Worldwide Ltd v Bee Load Ltd [2007] EWHC 134 (Comm) [93] ‘the agreement to 
consider in good faith any request [by the defendant] to extend the scope of the agreement was (...) 
unenforceable as a matter of English law on the principle of Walford v Mile’. 
242 See articles 1.7 and 2.1.15 of PICC, articles 1:201 and 2:301 of PECL and article II.–3:301 of the DCFR. 
243 Moss (n 221) 71. 
244 See reg. 5(1) of Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999. 
245 [1995] EMLR 472 (CA). 
246 Philips Electronique Grand Public SA v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [1995] EMLR 472 (CA), 484. 
247 See Brownsword, Contract Law: Themes for the Twenty-first Century (n 127) 148. See also Brownsword, 
'Good Faith in Contracts Revisited' (n 86) 122-123. 
248 See Poole, Textbook on Contract Law (n 78) 16. 
249 See Brownsword, 'Two Concepts of Good Faith' (n 160) 243. 
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with the concept of good faith, treat it as a doctrine belonging exclusively on the 
consumer side of the line’.250 
 
2.3. Legislative control on unfairness in business contracts in Brazil 
 
In Brazil following the unification of the rules of private law, contracts between 
businesses251 and non-businesses have been governed by provisions of the Civil Code 
which regulate obligations.252 They include the general rules of contracts in articles 421 to 
426 that are applicable to all contracts including consumer agreements.253  
 
Although the systematization of the legislation through the use of Codes purports to 
provide a greater degree of transparency and consistency, their inflexibility may prevent 
an easy adaptation of the rules to social and economic transformations.254 Such 
inflexibility may be particularly problematic in the context of commercial dealings which 
require constant changes; hence the Civil Code has been unable to cover all contractual 
relationships of the marketplace which have become increasingly complex.255 
 
In order to compensate for such inability to offer solutions to all conflicts, the social state 
developed a new legislative technique consistent with a more interventionist approach. It 
is the adoption of vague concepts and principles (e.g., social function, good faith, public 
interest) which can be applied by judges in different situations.256 
 
However part of the legal literature contended that the application of general and abstract 
concepts and rules may not meet the needs of a complex society, because different 
                                                 
250 Ibid. 
251 Article 966 defines ‘business proprietor’ as ‘anyone who engages, on a professional basis, in organised 
economic activity for the production or trade of goods or services’. See Leslie Rose, O Código Civil Brasileiro 
em Inglês/ The Brazilian Civil Code in English (Renovar 2008) 188. 
252 Special Part, Book I, ‘The Law of Obligations’ (articles 233 to 965). 
253 However in the consumer context those general provisions are only subsidiary to the special rules provided 
by the Consumer Protection Code. B2C contracts are subject to more restrictions than other civil contracts 
because the Consumer Protection Code imposes more limitations to the sellers and suppliers in order to 
protect the vulnerable consumers. See chapter 3. 
254 Edil Batista Júnior, 'O Ilógico Necessário: Considerações Acerca da Crise da Codificação Jusracionalista' ano 
5, n. 48, 1, dez. 2000 <http://jus.uol.com.br/revista/texto/517> accessed 20 August 2011. 
255 Gondinho observed that nowadays the private relationships have been directly influenced by the Federal 
Constitution and other statutes that form important legal micro-systems (e.g., Consumer Protection Code, 
Statute of the Child and Adolescent) which have diminished the importance of the Civil Code. See André 
Osório Gondinho, 'Codificação e Cláusulas Gerais' (2000) Rio de Janeiro: Padma, n. 2 Revista Trimestral de 
Direito Civil 3. 
256 See Paula Castello Miguel, Contratos entre Empresas (Revista dos Tribunais 2006) 86-93 and Antonio 
Junqueira de Azevedo, 'O Direito Pós-Moderno e a Codificação' (2000) São Paulo, jan-mar, v. 33 Revista de 
Direito do Consumidor 123, 124. 
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relationships require distinct regulations.257 This argument is applicable especially to B2B 
contracts which due to their peculiarities need specific and clear rules to provide more 
certainty and enable companies to calculate risks.258  
 
Despite the Civil Code containing special provisions in addition to general provisions to 
govern contracts of businesses or enterprises,259 the immutability and rigidity of those 
special rules have not allowed them to adapt to the dynamism of the market. Furthermore 
the above rules (which include open provisions) are not sufficient to address important 
institutions of commercial law (e.g., bankruptcy, debt instrument and business 
corporation) which made necessary the enactment of sparse statutes to fill the gap left by 
the codified law.260  
 
Brownsword recently pointed out that the dilemma that contract law currently faces in the 
context of B2B contracts is regarding the balance between rigidly prescribing rules for the 
market and adapting to the practices that give particular markets their ‘distinctive 
normative identity’.261 The law should be flexible enough to adapt to different 
marketplaces and to different attitudes of the parties towards each other.262 
 
2.3.1. Limits to the freedom of contract 
 
The contemporary legislation has faced the onerous task of establishing a balance 
between the rights of business parties to pursuit their self-interests and the need to 
protect the weak party against abuses. The freedom of contract is no longer an absolute 
value263 as it cannot contradict other constitutional values such as the social justice that 
purports to prevent imbalances in relationships.264 In other words contractual terms in 
B2B contracts are not immune to judicial interferences, but interventions should only be 
                                                 
257 See Castello Miguel (n 256) 94-95 and Gondinho (n 255) 3. 
258 Bulgarelli noted that ‘the general rules of obligations are related to the relationships of peoples and goods; 
whereas the business contracts are concerned to the production activity and circulation of wealth’. See 
Waldírio Bulgarelli, Direito Comercial (16th edn, Atlas 2001) 59. 
259 See Special Part, Book I, ‘The Law of Obligations’ (articles 233 to 965) and Book II, ‘The Law of 
Enterprises’ (articles 966 to 1195) of the Civil Code. 
260 Bankruptcy is regulated by Act 11101/2005 and Business Corporations by Act 6404/1976. Debt instruments 
are regulated by Decrees 2044/1908 and 57663/1966 (regulate Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes) as 
well as by the Trade Acceptance Act (Act 5474/1968) and Check Act (Act 7357/1985). 
261 Brownsword, 'Maps, Methodologies, and Critiques: Confessions of a Contract Lawyer' (n 235) 136. 
262 Ibid. 142-143. 
263 The contemporary Brazilian private law stipulates that parties no longer possess ‘absolute rights’ which 
depend only on their sole discretion and are free of any interference. See Flávio Tartuce, Função Social dos 
Contratos: do Código de Defesa do Consumidor ao Código Civil de 2002 (2nd edn, Coleção Prof. Rubens 
Limongi França, Método 2007) 175. 
264 Castello Miguel (n 256) 124-125. 
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made on an exceptional basis when it is ascertained that there has been the transgression 
of other values.  
 
Theodoro Júnior contended that such ‘contractual interventionism’ is a guarantee that the 
stronger party will not use his dominant position to exploit the other party.265 Moreover it 
implies that some legal provisions of public order (that impose certain limits on the 
individual will) cannot be revoked or modified by the parties.266  
 
Castello Miguel classified those interventions in two types:267 the first one aims to protect 
interests that are external to the contracting parties and are related to collectivity (e.g., 
social function of the contract and the environment). The second type aims to protect the 
interests of the parties of the contract and its application is justified only when there is an 
inequality of bargaining power between parties. If there is a balance between them, they 
are presumably able to protect their own interests and avoid the violation of social values 
such as the principle of equality.268 Consequently it is possible to contend that 
interventions in B2B contracts are generally of the first type; whereas the second type 
may be more relevant to small businesses contracts. 
 
Arguably one of the most important limitations to the freedom of contract in Brazil is the 
principle of the social function of the contracts. The Civil Code expressly stipulates that 
the former ‘shall be exercised by virtue, and within the limits’ of the latter;269 thus the 
individualist ethic that normally permeates B2B contracts is delimited by the social 
interest.270 
 
Such a principle of the social function of contracts is also implied in the provisions of the 
Federal Constitution which prescribe that the social values of the free enterprise (one of 
the cornerstones of the Federative Republic of Brazil) have to be compatible with the 
fundamental objectives of Brazil that include the ‘creation of a free society, just and with 
                                                 
265 Humberto Theodoro Júnior, O Contrato e seus Princípios (3rd edn, Aides 2001) 17. 
266 Ibid. 
267 Castello Miguel (n 256) 124-125. 
268 Ibid.  
269 See article 421 of the Civil Code. Although the Civil Code prescribes limitations to the freedom of contract, 
it does not reject its application. For instance, parties are allowed to conclude atypical contracts (art. 425), 
which means that they can establish any terms that suit their needs as long as they are consistent with the 
legislation. 
270 Additionally judges have to take into account the social ends of the legislation and the requirements of the 
common good when applying the law. See article 5 of the Law of Introduction to the Brazilian Civil Code. Rose 
(n 251) 2. 
 - 74 -  
 
solidarity’.271 This constitutional principle of solidarity therefore imposes some boundaries 
to the free enterprise spirit that could give rise to unjust situations and abuses.272  
 
The Federal Constitution prescribes other principles which govern economic activity.273 
Although some of them also have an interventionist nature; others are considered non-
interventionist. These apparent discrepancies result from the fact that the Constitution 
incorporated provisions typical of the liberal state as well as of the social state.274 For 
instance on one hand they include the promotion of the free enterprise and protection of 
the private property and free competition; but on the other hand the objectives of the 
economic order also purports to ensure everyone a life with dignity, in accordance with 
the precepts of social justice and the social function of property. 
 
2.3.2. Contracts of adhesion 
 
In Brazil businesses make use of ‘general contractual conditions’ in B2B agreements which 
are unilaterally stipulated by one of the parties with the purpose of governing their 
commercial operations and negotiations in a more uniform way.275 Those conditions 
therefore facilitate their dealings and allow them to conclude large amounts of contracts. 
They become ‘contracts of adhesion’ once accepted by the other party.276  
 
The Brazilian legal system however recognises that the party (including businesses) who 
was unable to negotiate terms in those contracts of adhesion is susceptible to abuses; for 
this reason the Civil Code expressly prescribes protections to the adhering party. In those 
contracts the interpretation most favourable to the adhering party shall be adopted when 
clauses are ambiguous or contradictory. Additionally clauses that stipulate that the 
adhering party has waived in advance rights arising out of the nature of the transaction 
are deemed void.277 Those provisions clearly aim to protect the party who has not drafted 
the terms either through a more beneficial interpretation or through the prevention of the 
renouncement of rights.  
 
                                                 
271 See articles 1, IV and 3, I of the Brazilian Federal Constitution. 
272 Fábio V. Figueiredo and Simone D. C. Figueiredo, Código de Defesa do Consumidor Anotado (Rideel 2009) 
283. 
273 See article 170 of the Brazilian Federal Constitution. 
274 See José Afonso da Silva, Curso de Direito Constitucional Positivo (20th edn, Malheiros 2002) 763. 
275 Grinover and others (n 34) 530-533. 
276 Ibid. 531. 
277 See articles 423 and 424 of the Civil Code. See also Rose (n 251) 88. 
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Ferreira suggested that judicial precedents corroborate the opinion that in the absence of 
a governmental intervention, contracts of adhesions would be far more damaging to 
parties who simply adhere to them.278 
 
Although businesses in general are more likely to have some bargaining power to 
negotiate better terms than consumers, they may be compelled to accept imposed terms 
in certain situations. For instance in occasional contracts or in contracts with larger 
companies the dominant party may consider it not worth changing terms for an individual 
agreement, especially if he has a high demand for his products or services in which case 
the weaker business may be subject to a ‘take it or leave it’ situation.  
 
As will be examined in chapter 4, the bargaining strength of a business is not always 
related to its size. There are some sectors (e.g., financial) where although businesses may 
be considered relatively small, are often in a strong position to negotiate. Therefore 
courts have to examine the circumstances of each individual agreement to determine 
whether one party abused its advantageous position to impose harmful terms on the 
adhering party.  
 
2.3.3. Good faith 
 
In Brazil good faith is not limited to B2C contracts, but it is also applied to business 
contracts as a general clause. The generalised application of this principle in contracts 
reflects the influence of the social state on the Brazilian legal system.279 Nonetheless 
ironically the revoked article 131 of the Commercial Code of 1850 was the first provision 
in this jurisdiction which expressly referred to good faith in an objective sense;280 even 
though such Code was enacted under a liberal state which advocated minimal 
government interventions in the economy.281 For that reason this provision was virtually 
                                                 
278 Daniela Moura Ferreira, 'O Contrato de Consumo e o Princípios Informadores no Novo Código Civil' (2004) 
São Paulo, jan/mar, v. 13, f. 49 Revista de Direito do Consumidor 177, 179. 
279 Leonardo Cacau Santos La Bradbury, 'Estados Liberal, Social e Democrático de Direito' ano 11, n. 1252, 5 
dez. 2006 <http://jus.uol.com.br/revista/texto/9241> accessed 25 August 2011. 
280 Article 131, item 1 of the Commercial Code applied good faith as a general rule of interpretation according 
to which this principle and ‘the true spirit and nature of the contract shall prevail over the strict and narrow 
meaning of the words’. This article was among the provisions revoked by the new Civil Code (Act 
10406/2002). 
281 La Bradbury (n 279). 
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ignored at that time and there were only a few isolated cases that made reference to 
good faith in the context of B2B contracts.282 
 
Currently good faith can be found in various provisions of the new Civil Code that are 
relevant to all contractual relationships in Brazil. Nevertheless the operation and function 
of this concept will vary according to the type and peculiarities of the contract.283 Article 
422 prescribes a general clause according to which parties are bound to observe the 
principle of good faith in the conclusion and performance of a contract.284  
 
Legal literature and courts have also extended this principle to the negotiation stage 
through the application of the culpa in contrahendo doctrine in the absence of an express 
provision.285 This doctrine was proposed by Jhering and prescribes that ‘damages should 
be recoverable against the party whose blameworthy conduct during negotiations for a 
contract brought about its invalidity or prevented perfection’.286 Therefore parties have to 
behave reasonably and loyally towards each other at this stage on pain of giving rise to 
pre-contractual liability, but for that ‘the negotiations must at least have reached the 
stage of establishing a relation between the parties in which one may legitimately rely on 
the conduct of the other’.287 
 
The duty to negotiate in good faith protects the reasonable expectations created by the 
behaviour of the parties and the trust between them. It is compatible with the freedom of 
contract that prevails in B2B contracts as parties are not compelled to conclude the 
contract.288 By the end of the negotiations, parties may opt to not contract according to 
                                                 
282 Lívio Goellner Goron, 'Anotações sobre a Boa-Fé no Direito Comercial' (2003) São Paulo, jan./mar, v. 4, f. 
13 Revista de Direito Privado 143, 153. 
283 Andréa Carvalho Brito, 'A Função Restritiva do Princípio da Boa-Fé Objetiva: Uma Limitação ao Exercício 
Irregular dos Direitos Subjetivos' <http://www.bahianoticias.com.br/justica/artigo/38,a-funcao-restritiva-do-
principio-da-boa-fe-objetiva-uma-limitacao-ao-exercicio-irregular-dos-direito.html> accessed 25 February 
2011. 
284 See Rose (n 251) 88. 
285 In this context Brazilian law was particularly influenced by the German law. According to Quagliato 
‘although the Brazilian Legal System does not expressly require a negotiation procedure to be just, there is 
already a well defined tendency in admitting the ‘‘fair dealing’’ as an element of bargaining’. See Quagliato (n 
82) 217. 
286 Friedrich Kessler and Edith Fine, 'Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith, and Freedom of 
Contract: A Comparative Study' (1963-1964) 77 Harv L Rev 401, 401. This doctrine was expressly included in 
section 241(2) of the German Civil Code (BGB) which prescribes duties arising from an obligation such as ‘to 
take account of the rights, legal interests and other interests of the other party’. 
287 Carter and Furmston, 'Good Faith and Fairness in the Negotiation of Contracts Part II' (n 224) 119. 
288 Quagliato (n 82) 216. 
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their own interests as long as they were transparent in relation to their intentions and 
made the other party aware of the risk of desistance.289  
 
In some circumstances however the exercise of this right may be considered abusive. If a 
party breaks off the negotiations in bad faith and harms the other party, he will be liable 
for his wrongful behaviour. For instance if one party who never intended to conclude a 
contract induces the other party not to contract with a third party or to incur unnecessary 
expenses, he may be held accountable for his deceitful behaviour.290 Moreover according 
to the Civil Code if parties concluded a ‘preliminary contract’ which contains all the 
requirements of the contract to be entered to, then either of them has the right to 
demand the conclusion of the definitive contract, unless there is a clause allowing the 
parties to recede.291 
 
In other stages of B2B contracts good faith may be applied to prevent the ‘abuse of 
rights’;292 hence an act of a business may be formally legal but it will not be accepted by 
the legal system if it is contrary to this principle.293 As a result large companies which can 
afford staff with expertise to find loopholes in agreements or the law may have their 
behaviour limited by good faith. Similarly such principle can be employed to prevent any 
‘abuse of power’ by the controlling shareholder in corporations as well as any disloyal 
behaviour among shareholders or partners who misuse their rights.294  
 
2.3.3.1. Application of good faith by interpreters 
 
Courts used to extend the application of the principle of good faith prescribed by the 
Consumer Protection Code to relationships between non-consumers by analogy.295 This 
                                                 
289 Ibid. 
290 Dário Manuel Lentz Moura Vicente, 'A Responsabilidade Pré-Contratual no Código Civil Brasileiro de 2002' 
(abr./jun. 2004) R. CEJ 34, 37. 
291 Articles 462 and 463 of the Civil Code. See Rose (n 251) 95. 
292 Article 187 of the Civil Code considers illicit the exercise of a right that manifestly exceeds the limits 
imposed by its economic or social purpose, good conduct or good faith. See Ibid. 47. Good faith is also 
applied to prevent the abuse of rights. According to the Superior Court of Justice a lawful exercise of a right 
will become illicit at the moment that it goes beyond what it was reasonably expected in accordance with the 
objective good faith. See REsp 250523/SP (18/12/2000) and REsp 735168/RJ (26/03/2008).  
293 Teresa Negreiros, Teoria Geral do Contrato: Novos Paradigmas (2nd edn, Renovar 2006) 141. 
294 See article 117 of the Business Corporation Act (6404/1976). 
295 See Ester Lopes Peixoto, 'O Princípio da Boa-Fé no Direito Civil Brasileiro' (2003) São Paulo, jan./mar, v. 
12, f. 45 Revista de Direito do Consumidor 140, 160. Article 4 of the Law of Introduction to the Brazilian Civil 
Code authorises the use of analogy by judges. 
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analogical interpretation is no longer required following the enactment of the new Civil 
Code that expressly prescribes the use of good faith between private parties.296 
 
Article 113 of the Civil Code prescribes that ‘juridical transactions shall be interpreted in 
conformity with good faith and the practice of the place in which they are made’.297 This 
provision has therefore two implications for B2B contracts. First of all the legal effects of 
contracts will be guided by the principle of good faith. Secondly, business contracts 
should be interpreted in accordance with commercial practices common to a specific 
sector, commercial branches or professional categories,298 which is in line with a dynamic 
market-individualism approach. 
 
The antecedent provision299 in its turn stipulates that more heed should be given to the 
intention of the parties than to the literal meaning of the language; but if it is not possible 
to infer the actual parties’ intention or if the declaration of will is ambiguous, judges 
should interpret terms according to good faith and reject the ones that are abusive or 
unreasonable.300 Consequently this principle will attribute to a contractual term the 
meaning that parties would confer if they were behaving honestly and reasonably.  
 
2.4. Analysing the differences and similarities of the legislative controls on 
unfairness in business contracts in England and Brazil 
 
The English and Brazilian legal systems consider that when parties are both businesses 
and have equal resources and bargaining power, usually they do not need special 
protection so that freedom of contract should prevail in their agreements. As a 
consequence they should observe the agreed terms because they had the opportunity to 
negotiate them as well as to protect their own interests; hence ‘the contract is law 
between equal parties’.301 Otherwise agreements would not provide enough certainty to 
business parties.302 
                                                 
296 See REsp 1217951/PR (10/03/2011). 
297 Rose (n 251) 34. 
298 Judith Martins-Costa, 'Os Campos Normativos da Boa-Fé Objetiva: As Três Perspectivas do Direito Privado 
Brasileiro' (2005) Rio de Janeiro, nov./dez, v. 101, f. 382 Revista Forense 119, 139-140. 
299 See article 112 of the Brazilian Civil Code. 
300 In this context good faith should be applied in accordance with article 47 of the Consumer Protection Code. 
See Nobre Júnior (n 89) 79. In line with this interpretation see REsp 246562/SE (13/08/2001). 
301 Ulhoa Coelho (n 31) 20. 
302 Hoffman LJ observed that ‘in many forms of transaction it is of great importance that if something happens 
for which the contract has made express provision, the parties should know with certainty that the terms of 
the contract will be enforced. The existence of an undefined discretion to refuse to enforce the contract on 
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Nonetheless England and Brazil recognise that there are situations in which business are 
not able to negotiate terms (such as in standard form contracts) or that they are in no 
position to have them changed (e.g., asymmetric relationships).303 Consequently both 
legislatures prescribe some controls on unfairness in the context of B2B contracts to 
prevent abuses in those circumstances. As seen above, general provisions of the Brazilian 
Civil Code can be used to protect businesses against disadvantageous terms that are 
included in contracts of adhesion.304 Section 3 of UCTA provides a similar protection to 
businesses (re: ‘standard terms of business’). 
 
Therefore courts are allowed to interfere in business contracts to a certain extent and 
they may relieve parties from harsh terms; however they should limit such interferences 
only when the latter are strictly necessary to re-establish the contractual balance. 
Nonetheless while English courts have adopted a clear non-interventionist approach, the 
Brazilian courts have been given more flexibility to intervene in commercial agreements 
through the application of the principle of good faith. 
 
2.4.1. Good faith in negotiations 
 
There are fundamental differences between the approach adopted by the Brazilian legal 
system (and other civil law jurisdictions) and the English legal system concerning the 
application of good faith in negotiations. Those distinctions reflect the differences in the 
prevailing legal values in each legal system.305 
 
Presently there is a tension between the freedom of contract and the need to limit such 
freedom in deference to the common good. On one hand, parties should be able to 
negotiate and conclude contracts according to their will and own interests. On the other 
hand, they should respect the legitimate expectations of the other party.306 In other 
words, in order to make life in society viable there is the need for some degree of 
                                                                                                                                                    
the ground that this would be 'unconscionable' is sufficient to create uncertainty’. See Union Eagle Ltd v 
Golden Achievement Ltd [1997] AC 514 , 519. 
303 E.g., small businesses. 
304 Articles 423 and 424 of the Civil Code. 
305 Moura Vicente (n 290) 35. 
306 Ibid. 
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sacrifice of individual interests in favour of the interests of the collectivity. However the 
‘extent of this sacrifice will vary considerably in time and space’.307 
 
The recognition of a duty to negotiate in good faith by the Brazilian legal system reflects 
the influence of the culpa in contrahendo doctrine as well as the importance of the 
principle of the social function of the contracts.308 Therefore in Brazil there is a clear 
concern with the protection of the mutual trust and equilibrium between parties, even if 
this means interfering in their actions. 
 
By comparison in the common law the main objective of the law of contracts is to provide 
the essential conditions for the operation of the market and the economy through the 
observance of freedom of contract and the sanctity of contract.309 In this context parties 
are free to conclude or not a contract; hence they should not be liable before its 
conclusion.310 
 
Although the English law of contract does not prescribe a duty to negotiate in good faith, 
it may be influenced by European initiatives such as PECL and DCFR which make 
reference to this duty as part of the common core of European contract law and which 
reflect the civilian position.311  
 
Article 2:301 of the PECL (that inspired article II.–3:301 of the DCFR)312 tackles 
negotiations contrary to good faith and fair dealing. Under its paragraph (1) ‘a party is 
free to negotiate and is not liable for failure to reach an agreement’. This is consistent 
with the English law position according to which there is no liability at negotiation stage. 
 
However, paragraph (2) provides that ‘a party who has negotiated or broken off 
negotiations contrary to good faith and fair dealing is liable for the losses caused to the 
other party’. This provision is incompatible with the Walford313 position as it prescribes the 
‘pre-contractual liability role’ of good faith in the context of negotiations.314 According to 
                                                 
307 Ibid. 35-36. 
308 This principle can be expressly found in article 421 of the Civil Code. 
309 Brownsword, Contract Law: Themes for the Twenty-first Century (n 127) 50-53. 
310 Carter and Furmston, 'Good Faith and Fairness in the Negotiation of Contracts Part I' (n 94) 1. 
311 Both PECL and DCFR are a result of discussions and studies of eminent jurists and academics from various 
European countries which led to the inclusion of concepts and principles typical of civil law. 
312 Art. II.–3:301 DCFR (on negotiations contrary to good faith and fair dealing). 
313 Walford v Miles [1992] 2 AC 128. 
314 According to Carter and Furmston the ‘pre-contractual liability’ provides a basis for relief when one the 
parties withdraw from negotiations and it includes: remedial consequences for the breach of a contractual or 
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this role the defaulting party has to pay damages to the other party in order to 
compensate for the loss incurred.315 
 
Finally, paragraph (3) prescribes that ‘it is contrary to good faith and fair dealing, in 
particular, for a party to enter into or continue negotiations with no real intention of 
reaching an agreement with the other party’. If the termination of the negotiations was 
caused by bad faith, parties should be obliged to continue such negotiations in 
accordance with the ‘preservation role’ of good faith.316 Nevertheless if parties were acting 
in good faith they should be allowed to withdraw from the negotiations even if expenses 
were already incurred in reliance that the contract would be agreed.317 
 
2.5. Conclusion 
 
In general business parties should be free to pursue their own interests; however 
agreements and other types of relationships have inevitably ‘the capacity to affect 
adversely the interests of the other. Expectations can be thwarted, obligations ignored, 
vulnerability exploited, legitimate interests disregarded, powers exercised harshly, and so 
on.’318 It is difficult to draw a line when the law should interfere.  
 
Finn proposed that the idea of ‘basic fairness’ should limit a party’s decision or action 
which directly affects the interests of the other.319 Similarly Adams and Brownsword 
suggested that the ‘pursuit of self-interest is permissible only so long as it is compatible 
with the legitimate interests of others’.320 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
non-contractual duty of good faith and invocation of promissory estoppels. It also includes claims for 
restitution based of the lack of good faith (when one party has conferred benefits to the other during 
negotiations). See Carter and Furmston, 'Good Faith and Fairness in the Negotiation of Contracts Part I' (n 94) 
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the context of an existing contractual relation. See Carter and Furmston, 'Good Faith and Fairness in the 
Negotiation of Contracts Part II' (n 224) 100. In Jorden v Money (1854) 5 HL Cas 185 , 881 Lord Cranworth 
LC observed that there is ‘a principle well known in the law, founded upon good faith and equity’. 
315 Quagliato (n 82) 215. 
316 Furmston, Norisada and Poole, Contract Formation and Letters of Intent: A Comparative Assessment (n 
84) 275. Additionally Furmston and Tolhurst suggested that in Hillas (WN) & Co Ltd v Arcos Ltd (1932) 147 LT 
503 (HL) the House of Lords decided that judges may imply terms into a contract based on the past dealings 
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in Walford v Miles. See Furmston and Tolhurst, Contract Formation: Law and Practice (n 237) 378. 
317 Parties are aware that negotiations always imply costs, but they intend to recoup expenses ‘from contracts 
which result from successful negotiation’. See Carter and Furmston, 'Good Faith and Fairness in the 
Negotiation of Contracts Part I' (n 94) 8. 
318 Paul Finn, 'Commerce, the Common Law and Morality' (1989-1990) 17 MULR 87, 95. 
319 Ibid.  
320 Brownsword, 'Two Concepts of Good Faith' (n 160) 215. 
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Therefore the English and Brazilian legal systems interfere in the freedom of contract in 
B2B agreements when they deem it necessary to prevent one party from harming the 
interests of the other. Among the tools employed in such intervention are the 
reasonableness test of UCTA and the concept of good faith of the Brazilian Civil Code. 
Bridge contended that the application of undefined standards however, may not be 
appropriate to regulate commercial relationships.321 He argued that their vagueness gives 
too much leeway to judges who can interpret them according to their own convictions 
and beliefs, rendering their decisions unpredictable.322 
 
Nonetheless ‘where the parties are free and equal, they make little use of contract law’,323 
because a legal action implies high costs and may not provide the remedy that parties 
were expecting. For this reason the latter may prefer to settle eventual disputes ‘in their 
own way’ or through the use of ‘customs of trade’.324 Even in the case of breach of 
contract they may opt for non-legal sanctions in the first instance (e.g., ‘informal 
blacklisting’) because a legal action ‘often results in a “divorce” ending the “marriage” 
between the two businesses’.325 Therefore in order to preserve long-term relationships a 
business may avoid litigation or may adjust agreements in the case of the emergence of 
unexpected contingencies that impose an extra burden to the other party.326  
 
Moreover more recently businesses have considered it more advantageous to behave 
according to a cooperativist ethic which takes into account the other party’s interests with 
a view to ‘obtaining mutual profits’.327 A cooperative relationship is conduct by a general 
norm of fairness and the individual self-interest is replaced by a ‘common interest’ attitude 
to contracts.328 Such rationale of cooperation has been also applied in the context of 
                                                 
321 Bridge (n 221) 140. 
322 Ibid.  
323 Brownsword, Contract Law: Themes for the Twenty-first Century (n 127) 37. Similarly Lewis observed that 
‘there is also work which shows businesses to be reluctant to use the law in their relationships’. See P. Lewis, 
'Small Firms and Their Difficulties with Contractual Relationships: Implications for Legal Policy' (2004) 33 
Comm L World Rev 81, 83. 
324 Macaulay (n 164) 61. 
325 Ibid. 65. 
326 Robert A Hillman, 'Court Adjustment of Long-Term Contracts: An Analysis under Modern Contract Law' 
(1987) 1987 Duke LJ 1, 5. 
327 Quagliato (n 82) 213. According to Axelrod ‘ordinary business transactions are also based upon the idea 
that a continuing relationship allows cooperation to develop without the assistance of a central authority. Even 
though the courts do provide a central authority for the resolution of business disputes, this authority is 
usually not invoked (...). The fairness of the transaction is guaranteed not by the threat of a legal suit, but 
rather by the anticipation of mutually rewarding transactions in the future’. See Robert Axelrod, The Evolution 
of Co-operation (Penguin 1990) 178-179. See Carvajal-Arenas and Maniruzzaman (n 83). 
328 David Campbell and Donald Harris, 'Flexibility in Long-Term Contractual Relationships: The Role of Co-
operation' (1993) 20 J Law & Soc 166, 167-168. 
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international business contracts and parties have ‘voluntarily incorporated good faith’329 in 
their agreements for the sake of their long-term relationships.330 
 
Such position is consistent with the current legislation that imposes controls on the 
adversarial ethic in bargains and prescribes that parties should act with loyalty and not 
obstruct or prevent the faithful compliance of the contract.331 For instance a duty to 
cooperate is expressly prescribed by the Principles of International Commercial Contracts 
(PICC) and Principles of European Contract Law (PECL).332 Additionally according to recital 
31 of the Proposal for a Regulation on a Common European Sales Law (CESL) ‘the 
principle of good faith and fair dealing should provide guidance on the way parties have 
to cooperate’. 
 
Therefore in contractual relationships an environment of trust may be more fruitful to 
both parties as it involves fewer risks and protect legitimate expectations. It also ensures 
that businesses will mutually benefit from the agreement. For this reason the legislative 
controls on unfairness may contribute to the balance and stability of contractual 
relationships which many businesses aspire to. 
 
                                                 
329 Lord Justice Rix observed that ‘commercial contracts assume such good faith, which is why express 
language requiring it is so rare’. See Socimer International Bank Ltd (In Liquidation) v Standard Bank London 
Ltd (No.2) [2008] EWCA Civ 116 , 116. 
330 According to Carvajal-Arenas and Maniruzzaman ‘good faith should be considered a framework of 
relationship between the parties to a contract and cooperation is the vehicle to maintain it’. See Carvajal-
Arenas and Maniruzzaman (n 83). 
331 See Balbino (n 93) 115. In Brazil good faith is expressly applied in B2B contracts and it entails a duty of 
cooperation between contractual parties. Although in England there is no provision of the application of good 
faith in the context of B2B contracts, more recently it has been accepted that parties should act in 
cooperation. See Rawls (n 69) 10-13. 
332 In the words of article 1:202 of PECL: ‘each party owes to the other a duty to co-operate in order to give 
full effect to the contract’. In addition article 1:301(4) of the same principles stipulates that the meaning of 
‘non-performance’ includes the ‘failure to co-operate in order to give full effect to the contract’. Article 5.3 of 
PICC prescribes that ‘each party shall cooperate with the other party when such co-operation may reasonably 
be expected for the performance of that party’s obligations’. 
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CHAPTER 3. ANALYSIS OF THE LEGISLATIVE CONTROLS ON UNFAIRNESS IN 
CONSUMER CONTRACTS IN ENGLAND AND BRAZIL 
 
3.1. Context 
 
As was seen in the previous chapter, freedom of contract prevails in agreements where 
parties are in a relatively equal position, thus it is still applicable in the context of business 
contracts when parties have equivalent bargaining strength. However the reality of 
consumer contracts is usually different. 
 
Beale observed that often consumers do not fully understand the meaning of contractual 
terms and may consider it not worth the time and cost to achieve a greater 
comprehension of such terms. They may prefer to evaluate other qualities of the product 
that can be readily assessed such as appearance and price.333 For most consumers, the 
price is particularly influential to their decision and sellers and suppliers are well aware of 
that.334 For this reason in order to offer competitive prices and reduce costs, sellers and 
suppliers may shift risks to consumers through the inclusion of harsh terms and 
exemption clauses which are frequently overlooked.335 
 
Moreover even when consumers are able to understand the content of the terms, they 
‘lack the power to have the contract changed’.336 Suppliers generally are not willing to 
alter a standard form contract for individual consumers, because it is impractical and 
involves extra costs; hence consumers are usually faced with a ‘take it or leave it’ 
situation.337 
 
Those circumstances have led to the need for state intervention to restore the balance in 
consumer agreements. As a result, domestic legislatures (such as England and Brazil) and 
regional trade agreements (e.g., European Union and Mercosul) have enacted legislation 
                                                 
333 Hugh Beale, 'Legislative Control of Fairness: The Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts' in J 
Beatson and D Friedman (eds), Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law (Clarendon Press 1997) 232. 
334 As it will be analysed latter the Law Commission recently proposed that the price should be ‘transparent 
and prominent’ because consumers ‘should know what they have to pay and what they will receive in return’. 
See Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts: A New Approach? (Law Com No 292, 2012) para 
8.26.  
335 Beale, 'Legislative Control of Fairness: The Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts' (n 333) 232. 
336 Nebbia (n 120) 103.  
337 See Suisse Atlantique Société d'Armement Maritime S.A. Appellants v N.V. Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale 
Respondents [1967] 1 AC 361, 406. 
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whose primarily objective is the protection of consumers against unfairness in contracts 
and the re-establishment of the contractual balance.  
 
Marques remarked that this interventionist approach reflected the introduction of a social 
conception of the contract which takes into account not only the agreement between 
parties but also its effects on the society. For this reason the law has protected certain 
social interests such as the trust between parties, legitimate expectations and good 
faith.338  
 
3.2. Legislative control on unfairness in consumer contracts in England 
 
English law has been exposed to the influence of the European law in particular in the 
area of consumer protection.339 Consequently a considerable amount of legislation in this 
area results from the implementation of EU directives (e.g., Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts Regulations 1999 and the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 
2008). It is therefore essential to analyse the consumer acquis prior to the examination of 
B2C contracts in the context of the English legal system. 
 
3.2.1. The influence of European law 
 
‘Consumer acquis’ may be defined as the cumulative body of European legislation and 
case law in the area of consumer protection. Since 1985 the EU has adopted various 
directives to regulate different aspects of consumer relationships that include: Doorstep 
Selling Directive (85/577/EEC); Consumer Credit Directive (87/102/EEC); Package Travel 
Directive (90/314/EEC); Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive (93/13/EEC); 
Distance Selling Directive (97/7/EC); Price Indication Directive (98/6/EC); Injunctions 
Directive (98/27/EC) and Consumer Sales Directive (99/44/EC).340 
 
Directive 93/13/EEC is certainly the most relevant one for the purpose of the present 
study because it regulates terms on the basis of their ‘unfairness’ and has introduced the 
                                                 
338 Claudia Lima Marques, Contratos no Código de Defesa do Consumidor (6th edn, Revista dos Tribunais 
2011) 210. 
339 Poole, Textbook on Contract Law (n 78) 16. 
340 ‘The existing European consumer acquis is based on art. 3(t), 153 and 95 of the EC Treaty. According to 
these provisions, “the contribution to the strengthening of consumer protection falls among the activities of 
the European Community”, which has the right to take measures for the accomplishment of this objective.’ 
Zabia Vernadak, 'Consumer Protection and the Reform of the European Consumer Acquis' (2010) 21(9) ICCLR 
316, 317. 
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concept of good faith in this context.341 In addition to this type of directive which contains 
a broader regulation of terms; other directives are limited to specific sectors or selling 
methods (e.g., Directive on Distance Selling) or provide enforcement mechanisms 
(Directive on Injunctions).342  
 
These assorted types of directives however did not cover all key areas of consumer 
protection and the way they interacted with each other was far from straightforward.343 In 
order to address such fragmentation of the regulations of B2C contracts within the EU, in 
2001 the European Commission issued the Green Paper on European Consumer 
Protection in which it suggested the development of a ‘framework directive for fair 
commercial practices’ to improve the consistency of the rules.344  
 
As a result, the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (UCPD)345 was adopted in 2005 and 
it was transposed into English law via the ‘Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading 
Regulations 2008’ (CPRs).346 The CPRs prohibit unfair commercial practices (activities 
related to the promotion, sale or supply of a product to consumers) in consumer 
contracts. Those practices are categorised as misleading actions or omissions347 and 
aggressive practices348 which are assessed according to the effect that they may have on 
the behaviour of the ‘average consumer’.349  
 
                                                 
341 ‘The concept of “good faith” can be found in many acquis provisions. This is not surprising, because it is a 
notion found in most EU jurisdictions, although the common law continues to resist the adoption of a broad 
general “good faith” principle’. See Christian Twigg-Flesner, 'Pre-Contractual Duties – From the Acquis to the 
Common Frame of Reference' in R Schulze (ed) Common Frame of Reference and Existing EC Contract Law 
(Sellier.European law 2008) 101. ‘Arguably the most significant contribution to general English contractual 
principles resulting from European directives and influence has been the introduction of the concept of “good 
faith”’. See Poole, Textbook on Contract Law (n 78) 19 and 267. 
342 See Commission, 'Green Paper on European Union Consumer Protection' COM (2001) 531 final para 2.2. 
343 Ibid.  
344 Ibid. para 4.1. 
345 European Parliament and Council Directive 2005/29/EC of 11 May 2005 on Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive [2005] OJ L149/22. 
346 (SI 2008/1277). 
347 In Case C-453/10 Jana Pereničová and Vladislav Perenič v SOS Financ Spol. s r.o. [2012] OJ C133/7 para 
48 the EU Court of Justice observed that ‘a commercial practice such as (...) indicating in a credit agreement 
an annual percentage rate of charge lower than the real rate must be regarded as “misleading” within the 
meaning of Article 6(1) of UCPD (...) in so far as it causes or is likely to cause the average consumer to take a 
transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise. It is for the national court to ascertain whether 
that is the case in the main proceedings’.  
348 In February 2011 a consumer (John Wigmore) won a court judgment against Safestyle (UK) which ignored 
his request of not being disturbed at his home by frequently visits of salesmen (‘cold-callers’) who were 
dealing on behalf of the defendant. The company was fined £4,000, ordered to pay £18,013 costs and a £15 
victims’ surcharge. It has been considered a landmark ruling as it is the first case in which a company has 
been convicted under the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 and it represents an 
important step for consumer protection against harassment and other unfair commercial practices. 
349 According to reg. 2(2) of the CPRs an ‘average consumer’ is ‘reasonably well informed, reasonably 
observant and circumspect’. 
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A practice that is not considered misleading or aggressive may still be regarded as unfair 
under the general clause of reg. 3, provided that it fulfils two cumulative criteria: be 
contrary to the requirement of professional diligence and materially distorts (or be likely 
to) the average consumer’s economic behaviour.350 There are also 31 practices prescribed 
in Schedule 1 that are banned outright under the CPRs (e.g. falsely stating limited offers, 
pyramid schemes, direct exhortation to children).351 
 
Moreover the CPRs prescribe in its part 3 that most breaches of the prohibition on unfair 
commercial practices are criminal offences punishable by fine or imprisonment. Therefore 
certain unfair terms that can mislead consumers ‘are not only unfair but potentially 
criminally unfair’352 and as a consequence ‘such terms could give rise to enforcement 
action under the CPRs as well as, or instead of, the Regulations.’353 
 
The UCPD adopts a maximum harmonisation clause that prohibits Member States to apply 
measures more protective of consumers than the one prescribed by the directive to 
ensure more consistency among EU regulations.354 Prior to UCPD, directives used to adopt 
a minimum harmonisation approach which allowed Member States to provide greater 
protection to consumers; thus they did not promote the ‘uniformity of solutions for similar 
situations that the internal market would require’.355 The minimum harmonisation clauses 
were therefore another factor that contributed to the lack of harmony among the 
consumer protection legislation of the Member States.  
 
Those inconsistencies within the consumer acquis have led to its undergoing review.356 As 
part of this review, the European Commission issued a Proposal for a Directive on 
                                                 
350 Health and Consumer Protection Directorate-General of the European Commission, The Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive: New Laws to Stop Unfair Behaviour Towards Consumers (2006) 14-15.  
351 Ibid. 20-25. 
352 Oliver Bray and Lisa-Jayne Pickford, 'The UTCCRs: Coming to Terms with a Grey Area' (2009) 15(2) CTLR 
26, 26. 
353 Office of Fair Trading, Unfair Contract Terms Guidance (September 2008) 12. 
354 Department for Business Innovation & Skills (BIS), Review of the Eight EU Consumer Acquis Minimum 
Harmonisation Directives and their Implementation in the UK and Analysis of the Scope for Simplification 
(URN 05/1951, 2005). 
355 Commission, 'Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: A More 
Coherent European Contract Law: An Action Plan' COM (2003) 68 final para 24. 
356 In 2004 the Commission launched the review of the consumer acquis in its 'Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: European Contract Law and the Revision of the 
Acquis: the Way Forward' COM (2004) 651 final paras 3-5. Such review is part of a plan to increase the 
coherence of the European contract law. In 2006 the Commission published a 'Green Paper on the Review of 
the Consumer Acquis' COM (2006) 744 final to collect views about the review. 
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Consumer Rights in 2008357 which intended to merge four existing EU consumer 
directives358 that adopt minimum harmonisation clauses and put forward a measure of 
maximum harmonisation. Such measure was criticised by consumer lawyers on the basis 
that Member States should be able to adopt higher standards of consumer protection 
according to the public interest of their country.359  
 
Nonetheless the Directive on Consumer Rights (2011/83/EU)360 was adopted in October 
2011 by the EU’s Council of Ministers361 and although its draft in principle proposed to 
repeal and replace the Directive 93/13/EEC, in practice it made only a minimal 
amendment to its article 8 which requires Member States to inform the European 
Commission about the adoption of more stringent provisions that ensure a higher degree 
of consumer protection.362 This Directive has to be transposed into the national legislation 
of the Member States before the end of 2013.  
 
In parallel to those developments the European Commission launched a review of the 
European contract law through the publication of a Communication on European Contract 
Law in 2001363 which suggested possible solutions to problems that result from 
divergences between the contract law of Member States. The suggestions varied from 
one extreme of leaving problems to be dealt by the market to the other of adopting an EU 
Contract Code.  
 
There are also intermediate solutions that may be considered less controversial. The first 
one is the development of common non-binding contract law principles which may be 
satisfied by the UNIDROIT Principles on International Commercial Contracts (PICC)364 as 
                                                 
357 Commission, 'Proposal for a Directive on Consumer Rights' COM (2008) 614 final. In 2009 the Government 
published a response to this proposal though the White Paper ‘Department for Business, Innovation and Skills 
(BIS), A Better Deal for Consumers: Delivering Real Help Now and Change for the Future (Cm 7669, 2009), 
which focused on four key themes: real help now for vulnerable consumers; a new approach to consumer 
credit; empowering consumers through better enforcement and information and modernising consumer law. 
358 Consumer Sales and Guarantees (99/44/EC); Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Terms (93/13/EEC); 
Distance Selling (97/7/EC); Doorstep Selling (85/577/EEC). As the review included the Directive 93/13/EEC 
the Law Commission Proposal on Unfair Terms in Contracts is on hold. 
359 See Brownsword, 'Maps, Methodologies, and Critiques: Confessions of a Contract Lawyer' (n 235) 151-152. 
360 Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer 
rights [2011] OJ L304/64. 
361 The Directive on Consumer Rights (2011/83/EU) amended the Directives 93/13/EEC and 99/44/EC and 
repealed the Directives 85/577/EEC and 97/7/EC. 
362 Which ultimately allows the adoption of a minimum harmonisation clause. See article 32 of the Directive on 
Consumer Rights (2011/83/EU). 
363 Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on 
European Contract Law’ COM (2001) 398 final. 
364 UNIDROIT (International Institute for the Unification of Private Law) published in 1994 the Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts which aim to establish a set of rules for international commercial contracts 
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well as by the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL) which were already underway 
when the Communication was issued.365 The latter were produced by the Commission on 
European Contract Law (‘Lando Commission’) and ‘are intended to be applied as general 
rules of contract law in the European Union’.366 Picat and Soccio observed that although 
those principles are not legally enforceable (‘soft law’),367 they ‘are an excellent 
instrument for information on the fundamental concepts and common principles prevailing 
in contract law in Member States’; but ‘as a whole, these Principles remain too incomplete 
and abstract to provide solutions’.368  
 
The other intermediate suggested solution is to review and improve existing EU legislation 
in the area of contract law to make it more coherent. The ‘Action Plan’ issued by the 
European Commission in 2003 was in line with this solution and it proposed the creation 
of a Common Frame of Reference (CFR).369 This 2003 Communication noted that ‘the 
reform of the European legislation on consumer’ should be ‘a priority policy area (...) for 
the update and simplification of the Community acquis’.370 
 
Following the ‘Action Plan’, the Commission released a second Communication in 2004 
(‘The Way Forward’)371 which outlined the development of the CFR. The purpose of the 
Common Frame of Reference is to improve the quality of legislation and the coherence of 
the current and future European contract law through the establishment of principles, 
terminologies and model rules.372 In other words, ‘the principal goal for the CFR--it is to 
serve as a terminological model in the drafting and revision of European legislation, in this 
way improving the functioning of the internal market by way of the resulting benefits for 
                                                                                                                                                    
which can be applied in any jurisdiction irrespectively of its legal tradition. They were developed by jurists 
from different jurisdictions, including Professor Luiz Olavo Baptista from Brazil (University of São Paulo) and 
Professor Michael P. Furmston (University of Bristol). 
365 PECL are composed by three parts and were published in three phases: part I in 1995, part II in 2000 and 
part III in 2003. ‘These principles remain broadly inspired (i) by the CISG and (ii) by the UNIDROIT Principles 
on international commercial contracts’. See Marc Picat and Stessie Soccio, 'Harmonisation of European 
Contract Law: Fiction or Reality?' (2011) 4 IBLJ 371, 375. 
366 Article 1:101(1) of PECL. 
367 Article 1:101(2) of PECL: these principles will only bind parties when they ‘have agreed to incorporate 
them into their contract or that their contract is to be governed by them’.  
368 Picat and Soccio (n 365) 375. 
369 Commission, 'Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: A More 
Coherent European Contract Law: An Action Plan' COM (2003) 68 final. 
370 Vernadak (n 340) 318.  
371 Commission, 'Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: European 
Contract Law and the Revision of the Acquis: the Way Forward' COM (2004) 651 final. 
372 Study Group on a European Civil Code and Research Group on EC Private Law (Acquis Group), Principles, 
Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law: Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) - Outline 
Edition (2009). 
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consistency’.373 It may also be used as ‘basis for possible optional instruments of 
European contract law’ or even to its unification.374 
 
In 2009 a Draft of the Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) was published and it was 
based in part on the PECL.375 The DCFR ‘is intended to be an amalgam of best solutions 
taken from both national law and the acquis’;376 but the House of Lords is still sceptical 
about its application as well as the creation of an EU Contract Code and remarked that:  
 
How far the DCFR will be used as the basis for a European Union instrument, and 
what form such an instrument might take, is still undecided. The development of a 
harmonised code of European contract law (to which we remain opposed) appears 
to be off any foreseeable agenda.377 
 
Nevertheless, England cannot ignore the growing influence of the European law over its 
domestic law of contract. The latter will be increasingly exposed to concepts and 
principles typical of civil law which is the legal system that prevails among Member States. 
For the purpose of this work, the incorporation of ‘good faith’ into English law was used 
as a prominent example of such influence.378379  
 
In 2010 the European Commission launched a Green Paper to consult relevant 
stakeholders about ‘policy options for progress towards a European Contract Law for 
consumers and businesses’.380 This Commission proposed a range of options for a 
European Contract Law instrument,381 which included the set up of an Expert Group ‘to 
                                                 
373 See Lucinda Miller, 'The Common Frame of Reference and the Feasibility of a Common Contract Law in 
Europe' (2007) Jun JBL 378, 381. 
374 Dirk Staudenmayer, 'European Contract Law – What Does It Mean and What Does It Not Mean?' in S 
Vogenauer and S Weatherill (eds), The Harmonisation of European Contract Law: Implications for European 
Private Laws, Business and Legal Practice (Hart 2006) 242. 
375 The DCFR has an ‘almost identical structure as the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL)’, but the 
latter ‘have been elaborated with a clear objective in mind--the first step towards use as “a basis for a 
European Code of Contracts’. See Miller (n 373) 382. 
376 Twigg-Flesner (n 341) 99. 
377 European Union Committee, European Contract Law: the Draft Common Frame of Reference (Report with 
Evidence) (HL 2008-09, 95). 
378 ‘In many laws the principle [good faith] is accepted as fundamental, but it is not accorded the same 
recognition in the laws of all the Member States’. See Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European 
Private Law: Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) - Outline Edition (n 372) [72]. ‘Some see these 
frequent references to good faith and fair dealing as the Achilles' heel of the Draft, making it difficult to accept 
especially for lawyers in England’. See Carvajal-Arenas and Maniruzzaman (n 83). 
379 Such concept is expressly prescribed by PECL and DCFR as a general clause applicable in the formation, 
performance and enforcement of the contract. See articles 1:102, 1:201, 1:305, 2:301, 4:110 of the PECL and 
articles I. – 1:103 and II. – 1:102 of the DCFR. 
380 Commission, 'Green Paper on policy options for progress towards a European Contract Law for consumers 
and businesses' COM (2010) 348 final. 
381 The proposed options were: Option 1: Publication of the results of the Expert Group; Option 2: An official 
'toolbox' for the legislator; Option 3: Commission Recommendation on European Contract Law; Option 4: 
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study the feasibility of a user-friendly instrument of European Contract Law’ which would 
benefit consumers and businesses.382 The results of this study were published in May 
2011 but they were received with ‘a lot of scepticism amongst stakeholders’.383 The 
suggested implementation of a European Contract Law or a European Civil Code was 
rejected; hence ‘real harmonisation is excluded’.384 Consequently the proposals which may 
have a higher probability of being adopted are: an official 'toolbox' for the legislator, 
which may be satisfied by the adoption of the ‘Common Frame of Reference’ and/or an 
optional instrument of European Contract Law.385 
 
The latter option in its turn may be fulfilled by the Regulation on a Common European 
Sales Law (CESL)386 which was proposed by the European Commission in October 2011. 
This regulation prescribes optional common rules of contract law that parties ‘may choose 
to use to govern their cross-border sales and supply contracts’ which would work as a 
28th regime of contract law alongside the contract law of the 27 EU Member States.387 It 
contains provisions that expressly tackle unfair terms in ‘contracts between a trader and a 
consumer’ which resemble articles 3 and 4 of the Directive 93/13/EEC388 but they make 
express reference to the duty of transparency. It also prescribes a black list of ‘contract 
terms which are always unfair’ and a grey list of ‘contract terms which are presumed to 
be unfair’ that include provisions already prescribed in the annex of Directive 93/13/EEC 
(Schedule 2 of the Regulations) and a few others.389 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
Regulation setting up an optional instrument of European Contract Law; Option 5: Directive on European 
Contract Law; Option 6: Regulation establishing a European Contract Law; Option 7: Regulation establishing a 
European Civil Code. See Ibid. para 4.1. 
382 Ibid. para 2. 
383 Carvajal-Arenas and Maniruzzaman (n 83). 
384 Ibid.  
385 Ibid. See Commission, 'Green Paper on policy options for progress towards a European Contract Law for 
consumers and businesses' COM (2010) 348 final para 4.1. 
386 Commission, 'Proposal for a Regulation on a Common European Sales Law' COM (2011) 635 final. 
387 Poole, Textbook on Contract Law (n 78) 15. The CESL covers sale of goods, supply of digital content and 
provision of related services. See article 1 of the Commission, 'Proposal for a Regulation on a Common 
European Sales Law' COM (2011) 635 final. 
388 Art. 83 of CESL: 1. ‘In a contract between a trader and a consumer, a contract term supplied by the trader 
which has not been individually negotiated within the meaning of Article 7 is unfair for the purposes of this 
Section if it causes a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising under the contract, to 
the detriment of the consumer, contrary to good faith and fair dealing. 2. When assessing the unfairness of a 
contract term for the purposes of this Section, regard is to be had to: (a) whether the trader complied with 
the duty of transparency set out in Article 82; (b) the nature of what is to be provided under the contract; (c) 
the circumstances prevailing during the conclusion of the contract; (d) to the other contract terms; and (e) to 
the terms of any other contract on which the contract depends’. 
389 For instance they considered unfair contract terms which ‘oblige the consumer to pay for goods, digital 
content or related services not actually delivered, supplied or rendered’ or ‘inappropriately exclude or limit the 
right to set-off claims that the consumer may have against the trader against what the consumer may owe to 
the trader’. Article 84 (j) and 85 (c) of the Regulation on a Common European Sales Law respectively. 
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Nonetheless Picat and Soccio argued that a ‘non-binding instrument would have no direct 
effect on national contract laws’ thus they ‘do not enable the ambitious project of the 
European Commission to standardise or harmonise contract law to be realised’.390 
 
3.2.2. The English law on unfairness in B2C contracts 
 
As seen in chapter 2 the controls prescribed by the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 are 
mainly limited to exemption clauses. The Directive 93/13/EEC later introduced further 
controls on unfairness applicable more generally to ‘unfair terms’ in the context of 
consumer contracts. This directive was transposed into English law by the Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts Regulations 1994 which was replaced by the UTCCR 1999.391 As will 
be analysed in chapter 5, there are numerous issues arising from overlapping and 
inconsistencies between UCTA and the UTCCR. For this reason in 2005 the Law 
Commission published recommendations which aim to unify the regimes of those unfair 
terms legislation to provide more coherence to the law. In view of the case law developed 
since then, in July 2012 the Law Commission proposed a review and update of these 
recommendations. This review was open for consultation until 25 October 2012 and it ‘will 
be followed by an Advice to the Department for Business Innovation and Skills in spring 
2013’.392 The consultation involves discussions such as whether the list of Schedule 2 of 
the Regulations should be re-written and whether new legislation should cover non-
negotiated and negotiated terms in B2C contracts.393 
 
In addition to the Law Commission’s recommendations, the Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills (BIS) proposed a Consumer Bill of Rights in September 2011 which 
purports to reform the current pieces of consumer legislation in the UK because they are 
‘fragmented, overlapping and often expressed in complex language that is difficult for 
consumers and business to understand.’394 The first steps towards such reform include: 
                                                 
390 See Picat and Soccio (n 365) 395. 
391 The Directive on Certain Aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees, SCGD 
(99/44/EC) which was implemented by the Sale and Supply of Goods to Consumers Regulations 2002 ‘also 
requires Member States to ensure that certain types of limitation and exclusion clauses in consumer contracts 
are invalid’. See Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Contracts (Law Com CP No 166, 2002) para 1.4.  
392 See <http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/areas/unfair_terms_in_contracts.htm> accessed 26 July 2012. 
393 See Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts: A New Approach? (Law Com No 292, 2012) 
paras 9.36, 9.53, 10.15 and 10.17. 
394 See <http://www.bis.gov.uk/policies/consumer-issues/consumer-rights> accessed 10 October 2011. This 
Consumer Bill of Rights will affect secondary legislation (Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 
1999, Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts (Amendment) Regulations 2001 and Sale and Supply of Goods to 
Consumers Regulations 2002) and primary legislation (Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973, Unfair 
Contract Terms Act 1977, Sale of Goods Act 1979, Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 and Sale and 
Supply of Goods and Services Act 1994). See Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), Enhancing 
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the consultation on the consolidation and modernisation of consumer law enforcement 
powers and the Law Commission’s consultation and report on Misleading and Aggressive 
Practices. The latter resulted in the publication of the Report on Consumer Redress395 by 
the Law Commission in March 2012 which recommended the enactment of ‘new 
legislation to provide redress to consumers who experience misleading and aggressive 
practices in their dealings with traders’ in order to ‘clarify and simplify the current law on 
misleading practices, and to improve the law on aggressive practices by filling the gaps in 
the current law’.396 
 
Furthermore in July 2012 the government launched a new consultation 'Enhancing 
Consumer Confidence by Clarifying Consumer Law' concerning the Consumer Bill of 
Rights, seeking ‘views on strengthening and modernising consumer law’ in particular ‘on 
rights and remedies for goods and services and digital content supplied under a 
contract’.397 Due to the ongoing consultations it is still unclear how the new 
recommendations of the Law Commission (which may follow the consultation process) 
and the proposed Consumer Bill of Rights will interact with each other. Although the latter 
partly share a similar objective with the former, i.e. the enactment of a more coherent 
and clearer legislation to govern B2C contracts, the Law Commission recommendations 
also include provisions which cover B2B and small business contracts and the ‘primary 
legislation that apply to business to business transactions’ is outside the scope of the 
Consumer Bill of Rights.398  
 
Nonetheless in its response to the Law Commission consultation, the Law Society 
contended that the proposed reform to unfair terms in contracts legislation ‘should be 
focused solely on consumer contracts’ due to existing doctrinal distinctions between rules 
which govern B2C and B2B contracts; hence they ‘urge that the business relevant clauses 
of the Law Commissions draft bill be left out of this reform to the UTCCRs’.399 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
Consumer Confidence by Clarifying Consumer Law: Consultation on the Supply of Goods, Services and Digital 
Content (July 2012) 225. 
395 Law Commission, Consumer Redress for Misleading and Aggressive Practices (Law Com No 332, 2012). 
396 Ibid. para 22. 
397 See <http://www.bis.gov.uk/news/topstories/2012/Jul/consumer-bill-of-rights> accessed 08 August 2012. 
This consultation is open until 05 of October 2012. See also Department for Business, Innovation and Skills 
(BIS), Enhancing Consumer Confidence by Clarifying Consumer Law: Consultation on the Supply of Goods, 
Services and Digital Content (July 2012). 
398 See Ibid. 225. 
399 Response by the Law Society to Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts: A New Approach? 
Issues Paper (Law Com No 292, 2012) para 9. 
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3.2.2.1. Defining consumer 
 
In the context of UCTA, in order to determine who deals as a consumer it is necessary to 
establish who makes a contract in the course of a business as both definitions are 
intrinsically correlated. In the words of section 12(1) a party ‘deals as consumer’ if he 
does not make the contract in the course of a business or holds him out as doing so; the 
other party does make the contract in the course of a business; and if the consumer is 
not an individual the goods should be of a type ordinarily supplied for private use or 
consumption.400 Therefore under UCTA a company can deal as a consumer as long as it 
does not make the contract in the course of a business.  
 
The meaning of ‘in the course of a business’ however is not unequivocal; hence it has 
been subject of judicial consideration. According to R&B Customs Brokers Co Ltd v United 
Dominions Trust Ltd401 a degree of regularity is needed for an activity be considered an 
integral part of the business for the purpose of section 12 of UCTA.402 Similarly, Davies v 
Sumner403 ‘overlooks the width of the phrase at issue and appears to revert to a narrow 
definition of business as only applicable to the actual business in dispute and to the goods 
normally dealt with in that business’.404 In line with this view a company will not make a 
contract ‘in the course of a business’ in transactions merely incidental to the business; in 
which case it may ‘deal as a consumer’ and protected accordingly. 
 
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal adopted a broader approach for this phrase in 
Stevenson v Rogers.405 It concluded that in the context of section 14(2) of the Sale of 
Goods Act 1979 a sale is made in the course of a seller’s business except when it is made 
‘outside the confines of the business.’406 Therefore even transactions ancillary to the 
scope of a business are also considered to be made ‘in the course of a business’; thus 
there is no need to determine the regularity of the activity. Macdonald suggested that this 
approach is more appropriate than the narrow approach adopted in R&B Customs 
                                                 
400 There are exceptions in public auctions (s. 12(2)). However, is the person who claims that a party does not 
deal as consumer who has the burden of proof (s. 12(3)). 
401 [1988] 1 WLR 321 (CA). 
402 R&B Customs Brokers Co Ltd v United Dominions Trust Ltd [1988] 1 WLR 321 (CA) 331. 
403 [1984] 1 WLR 1301 (HL). 
404 Ian Brown, 'Business and Consumer Contracts' [1988] JBL 386, 391. 
405 [1999] QB 1028. 
406 Stevenson v Rogers [1999] QB 1028 , 1039. 
 - 95 -  
 
Brokers407 because otherwise it would allow ‘merely incidental, and not regularly 
occurring, business purchases’ to be protected as consumers.408  
 
However, in Feldarol Foundry Plc v Hermes Leasing (London) Ltd409 the Court of Appeal 
preferred to apply the R&B Customs Brokers test instead of the Stevenson v Rogers 
approach in the context of UCTA. Notwithstanding the above decision, the Law 
Commission recommended the adoption of the broader approach that is currently applied 
in the Regulations (reg. 3).410 It proposed that a ‘person who makes a contract to obtain 
goods or services “related to”, even if not “in the course of”, his business should be 
treated as dealing as a business and not as a consumer’.411 
 
By comparison with UCTA, the UTCCR 1999 regard as consumers only natural persons 
who in a contract act for purposes which are outside their trade, business or profession 
(reg. 3(1)); consequently for the purposes of the Regulations under no circumstances will 
businesses be deemed consumers. The Law Commission adopted a similar definition of 
‘consumer’ who is described by the ‘Unfair Contract Terms Bill’ as an individual (hence a 
‘natural person’) ‘who enters into a contract wholly or mainly for purposes unrelated to a 
business of his’ (clause 26).412 Furthermore the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading 
Regulations 2008 (CPRs) also define consumer as an individual ‘who in relation to a 
commercial practice is acting for purposes which are outside his business’ (reg. 2(1)).413 
 
3.2.2.2. Assessment of reasonableness 
 
The determination of the meaning of in the course of business as seen previously will 
enable the conclusion to be made as to whether a person is dealing as a consumer; which 
in its turn is essential to determine the application of section 3 of UCTA. This provision is 
                                                 
407 [1988] 1 WLR 321 (CA). 
408 See Elizabeth Macdonald, 'In the Course of a Business - A Fresh Examination' Web JCLI 
<http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/1999/issue3/macdonald3.html> accessed 08 April 2010. 
409 [2004] EWCA Civ 747. 
410 According to reg. 3(1) ‘“seller or supplier” means any natural or legal person who, in contracts covered by 
these Regulations, is acting for purposes relating to his trade, business or profession (...).’ 
411 Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Contracts (Law Com CP No 166, 2002) paras 3.94 and 5.12. See also 
para. 4.44 of Law Commission’s Report (Law Com No 292, 2005) and clause 26 of the respective draft Bill. 
412 In the words of the clause 26 (draft Bill) a “consumer contract” means a contract (other than one of 
employment) between— (a) an individual (“the consumer”) who enters into it wholly or mainly for purposes 
unrelated to a business of his, and (b) a person (“the business”) who enters into it wholly or mainly for 
purposes related to his business. 
413 Law Society contended ‘that the definition of consumer should be uniform across all consumer legislation’ 
and ‘this should be the EU definition’. See Response by the Law Society to Law Commission, Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts: A New Approach? Issues Paper (Law Com No 292, 2012) paras 47 and 48. 
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applicable to attempts to limit or exclude strict contractual liability414 in the occurrence of 
one of the qualifying conditions: when one of the contracting parties deals as consumer, 
or one business deals on the other’s written standard terms in a B2B contract.415  
 
Section 3 prescribes restrictions on the party who is in breach of contract to exclude or 
restrict his own liability; or claim to be entitled to provide performance substantially 
different from what is reasonably expected or to render no performance at all.416 Such 
restrictions are particularly important in B2C contracts to prevent sellers or suppliers from 
evading obligations. Those terms however will be valid if they satisfy the requirement of 
reasonableness which was examined in chapter 2. 
 
In the assessment of the reasonableness requirement courts tend to be more protective 
in contracts involving consumers. In Smith v Eric Bush417 the House of Lords held that a 
disclaimer of liability for the accuracy of the valuation report of a house for mortgage 
purposes was unreasonable because parties did not share equivalent bargaining strength. 
Similarly in St Albans City & District Council v International Computers Ltd,418 a ‘quasi-
consumer’ case, the Court of Appeal also adopted an interventionist approach due to the 
lack of bargaining power of a local authority in relation to a supplier of computer 
software. For that reason the limitation clause that purported to restrict the loss caused 
by an error of the software supplied by the defendant was held unreasonable. 
 
3.2.2.3. Assessment of fairness 
 
By comparison with UCTA, the test applied by UTCCR 1999 is of ‘fairness’ not 
‘reasonableness’. The application of the Regulations however is limited to non-individually 
negotiated terms in contracts between consumers and sellers or suppliers; whereas the 
provisions of UCTA also cover business contracts and negotiated terms. For this reason 
                                                 
414 Strict contractual obligations ‘must be performed completely and precisely to an absolute standard’, 
differently from qualified obligations that require only that the party ‘takes reasonable care or exercise 
reasonable skill in the performance of the contract’. See Poole, Textbook on Contract Law (n 78) 244. For the 
purpose of exemption clauses, qualified obligations are equate to negligence liability that is regulated by 
section 2 of the UCTA. 
415 If the breach of strict contractual obligations is related to sale and supply of goods, then sections 6 and 7 
of UCTA should be applied instead s. 3. According to s. 6(2) if a person is dealing as a consumer (in line with 
s. 12) then such obligations cannot be excluded or restricted; whereas under s. 6(3) in case of non-
consumers such obligations can be excluded or restricted if the clause is considered reasonable. 
416 According to Brownsword, the standards of reasonable expectation vary in different sectors, thus they 
need to be analysed case-by-case, what can be unpredictable. See Brownsword, Contract Law: Themes for 
the Twenty-first Century (n 127) 10. 
417 [1990] 1 AC 831, 858. 
418 [1996] 4 All ER 481 (CA), [1995] FSR 686. 
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the Law Commission proposed that the consumer regime should cover terms individually 
negotiated and non-individually negotiated so that the protection currently offered to 
consumers by the UCTA is not reduced.419 This recommendation is a positive step to 
increase the level of consumer protection because the weaker party can be influenced or 
persuaded to agree with an unjust term which may be regarded as negotiated. 
 
For the purpose of the Regulations a term is considered not individually negotiated ‘where 
it has been drafted in advance and the consumer has therefore not been able to influence 
the substance of the term’.420 Even if the consumer was able to influence a specific term 
or certain aspects of it, the Regulations will be still applicable to the rest of the contract if 
an overall assessment indicates that it is a pre-formulated standard contract.421 Otherwise 
sellers and suppliers would be able to easily circumvent the provisions of the UTCCR by 
negotiating an insignificant term and imposing harsh conditions on the remaining non-
negotiated terms. In other words this provision ‘is seeking to close a possible loophole 
whereby standard forms are deemed to be negotiated contracts (...) simply on the 
strength of one term in the contract being open to negotiation’.422 
 
As in practice B2C contracts are frequently drafted beforehand, they may usually be 
regarded as standard form contracts and subjected to the controls of the Regulations. 
Nonetheless consumers may consider that the pre-drafted terms suit their needs and can 
freely accept them, in which case they should not be considered unfair. Directive 
93/13/EEC and its respective Regulations’ ‘primary target is not [the] standard form as 
such, but unfair standard form dealing in the mass consumer market’.423 
 
Negotiated terms in their turn are not subject to the ‘fairness test’. Similarly core terms 
will not have their fairness assessed as long as they fulfil the transparency requirement;424 
which means to be written in plain and intelligible language in order to enable consumers 
                                                 
419 Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Contracts (Law Com No 292, 2005) para 3.55. 
420 See reg. 5(2). 
421 See reg. 5(3). 
422 Howells and Brownsword (n 193) 247. 
423 Brownsword, Howells and Wilhelmsson, 'Between Market and Welfare: Some Reflections on Article 3 of the 
EC Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts' (n 77) 27. 
424 Christian Twigg-Flesner, 'The Implementation of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive in the United 
Kingdom' (2006/7) CIL 235, 255. Schillig observed that a term which violates the principle of transparency is 
not automatically cancelled; instead under reg. 7(2) it can ‘be retained’ if interpreted in favour of the 
consumer. He added that ‘to interpret an ambiguous term in the most favourable way to the other party 
seems to set a powerful incentive for the seller or supplier to draft his terms in a clear and transparent 
fashion’. See Michael Schillig, 'Inequality of Bargaining Power Versus Market for Lemons: Legal Paradigm 
Change and the Court of Justice's Jurisprudence on Directive 93/13 on Unfair Contract Terms' (2008) 33 EL 
Rev 336, 351-352. 
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to understand their contents before agreeing with them.425 In Director General of Fair 
Trading v First National Bank plc426 this provision was used as a bank’s argument to avoid 
the application of the Regulations over a term which prescribed that interest was 
chargeable before and after the judgment on repayment in case of customer’s default; 
however the House of Lords considered that the term was incidental being ‘acutely aware 
of the need to adopt a restrictive approach to the notion of core term’.427 Although this 
court determined that UTCCR were applicable to the term in question, it also held that 
such term was not unfair as it was neither unbalanced nor detrimental to the consumer. 
 
In agreement with the above case and Bairstow Eves London Central v Smith,428 the 
interpretation of reg. 6(2) should be restrictive to avoid precluding the assessment of the 
unfairness of terms that are not strictly related to the subject matter of the contract. ‘We 
would expect a court minded to protect consumers to confine the main subject matter of 
the contract within the narrowest of bounds’ to allow the application of the fairness test 
over a greater number of terms.429 Otherwise this provision would be rendered inept for 
its protective purpose. 
 
More recently in Office of Fair Trading v Abbey National plc and Others430 it was discussed 
whether the OFT could assess the fairness of bank charges levied on customers’ personal 
accounts for unauthorised overdrafts under the Regulations. Although the Court of Appeal 
held that these charges could be subject to assessment for fairness, the Supreme Court 
reversed this decision based on reg. 6(2) of the UTCCR 1999. According to the latter, if 
overdraft fees constitute part of the price or bank’s remuneration, then they should be 
regarded as core terms and cannot be challenged.  
 
The decision in the above case gave rise to considerable uncertainty concerning the 
interpretation of reg. 6(2). As a result on 25 July 2012 the Law Commission published the 
issues paper 'Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts: A New Approach?’ containing new 
recommendations ‘on how the price and main subject matter exemption should be 
                                                 
425 Core terms are related to the definition of the main subject matter of the contract (goods or services) or to 
the adequacy of the price or remuneration. See reg. 6(2). The Directive 93/13/EEC purports to ensure that 
consumers have ‘access to all the information needed to arrive at his decision in full knowledge of the facts’. 
See Schillig (n 424) 351. 
426 [2001] UKHL 52, [2002] 1 AC 481 (HL). 
427 Twigg-Flesner, 'The Implementation of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive in the United Kingdom' , 246. 
428 [2004] EWHC 263 QB [25]. 
429 Howells and Brownsword (n 193) 251.  
430 [2009] UKSC 6, [2010] 1 AC 696, [2009] EWCA Civ 116. 
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interpreted’.431 For instance it was suggested that the exclusion of a price term from the 
fairness test should be made only if such term is ‘transparent and prominent’ and that it 
would be helpful to have statutory guidelines to clarify the meaning of both 
expressions.432 
 
3.2.2.4. Unfair terms 
 
The objective of the fairness test is to identify contractual terms which shall be regarded 
as unfair in order to declare them invalid. Reg. 5(1) defines unfair term as ‘a contractual 
term which has not been individually negotiated’ and ‘if, contrary to the requirement of 
good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations arising 
under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer’.  
 
Although it would be expected that an express definition of ‘unfair term’ would allow a 
clear understanding of its meaning, in practice the use of vague expressions such as 
‘good faith’ and ‘significant imbalance’ has caused a considerable degree of perplexity 
among interpreters. It is unclear whether those expressions complement each other or 
whether the imbalance may be considered an ‘evidence of lack of good faith’.433 
Furthermore, despite it being widely accepted that ‘significant imbalance’ is concerned 
with substantive fairness,434 there are questions whether ‘good faith’ is related to 
substantive and/or procedural fairness.435 
 
                                                 
431 See <http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/areas/unfair_terms_in_contracts.htm> accessed 26 July 2012. 
For instance the Law Commission suggested that the legislation should state ‘in clear terms that the 
exemption [from the fairness test] does not apply to’ ‘price escalation clauses, early termination charges and 
default charges’. See Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts: A New Approach? (Law Com No 
292, 2012) para 8.4. 
432 According to the Law Commission transparent term is the one written in ‘plain, intelligible language, legible 
and readily available to the consumer’ and a prominent term is the one ‘that it is presented during the sales 
process in such a way that a reasonable consumer would be aware of the term even if they did not read the 
full contractual document’. See Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts: A New Approach? 
(Law Com No 292, 2012) paras 8.16 to 8.34. According to the Law Society ‘the new rules should make it 
unambiguously clear which terms and conditions are core and which are not’. See Response by the Law 
Society to Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts: A New Approach? Issues Paper (Law Com 
No 292, 2012) para 18. 
433 Poole, Textbook on Contract Law (n 78) 267. 
434 According to Bright it is generally accepted that if a term causes significant imbalance in a contract, this 
term will be automatically contrary to good faith and substantively unfair, independently of the procedure. See 
Susan Bright, 'Winning the Battle against Unfair Contract Terms' (2000) 20(3) LS 331, 348. On the other hand 
the content of a term can be fair, but procedural issues, such as lack of transparency and bargaining defects 
can cause a significant imbalance to the detriment of the consumer. See Susan Bright, 'Unfairness and the 
Consumer Contract Regulations' in A Burrows and E Peel (eds), Contract Terms (Oxford-Norton Rose Law 
Colloquium Oxford University Press 2007) 184. 
435 Collins, 'Good Faith in European Contract Law' (n 109) 249. 
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The House of Lords suggested in Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank 
plc436 that ‘good faith’ in the context of the Regulations is an overarching concept of ‘fair 
and open dealing’.437 At first sight Lord Bingham circumscribed this concept to procedural 
aspects; however he also made references to examples of substantive unfairness in the 
definition of fair dealing.438 Furthermore Lord Steyn in the same judgment observed that 
‘any purely procedural or even predominantly procedural interpretation of the requirement 
of good faith must be rejected’ because there are overlaps between the requirements of 
‘good faith’ and ‘significant imbalance’ and both are related to substantive issues.439 
 
Similarly Collins and Beale contended that good faith has not only a procedural aspect but 
also a substantive one.440 The former is related to the disclosure of information to prevent 
unfair surprises on terms and products; whereas the latter recognises that there are 
terms that should always be considered unfair due to the imbalance that they may cause 
between parties, hence ‘the term itself must be contrary to good faith’.441 
 
There is more recent case law which also examined the unfairness of terms and whether 
it was related to procedural or substantive matters. For instance, in Office of Fair Trading 
v Foxtons Ltd442 Mann J assessed the existence of a significant imbalance of terms 
(pertinent to commissions which a consumer landlord had to pay for a letting agent 
services) as well as procedural issues related to the lack of openness that could become ‘a 
trap, or a time bomb’.443 Similarly in Mylcrist Builders Ltd v Buck444 Ramsey J held that an 
arbitration clause in a B2C contract was unfair because the consumer was not aware of 
the significance of such clause, thus the requirement of ‘fair and open dealing’ was not 
fulfilled.445  
                                                 
436 Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank plc [2001] UKHL 52, [2002] 1 AC 481 . 
437 Ibid. [17]. 
438 ‘Fair dealing required that a supplier should not, whether deliberately or unconsciously, take advantage of 
the consumer's necessity, indigence, lack of experience, unfamiliarity with the subject matter of the contract, 
weak bargaining position (...)’. See Ibid.  
439 Ibid. [36]. 
440 Collins, 'Good Faith in European Contract Law' (n 109) 250 and Beale, 'Legislative Control of Fairness: The 
Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts' (n 333) 245. 
441 According to Collins ‘the Directive does not state that the significant imbalance of the obligations must be 
caused by actions contrary to the requirement of good faith, as one would expect if the requirement of good 
faith referred solely to procedural matters such as pressure and deception’. Collins, 'Good Faith in European 
Contract Law' (n 109) 250. See also Beale, 'Legislative Control of Fairness: The Directive on Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts' (n 333) 245. 
442 [2009] EWHC 1681 (Ch). 
443 Office of Fair Trading v Foxtons Ltd [2009] EWHC 1681 (Ch) [91]. In the words of Mann J ‘the typical 
consumer landlord may well be familiar with the concept of commission, but the real question is: commission 
on what?’. 
444 [2008] EWHC 2172 (TCC); [2009] 2 All ER (Comm) 259; [2008] BLR 611. 
445 Mylcrist Builders Ltd v Buck [2008] EWHC 2172 (TCC), [2009] 2 All ER (Comm) 259, [2008] BLR 611 [56]. 
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On the other hand, in Bryen & Langley Ltd v Boston446 the Court of Appeal concluded that 
there was no procedural unfairness because the term, although potentially unfair, was 
included by the consumer’s own agent and not by the supplier; thus in this case the 
consumer ‘had the opportunity to influence the terms’.447  
 
Notwithstanding the controversy surrounding the definition of ‘unfair terms’ in reg. 5(1); 
reg. 6(1) stipulates that the assessment of the unfairness of a contractual term should 
take into account the nature of the goods or services for which the contract was 
concluded, all circumstances attending the conclusion of the contract and all other terms 
of the contract.  
 
In addition, Schedule 2 provides an indicative list of terms that may be regarded as 
unfair, also known as ‘grey list’.448 The examples provided refer mainly to the substance of 
the contract rather than the contracting process, with exception of para ‘i’ which considers 
unfair a term that ‘irrevocably binding the consumer to terms with which he had no real 
opportunity of becoming acquainted before the conclusion of the contract’ (‘unfair 
surprise’).449 
 
Furthermore, in 2008 the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) published an Unfair Contract Terms 
Guidance ‘which taken with the decision of the House of Lords in Director General of Fair 
Trading v First National Bank plc [2001] UKHL 52, [2002] 1 AC 481 and subsequent case 
law, constitutes some guidance on the interpretation of unfairness under the 
regulations’.450 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
446 [2005] EWCA Civ 973, [2005] BLR 508.  
447 Bryen & Langley Ltd v Boston [2005] EWCA Civ 973, [2005] BLR 508 [46]. Similarly according to 
Westminster Building Co. Ltd v Beckingham [2004] EWHC 138 (TCC), 94 Con LR 107 [31] ‘the terms in this 
case were not individually negotiated but were couched in plain and intelligible language’ and ‘the terms of 
the contract were decided upon by [the consumer’s] agent’. 
448 The ‘grey list’ differs from the ‘black list’ provided by UCTA 1977 that makes certain exclusions or 
restrictions absolutely invalid. 
449 Howells and Brownsword (n 193) 256. 
450 Poole, Textbook on Contract Law (n 78) 273. 
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3.2.2.4.1. Good faith 
 
One of the most controversial aspects of the ‘unfair term’ definition is the use of the good 
faith expression. This concept was only introduced into English law by the Regulations 
and its application is still limited to the performance of consumer contracts.451 
 
In England good faith is not expressly defined but as observed above it may be related to 
procedural and substantive matters. In the absence of a definition, interpreters may refer 
to the provisions of the American Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)452 which defines the 
obligation of good faith in the performance or enforcement of a contract453 as ‘honesty in 
fact in the conduct or transaction concerned’.454 Good faith is therefore opposed to ‘bad 
faith’ and is based on the ‘community standards’ of reasonableness, honesty and 
fairness;455 according to which parties have to behave with loyalty towards a common 
purpose that was agreed between them in order to not frustrate the legitimate 
expectations of the other party.  
 
As a result of the uncertainty which surround the meaning and interpretation of good 
faith, the Law Commission proposed in its Report on Unfair Terms in Contracts a ‘fair and 
reasonable’ test which does not make reference to this concept.456457 In chapter 6 the 
advantages and disadvantages of the application of good faith in English law will be 
discussed in more depth. 
                                                 
451 See Ibid. 19. As seems previously the English law rejects the duty of good faith in negotiations for the 
reasons discussed in chapter 2. 
452 The law of the United States may be applied by English comparatists due the fact that it represents other 
major common law jurisdiction. Moreover good faith ‘had already become established in American law’. See 
Bridge (n 221) 142. 
453 In the words of the Uniform Commercial Code § 1-203 ‘every contract or duty within this Act imposes an 
obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement’. Similarly the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
prescribes in its §205 that ‘every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its 
performance and its enforcement’. 
454 § 1-201 (19). 
455 According to Brownsword and Reiter good faith is not determined by judges’ discretion, but is based on the 
community standards. See Brownsword, 'Good Faith in Contracts Revisited' (n 86) 120 and B. J. Reiter, 'Good 
Faith in Contracts' (1983) 17 Val U L Rev 705, 716. Summers defined good faith as the opposite of bad faith. 
He contended that ‘it is a phrase without general meaning (or meanings) of its own and serves to exclude a 
wide range of heterogeneous forms of bad faith’. Robert S. Summers, 'Good Faith in General Contract Law 
and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code' (1968) 54 Va L Rev 195, 201. 
456 ‘It will be easier for UK lawyers to apply than a more “European” test which makes express reference to 
good faith. Therefore we still recommend that the test should be one of “fairness and reasonableness”’. Law 
Commission, Unfair Terms in Contracts (Law Com No 292, 2005) paras 3.85 and 3.91. 
457 The proposed test shall be applied to consumer and small businesses contracts as well as to B2B contracts 
where UCTA provisions are still applicable. According to the draft clause 14(1) the ‘fair and reasonable’ test of 
a term will take into account (a) the extent to which the term is transparent, and (b) the substance and effect 
of the term, and all the circumstances existing at the time it was agreed. The matters concerning the 
substance include: the balance of the parties’ interests and the strength of the parties’ bargaining positions 
(clause 14(4)). 
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3.3. Legislative control on unfairness in consumer contracts in Brazil 
 
Under the provisions of the Brazilian Federal Constitution ‘consumer protection’ has the 
status of a fundamental right and a general principle of the economic activity.458 The 
constitutional protection of consumers also included the stipulation of the creation of the 
Consumer Protection Code459 which contains the main controls on abusive clauses and 
exemption clauses in the context of B2C contracts. This Code has represented a powerful 
tool in the prevention of abuses of consumers’ rights and has contributed to the growth of 
the consumer consciousness in Brazil. Furthermore the importance of its provisions has 
been widely recognised and applied by the higher courts of this country.460 
 
In addition to the Federal Constitution and the Consumer Protection Code, the new Civil 
Code also contains provisions relevant to the protection of consumers against unfair 
terms; however its general rules have only a subsidiary application to the special rules of 
the Consumer Protection Code. Furthermore key principles of this Code, such as good 
faith and the social function of the contracts, could already be found in the consumer 
legislation.461 
 
3.3.1. Defining consumer 
 
The Brazilian Consumer Protection Code expressly defines consumer in its article 2 as 
‘every natural or legal person who acquires or uses any product or service as a final 
recipient’. This article’s sole paragraph adds that ‘any group of people, even if 
indeterminate, who have participated in consumer relations shall be equated to 
consumers’.  
 
In agreement with this definition, businesses may contract as consumers as long as they 
are the final recipients of goods and services and do no resell products with the purpose 
                                                 
458 See article 5, XXXII and article 170, V of the Federal Constitution. This article 5 contains a list of rights that 
cannot be revoked by amendments to the Constitution (article 60 §4, IV).  
459 According to article 48 of the Constitution’s Transitional Provisions the National Congress had to draw up 
the Consumer Protection Code within 120 days of the Constitution’s promulgation. 
460 E.g., REsp 827833/MG (16/05/2012).  
461 Tartuce (n 263) 106. 
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of making profit.462 This provision does not discriminate between different sizes or types 
of legal persons, thus it covers ‘small businesses, multinationals, foundations and even 
legal entities of public law’.463 
 
The protection afforded by this Code can be also extended to third parties who are 
equated to consumers stricto sensu such as the victims of damages caused by defective 
products or services as a result of the supplier’s fault (art. 17).464 They are termed as 
‘bystanders’ by legal literature because although they are not part of the consumer 
relation, their health and safety are affected ‘by intrinsic and extrinsic defects of the 
product or service’.465 
 
Furthermore any person (determinable or not) exposed to abusive commercial practices is 
also protected under the Consumer Protection Code (art. 29). The mere exposure to 
those practices is sufficient to allow the application of preventive and abstract controls by 
courts and public prosecutors.466 The legal ties involving those third parties ‘are 
determined by law and not by their will’ and it represents a major change to the 
traditional idea that the effects of contracts should be limited to its actual parties (inter 
partes effect).467 
 
This wide consumer definition clearly indicates the adoption of an interventionist approach 
in the context of B2C contracts as it covers any person who may be directly or indirectly 
harmed in a consumer relationship. This is in line with one of the principles of the 
National Policy for Consumer Relations which prescribes that the ‘efficient prevention and 
suppression of all abuses in the consumer market’ should be observed.468 
 
 
                                                 
462 Nevertheless the Superior Court of Justice has extended the consumer protection to vulnerable small 
businesses even when they employ goods or services as part of their economic activity. See REsp 
1010834/GO (13/10/2010). 
463 Figueiredo and Figueiredo (n 272) 284. 
464 The Superior Court of Justice applied this provision to make liable an establishment (which stocked and 
sold fireworks) for the damages caused to people who were injured or perished in an explosion caused by the 
firework’s poor storage condition, even though did not have a consumer relationship with the business. See 
REsp 181580/SP (22/03/2004).  
465 Grinover and others (n 34) 216. 
466 Ibid. 271-272. 
467 Marques, 'Notas sobre o Sistema de Proibição de Cláusulas Abusivas no Código Brasileiro de Defesa Do 
Consumidor: Entre a Tradicional Permeabilidade da Ordem Jurídica e o Futuro Pós-Moderno do Direito 
Comparado' (n 125) 59. 
468 Article 4, VI of the Consumer Protection Code. 
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3.3.2. Unfair terms or abusive clauses 
 
The Consumer Protection Code expressly addresses ‘unfair terms’ in B2C contracts; 
however as is the case for other countries that adopt the civil law tradition, it refers to 
such terms as ‘abusive clauses’.469 Although they are usually found in standard form 
contracts, the controls on unfairness cover both negotiated and non-negotiated terms 
either written or verbal.470  
 
According to the aforementioned Code the protection against abusive clauses is regarded 
as one of the basic consumer rights.471 Furthermore its article 51 contains examples of 
terms which shall be considered abusive and declared void. They can be classified in three 
groups:472 clauses that limit rights of the consumer;473 clauses that offer advantages only 
to the supplier474 and clauses that may represent an ‘unfair surprise’ to the consumer.475 
This list however is indicative and non-exhaustive,476 which means that judges may also 
consider other terms ‘unfair’ in accordance with the circumstances of each individual 
case.477 
 
The most significant subsection of the list contains a general rule which regard as 
‘abusive’ all terms which ‘establish obligations considered inequitable or abusive which put 
the consumer at an unreasonable disadvantage478 or that are inconsistent with good faith 
                                                 
469 ‘The denomination given to “abusive clause” varies depending on the jurisdiction. For instance, in England 
it is called “unfair terms” and in the United States “unconscionable contract or clause”’. See Edilson Pereira 
Nobre Júnior, 'A Proteção Contratual no Código do Consumidor e o Âmbito de sua Aplicação' (1998) Bauru, 
ago./nov, f. 23 Revista do Instituto de Pesquisas e Estudos 275, 286. 
470 Grinover and others (n 34) 535 and 570. As the Consumer Protection Code purports to cover also 
negotiated terms, the protection against abusive clauses is not prescribed under the section which regulates 
‘contracts of adhesion’. 
471 See article 6, IV of the Consumer Protection Code. 
472 Marques, 'Notas sobre o Sistema de Proibição de Cláusulas Abusivas no Código Brasileiro de Defesa Do 
Consumidor: Entre a Tradicional Permeabilidade da Ordem Jurídica e o Futuro Pós-Moderno do Direito 
Comparado' (n 125) 65. 
473 Subsections I, II, III, VI, XV and XVI. 
474 Subsections IX, X, XI, XII and XIII. 
475 Subsections VII and VIII. 
476 Article 51 provides a list of abusive clauses, but it expressly says that the examples provided are void 
‘among others’. 
477 Grinover and others (n 34) 533-534. In addition subsection XV of article 51 allows judges to deem as void 
clauses which are in disagreement with the consumer protection system. 
478 It is considered ‘unreasonable’ the advantage that: offends the fundamental principles of the legal system 
to which it belongs; restricts fundamental rights and obligations inherent to the nature of the contract in a 
manner which jeopardise its purpose or the contractual balance; and proves excessively onerous to the 
consumer considering the nature and content of the contract, the interests of the parties and other 
circumstances peculiar to the case. These provisions purport to protect the reasonable expectations of the 
parties and the balance of their rights and obligations. See article 51, first paragraph of the Consumer 
Protection Code. 
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or equity’.479 The considerable broadness and subjectivity of the expressions ‘good faith’ 
and ‘equity’480 confer judges with ample flexibility to interpret them. This provision 
‘represents one of the most important innovations introduced by the Consumer Protection 
Code into the Brazilian contractual law’, because it allows courts to examine the contents 
of consumer contracts and consequently exercise a substantive control on unfairness.481  
 
The Consumer Protection Code also entrust Public Prosecutors with extensive power in 
the battle against unfair terms.482 This body can propose on request of any consumer (or 
legal entity that represent the consumer) a legal action aimed at invalidating the terms 
that are contrary to the provisions of this Code or which are opposed to a fair balance 
between the rights and obligations of the parties.483 
 
3.3.3. Good faith 
 
Marques suggested that the Consumer Protection Code encompasses three fundamental 
principles that aim to prevent unfairness in B2C contracts: good faith, vulnerability and 
equity (the latter in the sense of contractual balance).484  
 
Those principles are interrelated and complement each other. The principle of 
vulnerability recognises that consumers are particularly susceptible to harsh contractual 
terms due to their lack of bargaining strength.485 For this reason they need a special 
regime to protect them against economic abuses that may result from the suppliers’ 
dominant position. This intervention is justified by the principle of equity which stipulates 
the need for a balance between the rights and obligations of the contracting parties.486 
                                                 
479 See subsection IV of article 51 of the Consumer Protection Code. See REsp 158728/RJ (17/05/1999) that 
considered abusive a term imposed by a health insurance company which limited the time of hospitalisation of 
the insured as it violated this article 51, IV. See also judicial precedent (Súmula) 307 (22/11/2004) of the 
Superior Court of Justice. 
480 Equity here in the sense of contractual balance and not as a system of justice typical of common law 
jurisdictions which allow the supplement of unsatisfactory law in favour of a fair judgment. 
481 Marques, 'Notas sobre o Sistema de Proibição de Cláusulas Abusivas no Código Brasileiro de Defesa Do 
Consumidor: Entre a Tradicional Permeabilidade da Ordem Jurídica e o Futuro Pós-Moderno do Direito 
Comparado' (n 125) 69. 
482 The Public Prosecutors have played an important role in the control on abusive clauses especially in cases 
involving banks, health insurance, credit cards and so forth. Ibid. 55. 
483 Article 51 §4 allows Public Prosecutors to control abstractly the unfairness of terms which were included in 
a contract during its formation stage. Ibid.  
484 Ibid. 45-54. 
485 Article 4, I of the Consumer Protection Code. 
486 Article 51, IV of the Consumer Protection Code. The principle of equity can also be found in article 4, III 
which emphasises the importance of the ‘balance in the relationship between consumers and suppliers’. The 
principle of equity is directly related with the constitutional principle of equality (art. 5, caput of the Federal 
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Ultimately these two principles are based on the idea that consumer contracts should be 
guided by the principle of good faith which aims to promote the fairness and harmony 
between parties. 
 
As seen in chapter 1, the Brazilian law adopts the objective good faith that is a ‘standard’ 
according to which parties should respect the interests and expectations of the other 
party and cooperate for the fulfilment of the contract.487 Parties therefore have to act 
loyally and avoid abuses so that they do not harm or cause excessive disadvantage to the 
other party.  
 
This principle of good faith governs all consumer relationships in Brazil and any clause 
which violates this principle shall be regarded as ‘abusive’. As seen above under article 51, 
IV terms which are not consistent with good faith are unfair. In addition article 4, III 
prescribes that ‘good faith and the balance in the consumers and suppliers’ relationships’ 
is one of the principles of the National Policy for Consumer Relations and article 51, XV 
stipulates that any clause in disagreement with the consumer protection system is also 
deemed abusive. Consequently it is possible to argue that all B2C contracts contain an 
implied general clause of good faith.488 
 
The application of good faith is also expressly prescribed by the Civil Code which 
stipulates that courts shall interpret contractual terms according to this principle and to 
the ‘practice of the place in which they are made’.489490 Furthermore in line with this 
                                                                                                                                                    
Constitution) because the latter prescribes the need for legislative intervention to restore the balance between 
consumers and suppliers. See Nunes Júnior and De Matos (n 75) 36. 
487 Marques, Contratos no Código de Defesa do Consumidor (n 338) 215-216. 
488 The good faith prescribed by article 4, III is considered a general clause which gives some leeway to 
judges and allows them to go beyond the literal meaning of the law; whereas the good faith of article 51, IV 
is an indefinite legal concept which is related to the judges’ interpretative and evaluative activity when they 
declare a clause abusive and void. See Grinover and others (n 34) 534-535 and Nobre Júnior, 'O Princípio da 
Boa-Fé e o Novo Código Civil' (n 89) 76. 
489 See article 113 of the Civil Code. Therefore courts should take into account the context of the contract and 
its social ends. See article 5 of the Law of Introduction to the Brazilian Civil Code which stipulates that ‘in 
applying the legislation the judge shall attend the social ends to which it is direct and to the requirements of 
the common good’. See Rose (n 251) 2. 
490 The Brazilian higher courts have extensively applied good faith in the interpretation of consumer contracts. 
For instance, the Superior Court of Justice has applied this principle to deal with unfair terms in health 
insurance contracts, such as terms which determine that pre-existing illnesses are not covered in the absence 
of previous health examination (AgRg no Ag 973265/SP - 17/03/2008)) or terms which limit the length of stay 
in intensive care unit (REsp 249423/SP - 05/03/2001). The Supreme Federal Court has also made reference to 
good faith in various cases such as the discussion of the constitutionality of the transfer of the tax burden to 
the final consumer. See RE 370682/SC (25/06/2007). 
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principle as well as the principles of vulnerability and equity, terms shall be interpreted 
more favourably to consumers and to the adhering party in contracts of adhesion.491  
 
3.3.3.1. Good faith at performance stage 
 
The Civil Code establishes in its article 422 that ‘contracting parties are bound to observe 
the principles of probity and good faith, both in entering into the contract and in its 
performance’.492 This provision prescribes a model of conduct that is ‘operative and with a 
real practical value’.493  
 
There are secondary duties that can be derived from good faith at this contractual stage 
such as the duty of cooperation.494 According to the latter parties should cooperate with 
each other and not prevent or interfere with the fulfilment of the contractual obligations 
by the other party. The Superior Court of Justice observed that such duty of cooperation 
has been underlined by the modern conception of contracts and presupposes a reciprocal 
loyalty between parties.495 It also requires proactive behaviour from sellers and suppliers 
through compliance with their obligations (e.g., providing information or performing a 
service).496  
 
This duty to cooperate also implies the possibility of renegotiation or revision of clauses 
and obligations which become excessively onerous or disproportionate as a result of 
supervening facts.497498 Filomeno suggested that the possibility of modification of terms in 
the occurrence of fundamental and unpredictable changes of circumstances after the 
conclusion of a contract is in line with the so-called clausula rebus sic standibus (Latin for 
                                                 
491 Article 423 of the Civil Code and article 47 of the Consumer Protection Code. 
492 See Rose (n 251) 88. 
493 Judith Martins-Costa, A Boa-Fé no Direito Privado (Revista dos Tribunais 1999) 436. In addition as seen 
above the Consumer Protection Code prescribes that in the performance of the contract clauses that are 
inconsistent with good faith or equity shall be declared void (article 51, IV). 
494 This duty of cooperation can be derived from articles 39, 40, 51, 52, 53 and 54 of the Consumer Protection 
Code.  
495 See REsp 927457/SP (01/02/2012) and REsp 595631/SC (02/08/2004). 
496 Marques, Contratos no Código de Defesa do Consumidor (n 338) 232. 
497 Ibid. 233. 
498 This argument was used as ground for the revision of contracts of leasing which instalments were linked to 
the exchange rate variation. In January 1999 there was an exchange rate overvaluation of the US dollar in 
relation to the Brazilian real and contracts of leasing became excessively onerous to consumers in Brazil. The 
understanding of the Superior Court of Justice has been in favour of the revision of the contracts; however 
this court has decided that the differences resulting from the devaluation of the ‘real’ (Brazilian currency) 
should be split equally between the parties what can be unfair to consumers as they normally have less 
financial resources than leasing companies. See AgRg no REsp 627674/SP (22/05/2009). 
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‘things thus standing’).499 The latter is an exception to the principle pacta sunt servanda 
(Latin for ‘agreements must be kept’) which establishes that agreements freely made 
should be strictly observed. Nonetheless both principles aim at the fulfilment of the 
contract either through the performance of its original terms or through the revision of 
the terms if necessary.500 Tartuce contended that in the consumer context there is no 
need to prove the above unpredictability but only that terms became highly onerous to 
the vulnerable party as a result of supervening events.501  
 
Another important secondary duty that can be derived from good faith at this contractual 
stage is the duty of care. According to this duty parties should be careful to not cause 
damage (physical, moral or economic) to the integrity of any person.502 For instance the 
Superior Court of Justice concluded that a financial institution which registered an 
innocent consumer as a defaulter due to its lack of care should pay compensation for 
moral damages.503 
 
3.3.3.2. Good faith at the negotiation and post-contractual stage 
 
In the context of consumer contracts, Marques contended that parties not only have a 
‘duty to provide’ but also a ‘duty to behave’.504 Parties should therefore consistently 
behave honestly and faithfully towards each other to make their relationship more stable 
and trustworthy. In other words parties have to act in good faith in all contractual stages 
not only during the performance of the contract, but also in its negotiations (pre-
contractual stage) and in a posterior stage (post-contractual).505 
 
                                                 
499 Grinover and others (n 34) 155-156. See also article 6, V of the Consumer Protection Code and article 317 
of the Civil Code. According to the latter the revision of terms is justified in the occurrence of unforeseen 
circumstances. 
500 In Brazil the clausula rebus sic standibus is also applied to business contracts. Articles 478 to 480 of the 
Civil Code prescribe that contracts with continuing or deferred performance may be dissolved if the obligation 
of one of the parties becomes excessively onerous with extreme advantage for the other party due to 
unforeseeable events. The dissolution may be avoided by the modification of the conditions on an equitable 
basis. See Rose (n 251) 98. 
501 Tartuce (n 263) 127-129. See article 51 §1, III of the Consumer Protection Code which tackles the 
excessive onerousness of one party’s obligations. 
502 See article 186 of the Civil Code and article 6, VI of the Consumer Protection Code.  
503 See REsp 987483/RJ (02/02/2010). 
504 Marques, Contratos no Código de Defesa do Consumidor (n 338) 217. 
505 Ibid. Marques observed that if the protection was limited to the contracting parties, it would exclude from 
the special protection all pre-contractual relationships which are also extremely relevant to the consumer 
market context. See Cláudia Lima Marques, 'Novas Regras sobre Proteção do Consumidor nas Relações 
Contratuais' (1992) São Paulo, n 1, Revista de Direito do Consumidor 27, 33. 
 - 110 -  
 
The application of good faith at the negotiation stage has been supported by the culpa in 
contrahendo doctrine (as seen in chapter 2) as well as by the stipulation of extra-
contractual liability for damages (including moral) or for violation of rights caused by any 
voluntary act or omission, negligence or imprudence; which means that liability may be 
attributed despite the non-existence of a contract between parties.506 Furthermore the 
Consumer Protection Code protects any person exposed to unfair commercial practices 
even before he performs an act of consumption (e.g., when a potential consumer is 
exposed to a misleading advertisement).507 
 
There are also provisions of the Civil Code which prescribe the application of pre-
contractual liability that are in line with a duty to behave in good faith. For instance under 
article 430 ‘if, for unforeseen circumstances, acceptance becomes known to the offeror 
late, he must communicate that fact immediately to the accepting party, on pain of 
liability for losses and damages’ and according to article 443 ‘if the alienor knows of the 
vice or defect in the thing, he shall restitute what he received with losses and 
damages’.508  
 
Therefore parties in Brazil are expected to observe the principle of good faith and its 
secondary contractual duties, such as transparency and information during 
negotiations.509 Those duties are of paramount importance at the pre-contractual stage as 
they imply that contracts shall be written in an intelligible manner to allow consumers to 
fully understand their contents.510 They also establish that sellers and suppliers have to 
offer and publicise their products and services in a clear and honest way to enable 
consumers to make an informed decision.511 For this reason the Superior Court of Justice 
has reiterated that the information provided by sellers to consumers must be ‘correct, 
                                                 
506 Article 186 of the Civil Code. See Rose (n 251) 47. Interpreters can also apply general rules of civil liability 
prescribed in articles 389 and 927 of the Civil Code.  
507 See article 29 of the Consumer Protection Code. See also Castello Miguel (n 256) 74. 
508 See Moura Vicente (n 290) 35. Rose (n 251) 89 and 92. 
509 Marques, 'Notas sobre o Sistema de Proibição de Cláusulas Abusivas no Código Brasileiro de Defesa Do 
Consumidor: Entre a Tradicional Permeabilidade da Ordem Jurídica e o Futuro Pós-Moderno do Direito 
Comparado' (n 125) 48-49. 
510 Peixoto (n 295) 163. See article 6, III of the Consumer Protection Code. In MS 5986/DF (13/10/1999) the 
Superior Court of Justice observed that suppliers have to provide appropriate and clear information about 
products and services including their price. The same court recently decided in REsp 1293006/SP 
(29/06/2012) that an insurance company cannot be exempted to cover damages caused by a ‘larceny’ on the 
basis that the contract covers only ‘compound larceny’ because there was a failure to provide adequate 
information about the insurance cover and the use of a legal and technical expression also indicates that the 
clause is abusive. 
511 Consequently in line with good faith consumers have the right to withdraw from a contract in case of 
distance selling because they did not have the opportunity to examine the product (see article 49 of the 
Consumer Protection Code). See Nobre Júnior, 'A Proteção Contratual no Código do Consumidor e o Âmbito 
de sua Aplicação' (n 469) 285. 
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clear, accurate, noticeable and in Portuguese language’.512 Sellers will be bound by this 
information in the conclusion of the contract on pain of frustrating the consumer’s 
legitimate expectations.513 
 
The non-compliance with the above duties may imply the invalidation of contractual 
terms514 or the imposition of other sanctions (e.g., fine or imprisonment for the practise of 
misleading advertisement).515 Furthermore the Consumer Protection Code expressly 
provides that suppliers are bound by ‘declarations of will’ given in pre-contracts and that 
judges may grant specific performance if necessary to ensure a practical result equivalent 
to the compliance of the obligations (‘to do’ or ‘not to do’) assumed in those declarations 
in case suppliers fail to fulfil them.516 
 
The application of the general clause of good faith is not only extended to the negotiation 
stage but it also covers the post-contractual stage because there are duties that should 
remain after the contractual performance, such as the duty of confidentiality. The latter 
provides that a seller is not allowed to share a buyer’s personal information without his 
authorisation following the performance of the contract.517 The duty of care also remains 
applicable at this stage. For instance there are risks that may be only identified after the 
performance of the contract, but suppliers are still liable for defects that can endanger the 
health and safety of the consumers (this is the basis for the ‘recalls’ of defective 
products).518 Furthermore the Consumer Protection Code expressly prescribes that in the 
collection of debts the consumer in default shall not be exposed to ridicule or any type of 
embarrassment or threat (harassment of debtors).519  
 
                                                 
512 See article 31 of the Consumer Protection Code. The Superior Court of Justice determined in REsp 
586316/MG (19/03/2009) the application of such ‘duty to inform’ in the sale of products containing gluten 
(‘allergy information’). 
513 Marques, Contratos no Código de Defesa do Consumidor (n 338) 223 and 243. In REsp 590336/SC 
(21/02/2005) the Superior Court of Justice decided that an insurance company must pay the agreed 
indemnification in the occurrence of the insured event based on the trust between parties and the principle of 
good faith which protects the consumer expectations.  
514 According to article 46 of the Consumer Protection Code the contract will not bind the consumer if he was 
not given the opportunity to have prior knowledge of its contents or if it was drafted in a way to hinder the 
understanding of its meaning and scope. 
515 See articles 37 and 67 of the Consumer Protection Code  
516 See Nunes Júnior and De Matos (n 75) 221. See also articles 48 and 84 of the Consumer Protection Code.  
517 Nobre Júnior, 'O Princípio da Boa-Fé e o Novo Código Civil' (n 89) 83. 
518 Marques, Contratos no Código de Defesa do Consumidor (n 338) 233. For instance the manufacturer has a 
duty to recall defective cars in order to be repaired if they endanger the safety of the buyer. See REsp 
1010392/RJ (13/05/2008) and articles 8 to 10 of the Consumer Protection Code. 
519 Article 42 of the Consumer Protection Code.  
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3.4. Analysing the differences and similarities of the legislative controls on 
unfairness in consumer contracts in England and Brazil 
 
At first sight one of the most evident differences between the legislative controls on 
unfairness in B2C contracts in England and Brazil is that in the Brazilian legislation these 
controls are concentrated in Codes (e.g., Civil Code and Consumer Protection Code); 
whereas in English law the statutory controls can be found in different pieces of 
legislation, such as UCTA 1977 and the UTCCR 1999. 
 
In principle this could lead to the conclusion that the Brazilian legal system is more 
coherent than the English legal system as the piecemeal solutions of the latter may be 
tainted by overlapping and inconsistencies. However the Brazilian law just like the English 
law also have conflicts among its internal provisions, as will be analysed in chapter 5. 
 
3.4.1. Defining consumer 
 
The first part of the consumer’s definition in article 2 of the Brazilian Consumer Protection 
Code is compatible with the definition in reg. 3(1) of UTCCR 1999 as both regard 
consumers as natural persons.520 Furthermore, according to both provisions consumers 
should be at the end of the market chain and do not have the purpose of making profit.  
 
However article 2 proceeds to include ‘legal persons’ in its consumer definition. Therefore 
the Brazilian law, similarly to UCTA, may also regard a business as a consumer when it is 
not making the contract ‘in the course of a business’. Such wider definition may be 
preferable when companies or legal persons are vulnerable in asymmetric contracts and 
exposed to harmful terms.521  
 
3.4.2. Burden of proof 
 
In England the burden of proof of the unfairness of a term rests on the consumer or a 
qualifying body (reg. 12) because the UTCCR 1999 did not ‘make any provision to displace 
                                                 
520 According to art. 2 of the Consumer Protection Code, consumer is ‘every natural or legal person who 
acquires or uses products or services as a final recipient’; similarly in the words of reg. 3(1) of the UTCCR 
1999 consumer is ‘any natural person who is acting for purposes which are outside his trade, business or 
profession’. 
521 E.g., small businesses. See chapter 4. 
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the normal burden of proof resting on the claimant’,522 except from reg. 5(4) which 
stipulates that ‘it shall be for any seller or supplier who claims that a term was individually 
negotiated to show that it was’. On the other hand, under UCTA it is the party claiming 
that the term satisfies the requirement of reasonableness (normally a business) who has 
to prove it. Similarly, the Law Commission recommended that the burden of showing the 
fairness of a term should fall on the business which will facilitate the access of consumers 
to the protection offered by the relevant legislation.523  
 
By comparison in Brazil article 6, VIII of the Consumer Protection Code provides that if 
the judge considers that the claim is verisimilar or that the consumer is vulnerable, he can 
invert the burden of proof in favour of the consumer. In addition article 51, VI of the 
same Code considers a term abusive, hence void, when it establishes the inversion of the 
burden of proof to the detriment of the consumer. The latter provision is similar to 
paragraph 1(q) of Schedule 2 of the Regulations which regards as unfair a term that 
imposes on the consumer the burden of proof ‘which, according to the applicable law, 
should lie with another party to the contract’. 
 
3.4.3. Transparency and interpretation favourable to consumers 
 
According to both legislatures, terms have to be written in an understandable way, 
because consumers should be aware of their contents to be able to make a conscious 
decision. For this reason suppliers have the obligation to provide all relevant information 
to consumers, which is in line with the principle of transparency in consumers’ 
relationships.524 ‘Transparency in consumer contracts has an important role to play in 
ensuring that markets operate effectively and that both parties in a business to consumer 
transaction can have an element of trust in each other’.525 
 
Under article 46 of the Consumer Protection Code ‘contracts which regulate consumer’s 
relationships do not oblige consumers if they were not given the opportunity to have prior 
knowledge of their contents or if the respective documents are drafted in a way to hinder 
                                                 
522 Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Contracts (Law Com CP No 166, 2002) para 3.79. 
523 Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Contracts (Law Com No 292, 2005) para 3.130. 
524 Collins proposed that this duty to disclose information purports to ‘assist the successful completion of the 
contracts by requiring a minimal and inexpensive mutual duty to safeguard the other contracting party’s 
interests’, which is directly related to an implied duty of cooperation between parties. See Hugh Collins, 
'Implied Duty to Give Information during Performance of Contracts' (1992) 55(4) MLR 556, 556-557. 
525 See Response by the Law Society to Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts: A New 
Approach? Issues Paper (Law Com No 292, 2012) para 6. 
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the understanding of its meaning and scope.’526 Similarly, according to Schedule 2 
paragraph 1(i) of the UTCCR 1999 it may be regarded as unfair a term which has the 
object or effect of ‘irrevocably binding the consumer to terms with which he had no real 
opportunity of becoming acquainted before the conclusion of the contract’. 
 
In addition, in Brazil under article 54 §3 of the Consumer Protection Code ‘the terms of 
contracts of adhesion shall be clear and written in plain and legible font in order to 
facilitate their understanding by the consumer’ and article 47 of the same Code states 
that ‘contractual clauses shall be interpreted in favour of the consumer’. By comparison, 
reg. 7(1) of the UTCCR 1999 prescribes that ‘a seller or supplier shall ensure that any 
written term of a contract is expressed in plain, intelligible language’ and although there is 
no provision of sanction in case of its non-compliance, if the unintelligibility results in 
uncertainty about the meaning of the term, then ‘the interpretation which is most 
favourable to the consumer shall prevail (reg. 7(2)).527  
 
More recently the Law Commission proposed in the review of its 2005 recommendations 
that only terms which are transparent and prominent should be exempted from the 
fairness test.528529 Furthermore the Proposal for a Regulation on a Common European 
Sales Law (CESL) prescribed that the assessment of the unfairness of a contract term has 
to take into account whether the trader complied with the ‘duty of transparency’ which 
requires terms to be ‘drafted and communicated in plain, intelligible language’. Terms that 
are regarded as unfair will not bind the parties.530  
 
Marques suggested that this duty of transparency caused a shift from the caveat emptor 
rule (‘let the buyer beware’) to the caveat venditor rule (‘let the seller beware’) in B2C 
                                                 
526 See also article 4 of the Consumer Protection Code.  
527 Additionally reg. 6(1)(c) of the CPRs prescribes that a commercial practice is a misleading omission if it 
provides material information in a manner which is unclear, unintelligible, ambiguous or untimely. 
528 See Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts: A New Approach? (Law Com No 292, 2012) 
paras 8.2 and 8.4. This concept of ‘transparency’ is also employed in the ‘fair and reasonable test’ of its 
proposed Unfair Contract Terms Bill (Law Com No 292, 2005). According to clause 14(1) ‘whether a contract 
term is fair and reasonable is to be determined by taking into account: the extent to which the term is 
transparent’ (...). Clause 14(3) defines ‘transparent’ as ‘expressed in reasonably plain language, legible, 
presented clearly, and readily available to any person likely to be affected by the contract term or notice in 
question’. 
529 ‘The UK position on the role of transparency in legitimizing substantively unfair terms is uncertain and 
unstable’. According to Willet in England it is unclear whether consumers are ‘protected from substantively 
unfair terms’ if terms are clear or transparent. See Chris Willett, 'The Functions of Transparency in Regulating 
Contract Terms: UK and Australian Approaches' (2011) 60 ICLQ 355, 355-356. 
530 See article 79, 82 and 83 of the CESL. 
 - 115 -  
 
contracts.531 This means that presently is the seller or supplier who has the duty to 
provide information about the products, services and terms of the contract; hence the 
consumer no longer has to actively look for the relevant information on pain of not being 
able to complain later.532 In other words now the ‘consumer protection ethic’ prevails over 
the ‘consumer self reliance ethic’ as the latter provided that consumers had to protect 
their own interests.533 
 
3.4.4. Consequences of the unfairness of a term 
 
In Brazil the Consumer Protection Code (art. 51) prescribes that abusive clauses may be 
declared void ex officio by courts; hence judges can take action of their own accord 
(without the request of the parties).534 Similarly article 6(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC and 
reg. 8(1) provide that an unfair term in a B2C contract will not bind consumers and 
recently the EU Court of Justice in the case Banco Español de Crédito SA v Joaquín 
Calderón Camino535 maintained that article 6(1) should be interpreted:  
 
‘to mean that national courts are required to raise, of their own motion, the issue 
as to whether an unfair term is void and/or inapplicable, even where none of the 
parties to the contract has made an application to that effect’.536 
 
In the same case, the Court of Justice determined that national courts should be limited 
to exclude the application of terms tainted by unfairness; therefore judges cannot revise 
their contents otherwise sellers and suppliers would be ‘tempted to use those terms’ with 
the knowledge that even if the latter were considered invalid they still could be modified 
by courts and applied.537 
 
Article 51 §2 of the Consumer Protection Code in its turn prescribes that the invalidation 
of abusive clauses does not invalidate the contract as a whole unless it results in an 
                                                 
531 Marques, Contratos no Código de Defesa do Consumidor (n 338) 225-226. 
532 The Superior Court of Justice maintained that the duty to inform requires a proactive behaviour from 
sellers and suppliers because the Consumer Protection Code rejects the caveat emptor rule and the silence 
(total or partial) which may mislead the consumer. See REsp 586316/MG (19/03/2009) and article 31 of the 
Consumer Protection Code. 
533 Willett, 'General Clauses and the Competing Ethics of European Consumer Law in the UK' (n 9) 413-414. 
534 See Grinover and others (n 34) 571-572 and Marques, Contratos no Código de Defesa do Consumidor (n 
338) 245. According to the Superior Court of Justice courts can review ex officio clauses considered abusive in 
line with article 51, IV. See AgRg no REsp 506650/RS (03/11/2003). 
535 Case C-618/10 Banco Español de Crédito SA v Joaquín Calderón Camino [2012] OJ C227/5 . 
536 Ibid. para 33.  
537 Ibid. paras 65-69. 
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excessive burden for one of the parties.538 By comparison under reg. 8(2) the rest of the 
contract will continue binding the parties if it is capable of continuing in existence without 
the unfair term. Consequently in England the severance of offending parts of a contract 
may be employed in order to keep the rest of it enforceable.539  
 
Therefore there is a tendency in both jurisdictions towards the preservation of contracts 
when possible; hence the English and Brazilian law are in agreement with a ‘universal 
legislative trend that aims to limit the invalidation of terms in order to keep the legal 
transactions “alive”.’540 
 
3.4.5. Strict and qualified obligations 
 
In English law there are contractual obligations that are considered strict, which means 
that a party must achieve a certain result otherwise he will be in breach of contract.541 
Those strict obligations can be compared with the qualified obligations according to which 
a party will achieve the purpose of the contract if he takes reasonable care or exercise 
reasonable skill in its performance (e.g., s. 2 of UCTA).  
 
In Brazil there is a similar dichotomy between the so-called ‘obligation of means’ and the 
‘obligation of result’. According to the first type of obligation, the party should employ his 
skills diligently and honestly towards an end, but he is not obliged to achieve the 
expected result; differently from the second type where the party must obtain a certain 
result otherwise he will be in breach of contract.542 For instance, in an obligation of 
means, although a doctor cannot guarantee that he will cure a disease, he should do 
everything possible to heal the patient. On the other hand, in the Brazilian jurisdiction the 
                                                 
538 This is known as ‘principle of preservation’ (of the contracts) which is based on the idea that judges should 
derive a maximum utility from contractual terms and consider them valid always when possible in the context 
of consumer contracts (see also article 170 Civil Code). See Figueiredo and Figueiredo (n 272) 409.  
539 Nonetheless ‘severance is allowed only if it is consistent with the public policy which made the contract 
containing the offending part illegal. If the whole contract is tainted by the illegality, severance cannot save 
it’. See Poole, Textbook on Contract Law (n 78) 274 and 592. 
540 Antonio Janyr Dall'agnol Júnior, 'Cláusulas Abusivas: A Opção Brasileira' (1994) Porto Alegre, mar, v. 21, f. 
60 Ajuris 129, 140. 
541 See UCTA 1977 ss. 6 and 7 (specific provisions) and s. 3 (general provision). See also Poole, Textbook on 
Contract Law (n 78) 244. 
542 Luiz Roldão Freitas Gomes, 'Elementos de Responsabilidade Civil' in RP Lira (ed) Curso de Direito Civil 
(Renovar 2000) 347. 
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surgeon has to achieve the promised result in a purely aesthetic plastic surgery. This is 
the understanding of the Superior Court of Justice.543  
 
In England, in its turn, the standard of performance required in qualified obligations ‘has 
long been regarded as the appropriate standard for professional people such as doctors 
and lawyers, whose work make it impossible to guarantee a result.’544 
 
3.4.6. Pre-emptive challenges 
 
The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1994 followed by the UTCCR 1999, 
introduced a significant mechanism of consumer protection: the preventive action by the 
Office of Fair Trading (OFT),545 the Director General of Fair Trading and qualifying bodies 
(Schedule 1) who can request traders to remove or amend unfair terms. The fact that 
those bodies can apply for an injunction to prevent continued use of unfair terms (reg. 
12) has been deemed very useful in the context of B2C contracts because ‘ordinary 
consumers do not normally resort to the courts’.546 Such preventive protection however is 
not applicable to B2B contracts, in which disputes are analysed individually according 
UCTA.  
 
The Brazilian Consumer Protection Code also prescribes preventive protection for 
consumers either individually or collectively;547 hence in Brazil the above protection is also 
limited to consumer contracts. The consumers’ basic rights include the effective 
prevention and redress for material, moral, individual, collective and diffuse damages.548 
In addition any type of legal action capable of providing adequate and effective protection 
to consumers’ rights and interests, such as ‘provisional remedies’, is allowed (article 
83).549 
 
                                                 
543 The Superior Court of Justice ‘has understood that in the case of plastic surgery merely aesthetic, the 
obligation is of result not of means. Consequently the claimant does not need to prove that the defendant was 
at fault, but only that he did not achieve the promised result’. See REsp 236708/MG (10/02/2009). 
544 Poole, Textbook on Contract Law (n 78) 281. 
545 The OFT is a governmental department of the United Kingdom which aims to ‘make markets work well’ for 
consumers, enforcing the consumer protection and competition law. See <http://www.oft.gov.uk/about-the-
oft/;jsessionid=746885F446EEFB86E20360BAF53F13AE> accessed 10 October 2010. 
546 W.C.H. Ervine, 'The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations in Courts' (2004) SLT 127, 130. 
547 See arts. 81 and 51 §4 of the Consumer Protection Code. 
548 See article 6, VI and VII of the Consumer Protection Code. 
549 See articles 796 to 889 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act 5869/1973). See also Dall'agnol Júnior (n 540) 
141. 
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Furthermore the Department of Justice and other bodies listed in article 82 (Public 
Prosecutors, Federal Government, States, Municipalities, the Federal District, 
governmental entities and agencies and consumers’ associations) can exercise pre-
emptive challenges through the use of a public civil action550 to protect collective rights 
which have not been affected yet.551 Ferreira called such preventive powers as ‘abstract 
controls’ of unfairness which may be employed before the actual use of abusive clauses; 
as opposed to ‘concrete controls’ which aim to declare void unfair terms or clauses that 
are in fact contrary to the principles of consumer protection.552 
 
3.4.7. Investigative powers 
 
Under reg. 13 of the UTCCR 1999 the Director General and the public qualifying bodies 
can require copies of pre-formulated standard contracts and information about their use 
to facilitate the consideration of a complaint concerning the unfairness of a term; or to 
ascertain the compliance with an undertaking or court order. However a person cannot be 
compelled to supply any document or information that he could refuse to produce in civil 
proceedings before the court (reg. 13(5)). 
 
In addition the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 give powers to 
the OFT and local weights and measures authorities to investigate a possible breach of 
the Regulations. These powers include: making test purchasers (reg. 20), inspecting any 
goods (reg. 21) and entering premises (reg. 22). 
 
In Brazil the Public Civil Action Act (Act 7347/1985) provides that public bodies and 
consumer associations (art. 5) can commence a civil investigation and request from public 
or private bodies certificates, information, tests or expert evidence in order to establish 
whether there are grounds to propose a public civil action (art. 8 §1).553 Only when the 
law imposes confidentiality a person can refuse to supply a certificate or information, in 
which case judges can request it. 
 
 
                                                 
550 See Act 7347/1985. 
551 REsp 175645/RS (30/04/2001). 
552 See Ferreira (n 278) 190. 
553 The refusal, delay or omission in the supply of documents and information are regarded as crime 
punishable by imprisonment from 1 to 3 years plus fine (art. 10 of the Act 7347/1985). 
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3.4.8. Enforcement 
 
In line with reg. 10 to 12 of the UTCCR 1999 the Director General of Fair Trading (DGFT) 
has a duty to consider a complaint concerning the unfairness of a contract term drawn up 
for general use. The DGFT and qualifying bodies (Schedule 1) may apply for an injunction 
(including an interim injunction) in the High Court or county court to prevent the 
continued use of unfair terms or of a term having like effect in standard form contracts. 
 
Similarly, according to part 4 of the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 
2008 (CPRs), the OFT and local weights and measures authorities have a duty to enforce 
the CPRs provisions when there are breaches of the prohibition on unfair commercial 
practices that may imply in criminal offences. ‘The prohibitions will be enforceable through 
the procedure for the enforcement of Community infringements in Part 8 of the Enterprise 
Act 2002.’554 
 
Part 8 of the Enterprise Act 2002 (s. 210 onwards) provides that the Office of Fair 
Trading, every local weights and measures authority in Great Britain and other 
‘enforcers’555 can seek enforcement orders against businesses that are in breach of certain 
consumer legislation.556 Those enforcement actions can be taken against ‘community 
infringements’ that are breaches of UK legislation that give effect to specified EU 
Directives and which may harm the collective interests of consumers.557 Those Directives 
are listed in Schedule 13 of the Act that includes the Directive on Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts (93/13/EEC) and the Directive on Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive (2005/29/EC). 
 
The court can order the cessation and non-repetition of the infringement or accept 
undertakings from the business that it will cease the infringing conduct. If the business 
fails to comply with the enforcement order or breach an undertaking to the court, it may 
                                                 
554 See recital 2 of the ‘Explanatory note’ of the CPRs. 
555 The Secretary of State can designate sectoral regulators and consumer protection bodies as enforcers. 
556 The enforcer must consult with the business before recourse to the court for the purpose of achieving the 
cessation of the infringement and ensuring that it will not be repeated (s. 214) through the acceptance of 
undertakings from the business that it will cease the infringing conduct. 
557 Enforcement actions can also be taken against ‘domestic infringements’ that are breaches of UK laws or 
contracts of a type specified by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (SoS) which are committed in 
the course of a business and harm the collective interest of consumers. See Office of Fair Trading, Overview 
of the Enterprise Act: The Competition and Consumer Provisions (June 2003) 23. 
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be considered in contempt of court, which could lead to a fine or imprisonment for up to 
two years.558 
 
By comparison, the Brazilian Consumer Protection Code expressly prescribes civil, penal 
and administrative mechanisms to prevent injustices and arbitrariness which may 
negatively affect consumers.559 As seen previously all types of legal actions capable of 
providing adequate and effective protection to consumers are permitted.560 In addition 
judges can determine measures that ensure a practical result equivalent to the 
performance of an obligation (‘to do or not to do’) which vary from the imposition of daily 
fines to the use of police intervention.561 
 
Furthermore articles 61 to 80 prescribe a list of criminal offences that are punishable by 
imprisonment for up to two years and fine.562 For instance it is crime to omit information 
about the hazards of a product or mislead the consumer about the characteristics and 
quality of a product or service. 
 
In addition, Act 8137/1990 defines ‘crimes against the economic order and consumer 
relations’, which include practices that are detrimental to the market competition and may 
limit the consumer choice and freedom of contract.563 Those crimes are punishable by fine 
or imprisonment for up to eight years. 
 
3.4.9. Harmonisation of consumer protection (EU versus Mercosul) 
 
As seen earlier, the consumer acquis is under review and there is a trend towards the 
harmonisation of consumer protection in the European Union. As a consequence English 
consumer legislation may be increasingly shaped by the European law. 
 
                                                 
558 See Office of Fair Trading, Enforcement of Consumer Protection Legislation (June 2003) [3.47] and [3.51]. 
559 Ferreira (n 278) 178. See articles 55 to 80 of the Consumer Protection Code. 
560 See article 83 of the Consumer Protection Code. 
561 See article 84 of the Consumer Protection Code. Other measures include search and seizure, removal of 
things and persons, undoing construction works and prevention of harmful activities (§5). 
562 Other sanctions may be adopted cumulatively or alternately, such as: temporary suspension of rights, 
publication in the media about the conviction and community services (art. 78). 
563 For instance according to article 4 ‘it constitutes crimes against the economic order (...) I – the abuse of 
economic power, through the domination of the market or elimination of all or part of the competition’. The 
crimes against the consumer relations include ‘inducing the consumer or user in error through indication or 
false or misleading statement about the nature or quality of the goods or service, through any means, 
including advertising’ (art. 7, VII). 
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Similarly in the Mercosul there was an attempt to harmonise the consumer law of its 
Member States through a Consumer Protection Protocol of the Mercosul.564 However, as 
examined earlier, the latter did not come into force because the protection offered by the 
protocol was inferior to the protection provided by the Brazilian Consumer Protection 
Code and any reduction of fundamental rights in Brazil is deemed unconstitutional.565 As a 
consequence until a common regulation to protect consumers within the Mercosul is 
approved, each Member State will keep applying its own legislation independently.566 
 
Marques contended that such uniform legislation of consumer protection may not be 
viable in the context of the Mercosul because the latter does not have a ‘supranational 
court of law which holds the monopoly of the interpretation of the common rules’.567 In 
addition the ‘Consumer Protection Protocol’ imposed clauses containing maximum levels 
of protection which did not suit the distinct realities of each Member State (e.g., different 
levels of industrialisation).568 By comparison, the European Union has its Court of Justice 
and most of its consumer directives (such as the Directive 93/13/EEC) used to contain 
minimum harmonisation clauses that respected higher levels of protection offered by 
Member States.569 Marques suggested that the Mercosul should adopt a similar technique 
as applied by the EU because such minimal regulation respects the individual 
characteristics of the Member States.570 However more recently the EU has changed its 
approach in favour of the adoption of maximum harmonisation clauses in a bid to improve 
the consistency among the regulations of its members.571  
 
Nonetheless any level of harmonisation of the consumer protection within the EU and the 
Mercosul is an important step to facilitate cross-border transactions and enhance the 
                                                 
564 The draft of the ‘Consumer Protection Protocol in the Mercosul’ was proposed by the Technical Committee 
number 7 (CT 7) of the Mercosul in 1997. 
565 Fabrício Castagna Lunardi, 'A Defesa do Consumidor no Mercosul: Necessidade de Harmonização das 
Legislações' ano 11, n. 1024 <http://jus.com.br/revista/texto/8268> accessed 23 September 2011. 
566 See article 2 of Resolution 126/94. 
567 Cláudia Lima Marques, 'União Européia legisla sobre Cláusulas Abusivas: um Exemplo para o Mercosul' 
(1997) São Paulo, jan./mar., n. 21, Direito do Consumidor 300 (n 568) 301. See article 8 of the Directive 
93/13/EEC. 
568 At the time that the Protocol was proposed Uruguay and Paraguay did not have a systematic and 
comprehensive legislation in the context of consumer protection and the Argentine legislation did not offer the 
same level of protection as the Brazilian legislation. See Ibid. 301. 
569 Ibid. See article 8 of the Directive 93/13/EEC. Similarly Gardini observed that ‘contrary to what happens in 
Europe, no supranational organs, such as the European Commission or the European Court of Justice, exist in 
MERCOSUR. Therefore, integration has not been promoted as much by regional institutions as it has by 
member states and their leaders, upon whom the entire process has been highly dependent’. See Gardini (n 
42) 685. 
570 Marques, 'União Européia legisla sobre Cláusulas Abusivas: um Exemplo para o Mercosul' (n 567) 302. 
571 Department for Business Innovation & Skills (BIS), Review of the Eight EU Consumer Acquis Minimum 
Harmonisation Directives and their Implementation in the UK and Analysis of the Scope for Simplification 
(URN 05/1951, 2005). 
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consumer confidence in their common markets. The absence of a clear transnational 
protection may discourage consumers from entering transactions outside their own 
country, which may jeopardise the purpose behind the existence of a common market. 
 
Presently the European Union through its consumer acquis is ahead of its Latin American 
counterpart in terms of offering effective ways to deal with conflicts in cross-border 
transactions.572 Although the Mercosul proposed the Protocol of Santa Maria which 
purported to regulate consumer protection in disputes involving more than one Member 
State,573 this Protocol did not come into force because it was subjected to the approval of 
the ‘Consumer Protection Protocol of the Mercosul’ which did not happen.574 
 
Despite the above differences between the EU and the Mercosul, there have been 
negotiations for a ‘Bi-Regional Association Agreement’ or ‘EU-Mercosul Free-Trade 
Agreement’.575 However their different levels of consumer protection may be a hindrance 
to these negotiations; thus the Mercosul should consider implementing the 
aforementioned protocols or finding alternative ways to improve the protection of 
consumers in cross-border contracts in the forthcoming years.576 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
 
The numerous differences in cultural, social and economic aspects between England and 
Brazil have influenced the development of their legislation. Although one could expect 
that both legislatures would be completely distinct from each other, they have similar 
approaches in relation to the control on unfairness in B2C contracts. Zweigert and Kötz 
pointed out that often ‘different legal systems give the same or similar solutions (...) to 
the same problems of life, despite the great differences in their historical development, 
conceptual structure, and style of operation’.577 
                                                 
572 Klausner (n 38) 31. Differently from the EU, the Mercosul does not have a ‘community law’ but a ‘law of 
integration’ which is ‘”in between” international law and community law’. See Belen Olmos Giupponi, 
'International Law and Sources of Law in MERCOSUR: an Analysis of a 20-year Relationship' (2012) 25(3) LJIL 
707, 732.  
573 John A.E. Vervaele, 'Mercosur and Regional Integration in South America' (2005) ICLQ 387, 402. 
574 See article 18 of the Protocol of Santa Maria. 
575 Negotiations between the EU and the Mercosul were launched in 1999, suspended in October 2004 and re-
launched in 2010. Recent rounds of negotiations involving delegations of both regions took place in March and 
July of 2012. See <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/regions/mercosur/> 
accessed 17 July 2012. See also Foreign Affairs Committee, UK-Brazil Relations: Ninth Report of Session 2010-
12 (HC 2010-12, 949) and Foreign Affairs Committee, UK-Brazil Relations: Response of the Secretary of State 
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Cm 8237, 2011). 
576 Klausner (n 38) 71. 
577 Zweigert and Kötz (n 48) 39. 
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Similarities between legal solutions of both legal systems may result in part from the fact 
that over the centuries countries which adopt the civil law and common law systems have 
constantly interacted with each other, resulting in the approximation of their law to a 
certain extent.578 According to David those legal families have developed a ‘shared vision 
of justice’ and consequently they ‘have often produced very similar answers to common 
problems’579 as it can be observed from the solutions offered by England and Brazil to 
unfairness in consumer contracts.580 
 
To begin with, the definition of ‘unfair terms’ in the English and Brazilian legislation share 
some remarkable similarities. According to article 51, IV of the Consumer Protection Code 
and reg. 5(1) of the UTCCR a term may be regarded as ‘unfair’ or ‘abusive’ if there is a 
significant imbalance between the rights and obligations of the parties or an unreasonable 
disadvantage to the detriment of the consumer. Additionally the inconsistency with good 
faith may also indicate a lack of fairness.  
 
Furthermore Schedule 2 of the Regulations and article 51 of the Consumer Protection 
Code contain similar indicative and non-exhaustive lists of terms that are likely to be 
unfair or abusive. Most of the situations prescribed by Schedule 2 can find corresponding 
provisions in the Consumer Protection Code and the Civil Code. In addition the Brazilian 
Senator Antonio Valadares proposed a Bill (PLS 42/2007) which aims to include 
subsections in article 51 to cover cases that are prescribed by Schedule 2 but are 
nowhere to be found in the Brazilian law.581 
 
                                                 
578 Due to their affinities it is possible to include them under a common ‘western law’ family. David and 
Brierley, Major Legal Systems in the World Today: An Introduction to the Comparative Study of Law (n 16) 
25. 
579 Ibid.  
580 Rawls observed that people who live in society recognise that they are bound by rules of conduct and that 
a shared conception of justice and fairness guides people’s conduct to act in cooperation in order to achieve 
mutual benefits taking into account the needs of the less advantaged. See Rawls (n 69) 3-13. Indeed the 
Brazilian and English legal systems have converged on the adoption of a cooperative ethic in the context of 
consumer contracts. It is possible to argue that such cooperative ethic is also applicable to a certain extent in 
the context of business contracts. See St Albans City & District Council v International Computers Ltd [1995] 
[1996] 4 All ER 481 (CA), [1995] FSR 686 and CC 92519/SP (04/03/2009). 
581 In the justification for the Bill (PLS 42/2007), the aforementioned Senator contended that the proposed 
subsections already exist in the context of the European Union (i.e., Directive 93/13/EEC) and that a 
comparative analysis with the Brazilian Consumer Protection Code concluded that the above subsections were 
absent in the latter despite the fact that they can be perfectly adapted to the Brazilian context. 
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It is noteworthy that the existing similarities are not only a matter of coincidence. The list 
of article 51 was based on common problems which affect consumers in Brazil582 and it 
was also considerably influenced by provisions of the AGB-Gesetz.583 Similarly the 
Directive 93/13/EEC (which introduced the list of unfair terms that can be found in the 
Regulations) also ‘owed a considerable debt to German law’ in particular to the same 
AGB-Gesetz.584 Therefore ultimately both lists were based on the same German piece of 
legislation which contained provisions that presumably satisfied the needs of Brazil and of 
the EU Member States. 
 
The comparative table below demonstrate the existing equivalence between provisions of 
the Schedule 2(1) of the Regulations and provisions of article 51 of the Brazilian 
Consumer Protection Code, the Civil Code and the Bill PLS 42/2007: 
 
Schedule 2(1) UTCCR 1999 Consumer Protection Code and others 
(a) excluding or limiting the legal liability of 
a seller or supplier in the event of the death 
of a consumer or personal injury to the 
latter resulting from an act or omission of 
that seller or supplier. 
Article 12: manufacturers, producers, 
constructors, and importers are liable, 
regardless the existence of culpability for 
the redress of damages caused to the 
health or safety of consumers (...) 
(b) inappropriately excluding or limiting the 
legal rights of the consumer vis-a-vis the 
seller or supplier or another party in the 
event of total or partial non-performance or 
inadequate performance by the seller or 
supplier of any of the contractual 
obligations, including the option of 
offsetting a debt owed to the seller or 
supplier against any claim which the 
consumer may have against him. 
Article 51, I: prevent, exempt or reduces 
the suppliers’ liability for defects of any 
nature in products and services or imply a 
renouncement or a waiver of rights. 
(c) making an agreement binding on the 
consumer whereas provision of services by 
the seller or supplier is subject to a 
condition whose realisation depends on his 
own will alone. 
Article 51, IX: leave to the supplier alone 
the option to conclude or not the contract, 
though obliging the consumer. 
(d) permitting the seller or supplier to 
retain sums paid by the consumer where 
the latter decides not to conclude or 
perform the contract, without providing for 
Article 51, II: take from the consumer the 
option for reimbursement of an amount 
already paid. 
 
                                                 
582 In accordance with judicial precedents and bodies responsible for the consumer protection in Brazil, such 
as PROCONs (Consumer Protection Agencies) and Public Prosecutors. See Grinover and others (n 34) 535-
536. 
583 Gesetz zur Regelung des Rechts der Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen (Act on Standard Contract Terms 
– AGBG) of 1976. See Ibid. 535-536 and 570. 
584 See Youngs (n 110) 622-623. Annex of Directive 93/13/EEC which refers to its article 3(3) was introduced 
by Schedule 2 of the UTCCR 1999. See Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Contracts (Law Com CP No 166, 
2002) para 3.60. 
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the consumer to receive compensation of 
an equivalent amount from the seller or 
supplier where the latter is the party 
cancelling the contract. 
Article 51, XII: require from the consumer 
the reimbursement for expenses related to 
the collection of his debts, without giving 
the same right to the consumer against the 
supplier. 
(e) requiring any consumer who fails to 
fulfil his obligation to pay a 
disproportionately high sum in 
compensation. 
Bill (PLS 42/2007) proposes the inclusion of 
a new subsection in art. 51 which considers 
void terms which stipulate disproportionate 
penalties or damages to be paid by the 
consumer who fails to fulfil his obligations.  
(f) authorising the seller or supplier to 
dissolve the contract on a discretionary 
basis where the same facility is not granted 
to the consumer, or permitting the seller or 
supplier to retain the sums paid for services 
not yet supplied by him where it is the 
seller or supplier himself who dissolves the 
contract. 
Article 51, XI: authorise the supplier to 
unilaterally cancel the contract without 
giving the same right to the consumer. 
 
Article 51, II: take from the consumer the 
option for reimbursement of an amount 
already paid. 
 
(g) enabling the seller or supplier to 
terminate a contract of indeterminate 
duration without reasonable notice except 
where there are serious grounds for doing 
so. 
Article 720 (Civil Code): if the contract is of 
indeterminate duration, either of the parties 
may terminate it on 90 days’ notice, 
provided that a period of time has passed 
that is compatible with the nature and size 
of the investment required from the agent. 
(h) automatically extending a contract of 
fixed duration where the consumer does 
not indicate otherwise, when the deadline 
fixed for the consumer to express his desire 
not to extend the contract is unreasonably 
early. 
Bill (PLS 42/2007) proposes the inclusion of 
a new subsection in art. 51 which considers 
void terms which authorise the automatic 
renewal of contracts of fixed duration, 
without the prior consent of the consumer. 
(i) irrevocably binding the consumer to 
terms with which he had no real 
opportunity of becoming acquainted before 
the conclusion of the contract. 
Article 46: contracts governing consumer 
relations do not bind consumers when they 
have not been given the opportunity of 
being previously acquainted with their 
contents (...). 
(j) enabling the seller or supplier to alter 
the terms of the contract unilaterally 
without a valid reason which is specified in 
the contract. 
Article 51, XIII: authorise the supplier to 
unilaterally modify the contents or the 
quality of the contract after it has been 
entered into. 
 
(k) enabling the seller or supplier to alter 
unilaterally without a valid reason any 
characteristics of the product or service to 
be provided. 
Article 51, XIII: authorise the supplier to 
unilaterally modify the contents or the 
quality of the contract after it has been 
entered into. 
(l) providing for the price of goods to be 
determined at the time of delivery or 
allowing a seller of goods or supplier of 
services to increase their price without in 
both cases giving the consumer the 
corresponding right to cancel the contract if 
the final price is too high in relation to the 
price agreed when the contract was 
Article 51, X: allow the supplier to directly 
or indirectly change the price unilaterally. 
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concluded. 
(m) giving the seller or supplier the right to 
determine whether the goods or services 
supplied are in conformity with the 
contract, or giving him the exclusive right 
to interpret any term of the contract. 
Bill (PLS 42/2007) proposes the inclusion of 
a new subsection in art. 51 which considers 
void terms which authorise exclusively the 
supplier to determine whether the contract 
has been fulfilled or to interpret it. 
(n) limiting the seller's or supplier's 
obligation to respect commitments 
undertaken by his agents or making his 
commitments subject to compliance with a 
particular formality. 
Article 932, III (Civil Code): employers and 
principals are liable for civil reparation for 
their employees, servants and agents in the 
performance of the work given to them, or 
by the reason of that work. 
(o) obliging the consumer to fulfil all his 
obligations where the seller or supplier does 
not perform his. 
Article 51, IX: leave to the supplier alone 
the option to conclude or not the contract, 
though obliging the consumer. 
(p) giving the seller or supplier the 
possibility of transferring his rights and 
obligations under the contract, where this 
may serve to reduce the guarantees for the 
consumer, without the latter's agreement. 
Bill (PLS 42/2007) proposes the inclusion of 
a new subsection in art. 51 which considers 
void terms which allow the assignment of 
the contract with the guarantees given by 
the consumer without his agreement. 
(q) excluding or hindering the consumer's 
right to take legal action or exercise any 
other legal remedy, particularly by requiring 
the consumer to take disputes exclusively 
to arbitration not covered by legal 
provisions, unduly restricting the evidence 
available to him or imposing on him a 
burden of proof which, according to the 
applicable law, should lie with another party 
to the contract. 
Article 51, VII: determine a compulsory use 
of arbitration. 
 
Article 51, VI: establish the inversion of the 
burden of proof to the detriment of the 
consumer. 
 
 
Despite the similarities between their legislation, the English and Brazilian legal systems 
may use different processes and concepts to limit harmful terms in B2C contracts which 
reflect the differences between their legal systems.585 Nonetheless ‘in a shrinking world 
(...) there must be some virtue in uniformity of outcome whatever the diversity of 
approach in reaching that outcome’.586 Furthermore those distinctions may be mitigated 
by the growing influence of the European law over the English law. The ongoing 
movement towards the harmonisation of the consumer acquis and the European contract 
law may lead to the convergence of concepts and principles within the EU.587 This process 
may result in the approximation of the English law with the civilian Continental law. As a 
consequence it is possible to argue that the legislation which regulates B2C contracts in 
England and Brazil may become even more alike in the forthcoming years. 
                                                 
585 For instance although good faith is employed in both jurisdictions, its scope varies between them. 
586 Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2002] UKHL 22, [2003] 1 AC 32 [66]. 
587 According to Picat and Soccio harmonisation means ‘a simple reconciliation between two or more legal 
systems in order to reduce or to remove certain contradictions’. See Picat and Soccio (n 365) 372. 
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CHAPTER 4. ANALYSIS OF THE LEGISLATIVE CONTROLS ON UNFAIRNESS IN 
SMALL BUSINESS CONTRACTS IN ENGLAND AND BRAZIL 
 
4.1. Context 
 
Following the analysis of the control on unfairness in the context of B2B contracts and 
B2C contracts, this chapter proceeds with the examination of the topic in small business 
contracts which as mentioned earlier are in a grey area between the other two categories 
of contracts. 
 
The dichotomy between the above B2B contracts and B2C contracts was explicitly 
recognised in England by the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 and prior to that case law 
had already adopted different approaches to those contracts.588 By comparison the 
Brazilian law and its respective case law already recognised a differentiated regime to 
business transactions in its revoked Commercial Code of 1850 and subsequently it 
prescribed a special regime for consumers in its Consumer Protection Code of 1990.589 
 
The recognition of differences between contracting parties implies the acknowledgement 
that parties are no longer presumably equals as they used to be considered in the 
classical model.590 The inequality and imbalance between parties may lead to distortions 
in the market relationships such as the imposition of exemptions clauses without a free 
consent of the weak party.591  
 
The need to protect the weak party justifies the state intervention in contracts, including 
B2B contracts where there is no actual equality between parties.592 In principle small 
businesses are more likely to be affected by the imposition of unfair terms than large 
                                                 
588 Brownsword, Contract Law: Themes for the Twenty-first Century (n 127) 43-44. See Thornton v Shoe Lane 
Parking [1971] 2 QB 163 (consumer case) and British Crane Hire Corp Ltd v Ipswich Plant Hire Ltd [1975] QB 
303 (B2B contracts).  
589 For example REsp 1447/RJ (19/02/1990) and REsp 9317/SP (07/10/1991) expressly applied provisions of 
the Commercial Code; whereas REsp 1230233/MG (03/05/2011) and REsp 59494/SP (01/07/1996) made 
express reference to provisions of the Consumer Protection Code. 
590 It has become relevant to take into account whether the parties are consumers or businesses and whether 
they are vulnerable or not. See Brownsword, Contract Law: Themes for the Twenty-first Century (n 127) 44. 
591 According to Lord Denning the ‘little man’ in the face of a ‘take it or leave it’ situation would have no 
option but to take it and even if exemption clauses were written in clear words the ‘little man’ would never 
read or understand them. See George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd v Finney Lock Seeds Ltd [1983] QB 284 , 297. 
592 Castello Miguel (n 256) 124-125. See also Philips Hong Kong Ltd v Attorney General of Hong Kong (1993) 
61 BLR 41 , 7. ‘Except possibly in the case of situations where one of the parties to the contract is able to 
dominate the other as to the choice of the terms of a contract, it will normally be insufficient to establish that 
a provision is objectionably penal (...)’  
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businesses either because they normally do not have staff with legal expertise to fully 
understand the consequences of the clauses or they lack bargaining strength to negotiate 
terms with the other party.593 
 
Nonetheless case law suggests that the imposition of harsh terms in B2B contracts is 
more concerned to the inequality of bargaining power than to the size of the business;594 
hence the fact that a business is dealing on the other party’s standard form of contract is 
more influential than whether the company is regarded as large or small.595 For instance a 
small supplier of an item which is essential to the production of a large firm is in a better 
position to negotiate terms than its larger counterpart.596 
 
Therefore it may be more appropriate for the control over unfairness in SME contracts to 
be based on a more general ‘vulnerability of the weak party’ criterion (resulting from the 
inequality of bargaining power) rather than on the classification of the weak party as 
‘small business’ or ‘consumer’.597 
 
Only when demonstrated such asymmetry between parties that interventions may be 
considered legitimate in B2B contracts, because when parties are in an equal position 
they are able to protect their own interests598 and freedom of contract should prevail. As 
Dillon LJ observed ‘courts would only interfere in exceptional cases where as a matter of 
common fairness it was not right that the strong should be allowed to push the weak to 
the wall’.599 
 
 
 
                                                 
593 Lewis concluded from an empirical research involving 40 small businesses in the UK that only a minority of 
them ‘had a professional legal input into their contracts’ and the ones which did not have such input 
considered ‘themselves as contractually vulnerable’. Additionally their ‘perceived legal problems’ included the 
‘inadequacies in contractual arrangements including trading on others’ unfavourable terms’ and ‘the high cost 
of legal advice and representation’. See Lewis (n 323) 84-93. See also Law Commission, Unfair Terms in 
Contracts (Law Com CP No 166, 2002) para 5.28. 
594 The Law Commission identified 34 cases related to the use of standard terms in B2B contracts. In 19 of 
these cases courts have found clauses to be unreasonable under UCTA, but only 5 out these 19 cases 
‘specifically make reference to one party being a small business’. See Law Commission, Unfair Terms in 
Contracts (Law Com CP No 166, 2002) para 5.28. 
595 Ibid. para 5.29. 
596 Macaulay (n 164) 67. 
597 Vincenzo Roppo, 'From Consumer Contracts to Asymmetric Contracts: A Trend in European Contract Law?' 
(2009) 5(3) ERCL 304, 346. 
598 Castello Miguel (n 256) 124-125.  
599 Dillon LJ also maintained that ‘inequality of bargaining power must anyhow be a relative concept. It is 
seldom in any negotiation that the bargaining powers of the parties are absolutely equal (...). See Alec Lobb 
Garages Ltd v Total Oil Great Britain Ltd [1985] 1 WLR 173 (CA), 182-183. 
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4.2. Defining the ‘small business’ 
 
The task of defining small business is not a straightforward one.600601 Pieces of legislation 
that aim to regulate the relationships of this type of business may adopt different 
definitions according to their own purposes.602 Furthermore one could say that SMEs have 
a ‘hybrid’ characteristic: although they are ‘businesses’ by nature they also share 
similarities with ‘consumers’ because often they are too weak to negotiate on an equal 
basis with large businesses.603 
 
It may be an impossible task to propose a unanimous criterion for distinguishing the 
‘smallness’ from the ‘bigness’ of a business ‘because we don’t know precisely where in the 
twilight to draw the line’.604 Nonetheless the application of differentiated regimes to those 
businesses has made necessary to define them, thus qualitative and quantitative criteria 
have been employed to this end. The Bolton Report of 1971605 was one of the first 
attempts to define small firms in the UK and applied both criteria. Its definition includes: 
independence from a larger business; personalised management and a relatively small 
share of the market.606  
 
As will be observed later, various pieces of legislation are inclined to apply quantitative 
criteria such as the number of employees, turnover, balance sheet, production and gross 
revenue.607 This may result from the fact that those criteria can be objectively assessed; 
                                                 
600 ‘Small business tends generally to be found among manufacturers of consumer products and retailers’. See 
D. G. Rice, 'Small Business and its Problems in the United Kingdom' (1959) 24(1) LCP 222, 234. 
601 The category of ‘small businesses’ may also include ‘medium and micro businesses’ depending on the 
legislation that regulates those enterprises in England and Brazil as well as in their respective common 
markets (EU and Mercosul). For instance the European Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC and the 
Companies Act 2006 are applicable to micro, small and medium businesses. The same categories of 
businesses are covered by the Mercosul Resolution 59/98, whereas the Brazilian Declaratory Statute 123/2006 
tackles only micro and small businesses. 
602 For example the Brazilian National Statute of Micro and Small Businesses (Declaratory Statute 123/2006) 
defines small businesses according to their gross revenue because its main concern is to simplify taxation of 
enterprises which need incentives due to their small revenue; whereas the Draft Bill of the Law Commission 
and the SEBRAE (Brazilian Support Service for Micro and Small Businesses) define those businesses based on 
their number of employees in order to facilitate their identification. 
603 Larry T. Garvin, 'Small Business and the False Dichotomies of Contract Law' (2005) 40 Wake Forest L Rev 
295, 297. 
604 M.A. Adelman, 'Small Business - A Matter of Definition' (1960) 16 ABA Antitrust Section 18, 18. Similarly 
Rice observed that ‘“small,” like “big,” is a relative term. What is small in one context is large in another, and 
what is insignificant to one person appears immense to someone else.’ Rice (n 600) 222. 
605 Bolton Committee, Report of the Committee of Enquiry on Small Firms (Cmnd 4811, 1971).  
606 The Report also adopted quantitative criteria based on the number of employees, turnover, production and 
so forth depending on the sector of the business. See Sara Carter and Dylan Jones-Evans, Enterprise and 
Small Business: Principles, Practice and Policy (2nd edn, Prentice Hall/Financial Times 2006) 8. 
607 Turnover ‘is the amount of sales of goods or services by a company’. Balance sheet is ‘a statement of the 
financial position of a company at a particular time, such as the end of the financial year or the end of a 
quarter, showing the company’s assets and liabilities’. Gross revenue is the ‘total money received with no 
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hence they provide more certainty to commercial relationships. In order to calculate risks 
and avoid undesirable surprises, a party should be able to determine whether the other 
party is a SME because the latter may be subject to a different regime that can give rise 
to distinct legal consequences. In other words the other party while assessing the risks 
involved should be aware of the possibility that agreed terms may be susceptible to 
judicial interferences. 
 
The Law Commission in its proposal for a unified regime to regulate unfair contract terms 
took into consideration this need ‘to promote certainty and predictability’ in business 
contracts.608 For this reason it defined small businesses by reference to the number of 
employees (nine or fewer)609 rather than the turnover as the former criterion is ‘most 
likely to be accessible to the other contracting party’.610 The proposed protection will 
cover the vast majority of businesses because companies with nine or fewer employees 
represent approximately 95% of the enterprises in the UK.611 In Brazil the SEBRAE 
(Brazilian Support Service for Micro and Small Businesses) also adopts the ‘number of 
employees’ criterion to classify the size of an enterprise because it can be easily identified 
by businesses which intend to apply for this institution’s support.612  
 
However the criterion based on the number of employees in isolation may include some 
types of businesses (e.g., financial businesses) that can be considerably sophisticated. 
They may generate a substantial amount of money in spite of having few employees and 
                                                                                                                                                    
deductions’. See P. H. Collin, Dictionary of Business (4th edn, A & C Black 2006) 428 and 29. Production is the 
‘formal activity that adds value to goods and services (...) until used’ or ‘an organized process with specific 
goals’. See Friedman (n 114) 539. 
608 Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Contracts (Law Com No 292, 2005) paras 2.26 and 5.76. Specialised 
categories of contracts that require a higher level of certainty (such as contracts relating to land and 
intellectual property) are excluded from the small business regime. 
609 See clause 27 of the Unfair Contract Terms Bill. Schedule 4 of the Bill defines employee as ‘an individual 
who works in the business under a contract of employment or a contract for services’ (item 8) and stipulates 
how the number of employees in a business should be calculated. 
610 According to the Law Commission turnover may be not an accurate guide to the size of the business 
because depending on the sector it does not reflect its profit. Moreover it is difficult to be ascertained by the 
other party and it would need to be reassessed in each transaction. The turnover of a business can be also 
market-sensitive information that cannot be widely available. Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Contracts 
(Law Com No 292, 2005) paras 5.36 to 5.38. 
611 According to the ‘Business Population Estimates for the UK and Regions 2012’ at the start of 2012 there 
were approximately 4.8 million enterprises in the private sector: 74.16% with no employees and 20.84% with 
1 to 9 employees. See <http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/BISCore/statistics/docs/B/12-92-bpe-2012-stats-
release.pdf> accessed 26 December 2012. 
612 For instance in the sector of trade and services, micro enterprises are the ones with 9 or fewer employees 
and small enterprises the ones with 49 or fewer employees; whereas in the sector of industry those numbers 
double. See SEBRAE, Anuário do Trabalho na Micro e Pequena Empresa: 2010-2011 (2011). SEBRAE is a non-
profit private entity of public interest that aims to promote competitiveness and sustainable development of 
micro and small businesses in Brazil. It supports the opening and expansion of businesses that fulfil the above 
criteria. See <http://www.sebrae.com.br/customizado/sebrae/institucional/quem-somos/sebrae-um-agente-
de-desenvolvimento> accessed 20 April 2011. 
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consequently do not require special protection.613 In order to avoid potential unjust 
situations the headcount criterion may be complemented by another criterion that reflects 
the wealth of the company (e.g., turnover and gross revenue).614 
 
For instance Recommendation 2003/361/EC of the European Commission adopts financial 
ceilings (annual turnover and balance-sheet total) in addition to the headcount of the 
enterprises to define them as micro, small and medium-sized.615 Those definitions entered 
into force in 2005 and have been applied by EU Member States, the European Investment 
Bank (EIB) and the European Investment Fund (EIF) ‘without any notable difficulty’.616 
The European Commission was planning to open a consultation in 2012 to discuss 
whether such SME definitions need to be revised and any changes should be implemented 
in 2013, but so far this consultation has not materialised.617  
 
England has incorporated the Recommendation’s definition into its domestic legislation 
such as the Community Investment Tax Relief (Accreditation of Community Development 
Finance Institutions) (Amendment) Regulations 2008, Payment Services Regulations 2009 
and Taxation (International and Other Provisions) Act 2010.618 The Corporation Tax Act 
2009 also adopted this definition but excluded from the small businesses category 
companies which in any time of an accounting period were:619 an open-ended investment 
company, an authorised unit trust scheme, an insurance company, or a friendly society 
because their dealings may involve high values.620 On the other hand the Companies Act 
                                                 
613 Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Contracts (Law Com No 292, 2005) para 2.32. 
614 The adoption of the mechanical test ‘of number of employees and/or having a certain level of turnover’ to 
specify the application of a special regime allows the ‘relative bargaining positions of the parties become what 
it should be, a factor in assessing reasonableness.’ See Wilson and Bone (n 173) 38. 
615 Under Title I of the Annex of the Recommendation: medium-sized enterprises employ fewer than 250 
persons and have an annual turnover which does not exceed €50 million (approximately £42.5 million) or an 
annual balance-sheet total up to €43 million (approximately £36.5 million). A small enterprise employs up to 
50 persons and has a turnover and/or annual balance sheet total up to €10 million (approximately £8.5 
million). A micro enterprise employs fewer than 10 persons and has a turnover and/or annual balance sheet 
total that does not exceed €2 million (approximately £1.7 million). According to a European Commission’s 
report of October 2009 the current headcount ceiling was still appropriate. Similarly the financial ceiling was 
kept the same because the inflation has been considered moderate. See Commission, 'Commission staff 
working document on the implementation of Commission Recommendation of 6 May 2003 concerning the 
definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises' SEC (2009) 1350 final para 3.2. 
616 Ibid. para 4. 
617 See <http://www.euractiv.com/innovation-enterprise/sme-commission-ask-news-506418> accessed 10 
February 2012. 
618 Section 9(2) of the Community Investment Tax Relief (Accreditation of Community Development Finance 
Institutions) (Amendment) Regulations 2008 (SI 2008/383); section 2(1) of the Payment Services Regulations 
2009 (SI 2009/209); Taxation (International and Other Provisions) Act 2010 in section 172(1) provides 
exemptions from the basic rule of taxation for dormant companies and SMEs.  
619 Accounting period: a period of time at the end of which the firm’s accounts are made up. See Collin (n 
607) 4. 
620 Corporation Tax Act 2009 (2009 c4) 931S (1). 
 - 132 -  
 
2006 adopts the same number of the employees’ criterion of the Recommendation but 
applies different criteria for turnover and balance sheet totals.621  
 
The Mercosul also adopts the number of employees and turnover criteria similar to 
Recommendation 2003/361/EC; however the protection offered by the European 
Commission covers businesses with a turnover almost four times higher than its South 
American equivalent.622 One could suggest that SMEs in EU countries are more 
sophisticated or profitable. However this difference may result from the fact that the EU 
criterion includes businesses with a larger number of employees which presumably have 
transactions involving larger amounts of money and higher turnovers.  
 
By comparison, the Brazilian National Statute of Micro and Small Businesses (Declaratory 
Statute 123/2006)623 adopted only the gross revenue as the criterion to classify a 
company as small or micro because this statute is mainly concerned with estimating and 
collecting taxes and contributions; consequently the number of employees is not essential 
for its purpose.624  
 
 
 
                                                 
621 According to section 382 of this Act a company is classified as small if it has a turnover of not more than 
£6.5 million, a balance sheet total of not more than £3.26 million and not more than 50 employees. On the 
other hand, a company is classified as medium-sized if it has a turnover of not more than £25.9 million, a 
balance sheet total of not more than £12.9 million and not more than 250 employees. Nonetheless, those 
definitions are limited to the purpose of accounting and reporting requirements (section 465). 
622 In the context of the Mercosul, Resolution 59/98 applies a quantitative criterion that takes into account the 
number of employees and the turnover. In the sector of trade and services, a micro business has up to 5 
employees and a turnover not higher than US$200,000 (approximately £125,000) whereas a small business 
has up to 30 employees and a turnover under US$1.5 million (approximately £945,000). In the sector of 
industry, a micro business has up to 10 employees and a turnover not higher than US$400,000 
(approximately £250,000) and a small business has up to 40 employees and a turnover under US$3.5 million 
(approximately £2.2 million). There is also a qualitative criterion according to which small businesses should 
not be controlled by another company or belong to a business group which has a turnover that exceed the 
established values. 
623 The Declaratory Statute 123/2006 was enacted in accordance with the constitutional amendment 42/2003, 
which introduced changes into the National Tax System including the provision that a Declaratory Statute 
should establish general rules for tax legislation, particularly regarding to the definition of a differentiated and 
favourable tax treatment to be given to micro and small businesses, including special or simplified tax regimes 
(article 146, III, ‘d’ of the Federal Constitution).  
624 According to article 3 of the National Statute of Micro and Small Businesses small and micro businesses are 
the companies, societies and business proprietors properly registered in the Registry of Companies or the Civil 
Registry of Legal Entities, provided that I – in the case of micro businesses: the business proprietor, the legal 
person or its equivalent receives in each calendar year gross revenue of less than R$240,000 (approximately 
£92,500); II – in the case of small businesses: the business proprietor, the legal person or its equivalent 
receives in each calendar year gross revenue higher than R$240,000 and equal or less than R$2.4 million 
(approximately £925,000). 
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4.3. Legislative control on unfairness in small businesses contracts in England 
and the EU 
 
European contract law has been developed mainly in the area of B2C contracts and has 
left B2B transactions to be regulated by Member States.625 One could say that the EU 
recognises that consumers are particularly vulnerable in cross-borders transactions within 
the common market thus it provides special protection at European level to the latter; 
whereas interferences in businesses transactions should be avoided in deference to 
freedom of contract. When such interferences are deemed strictly necessary they should 
be determined by the legislation of each Member State which can identify specific issues 
that have to be addressed. 
 
In England the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 prescribes provisions that purport to 
protect businesses and non-businesses from exclusion and limitation clauses as seen in 
chapter 2. Its section 3 affords protection in the context of breaches of strict contractual 
obligations to consumers and those ‘dealing on the other’s written standard terms of 
business’ in B2B contracts. This provision may be particularly significant to small 
businesses contracts as it may protect SMEs from unreasonable terms that are unlikely to 
be negotiated or modified due to the disparity of bargaining strength between the parties. 
 
Notwithstanding the aforementioned provision the classical model still prevails in the 
context of business contracts in England. Such model is consistent with the static market-
individualist ideology which is underpinned by an individualist ethic. According to this 
ideology each party can pursue his self-interest and courts should not interfere in 
contracts freely agreed.626 
 
However this ideology may not prevent distortions created by market asymmetries such 
as the imposition of unfair terms in contracts where parties do not share equal bargaining 
power. Brownsword suggested that the so-called dynamic market-individualist ideology 
may adjust better to the market reality as it takes into account commercial expectations 
and prescribes limits to the pursuit of self-interest.627 
                                                 
625 Roppo (n 597) 306. 
626 Brownsword and Adams, 'The Ideologies of Contract' (n 127) 208. See also Photo Production Ltd v 
Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] AC 827 (HL) which adopted a non-interventionist approach in a business 
contract. A similar position was adopted in Regus (UK) Ltd v Epcot Solutions Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 361, [2009] 
1 All ER (Comm) 586 because parties had an equivalent bargaining strength. 
627 Brownsword, Contract Law: Themes for the Twenty-first Century (n 127) 142-143. 
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Additionally Roppo contended that EU legislation should regulate B2B contracts where a 
dominant party takes advantage of a weak business, in particular of a small business. 
Therefore special protections should be no longer limited to consumer contracts and 
should also be applied to business agreements in those circumstances.628  
 
According to the European Commission in its ‘Green Paper on the Review of the 
Consumer Acquis’ small businesses and individual entrepreneurs may be comparable to 
consumers ‘when they buy certain goods or services’, ‘which raises the question whether 
they should benefit to a certain extent from the same protection provided to 
consumers.’629 
 
In 2008 the same Commission enacted A Small Business Act for Europe (SBA)630 that 
prescribed principles and proposed policies and legislative actions aiming at the full 
development of SMEs (e.g., facilitate access to funding) and creation of jobs. At the heart 
of the SBA was the think small first principle which ‘requires that legislation takes SMEs’ 
interests into account at the very early stages of policy making in order to make 
legislation more SME friendly’.631 This principle can be found in the domestic legislation of 
England such as the Companies Act 2006 which took into account not only the interests of 
larger companies but also of SMEs. This Act prescribes a ‘small companies regime’632 
which is a positive step for SMEs as the previous legislation ‘was incomprehensible to 
many small businesses, bureaucratic and unsympathetic to the needs of small companies 
and clearly not user-friendly’.633 
 
A review of SBA in 2011 expressly recognised that unfair commercial practices and unfair 
contractual clauses are often imposed on SMEs;634 for this reason the European 
Commission intends to carry out an analysis of such practices and clauses in B2B 
                                                 
628 Roppo (n 597) 311. 
629 Commission, 'Green Paper on the Review of the Consumer Acquis' COM (2006) 744 final para 15. 
630 Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - “Think Small First” - A “Small Business 
Act” for Europe’ COM (2008) 394 final. 
631 See <http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/small-business-act/think-small-first/> accessed 10 
December 2011. 
632 The Act defines in its sections 381 to 384 the ‘companies subject to the small companies’ regime’. This 
regime includes: ‘group accounts’ if a small business is a ‘parent company’ (‘a company which owns more 
than 50% of the shares of another company’) (s. 398); distinct provisions for filing obligations (s. 444) and 
exemption from audit of accounts (s. 477). See Collin (n 607) 290. 
633 According to Sheikh the CA 1985 ‘was opaque and inaccessible for small business users’. See Saleem 
Sheikh, A Guide to the Companies Act 2006 (Routledge-Cavendish 2008) 47 and 126. 
634 Commission, 'Review of the "Small Business Act" for Europe' COM (2011) 78 final. 
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contracts within the EU and recommend ‘a legislative proposal if needed in order to 
protect businesses’ against them.635 This proposition supports the idea that small 
businesses may need protections similar to consumers as the latter are already covered 
by the provisions of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (UCPD).636 
 
Furthermore the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL) and the Draft Common 
Frame of Reference (DCFR) contain provisions which in spite of not referring to small 
businesses expressly may benefit them indirectly as they purport to protect the weaker 
party in asymmetric contracts.637 
 
The PECL transposed rules from the Directive 93/13/EEC (that are limited to B2C 
contracts) to control any non-negotiated term, but they ‘do not differentiate between 
possible legal entities’.638 Therefore, although there is no special treatment for small 
businesses, they may be favoured by provisions that used to be restricted to consumer 
contracts.  
 
The DCFR in its turn deals with unfair terms more generally and does not confer 
privileged treatment on consumer contracts because ‘other market players (especially 
small businesses) (...) suffer in the same way as consumers do an asymmetry of 
bargaining power in their relationships to stronger contract parties’.639 For this reason the 
DCFR regulates unfair terms in B2C contracts (article II - 9:404); C2C contracts (article II 
- 9:405) and also B2B contracts (article II - 9:406). Such provisions purport to protect 
parties who adhere to non-negotiated terms which significantly disadvantage them and 
that are contrary to good faith and fair dealing. Those controls are justified because in 
standard form contracts there is ‘no free consent to the terms by one side’.640  
 
                                                 
635 Ibid. para 3.3.1. 
636 European Parliament and Council Directive 2005/29/EC. 
637 See Roppo (n 597) 331-336. Additionally the Directive 2011/7/EU on Combating Late Payment in 
Commercial Transactions made reference to SBA in its recital 6 which prescribes the facilitation of the SMEs’ 
access to finance and the development of ‘a legal and business environment supportive of timely payments in 
commercial transactions’ because late payments aggravate the weak position of those businesses. This 
provision implicitly recognises an asymmetric position of SMEs in B2B contracts. 
638 The PECL ‘proceed on the basis of the equality of all potential legal entities and address natural persons as 
well as legal entities’. Hans W Micklitz, 'The Principles of European Contract Law and the Protection of the 
Weaker Party' (2004) 27(3) JCP 339, 341. 
639 Roppo (n 597) 335-336. 
640 Thomas Pfeiffer, 'Non-Negotiated Terms' in R Schulze (ed) Common Frame of Reference and Existing EC 
Contract Law (Sellier 2008) 179. 
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As the DCFR does not tackle small businesses contracts specifically, SMEs will share the 
same protection afforded to businesses in general (article II - 9:406). Such protection 
covers adhering businesses against terms which ‘use grossly deviates from good 
commercial practice’ and that is ‘contrary to good faith and fair dealing’. Those broad 
expressions leave some leeway to courts to interpret them and also indicate the adoption 
of a cooperativist ethic which opposes any harmful behaviour of either party. Furthermore 
the expression ‘good commercial practice’ may reflect the expectations of the commercial 
community of a certain trade which is consistent with the dynamic market-individualism 
ideology.641 
 
More recently the European Commission proposed an optional Regulation on a Common 
European Sales Law (CESL)642 and one of its main purposes is clearly to benefit SMEs ‘in 
particular, from entering cross border trade or expanding to new Member States' 
markets’.643644 Generally SMEs cannot afford the costs of trading with foreign markets as it 
requires legal expertise of the law of contracts of different countries and translation of 
agreements. Consequently the aforementioned regulation may offer an alternative 
solution to those problems because SMEs can opt to use this regime in cross-border 
transactions. As this set of rules shall be identical in all 27 Member States, there is no 
need to adapt contracts to different national contract law.645 
 
In addition small businesses contracting outside their jurisdiction may be protected by the 
provisions of this proposed regime which also tackles unfair terms in ‘contracts between 
traders’. They reproduce the wording of the DCFR provisions as they consider unfair non-
negotiated terms that are of ‘such a nature that its use grossly deviates from good 
commercial practice, contrary to good faith and fair dealing’ (art. 86). 
 
 
                                                 
641 Brownsword, Contract Law: Themes for the Twenty-first Century (n 127) 161.  
642 Commission, 'Proposal for a Regulation on a Common European Sales Law' COM (2011) 635 final. See 
further details in chapter 3. 
643 The Common European Sales Law ‘can be chosen in contracts between traders where at least one of them 
is an SME, drawing upon the Commission Recommendation 2003/361 concerning the definition of micro, small 
and medium-sized enterprises while taking into account future develpments’. See Commission, 'Proposal for a 
Regulation on a Common European Sales Law' COM (2011) 635 final paras 2 and 7. 
644 Poole observed that this ‘regime is not intended to contracts between two large businesses’; however 
according to article 13(b) of the CESL ‘a Member State may decide to make the Common European Sales Law 
available for contracts where all the parties are traders but none of them is an SME’. See Poole, Textbook on 
Contract Law (n 78) 15.  
645 See <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/contract/files/common_sales_law/i11_1175_en.pdf> accessed 13 
October 2011. 
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4.3.1. The Law Commission proposal 
 
In 2001 The Law Commission was asked by the Department of Trade and Industry to 
propose a unified regime to regulate the law of unfair contract terms as well as to 
consider whether small businesses particularly require an extended protection.646 
Following the analysis of the responses to its Consultation Paper,647 the Law Commission 
published a Report in 2005 which concluded that small businesses are more exposed to 
unfair terms than large businesses as a result of the inequality of bargaining power;648 
thus just like consumers they also require a special regime. 
 
The proposed regime extends consumer protections prescribed by the UTCCR 1999 to 
small businesses.649 It may benefit SMEs because currently they are mainly protected by 
the provisions of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 and ‘there is a clear potential for 
unfairness in terms other than those caught by UCTA’650 such as arbitration clauses, price 
variation clauses and termination clauses.651 Those clauses are frequently included in 
contracts in which small businesses are customers for goods and services and under the 
Law Commission’s proposal they shall be subjected to a ‘fair and reasonable test’.652 
 
Furthermore this regime allows small businesses to challenge all non-negotiated and non-
core terms653 which should increase significantly the level of protection afforded to those 
businesses. SMEs are particularly susceptible to the imposition of detrimental terms in 
standard form contracts; especially when those terms are included in sporadic contracts 
that are outside their area of expertise because normally they do not have the resources 
to take legal advice.654 Such special protection is however limited to non-negotiated terms 
in deference to freedom of contract and certainty of contracts. 
 
The need for certainty in B2B contracts is also consistent with the provision which 
prescribes that small businesses must bear the burden of proving that a non-negotiated 
                                                 
646 See <http://www.justice.gov.uk/lawcommission/unfair-terms-in-contracts.htm> accessed 05 April 2011. 
647 Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Contracts (Law Com CP No 166, 2002). 
648 Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Contracts (Law Com No 292, 2005) paras 5.3 and 5.4. 
649 See chapter 3. 
650 Chen-Wishart (n 3) 497. 
651 Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Contracts (Law Com No 292, 2005) para 2.31. 
652 Ibid. paras 5.12 and 5.26. 
653 Ibid. para 2.35. Core terms are related to the definition of the main subject matter of the contract (goods 
or services) or to the adequacy of the price or remuneration. See reg. 6(2) of the UTCCR 1999. 
654 Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Contracts (Law Com CP No 166, 2002) paras 5.28 and 5.29. 
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term is not fair and reasonable.655 Otherwise businesses would be able to ‘challenge the 
fairness of a term when the real reason behind the challenge is to try and avoid 
contractual obligations’ which would put at risk the market’s efficiency.656 
 
For the purpose of the proposed legislation, SMEs can make use of the special protection 
either against a large business (due to the inequality of bargaining power) or a small peer 
because ‘small business contract’ is defined as a contract between a small business and 
another business of any size.657 In contracts where both parties are considered ‘small’ in 
size, interventions may be required to prevent abuses when businesses have different 
levels of resources (e.g., access to legal advice).658 
 
There are however exceptions to the application of this regime. The first one is contracts 
involving values higher than £500,000 because according to the Law Commission they 
indicate that the business is probably sufficiently sophisticated or is likely to take legal 
advice.659 The same reasoning is applied to companies that are associated with or under 
the control of a larger business because in those cases the small businesses can recourse 
to the controller business for assistance and support.660 The second exception is the 
‘financial services contracts’ because they are subject to regulations by the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) and the application of another regime could result in an ‘over-
regulation of the market’.661 It is clear that the Law Commission aims to limit the 
application of the special regime to situations where it is absolutely required because 
interventions should be avoided especially in the context of B2B contracts. Consequently 
those businesses are also ‘not covered by the pre-emptive challenges’, though they ‘will 
need to possess sufficient resources to pursue court action challenging terms as unfair’.662 
 
                                                 
655 See clause 17(2) of the Unfair Contract Terms Bill in contrast with clause 16(1) which prescribes that in a 
consumer contract the burden of proof that a term is fair and reasonable rests on the business. The Law 
Commission pointed out that despite small businesses share similarities with consumers, they are more 
experienced and possess more resources than the latter, and consequently they must bear the burden of 
proving that a term is not fair and reasonable. Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Contracts (Law Com No 292, 
2005) para 5.85. 
656 Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Contracts (Law Com No 292, 2005) para 4.10. 
657 Clause 29 of the Unfair Contract Terms Bill. 
658 Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Contracts (Law Com No 292, 2005) para 5.32. 
659 See clause 29 of the Bill that excludes from the small business regime contracts or series contracts that 
contain transactions that exceed £500,000. See also Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Contracts (Law Com 
No 292, 2005) paras 5.55 to 5.59. 
660 Clauses 27 and 28 of the Unfair Contract Terms Bill. 
661 See Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Contracts (Law Com No 292, 2005) paras 5.64 to 5.67. See Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000. 
662 Poole, Textbook on Contract Law (n 78) 276. 
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On 25 July 2012 the Law Commission published a review and update of the 
aforementioned 2005 Report on ‘Unfair Terms in Contracts’ in the issues paper 'Unfair 
Terms in Consumer Contracts: A New Approach?’. However the latter did not contain 
revisions to the small businesses regime originally proposed in the Report; therefore 
presumably this regime will not be subject to new considerations. 
 
On the other hand the ‘reform of consumer rights’ proposed by the Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) through the Consumer Bill of Rights prescribes some 
protections to SMEs. As part of this reform it has launched a consultation on ‘private 
actions in competition law’ which purports to ‘increase growth, by empowering small 
businesses to tackle anti-competitive behaviour that is stifling their business’ and ‘promote 
fairness, by enabling consumers and businesses who have suffered loss due to anti-
competitive behaviour to obtain redress’.663 Those proposed protections however have a 
different scope from the protection afforded to SMEs against unfair terms.  
 
4.4. Legislative control on unfairness in small businesses contracts in Brazil 
and the Mercosul 
 
Globalisation expanded the consumer market beyond countries’ borders and triggered the 
demand for a greater variety of products. On the one hand this phenomenon favoured the 
development of small businesses that are more adaptable and capable of satisfying new 
niche markets.664 On the other hand those businesses may need extra support to enhance 
their competitiveness in a globalised market; otherwise they may not withstand the 
difficulties of competing with large-sized companies.665  
 
For this reason, the Mercosul proposed policies to support micro, small and medium 
enterprises via its Resolution 90/93 and subsequent Resolution 59/98.666 According to 
                                                 
663 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), Private Actions in Competition Law: A Consultation 
on Options for Reform (April 2012) 4. The closing date for responses was on 24 July 2012. 
664 Fernanda Kellner Oliveira Palermo, 'As Micro e Pequenas Empresas como Propulsoras do Desenvolvimento 
Econômico e Social: Contribuição para o Incremento das Atividades Econômicas no Âmbito do Mercosul' Jus 
Navigandi <http://jus.uol.com.br/revista/texto/2735> accessed 06 April 2011 [5.1]. According to Schwamm 
such adaptability ‘perhaps (...) is simply because they are on a more human scale, and closer to the 
consumer’s changing needs, expectations and tastes’. See Henri Schwamm, 'Small Firms in Europe' (1972) 6 
JWTL 648, 660. 
665 Paulo Roberto Colombo Arnoldi and Tais Cristina Camargo Michelan, 'Novos Enfoques da Função Social da 
Empresa numa Economia Globalizada' (2002) São Paulo, jul./set., v.11., Revista de Direito Privado 244, 248. 
666 Resolutions 90/93 and 59/98 prescribe stages one and two respectively of ‘policies to support micro, small 
and medium business’. Resolutions ‘are adopted by the Common Market Group and are binding on all member 
states’. They purport to implement the decisions of the Common Market Council which is the supreme body of 
the Mercosul that conducts policies towards the implementation of the Treaty of Asunción. They ‘cover an 
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those Resolutions the Member States of the Southern Common Market should identify 
deficiencies that may affect SMEs and create strategies to strengthen those businesses 
(e.g., enhance competitiveness, financial support and tax simplification). They 
demonstrate the concern of this regional trade agreement over the protection of SMEs, 
but they do not make express reference to any protection against contractual imbalances 
or unfairness. As a result Brazil proposed another Resolution667 which purports to tackle 
abusive clauses and shall be applied at Mercosul level. Although this Resolution is 
circumscribed to the context of B2C contracts, Brazilian courts have extended consumer 
protections to SMEs, thus the latter may benefit from its provisions.  
 
The protection of small businesses is not only important to the Mercosul as a whole, but it 
is also fundamental to the economy of its Member States. For instance, in Brazil SMEs 
represent approximately 99% of businesses and generate over 14.7 millions of jobs.668 
Those businesses are so invaluable to this country that their protection acquired 
constitutional status through article 170, IX of its Federal Constitution which prescribes 
that one of the principles of the economic activity is the ‘preferential treatment for small 
businesses organised under Brazilian law which have their head-office and management 
in Brazil’. Such special regime reflects the recognition of their weaker position in relation 
to other businesses. It is in line with the constitutional principle of equality which 
stipulates that equal parties should be treated equally but ‘unequal parties should be 
given unequal treatment in the extent of their inequality’.669 
 
Additionally this ‘preferential treatment’ prescribed by the Federal Constitution to SMEs 
supports article 6 of Act 10259/2001 according to which micro and small enterprises are 
the only type of businesses that can make claims in federal small claims courts.670 This 
provision makes evident that those businesses require more protection than others and 
equates them to natural persons. It recognises that they should be entitled to a simplified 
proceeding to deal with small claims because just like individuals their resources are 
generally limited or they are unable to seek legal advice. For this reason they are allowed 
                                                                                                                                                    
array of subject matter related to freedom of movement within the MERCOSUR area, such as commercial 
aspects and documents required for MERCOSUR citizens, budgetary aspects and relations with third states’. 
See Giupponi (n 572) 712. 
667 Mercosul/CT-7/DT4-02/Reserved. 
668 SEBRAE, Anuário do Trabalho na Micro e Pequena Empresa: 2010-2011 (2011) 21-22. 
669 Article 5 of the Brazilian Federal Constitution. See also Moraes (n 134) 64. 
670 Federal small claims courts are competent to judge cases involving values up to 60 minimum wages 
(approximately £12,385) or minor offences which have as defendant the Union, the federal governmental 
agencies, foundations or public companies. 
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to designate any representative for the cause other than a lawyer671 and the above 
proceeding enable SMEs to seek relief from harmful terms in a more straightforward 
manner.  
 
This differentiated treatment given to SMEs was the basis for the creation in 2011 of an 
Executive Department in Brazil exclusively dedicated to micro and small businesses 
matters which will have the status of a government cabinet.672 According to Bill 865/11 
this body will be responsible for the creation of policies and directives which aim the 
strengthening, expansion and formalisation of SMEs. Although this department will not be 
endowed with legislative powers, it will be able to propose new law for consideration by 
the competent body. While it is not possible to predict the future actions of this 
Department, its creation will represent an important step towards the promotion and 
protection of SMEs in Brazil. 
 
Nonetheless currently the specialised pieces of legislation concerning small businesses in 
Brazil (e.g., National Statute of Micro and Small Businesses) are mainly related to 
taxation, simplification of administrative obligations, access to credit, labour relations and 
social security.673 In the context of contract law MSEs are only protected by provisions 
applied to businesses in general, as seen in chapter 2. For instance, articles 423 and 424 
of the Civil Code may be used to protect weak businesses from unfair terms imposed by 
large businesses in contracts of adhesion.674 
 
However the general control over unfairness in B2B contracts may not adequately protect 
small businesses because they are often more vulnerable than other businesses. Most of 
them end their activities before completing two years of existence.675 The main reasons 
                                                 
671 See article 10 (Act 10259/2001). 
672 The protection will be in line with the preferential treatment prescribed by article 170, IX of the Federal 
Constitution. 
673 See article 179 of the Federal Constitution and the National Statute of Micro and Small Businesses 
(Declaratory Statute 123/2006). Additionally Act 9317/1996 establishes a simplified system of taxation system 
for micro and small businesses through the ‘Integrated System for Payment of Taxes and Contributions of 
Micro and Small Businesses’ (‘SIMPLES’). Furthermore, Decree 6204/2007 prescribes a favoured treatment, 
differentiated and simplified for micro and small businesses in public contracting of goods, works and services 
within the federal public administration and Decree 6038/2007 institutes the Steering Committee of Taxation 
of Micro and Small Businesses. 
674 Art. 423: ‘when there are ambiguous or contradictory clauses in a contract of adhesion, the interpretation 
most favourable to the adhering party shall be adopted’. Art. 424: ‘in contracts of adhesion, clauses that 
stipulate that the adhering party has waived in advance rights arising out of the nature are void’. See Rose (n 
251) 88. 
675 ‘Small firms are extremists (...) they grow or decline the most rapidly; enter and leave in great numbers’. 
Adelman (n 604) 19. Similarly Schwamm observed that ‘many small firms collapse and disappear from the 
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for their failure include the lack of expertise and experience of their proprietors and 
difficult access to professional advice,676 which leave them more exposed to abusive 
clauses and stipulations. In other words, the success or failure of a small business may 
result from a number of factors such as undercapitalisation or lack of planning. 
Nevertheless the constant exposure to unfair terms in their dealings is one of the factors 
which have a negative impact on them. This has prompted Brazilian courts to intervene in 
small businesses contracts as will be observed below.  
 
4.4.1. Businesses as consumers  
 
The general provisions of the Civil Code and the supplementary commercial legislation 
aim to regulate the relationships of businesses which share equal bargaining power; 
consequently they are often inadequate to regulate contracts which involve an 
unbalanced relationship. Ulhoa Coelho stressed the need for a distinct regime to deal with 
contracts between unequal parties. In the absence of such special rules, he suggested 
that small businesses are better protected under the provisions of the Consumer 
Protection Code.677 However while in line with the Consumer Protection Code it is 
incontrovertible that small businesses can be defined as a seller or supplier,678 there is 
some debate in relation to its treatment as a consumer.679 
 
In Brazil there are two main approaches concerning the definition of consumer for the 
purpose of the application of the special protection. The first approach called finalist or 
subjective takes into account the ‘non-professional’ quality of the consumer as opposed to 
a professional supplier.680 It regards as a consumer only the final recipient of goods or 
services who do not profit from this activity. Consequently this restrictive approach 
excludes from the consumer definition a company which acquires a service or product for 
business purposes.681 
                                                                                                                                                    
scene (...) but at the same time many new ones spring up and expand (...). Thus there is a constant process 
of renewal’. See Schwamm (n 664) 651. 
676 Palermo (n 664) [3.2] and [3.3.]. 
677 Ulhoa Coelho (n 31) 167-168. 
678 Article 3 of the Consumer Protection Code defines supplier as ‘any natural or legal person public or private, 
domestic or foreign, as well as depersonalised entities, which develop activities of production, assembly, 
creation, construction, processing, importation, exportation, distribution or trading of products or services.’ 
The definition of supplier contained in article 3 does not discriminate between businesses of different types 
and sizes, thus it may range from a family-run business to a multinational. 
679 Consumer is defined by article 2 of the Consumer Protection Code as ‘every natural or legal person who 
acquires or uses products or services as a final recipient’. 
680 Ulhoa Coelho (n 31) 169. 
681 REsp 761557/RS (03/12/2009). 
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According to the second approach, known as maximalist or objective, the protection 
afforded to consumers may be extended to any person who acquires goods or services as 
their final recipient and do not reintroduce them in the market chain.682 Therefore a 
business can still be treated as a consumer even if it is exercising a professional 
activity;683 hence a company will be regarded as a consumer if it purchases some 
paintings for the embellishment of its premises. 
 
The main problem of the application of this approach is concerning situations which do 
not involve a physical exchange of goods or services. For instance, if a manufacturer uses 
electrical energy to run his machinery he may be materially considered a final recipient; 
however the energy employed will be indirectly incorporated into the goods that will be 
made available to the consumer market.684 As a consequence the company may not be 
protected as a consumer in this case.685  
 
The position of the Superior Tribunal of Justice has moved from a finalist approach 
towards a maximalist approach.686 According to this court the consumer protection should 
not only be applied to the ‘non-professional’ consumer but also to vulnerable businesses 
(in the technical, legal or economic sense) who are the final recipients of goods or 
services.687 For instance, a person who acquires a small piece of machinery from a large 
supplier to be employed in a family-run business should be protected as a consumer due 
to her evident vulnerability.688 Consequently the consumer legislation is exceptionally 
                                                 
682 See Castello Miguel (n 256) 76. For instance goods cannot be reintroduced even if they were transformed 
into a different good through an industrial process. 
683 Article 2 of the Consumer Protection Code did not take into account the personal aspects of the recipient 
(whether he is acquiring the goods and services for personal use or business purposes). See Ibid. 78. 
684 In this context Ulhoa Coelho proposed that if the goods or services were indispensable for the production 
process then the business will not be treated as a consumer. If they are dispensable the company may be 
protected under the Consumer Protection Code. See Ulhoa Coelho (n 31) 169-173. 
685 According to Vidigal businesses should never be considered consumers because they will inevitably use the 
acquired goods or services in products which will be reintroduced into the market chain. See Geraldo Camargo 
Vidigal, 'A Lei de Defesa do Consumidor: sua Abrangência' in GC Vidigal (ed) Lei de Defesa do Consumidor 
(IBCB 1991) 16. 
686 CC 92519/SP (04/03/2009). 
687 The technical vulnerability is related to the party’s ignorance about the actual object of the contract. The 
legal vulnerability is concerned to the lack of knowledge of the relevant law and its consequences. Finally the 
economic vulnerability is a result from the different bargaining power of the parties. See Ulhoa Coelho (n 31) 
176. 
688 See REsp 1010834/GO (13/10/2010). Similarly it was exceptionally admitted the application of the 
provisions of the Consumer Protection Code to a small farmer who acquired fertilizer for farming due to his 
technical, legal and economic vulnerability. See AgRg no REsp 1200156/RS (14/10/2010). A taxi driver who 
bought a defective car for commercial purpose was also protect under the Consumer Protection Code 
provisions because he was considered vulnerable in relation to a car manufacturer. See REsp 575469/RJ 
(06/12/2004). 
 - 144 -  
 
applicable to disputes involving vulnerable businesses which are often micro and small 
enterprises.689 
 
There is therefore an inclination for courts to interfere in relationships where a large 
business takes advantage of the other party. The principle of good faith is also employed 
as ground for intervention to avoid the exploitation of weak companies. The prevention of 
abuses is particularly relevant in cases involving ‘asymmetric interdependences’ between 
businesses where the dominant company aims to control the outcomes of the 
relationship.690  
 
For instance, in the famous ‘case of tomatoes’ a large company (Cica) used to distribute 
tomatoes seeds to small producers and purchase their crops for subsequent 
industrialisation. However, without previous notice, Cica decided to stop purchasing the 
farmers’ crops in spite of the legitimate expectation created by its prior behaviour, which 
caused the loss of the production. The Supreme Court of the Rio Grande do Sul State 
recognised that this large company was in breach of trust and acting against good faith 
and concluded that the farmers were entitled to claim damages.691 
 
4.5. Analysing the differences and similarities of the legislative controls on 
unfairness in small businesses contracts in England and Brazil 
 
Presently neither England nor Brazil has a legislative act that specifically purports to 
protect SMEs and micro enterprises against unfair terms and exemption clauses; 
consequently they are subject to the same provisions applicable to businesses in general.  
 
In England however the Law Commission has already proposed a special regime to 
control unfairness in small businesses contracts. By comparison in Brazil there is no 
indication of any future legislation with such a purpose; possibly because article 179 of 
the Federal Constitution prescribes that the special treatment that should be given to 
SMEs is concerned with the simplification of their administration, tax, social security and 
                                                 
689 More recently the Superior Court of Justice contended that a factoring company could not be protected 
under the provisions of the Consumer Protection Code because it was neither a final recipient nor a vulnerable 
party. See REsp 938979/DF (29/06/2012). 
690 S Mouzas and D Ford, 'Contracts in Asymmetric Relationships' (2007) 1(3) Impact of Science on Society 
42, 47. 
691 See TJ/RS, Embargos Infringentes 591083357, Rel. Des. Adalberto Libório Barros (01/11/1991). 
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credit obligations. Therefore subsequent pieces of legislation have been shaped by this 
provision and are generally limited to those matters.692  
 
In the absence of legislative controls on unfair terms in small businesses contracts courts 
of both jurisdictions have adopted a more interventionist approach in contracts where one 
business abuses its dominant position by including harsh terms that put the other 
business at disadvantage. For instance, in St Albans City & District Council v International 
Computers Ltd693 an unreasonable limitation clause was included in a contract made 
between two ‘businesses’ (a local authority and a computer company). Although they 
could in principle freely negotiate terms, the court adopted ‘a protectionist attitude 
towards the local authority which (...) is in a distinct position and is arguably in greater 
need of protection than a large public limited company’.694 In Brazil courts have employed 
provisions of the Consumer Protection Code to protect vulnerable SMEs by analogy. 
Although this solution may not be ideal because it depends on the discretion of the 
judges, in practice it has offered a more adequate protection for small businesses than 
the general provisions of the Civil Code. 
 
4.5.1. Approaches adopted by courts 
 
As seen previously, in Brazil there is a discussion in the legal literature on whether a 
business can be regarded as a consumer under the provisions of the Consumer Protection 
Code. The objective or maximalist approach defines a consumer as the party who is at the 
end of the market chain. On the other hand the subjective or finalist approach examines 
whether the party will use the goods and services as part of his professional activity.695 
 
England adopts an approach similar to the ‘finalist’ one. According to section 12(1) of the 
Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 a party ‘deals as consumer’ if he does not make the 
                                                 
692 For instance Bills and other propositions of the Brazilian National Congress have been limited to the scope 
of this provision. E.g., Complementary Bill PLP 12/2011 which authorises the payment of debts of social 
security contributions in instalments by MSEs; Bill PL 7604/2006 which establishes the suspension of tax 
execution during the bankruptcy of MSEs; Bill PL 4449/2004 which establishes rules for the renegotiation of 
debts of MSEs. 
693 [1996] 4 All ER 481 (CA), [1995] FSR 686. The definition of ‘business’ prescribed by s. 14 of UCTA include 
‘local or public authority’. See also Motours Ltd v Euroball (West Kent) Ltd [2003] EWHC 614 (QB), [2003] All 
ER (D) 165. 
694 Poole, Casebook on Contract Law (n 150) 288. The computer company was in fact in a strong bargaining 
position because it was among few eligible suppliers; hence the Court of Appeal treated the local authority as 
a ‘quasi-consumer’. Similarly the Brazilian Superior Court of Justice decided in favour of a business considered 
vulnerable in a B2B contract. See REsp 1010834/GO (13/10/2010). 
695 Ulhoa Coelho (n 31) 169. 
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contract ‘in the course of a business’.696 Consequently the determination of whether a 
company acquired goods and services for its own use rather than for business purposes is 
of great significance to establish if a SME will be treated as a consumer and protected 
accordingly.697698 
 
The position of the European Court of Justice may be also comparable to the ‘finalist’ 
approach, as the special protection is limited to consumers ‘in the purest and fullest 
sense’699 and shall not be extended to protect businesses in the course of their 
professional activities.  
 
For instance, in Johann Gruber v Bay Wa AG700 a farmer purchased tiles to reroof his 
farmhouse which was used partly as a private dwelling by the claimant and his family and 
partly for farming purposes. The tiles were defective and the farmer claimed damages 
against the supplier of building materials. The court decided that a ‘person who concludes 
a contract relating to goods intended for purposes which are in part within and in part 
outside his trade or profession’ may not rely on the special rules of the Brussels 
Convention which benefit consumers ‘unless the trade or professional purpose is so 
limited as to be negligible in the overall context of the supply’.701 This position was 
incorporated into the Directive on Consumer Rights (2011/83/EU)702 which prescribes that 
a person shall be considered a consumer ‘in the case of dual purpose contracts, where the 
contract is concluded for purposes partly within and partly outside the person’s trade and 
the trade purpose is so limited as not to be predominant in the overall context of the 
contract’.703 
 
Therefore the European and English approach can be considered more restrictive than the 
prevailing approach in Brazil as it does not allow the extension of the consumer protection 
                                                 
696 Furthermore when the consumer is not an individual (e.g., a business) the goods under or in pursuance of 
the contract should be of a type ordinarily supplied for private use or consumption. See s. 12(1)(c) of UCTA. 
697 The meaning of ‘in the course of a business’ has been subject of discussion in chapter 2. See R&B Customs 
Brokers Co Ltd v United Dominions Trust Ltd [1988] 1 WLR 321 (CA) and Stevenson v Rogers [1999] 2 WLR 
1064. 
698 There are cases where it is difficult to distinguish if a weak company is acting as a business or a consumer 
such as in quasi consumer cases (e.g., St Albans City & District Council v International Computers Ltd [1996] 
4 All ER 481 (CA), [1995] FSR 686).  
699 Roppo (n 597) 306. 
700 Case C-464/01 Johann Gruber v Bay Wa AG [2005] ECR I-439 . 
701 Ibid. paras 204-225. The position of Gruber was also applied in English cases such as Turner & Co (GB) Ltd 
v Abi [2010] EWHC 2078 (QB) according to which the agreement in question was not a consumer contract 
because it was made for the purposes of the party’s business, not for his family or personal use. As a 
consequence unfair terms legislation was not applicable. 
702 This Directive was adopted in October 2011 by Member States in the EU’s Council of Ministers. 
703 Recital 17 of the Directive on Consumer Rights (2011/83/EU). 
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to SMEs which make a contract with business purposes. Moreover some EU Directives 
(e.g., article 2 of Directive 93/13/EEC)704 as well as their respective Regulations (e.g., 
UTCCR 1999) and case law such as The Republic v Patrice di Pinto705 provide that only 
‘natural persons’ can be regarded as consumers.706 This approach, by comparison with the 
finalist or maximalist approach, excludes businesses from the definition of consumer 
altogether.  
 
In view of the above it is possible to conclude that the approach which has been applied 
by the Brazilian courts is more consistent with the general protection of the weak party in 
asymmetric contracts as it has extended the same protection to consumers and 
businesses based on their vulnerability. 
 
4.6. Conclusion 
 
The dichotomies of the modern contract law include the relationship between ‘consumers 
versus merchants’.707 However ‘small businesses do not fall cleanly into any of these 
categories’ because although they are normally treated as merchants they also resemble 
consumers in many ways.708 Garvin contended that those businesses ‘get the worse of 
each dichotomy’: in contracts with consumers they have to provide protections to the 
latter based on asymmetries which may not exist, whereas in contracts with larger 
businesses they are treated as equals even if this is not the case.709 
 
Additionally in the market chain they find themselves in the middle of large suppliers and 
consumers and they have to respond to demands from both sides. For instance, although 
they have to replace defective products sold to consumers, exemption clauses may 
prevent them from asking manufacturers for compensation.710  
                                                 
704 Various directives limit the notion of consumer to natural persons as it can be observed from: Directive 
85/577/EEC in Article 2; Directive 97/7/EC in Article 2(2); Directive 2002/65/EC in Article 2(d); Directive 
87/102/EEC in Article 1(2)(a); Directive 1999/44/EC in Article 1(2)(a); Directive 98/6/EC in Article 1(e) and 
Article 2(1) of the Directive 2011/83/EU. 
705 Case C-361/89 The Republic v Patrice di Pinto [1991] ECR I-1189 . 
706 The Brazilian Consumer Protection Code expressly prescribes that consumers are either natural or legal 
persons (article 2); whereas the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 consider only natural 
persons as consumers (reg. 3(1)). Similarly the European Court of Justice also stressed in Case C-453/99 
Cape SNC v Idealservice Srl [2001] ECR I-9049 para 1239 that in line with article 2 of the Directive 93/13/EEC 
‘consumers’ are only ‘natural persons who concluded a contract with a seller or supplier’, therefore the 
protection against unfair terms cannot be extended to ‘legal persons’. 
707 Garvin (n 603) 296. 
708 Those similarities include ‘abilities to deal with risk’ and ‘fend for themselves in the market’. Ibid. 296-297. 
709 Ibid. 297. 
710 Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Contracts (Law Com CP No 166, 2002) para 5.7. 
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A possible solution to this problem would be the implementation of a special regime to 
regulate small business contracts similar to the one afforded to consumer contracts as 
proposed by the Law Commission. This special protection may be justified due the fact 
that SMEs also lack resources and bargaining strength in contracts.  
 
However special protections given to consumers and small businesses may result in the 
fragmentation of the contract law system which has been structured according to a 
‘binary articulation’: a general part that is applied to any contract and a special part that 
deals with particular types of contract.711 For instance in Brazil although the Civil Code 
regulates ‘contract in general’ and ‘various types of contracts’,712 the Consumer Protection 
Code prescribes a differentiated regime for B2C contracts. The coexistence of these two 
Codes creates conflicts of law713 that may be aggravated by the introduction of a small 
business regime in the area of contract law. 
 
For this reason a more general regulation of asymmetric relations may prevent such 
fragmentation as well as unnecessary complexity for the interpreter. This control may be 
applicable to all contracts involving a dominant business and a weaker party (that may be 
a consumer or a business);714 hence the avoidance of various regimes to deal with 
different types of vulnerable parties may afford more coherence to the system. 
 
Hondius agreed that the new paradigm should be the ‘protection of the weak party’ which 
can be extended to ‘non-consumers, such as small businesspersons’.715716 SMEs would 
therefore be protected in an asymmetric B2B contract where ‘the stronger party is likely 
to be able to dominate and influence the conclusion of contracts’.717  
 
                                                 
711 Roppo (n 597) 344. 
712 ‘Contract in general’ (articles 421 to 480) and ‘various types of contracts’ (articles 481 to 954). 
713 See chapter 5 on unresolved issues concerning the controls on unfairness in contracts. 
714 Roppo (n 597) 346. 
715 See Hondius (n 121) 246-250. 
716 Roppo suggested that regulations should protect ‘customers’ instead ‘consumers’ whilst dealing with a 
business on the grounds that ‘customer’ may include consumer or other business. The author referred to this 
contract as S2C (supplier to customer) and identified a number of Directives that deal with this type of 
contract. For instance according to Directive 2007/64/EC on payment services, consumers and enterprises do 
not share the same position and do not need the same level of protection; however micro-enterprises should 
be treated in the same way as consumers (recital 20). Additionally Regulation 593/2008 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) 
[2008] OJ L 177/6 that replaced the Rome Convention of 1980 prescribes special protection to the weaker 
party (recital 23) alongside the protection of consumers (e.g., recital 24) where there are asymmetric market 
relationships. See Roppo (n 597) 315-316. 
717 Mouzas and Ford (n 690) 43. 
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According to Waddams the above paradigm is not wholly unfamiliar to English law. 
Waddams provided a number of examples in which courts in England set aside contracts 
based on ‘unfairness and inequality of exchange’ in order to protect the weaker party.718 
Those examples include cases of undue influence, unconscionable transactions and unjust 
enrichment.719 By comparison Brazilian courts have extended the application of consumer 
protection to cases in which the weakness or vulnerability of a business is demonstrated 
(e.g., SMEs).720 
 
Independently of the approach adopted arguably small businesses need a protection more 
suitable to their peculiarities. Although one could say that SMEs are not as vulnerable as 
consumers, those businesses often cannot compete in equal conditions with their larger 
counterparts in terms of bargaining power, lower costs, better prices, advertising and so 
forth.721 For this reason a special protection, either through the application of a ‘SME 
regime’ or through a ‘weak party regime’, would greatly benefit those businesses and 
improve their chances of survival and growth in the marketplace.  
 
                                                 
718 Stephen Waddams, 'Protection of Weaker Parties in English law' in M Kenny, J Devenney and LF O'Mahony 
(eds), Unconscionability in European Private Financial Transactions: Protecting the Vulnerable (Cambridge 
University Press 2010) 28. 
719 Ibid. 
720 See CC 92519/SP (04/03/2009) and REsp 938979/DF (29/06/2012). 
721 Rice (n 600) 234-236. 
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CHAPTER 5. ANALYSIS OF UNRESOLVED ISSUES CONCERNING THE 
LEGISLATIVE CONTROLS ON UNFAIRNESS IN B2B AND B2C CONTRACTS IN 
ENGLAND AND BRAZIL 
 
5.1. Context 
 
As examined in the previous chapters, the English and Brazilian legal systems recognise 
that unfair terms and unreasonable exemption clauses may be included in consumer and 
business contracts. For this reason both jurisdictions have adopted legislative mechanisms 
which aim to prevent the application of the above terms or to render them ineffective. 
Nonetheless legislation which was enacted to solve the problem of unfairness in contracts 
is itself tainted by imperfections; hence it requires solutions to its own problems.  
 
The first step to improve the legislation of both countries and make them more efficient is 
to identify its unresolved issues, which is the main objective of this chapter. Following the 
analysis of the problems that affect each of those legal systems individually, this study will 
proceed to the comparison of the identified issues. The subsequent chapter in its turn will 
identify lessons that England and Brazil may learn from each other in other to improve 
their respective legal system.  
 
Due to fundamental distinctions between English law and Brazilian law, it is expected that 
they will raise issues of different nature. In England the Law Commission acknowledged 
the existence of inconsistencies and overlapping within the internal legislation of this 
jurisdiction.722 Part of the problem is caused by the imposition of concepts and rules 
typical of civilian traditions to this common law system through the implementation of EU 
Directives. 
 
By comparison, Brazil has its legislation organised in Codes which are a comprehensive 
collection of ‘general clauses and legal principles’ that intend to be ‘a formulation of all 
inclusive rules’ of a particular area of law.723 In other words the Brazilian legal system just 
like other civilian jurisdictions is considered ‘complete, coherent with no gaps or 
antinomies’;724 thus in principle it should be free of internal inconsistencies as opposed to 
the English legal system. However in practice the civilian legal systems are also not 
                                                 
722 Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Contracts (Law Com No 292, 2005). 
723 De Cruz (n 10) 48. 
724 Chaim Perelman, Lógica Jurídica (2nd edn, Martins Fontes 2004) 34. 
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impervious to flaws because their law is created by legislators who are imperfect beings. 
In fact there are observable conflicts among legal provisions which regulate the topic in 
analysis in Brazil. Although the Brazilian legal system prescribes ways of dealing with this 
problem,725 their application is not always straightforward.  
 
5.2. Analysis of unresolved issues concerning the legislative controls on 
unfairness in B2B and B2C contracts in England 
 
As seen above, the main issues surrounding the current statutory controls over unfair 
terms and exemption clauses in English law result from discrepancies in its internal 
legislation, in particular between UCTA 1977 and the UTCCR 1999. Those inconsistencies 
are partly caused by problems in the implementation of the Directive on Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts into the English legal system.  
 
5.2.1. Inconsistencies between UCTA and the UTCCR 
 
In English law the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 and the Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts Regulations 1999 are among the most relevant pieces of legislation for the 
purpose of this study. However, their intricate wording in addition to overlaps and 
inconsistencies between them has caused a great deal of complexity in the context of B2C 
contracts.726 This lack of clarity and transparency is particularly detrimental to consumers 
who usually struggle to understand the extent of their rights and obligations. It is also 
inconvenient for those businesses which would prefer to avoid using terms that may be 
regarded as ineffective by law.727 
 
One of the most notorious differences between UCTA and UTCCR 1999 is related to their 
scope. While the Regulations are confined to consumer contracts and terms which were 
not individually negotiated, UCTA is also applicable to B2B contracts and negotiated 
terms. Nonetheless the UTCCR cover more types of consumer contracts than UCTA as the 
latter does not extend to various types of contracts (e.g., insurance, patent).728 The scope 
of the Regulations in its turn is also subject to exceptions which include ‘contracts relating 
                                                 
725 Criteria of anteriority, speciality and hierarchy which will be analysed later in the chapter. 
726 Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Contracts (Law Com No 292, 2005) para 1.4. 
727 Macdonald, 'Unifying Unfair Terms Legislation' (n 5) 69-72. 
728 Schedule 1 contains a list of contracts that are not within the scope of the Act. UCTA is also not applicable 
to arbitration clauses (s. 13 (2)) neither to international supply contracts (s. 26). 
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to employment, succession rights, rights under family law, and the incorporation and 
organisation of companies and partnerships’.729  
 
Although UCTA was the first statute in England that purported to control the unfairness of 
contracts more generally, its title is misleading because the Act does not cover all unfair 
terms, but only exemption clauses that seek to exclude or limit liability.730 Those clauses 
are also regulated by the UTCCR 1999, but unfair terms which are not exemption clauses 
may be affected only by the Regulations.  
 
On the other hand, as the definition of ‘consumer’ in UCTA is wider than in the UTCCR 
1999731 some exemption clauses can be included in its scope but not in the 
Regulations.732733 This distinction between the ‘consumer’ definitions may result in other 
discrepancies in the application of both pieces of legislation to an individual case. For 
instance, a person who buys goods at auction is not a consumer for the purpose of UCTA 
(s. 12(2)), but he may be regarded as such within the scope of the Regulations. 
 
Further differences consist of the fact that although UCTA is quite detailed in comparison 
with UTCCR 1999, the latter contain general provisions (e.g., reg. 5(1)) that provide more 
leeway to courts in the control on unfairness in consumer contracts. Beale contended that 
this discretion conferred on judges gives rise to some degree of uncertainty to businesses, 
but such uncertainty could be minimised through the use of ‘black lists’.734 Those lists 
would enable businesses to predict with more accuracy the risks of invalidation of terms 
and protect their interests accordingly. As a consequence the ‘grey list’ (which terms are 
not presumptively invalid) provided by Schedule 2 of the Regulations may not allow 
suppliers to anticipate with sufficient certainty whether a term will be considered 
ineffective by judges.735 
 
                                                 
729 Howells and Brownsword (n 193) 244. The UTCCR are also neither applied to contractual terms which 
reflect mandatory statutory or regulatory provisions of the United Kingdom nor to provisions or principles of 
international conventions to which the Member States or the Community are party (reg. 4(2)). 
730 Koffman and Macdonald (n 1) 199. 
731 According to UCTA 1977, a party ‘deals as consumer’ if does not make the contract in the course of a 
business or holds him out as doing so; the other party does make the contract in the course of a business; 
and (...) the goods passing under or in pursuance of the contract are of a type ordinarily supplied for private 
use or consumption (s. 12(1)). The UTCCR 1999 in its turn define consumer as ‘any natural person who is 
acting for purposes which are outside his trade, business or profession (reg. 3(1)). 
732 F.M.B. Reynolds, 'Unfair Contract Terms' (1994) 110 LQR 1, 2. 
733 As seen in chapter 3, according to the UTCCR 1999 the definition of consumer is limited to ‘natural 
person’; whereas for the purpose of UCTA companies may also deal as consumers.  
734 Beale, 'Legislative Control of Fairness: The Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts' (n 333) 246. 
735 Ibid. 
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A ‘black list’ however can be found in UCTA as this Act makes certain exclusion or 
restriction clauses of no effect at all736 (terms are ‘unfair under all circumstances’) and 
subject the others to a reasonableness test (‘rebuttable presumption of unfairness’).737 
The Law Commission proposed that this ‘requirement of reasonableness’ should be 
combined with the ‘fairness test’ of the Regulations and replaced by a ‘fair and 
reasonable’ test with no express reference to ‘good faith’ in order to facilitate its 
application by UK lawyers.738 
 
The Law Commission highlighted the main differences between UCTA and the UTCCR 
1999 in its Consultation Paper as outlined below:739 
 
 UCTA 1977 UTCCR 1999 
Types of 
Contracts 
Applies to both B2C and B2B 
contracts. 
Apply only to B2C contracts. 
Types of Clauses 
Applies only to exclusion and 
limitation of liability clauses 
(and indemnity clauses in 
consumer contracts). 
Apply to any kind of term other 
than the definition of the main 
subject matter of the contract 
and the price. 
Black list/  
Grey list 
Makes certain exclusions or 
restrictions of no effect at all 
(black list). 
Do not make any particular type 
of term of no effect at all  
(grey list). 
Review 
Mechanism 
Subjects others to a 
reasonableness test. 
Subject the terms to a fairness 
test. 
Guidelines 
Contains guidelines for the 
application of the 
reasonableness test. 
Do not contain detailed 
guidelines as to how the fairness 
test should be applied, but 
contain a so-called grey list of 
terms which ‘may be regarded’ as 
unfair. 
Burden of Proof 
Puts the burden of proving 
that a term within its scope is 
reasonable on the party 
seeking to rely on the clause. 
Leave the burden of proof that 
the clause is unfair on the 
consumer. 
Standard Form/ 
Negotiated Terms 
Applies for the most part 
whether the terms were 
negotiated or were in a 
‘standard form’. 
Apply only to ‘non-negotiated’ 
terms. 
                                                 
736 See Koffman and Macdonald (n 1) 201. E.g., ‘business liability for death or personal injury to anyone 
caused by negligence (s. 2(1)) and business liability for breach of the implied terms as to the description, 
quality, etc in contracts for the supply of goods to a party dealing as a consumer (ss. 6(2), 7(2))’. See Chen-
Wishart (n 3) 479. The black-list contains terms which will be always regarded as unfair because their 
application would inevitably have harmful consequences to the interests of the party who did not draft them. 
For that reason the other party should not be allowed to argue for the reasonableness of those terms in order 
to enforce them. 
737 Schillig (n 424) 357. 
738 Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Contracts (Law Com No 292, 2005) paras 3.85 and 3.91. 
739 This table was based on the Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Contracts (Law Com CP No 166, 2002) 
paras 2.18 to 2.19 and Chen-Wishart (n 3) 463. 
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Application to 
B2C Contracts 
Does not apply to certain types 
of contract, even when they 
are consumer contracts. 
Apply to consumer contracts of 
all kinds. 
Enforcement 
Mechanism and 
Effect 
Has effect only between the 
immediate parties. 
Are not only effective between 
the parties but empower various 
bodies to take action to prevent 
the use of unfair terms. 
 
5.2.2. Problems in the implementation of Directive 93/13/EEC 
 
Due to time constraints the implementation of the Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts740 into English Law was rushed and made through Regulations. In line with 
Section 2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972,741 this directive could have instead 
amended the existing national law (e.g., UCTA)742 and repealed inconsistent legislation ‘to 
create a coherent and harmonised whole’.743 As a consequence although England 
introduced the substance of the directive, it ‘fails to harmonise the instrument with 
existing legislation’.744  
 
The contents of the Directive 93/13/EEC and the manner in which the implementation 
was carried out caused a number of uncertainties and complexities that have been 
subject of extensive debate in the legal literature.745 This study will examine some of the 
most common problems identified by interpreters.  
 
 
 
                                                 
740 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts [1993] OJ L95/29. 
741 Section 2(2) (European Communities Act 1972): ‘Subject to Schedule 2 to this Act, at any time after its 
passing Her Majesty may by Order in Council, and any designated Minister or department may [by order, 
rules, regulations or scheme], make provision - (a) for the purpose of implementing any [EU obligation] of the 
United Kingdom, or enabling any such obligation to be implemented, or of enabling any rights enjoyed or to 
be enjoyed by the United Kingdom under or by virtue of the Treaties to be exercised; or (b) for the purpose 
of dealing with matters arising out of or related to any such obligation or rights or the coming into force, or 
the operation from time to time, of subsection (1) above; and in the exercise of any statutory power or duty, 
including any power to give directions or to legislate by means of orders, rules, regulations or other 
subordinate instrument, the person entrusted with the power or duty may have regard to the [objects of the 
EU] and to any such obligation or rights as aforesaid.’ 
742 In France and Germany the Directive 93/13/EEC ‘was grafted on to the national systems’, ‘but in England it 
was dealt with separately’. See Youngs (n 110) 623. 
743 Howard Johnson, 'Unfair Contract Terms: Implementation Problems' (1994) 13(6) IBFL 66, 66. See also 
Reynolds (n 732) 2. 
744 Hondius (n 121) 249. 
745 According to Johnson the UK government is ‘choosing to adopt a complex and ill-fitting manner of 
implementation which, outside of an Alice in Wonderland-type world, it is difficult to see being at all user 
friendly for either business or consumers’. See Johnson (n 743) 66. 
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5.2.2.1. Definition of unfair terms 
 
At the heart of the Directive 93/13/EEC is the definition of ‘unfair terms’ in its article 3.1 
which was already exhaustively examined:  
 
A contractual term which has not been individually negotiated shall be regarded as 
unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant 
imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the 
detriment of the consumer. 
 
Article 3.3 (which makes reference to ‘an indicative and non-exhaustive list of the terms 
which may be regarded as unfair’) is also important in delineating the meaning of unfair 
terms, but its interrelationship with article 3.1 was not specified by the directive as those 
provisions do not make reciprocal references.746 Therefore it is possible to argue either 
that article 3.3 is supplementary to article 3.1 or that they are independent tests of 
unfairness.747  
 
Brownsword, Howells and Wilhelmsson contended that from the analysis of article 3.1 it is 
quite evident that a term is unfair if its causes: (i) ‘a significant imbalance’ (ii) ‘to the 
detriment of the consumer’; but it is unclear if (i) and (ii) necessarily implies that the term 
is contrary to (iii) ‘the requirement of good faith’ or if (iii) is an independent condition. 
Moreover if the requirement of good faith is regarded as an independent condition there 
are further questions on whether such condition has a procedural or substantive nature or 
whether it involves both procedural and substantive elements, as examined in chapters 1 
and 3.748  
 
Legal literature has not reached a consensus on this matter yet. One of the consequences 
of the pressured implementation of the directive was that the wording of this article 3.1 
was practically reproduced in reg. 5(1); hence the concept of ‘good faith’ was 
transplanted into English law quite apart from any question of its compatibility with UCTA 
1977 or the common law and the UK government did not specify its preferable 
interpretation.749 
 
                                                 
746 Brownsword, Howells and Wilhelmsson, 'Between Market and Welfare: Some Reflections on Article 3 of the 
EC Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts' (n 77) 33-36. 
747 Ibid.  
748 Ibid. 31-32. 
749 Ibid. 32. 
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Another issue concerning the good faith prescribed by article 3.1 is that its application is 
limited to the performance of the contracts as examined in chapters 2 and 3. Quagliato 
argued that in England ‘the assumption is that the parties enter into negotiation at their 
own risk and unless and until they conclude the contract they have no claim whatever on 
the other party’,750 because as Furmston, Norisada and Poole observed in common law ‘it 
has tended to take the position that either there is a contract or there is not’.751  
 
In England such absence of good faith in negotiations may give rise to unjust situations at 
the pre-contractual stage.752 In order to offer some protection to people who may have 
legitimate expectations created during the bargaining process, the English law has 
adopted piecemeal solutions such as negligent misstatement, promissory estoppel and 
restitution.753 However the adoption of a general duty of good faith applicable to all 
contractual stages may offer a more adequate protection to parties in negotiation, as will 
be seen in chapter 6. 
 
A further limitation on the application of the requirement of good faith is that it is only 
applicable to standard form contracts in transactions involving consumers, which may 
prove this requirement ‘largely redundant in English consumer protection law’.754 For 
instance harsh terms that may disadvantage consumers may be included in contracts 
regarded as negotiated. Moreover if the purpose of good faith is to avoid the unfair 
surprise as proposed by Dugan,755 then suppliers may satisfy such requirement by simply 
bringing the contents of terms to the attention of consumers or clarifying their 
meaning.756 
 
5.2.2.2. Interpretation of general clauses by Courts 
 
Willet suggested that the generality of clauses used in the definition of unfair terms such 
as good faith and significant imbalance means that ‘they can often only be given real 
practical meaning and direction by reference to some background ethic’ which are based 
                                                 
750 Quagliato (n 82) 218. 
751 For this reason common law ‘has not found it easy to give legal effect’ to the perception that interim 
agreements during the negotiating process may bind parties. See Furmston, Norisada and Poole, Contract 
Formation and Letters of Intent: A Comparative Assessment (n 84) 267. 
752 See chapters 2 and 6. 
753 Carter and Furmston, 'Good Faith and Fairness in the Negotiation of Contracts Part II' (n 224) 118. 
754 See also Brownsword, 'Two Concepts of Good Faith' (n 160) 242. 
755 According to Dugan ‘surprise’ may constitute ‘abuse’ when ‘the content of the standardized term diverges 
from the expectations of the nondrafter’. See Robert Dugan, 'Good Faith and the Enforceability of 
Standardized Terms' (1980-1981) 22 WMLR 1, 4.  
756 Brownsword, 'Two Concepts of Good Faith' (n 160) 242. 
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either on ‘values of trader self interest and consumer self reliance’ or on the protection of 
the consumer.757 Although the latter ethic is more in line with the EU position, the (now) 
Supreme Court has adopted the former ethic which does not provide the same level of 
protection as intended at EU level and remains influenced ‘by strong individualistic values’ 
typical of common law.758  
 
For instance in Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank plc759 the House of 
Lords understood that the term which stipulated that a bank could charge interest at 
contractual rate after the judgment was not unfair because banks should be able to 
recover the whole amount of interest due on default.760 Therefore the right of the bank to 
pursue its self-interest was more important than the ‘economic impact’ that this decision 
had on the consumer.761  
 
5.2.2.3. Exceptions to the fairness assessment 
 
While article 3 of the Directive 93/13/EEC prescribes a test of fairness to contractual 
terms in general, article 4.2 (implemented by reg. 6(2)) expressly exempts from the 
above test the so-called ‘core terms’ (related to the definition of the main subject matter 
of the contract or to the adequacy of the price and remuneration) as long as those terms 
are written in plain intelligible language.762  
 
Bright observed that the reason behind this exception is to exclude terms which may 
reflect a ‘free choice’ of the parties because ‘the price and quality of products’ are two 
aspects that consumers usually take into account in their decision on entering or not a 
contract.763 For the same reason terms which were negotiated are also excluded from the 
fairness test. 
 
                                                 
757 Willett, 'General Clauses and the Competing Ethics of European Consumer Law in the UK' (n 9) 413. 
758 Ibid. 415 and 431. ‘The effect has been to limit the protective potential of the general clause; notably, in 
cases where it might provide protection that was not available under pre-existing domestic law’. 
759 [2001] UKHL 52, [2002] 1 AC 481. 
760 Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank plc [2001] UKHL 52, [2002] 1 AC 481 [43]. 
761 Willett, 'General Clauses and the Competing Ethics of European Consumer Law in the UK' (n 9) 421-422. 
762 In Case C-484/08 Caja de Ahorros y Monte de Piedad de Madrid v Asociación de Usuarios de Servicios 
Bancarios (Ausbanc) [2010] ECR I-04785 the European Court decided that articles 4(2) and 8 of the Directive 
93/13/EEC does not preclude national legislation which authorises a judicial review as to the fairness of core 
terms, even if they are drafted in plain, intelligible language. This not however the case of English law which 
transposed art. 4(2) into reg. 6(2). 
763 Bright, 'Winning the Battle against Unfair Contract Terms' (n 434) 344. 
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Although apparently straightforward, the application of reg. 6(2) contains some 
difficulties. First of all it is unclear ‘whose standard of plainness and intelligibility is to 
apply’.764 This may give rise to a great deal of uncertainty as its determination is a 
prerequisite for the exemption of the core provisions. 
 
Furthermore, even if it was possible to establish that the term was written in plain 
intelligible language, reg. 6(2) prescribes that the assessment of fairness of such term 
‘shall not relate to’ core terms. Howells and Brownsword noted that this provision may 
leave the interpreter under the impression that the Regulations ‘prohibit reference to the 
core provisions in assessing the fairness of non-core terms’ when in reality ‘in assessing 
the fairness of a term, reference should be made to “all the other terms of the 
contract”’.765 Otherwise it would be rather problematic to apply the test of fairness ‘which 
looks to a significant detrimental imbalance in relation to one non-core term if the 
imbalance basically lies in the core term’.766 
 
All the above discussion however would be meaningless in the impossibility of determining 
which terms can be regarded as ‘core’. This leads to another problem concerning ‘where 
the line might be drawn between definitional and non-definitional767 terms’, because only 
those terms which define the main subject-matter of the contract will be excluded from 
the fairness test.768 On the occasions when English courts confronted this problem, they 
rejected the definitional argument used as ‘an attempted evasion of desirable control over 
unfair terms’.769 In other words, judges tend to adopt a more restrictive approach when 
considering a term as ‘core’, otherwise there would have a ‘potential for the directive to 
be rendered largely ineffective’770 if a large number of terms could be excluded from the 
test of fairness. 
 
However, as seen in chapter 3, in Office of Fair Trading v Abbey National plc and 
Others771 the Supreme Court held that bank charges for unauthorised overdrafts were 
core terms under reg. 6(2) even though the Court of Appeal and the OFT argued that 
                                                 
764 Howells and Brownsword (n 193) 248. 
765 Ibid.  
766 Elizabeth Macdonald, 'Mapping the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 and the Directive on Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts' [1994] JBL 441, 460. 
767 E.g., clauses dealing with secondary obligations. 
768 Macdonald, 'Mapping the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 and the Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts' (n 766) 461. 
769 Phillips Products Ltd v Hyland [1987] 1 WLR 659, 666. 
770 Macdonald, 'Mapping the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 and the Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts' (n 766) 462. 
771 [2009] UKSC 6, [2010] 1 AC 696, [2009] EWCA Civ 116. 
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those charges would not be perceived by consumers as ‘essential to the bargain’.772 This 
decision just added more uncertainty to the definition of ‘price or remuneration’.  
 
It is noteworthy that the Law Commission has recently published new recommendations, 
as mentioned in the earlier chapters, which suggested a different interpretation for the 
‘price and main subject matter exemption’ and proposed that only terms which are 
transparent and prominent should be exempted from the fairness test.773 Those 
recommendations were open to consultation and may result in significant changes to reg. 
6(2) which may improve its clarity and facilitate its application by courts. 
 
5.2.2.4. Pre-emptive challenges 
 
Article 3 prescribes an ex casu challenge to the unfairness of contractual terms which 
means that it can be proposed by individual consumers, but fails to distinguish it from the 
pre-emptive challenge described by article 7(2) of the Directive.774 The latter introduced a 
preventive mechanism against the continued use of unfair terms in contracts which can 
be proposed by ‘persons or organizations’ who have a legitimate interest under national 
law in protecting consumers.775 
 
According to article 7 each Member State should provide adequate and effective means to 
prevent the continued use of unfair terms in contracts concluded with consumers by 
sellers or suppliers. However there are questions as to whether this provision was fully or 
adequately implemented. For instance it is unclear if the injunction procedures are 
sufficient to fulfil the purpose of this provision or whether it would also require criminal 
sanctions.776 Nevertheless there is some reluctance in relation to the application of the 
latter in the absence of ‘black-list’ terms (which are automatically of no effect), because 
                                                 
772 Willett, 'General Clauses and the Competing Ethics of European Consumer Law in the UK' (n 9) 426. 
773 See Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts: A New Approach? (Law Com No 292, 2012) 
paras 8.2 and 8.4. 
774 The directive ‘does not explicitly identify the fairness regime applicable to each kind of challenge’. 
According to Brownsword, Howells and Wilhelmsson there are two approaches in the application of article 3 of 
the EC Directive 93/13 (that was implemented by reg. 5). The first one is that art. 3(1) is applied as a master 
test to pre-emptive and ex casu challenges and art. 3(3) is only a check list of sample unfair terms. In line 
with the second approach, art. 3(1) is applied to ex casu challenges whilst art. 3(3) is applied to pre-emptive 
challenges. See Brownsword, Howells and Wilhelmsson, 'Between Market and Welfare: Some Reflections on 
Article 3 of the EC Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts' (n 77) 28 and 36-37. 
775 In England even though the Director General of the Office of Fair Trading (DGFT) and qualifying bodies are 
‘unable to offer redress to private disputes’ they can propose pre-emptive challenges to unfairness as stated 
in reg. 12. Roland Fletcher, 'Good Faith or a Contagious Disease of Alien Origin?' (2002) 23(1) BLR 5, 5-6. 
776 Howells and Brownsword (n 193) 259. More recently part 3 of the Consumer Protection from Unfair 
Trading Regulations 2008 regards certain unfair commercial practices as criminal offences. 
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the ‘grey list’ in the Regulations may not provide enough certainty for the application of 
criminal sanctions as discussed in chapter 3.777  
 
5.3. Analysis of unresolved issues concerning the legislative controls on 
unfairness in B2B and B2C contracts in Brazil 
 
Marques suggested that one of the main challenges of the contemporary Brazilian lawyer 
and courts is to deal with the plurality of legislative acts and potential conflicts among 
them.778 In Brazil the interpretation of legislative provisions used to adopt a more 
formalist approach, according to which courts were essentially limited to a mechanical 
application of the rules to the facts.779 As a consequence apparent disagreements 
between legal provisions which regulate the same subject matter caused some perplexity 
among judges.  
 
This formalist thinking was mitigated by the introduction of general clauses, such as good 
faith, which have given judges more flexibility in the application of the law and led to the 
adoption of a more realist approach. The latter may be more adequate than the former 
approach in view that: 
 
‘Gaps will always exist because not everything can be anticipated or accounted for 
in advance; conflicts may arise between different bodies of rules; [...] and 
language is subject to ambiguity’.780 
 
Nonetheless conflicts and ambiguities are problems which are not limited to legal rules 
created by legislators, but they also affect contractual terms drafted by parties. In the 
latter case however the law of contracts may afford some guidance to interpreters. For 
instance if the term is unclear, the Civil Code and the Consumer Protection Code prescribe 
that the interpretation most favourable to the adhering party or to the consumer should 
be adopted,781 which is in line with the interventionist approach adopted by the Brazilian 
legal system in favour of the weaker party. 
 
                                                 
777 Beale, 'Legislative Control of Fairness: The Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts' (n 333) 254. 
778 Claudia Lima Marques, 'Diálogo entre o Código de Defesa do Consumidor e o Novo Código Civil: do Diálogo 
das Fontes no Combate às Cláusulas Abusivas' (2003) São Paulo, jan./mar, v. 12, f. 45 Revista de Direito do 
Consumidor 71, 72. 
779 Alberto Amaral Júnior, 'A Boa Fé e o Controle das Cláusulas Contratuais Abusivas nas Relações de 
Consumo' (1993) São Paulo, n.6, abr/jun, Revista de Direito do Consumidor 27, 32. 
780 Tamanaha (n 113) 190. 
781 See article 423 of the Civil Code and article 47 of the Consumer Protection Code. 
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5.3.1. Conflicts of law 
 
In Brazil there are three main pieces of legislation that tackle contractual unfairness: the 
Federal Constitution, the Civil Code and the Consumer Protection Code. In order to 
remedy possible conflicts of law,782 the Brazilian legal system prescribes mechanisms 
which aim to harmonise and coordinate its rules: the criteria of anteriority, speciality and 
hierarchy. They are particularly important to a civil law jurisdiction which presupposes an 
articulated system of abstract rules that should be exhaustive and consistent.783 
 
Brazilian courts and legal practitioners employ those mechanisms on a regular basis in 
order to identify the applicable rule to individual cases. On a number of occasions 
however such exercise is not an obvious task. For instance although the Civil Code and 
Consumer Protection Code share fundamental principles, such as the social function of 
contracts, their provisions may contain some divergences which can give rise to disputes 
concerning their application.  
 
5.3.1.1. Civil Code versus Consumer Protection Code 
 
In cases where there are apparent conflicts between the provisions of the Civil Code and 
the Consumer Protection Code, the criteria of hierarchy and anteriority may not be of 
great assistance. Both codes are federal acts, thus they belong to the same category of 
law. Additionally although the Civil Code was enacted over a decade after the Consumer 
Protection Code, the former did not revoke the later because they are (at least in theory) 
compatible and have different areas of application.784 
 
Therefore in the emergence of conflicts involving the aforementioned Codes the only 
applicable criterion is the speciality one, according to which in a B2C contract the general 
                                                 
782 ‘Conflict of laws’ in Brazil is concerned mainly to the internal legislation; whereas in England it ‘comes into 
play whenever a dispute before the English court contains one or more foreign elements’. See Abla J. Mayss, 
Principles of Conflicts of Laws (3rd edn, Cavendish 1999) 11. 
783 Fuller suggested that a man who is subjected to contradictory orders from the law cannot be expected to 
respond appropriately to future orders; thus the need for dealing with apparent contradiction in the law. See 
Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (2nd edn, Yale University Press 1969) 66. 
784 Under article 2 of the Law of Introduction to the Brazilian Civil Code ‘unless intended to have temporary 
effect, legislation shall be in force until other legislation modifies or revokes it’. In addition its first paragraph 
prescribes that ‘subsequent legislation revokes earlier legislation when it expressly so declares, when it is 
incompatible with the earlier or when it entirely regulates the matter dealt with the earlier legislation’. See 
Rose (n 251) 1. 
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rules of the Civil Code are considered subsidiary to the special rules of the Consumer 
Protection Code.785  
 
In order to apply this criterion, it is necessary to establish the scope of application of each 
of those Codes. Contracts between sellers/suppliers and consumers are governed by the 
Consumer Protection Code which prescribes protective measures in favour of consumers 
on the basis of the inequality of bargaining strength between parties. Other civil 
obligations are generally regulated by the Civil Code or special legislation that presumes a 
relative equality between parties and is less interventionist. 
 
The determination of the area of application of the Civil Code to contracts is a 
herculean task in this highly complex, micro-codified, plural and fluid legal system; 
because the roles of the parties in the market and society change from one act to 
another.786 
 
The Civil Code protects mainly individual rights, whereas the Consumer Protection Code 
purports to protect consumers individually and collectively.787 For this reason, once 
interpreters establish that a contract is a B2C agreement they have to determine whether 
the subjective right in question is individual or collective because the applicable rules and 
proceedings may differ.788 For example, a contract of sale made between a company and 
a consumer is clearly a B2C contract. If its terms affect the rights and interests of various 
consumers (determined or not), certain public bodies and associations can propose a legal 
action to protect them collectively.789  
 
It is noteworthy that there are provisions of the Civil Code that are considered of ‘public 
order’ (mandatory rules) and as such they should prevail over the Consumer Protection 
Code rules in spite of the criterion of speciality.790 However one could argue that all rules 
                                                 
785 Marques, 'Diálogo entre o Código de Defesa do Consumidor e o Novo Código Civil: do Diálogo das Fontes 
no Combate às Cláusulas Abusivas' (n 778) 98. According to article 2, second paragraph of the Law of 
Introduction to the Brazilian Civil Code ‘new legislation that establishes general or special provisions on a par 
with the existing legislation neither revokes nor modifies the earlier legislation’. See Rose (n 251) 1. 
786 Marques, 'Diálogo entre o Código de Defesa do Consumidor e o Novo Código Civil: do Diálogo das Fontes 
no Combate às Cláusulas Abusivas' (n 778) 87. 
787 See article 81 of the Consumer Protection Code. 
788 Marques, 'Diálogo entre o Código de Defesa do Consumidor e o Novo Código Civil: do Diálogo das Fontes 
no Combate às Cláusulas Abusivas' (n 778) 80. 
789 See Public Civil Action Act (Act 7347/1985). 
790 Mandatory rules are always binding and cannot be excluded by the agreement of the parties. According to 
the sole paragraph of article 2035 (Civil Code) ‘no agreement shall prevail if it is contrary to rules of public 
order, such as those established by this Code to ensure the social function of property and contracts’. See 
Rose (n 251) 433. 
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of the Consumer Protection Code are of ‘public order’ and ‘social interest’ in line with its 
article 1; consequently their special provisions should always prevail.791  
 
Nonetheless article 7 of the Consumer Protection Code expressly prescribes that its 
provisions do not exclude the application of other pieces of legislation;792 because 
although this code is a special law in the context of consumer relations, it recognises that 
its rules are not exhaustive and complete. 
 
For instance, although article 51 of this code prescribes a list of abusive clauses that are 
considered void, the conceptual basis for interpretation of when a juridical transaction is 
void is actually found in article 166 of the Civil Code.793 In addition, provisions of the Civil 
Code may prevail over the Consumer Protection Code if their interpretation is more 
favourable to consumers.794 
 
5.3.2. General rules of contracts 
 
Contracts between businesses or non-consumers are regulated by the general rules of 
articles 421 to 426 of the Civil Code.795 Those contracts are presumably made between 
equal parties who are able to negotiate the content of terms. However if a court 
concludes that there is an inequality of bargaining power between the parties, it may 
apply the rules of the Consumer Protection Code by analogy.796 
 
                                                 
791 Article 1 of the Consumer Protection Code prescribes that ‘the present Code establish rules of consumer 
protection, which are of public order and social interest in accordance with articles 5, XXXII and 170, V of the 
Federal Constitution and article 48 of its Transitional Provisions.’ According to art. 5, XXXII of the Federal 
Constitution the Brazilian fundamental rights and guarantees include the protection of consumers and art. 
170, V stipulates that one of the principles of the economic activity is the consumer protection. In addition 
article 48 of its Transitional Provisions prescribes that the National Congress should draw up a consumer 
protection code within 120 days of the Constitution’s promulgation. 
792 Art. 7 of the Consumer Protection Code: ‘the rights prescribed by this Code do not exclude other rights 
arising from treaties or international conventions to which Brazil is signatory, the internal legislation, the 
regulations issued by administrative authorities as well as those derived from general principles of law, 
analogy, customs and equity’. 
793 For example, according to article 166 a juridical transaction is void when: ‘IV – it is not made in the form 
prescribed by law’; (...) ‘VII - the law expressly declares it to be void or prohibits the transaction, without 
imposing any sanction’. See Rose (n 251) 43. 
794 E.g., art 431 (Civil Code) ‘a penalty must be reduced by the judge, on an equitable basis, if the principal 
obligation has been performed in part, or if the amount of the penalty is manifestly excessive, considering the 
nature and purpose of the transaction’. See Ibid. 86. 
795 Those general rules of contracts have a subsidiary application in B2C contracts. 
796 The Superior Court of Justice has extended the protection offered to consumers against abusive clauses to 
vulnerable parties even if they are not strictly considered consumers. Justice Nancy Andrighi applied the 
maximalist approach promoting a wider application of the rules of the Consumer Protection Code. See REsp 
1010834/GO (13/10/2010). See chapter 4. 
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Article 424 is the only provision of the Civil Code that expressly regulates abusive clauses. 
It says ‘in contracts of adhesion, clauses that stipulate that the adhering party has 
waived, in advance, rights arising out of the nature of the transaction are void’.797 
Nevertheless this Code does not contain a definition of ‘contract of adhesion’; by 
comparison the Consumer Protection Code defines the above type of contract as ‘one 
whose clauses have been approved by the competent authority or which has been 
established unilaterally by the supplier of goods or services without giving the consumer 
the opportunity to discuss or substantially modify its contents’.798 However the Brazilian 
Supreme Federal Court decided that this definition cannot be extended to contracts in 
general because its scope should be limited to consumer contracts.799 
 
5.3.2.1. Deficiencies of article 422 (Civil Code) 
 
Unquestionably article 422 is one of the most important general provisions of the Brazilian 
law of contracts. As seen previously, it prescribes that ‘the contracting parties are bound 
to observe the principles of probity and good faith, both in entering into the contract and 
in its performance’.800  
 
Notwithstanding the relevance of this provision, Junqueira de Azevedo contended that it is 
‘insufficient and deficient’.801 Article 422 leaves unclear whether parties are allowed to 
agree on the exclusion of this duty of good faith and whether they can define the 
standard of this obligation in the performance of the contract.802 Moreover, its application 
is limited from the moment when parties enter the contract to its performance; thus it 
does not expressly include the pre-contractual and post-contractual stages in which good 
faith is also of great relevance as seen in chapter 3.  
 
Nonetheless as Tucci pointed out case law and legal literature have extended the duty of 
good faith beyond the limits of article 422, because parties are expected to respect the 
trust created before and after they enter and perform a contract as well as the reasonable 
                                                 
797 Rose (n 251) 88. 
798 See article 54 of the Consumer Protection Code. 
799 SEC (Sentença Estrangeira Contestada) 5847-1 (01/12/1999). 
800 Rose (n 251) 88. 
801 Antonio Junqueira de Azevedo, 'Insuficiências, Deficiências e Desatualização do Projeto de Código Civil na 
Questão da Boa-Fé Objetiva nos Contratos' (2000) São Paulo, maio, v. 89, f. 775 Revista dos Tribunais 11, 11. 
802 By comparison the American Uniform Commercial Code explicitly provides in § 1-302(b) that, while the 
effect of its provisions may be modified by agreement, the obligation of good faith ‘may not be disclaimed by 
agreement’ but the parties may by agreement ‘determine the standards by which the performance of such 
obligations is to be measured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable.’ See Ibid. 12.  
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expectations of the other party at all times.803 Therefore the duty of good faith has also 
been applied to the negotiation stage and to the enforcement stage when parties do not 
fulfil the obligation satisfactorily.  
 
5.3.3. Functions of the concept of good faith 
 
The aforementioned article 422 and article 113804 of the Civil Code prescribe that the 
principle of good faith has essentially the function of guiding the interpretation of 
contracts.805 Nonetheless Junqueira de Azevedo argued that this code has neglected 
another two fundamental functions of this principle.806  
 
For instance the supplementary function was overlooked by those provisions. This 
function purports to supply an omitted term which would be important for the 
determination of parties’ rights and duties.807 It is however expressly prescribed in other 
pieces of legislation such as article 4.8 of the Principles for International Commercial 
Contracts of the UNIDROIT.808  
 
The other omitted function is the rectification of abusive clauses which purports to 
prevent or tackle unfair terms and that can be found in more recent legislation of other 
jurisdictions such as EU Member States.809 Junqueira de Azevedo argued that the reason 
why this function cannot be found in the current Brazilian Civil Code is due the significant 
amount of time elapsed between its draft Bill and its enactment; thus by the time when 
                                                 
803 Cibele Pinheiro Marçal Cruz Tucci, 'Teoria Geral da Boa-Fé Objetiva' (2002) São Paulo, v. 22, f. 68 Revista 
do Advogado 100, 105. 
804 Article 113 (Civil Code) ‘juridical transactions shall be interpreted in conformity with good faith and the 
practice of the place in which they are made’. See Rose (n 251) 34. 
805 Article 113 adopts good faith as an external and objective criterion of interpretation of contracts; whereas 
article 112 adopts a subjective criterion according to the will of the parties. It says ‘in declarations of will, 
more heed shall be given to the intention revealed through the declaration than to the literal meaning of the 
language’. See Pinheiro (n 117) 168 and Rose (n 251) 34. 
806 Junqueira de Azevedo, 'Insuficiências, Deficiências e Desatualização do Projeto de Código Civil na Questão 
da Boa-Fé Objetiva nos Contratos' (n 801) 14-15. 
807 Ibid. This function also implies the existence of secondary duties of good faith such as information. 
808 Article 4.8 (Supplying an Omitted Term): (1) Where the parties to a contract have not agreed with respect 
to a term which is important for a determination of their rights and duties, a term which is appropriate in the 
circumstances shall be supplied. (2) In determining what is an appropriate term regard shall be had, among 
other factors, to (a) the intention of the parties; (b) the nature and purpose of the contract; (c) good faith 
and fair dealing; (d) reasonableness. In addition article 5.2. prescribes implied obligations which ‘stem from: 
(a) the nature and purpose of the contract; (b) practices established between the parties and usages; (c) 
good faith and fair dealing; (d) reasonableness’. 
809 Junqueira de Azevedo, 'Insuficiências, Deficiências e Desatualização do Projeto de Código Civil na Questão 
da Boa-Fé Objetiva nos Contratos' (n 801) 14-15. 
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this code finally came into force, part of its contents was already outdated.810 As a 
consequence even though the enactment of the Consumer Protection Code was prior to 
the new Civil Code, its contents are more modern and up-to-date and include a provision 
that declares void abusive clauses which are incompatible with good faith (art. 51, IV). 
 
5.4. Analysing the differences and similarities between these unresolved issues 
concerning the legislative controls on unfairness in B2B and B2C contracts in 
England and Brazil 
 
As can be observed, although the Brazilian legal system purports to be exhaustive, it is far 
from being perfect. Brazilian legislators have created a complex system of interrelated 
pieces of legislation in an attempt to cover all possible situations that may result in abuses 
of the weaker party. As a consequence the interpretation and application of legal 
provisions may be quite challenging at times. 
 
Nevertheless the codification of the civil legislation and in particular of the consumer law 
has undoubtedly improved the protection afforded to contractual parties, which has been 
reinforced by court decisions that aimed at achieving a fair application of contractual 
terms and the protection of the vulnerable party.  
 
The English legal system shares a similar problem concerning the harmonious coexistence 
of different pieces of legislation which tackle the unfairness of contractual terms, in 
particular UCTA and the UTCCR. Macdonald contended that they are ‘completely 
unrelated to each other’ and their ‘complexities become considerable when their 
differences and overlaps fall to be considered’.811 In addition there are also questions on 
whether the Directive 93/13/EEC was satisfactorily implemented by the Regulations in 
England. 
 
5.4.1. Inconsistent legislation 
 
The above pieces of legislation in England are neither user friendly to consumers who 
should be able to easily understand the rights that they are entitled to; nor to businesses 
                                                 
810 Ibid. 14-15. The Bill of the current Civil Code dates back to 1975, but it was published only on 11/01/2002 
coming into force on 13/01/2003. 
811 See Macdonald, 'Unifying Unfair Terms Legislation' (n 5) 69. See Law Commission, Unfair Terms in 
Contracts (Law Com CP No 166, 2002) paras 3.1 to 3.124 which addressed ‘overlaps and differences between 
UCTA and UTCCR’. 
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who require a reasonable level of certainty and predictability in their transactions. 
Brownsword pointed out that ‘rules need to be clear, results should be calculable, people 
must know where they stand’.812  
 
Before the Consumer Protection Code came into force in 1991, the Brazilian consumer 
legislation used to face a similar problem to the one that English law is experiencing 
nowadays, i.e. the lack of a unified regime to deal with the protection of consumers.813 
According to Bittar the piecemeal legislation about the topic did not have a concrete 
application and did not prevent abusive practices against consumers.814 The Consumer 
Protection Code significantly improved the consistency of the consumer rules, but judges 
should be mindful that there are still some situations that may be covered by provisions of 
the Civil Code as seen previously. 
 
By comparison in the context of business contracts, some fundamental institutions of 
commercial law in Brazil (e.g., bankruptcy, debt instrument and business corporation) are 
regulated by different legislative acts.815 Such decentralisation of the legislation that 
governs B2B contracts may lead to its lack of unity and to the discredit of the provisions 
of the Civil Code;816 but it is possible to argue that because they cover distinct topics with 
different areas of application, there are no overlaps or conflicts among them.817  
 
Contradictions and inconsistencies between rules of the same legal system should be 
carefully addressed by legislators and interpreters. Fuller remarked that ‘legislative 
carelessness about the jibe of statutes with one another can be very hurtful to legality 
and there is no simple rule by which to undo the damage’.818 
 
                                                 
812 Brownsword, 'Two Concepts of Good Faith' (n 160) 234. 
813 There were various statutes which preceded the Consumer Protection Code and aimed to protect 
consumers including: Act 1521/1951 (prescribes crimes against the public economy); Statutory Instrument 
4/1962 (regulates the intervention in the economic domain to ensure the distribution of indispensable 
products for the consumption of the population); Act 4680/1965 (regulates the advertising activity); Act 
6463/1977 (makes mandatory the declaration of the total price in sales made in instalments); Public Civil 
Action Act (Act 7347/1985, regulates the public civil action for damages caused to the environment and 
consumers as well as to properties and rights of artistic, aesthetic, historical and touristic value). 
814 Carlos Alberto Bittar, 'Os Contratos de Adesão e o Sancionamento de Cláusulas Abusivas' (1989) São Paulo, 
out, v. 78, f. 648 Revista dos Tribunais 17, 17-20. 
815 See Act 11101/2005 (Bankruptcy Act); Decree 2044/1908 (define Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes) 
and Act 6404/1976 (Business Corporation Act). 
816 Castello Miguel (n 256) 98-100. 
817 In addition their enactment enabled a more straightforward update of the law that regulates business 
contracts. See chapter 2. 
818 Fuller (n 783) 69. 
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5.4.2. General clauses 
 
The Brazilian legal system adopts general concepts such as good faith, social function, 
public order and public interest which afford a certain degree of flexibility to courts. In the 
words of Martins-Costa, ‘legislators left “open windows” (...) in the form of “general 
clauses” that can be filled by judges according to the individual case’.819 
 
However the use of general clauses still faces some resistance in England on the grounds 
that it may create uncertainties that can negatively affect the market.820 For instance, if 
suppliers cannot predict whether terms will be considered ineffective, they may increase 
prices in order to compensate for unexpected losses switching the burden to consumers.  
 
As observed earlier in Brazil the introduction of such general clauses influenced the 
transition of the courts’ approach from a formalist to a realist one; hence judges are no 
longer limited to the application of ‘the letter of the law’. By comparison, English courts 
also adopt the realism ideology, but this results from the application of equity and the 
system of precedents. 
 
5.4.3. Collective protection 
 
Article 81 of the Brazilian Consumer Protection Code prescribes the protection of 
consumers’ rights and interests either individually or collectively. The collective protection 
covers the so-called ‘diffuse, collective and individual-homogeneous interests’ of a 
determined or indeterminate group of consumers. Such protection can be provided by 
public bodies (e.g., public prosecution services, Federal Government, States, 
Municipalities and Federal District) as well as by relevant associations821 through a public 
civil action in accordance with Act 7347/1985.822 In addition there are other examples of 
                                                 
819 See Judith Martins-Costa, 'O Novo Código Civil Brasileiro: em Busca da 'Ética da Situação'' in J Martins-
Costa and GLC Branco (eds), Diretrizes Teóricas do Novo Código Civil Brasileiro (Saraiva 2002) 118. 
820 Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v Stilleto Visual Programmes Ltd [1989] QB 433. 
821 See art. 82 of the Consumer Protection Code. These associations must be legally constituted for at least 
one year and their institutional purpose must include the protection of consumer’s rights and interests. 
822 The reciprocity between the Public Civil Action Act (Act 7347/1985) and the Consumer Protection Code can 
be found in articles 90 and 117 of the latter. 
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‘collective actions’ in Brazil for other purposes823 which include the popular action and the 
collective injunction.824 
 
The Consumer Protection Code also provides in its article 6, VII that one of the basic 
consumers’ rights is the access to judicial and administrative bodies for prevention or 
redress for material or moral damages of individual, collective or diffuse interests which 
include the protection against unfair terms. 
 
The above provisions contain noticeable similarities with the text of article 7(2) of the 
Directive 93/13/EEC: 
 
Persons or organizations, having a legitimate interest under national law in 
protecting consumers, may take action according to the national law concerned 
before the courts or before competent administrative bodies for a decision as to 
whether contractual terms drawn up for general use are unfair, so that they can 
apply appropriate and effective means to prevent the continued use of such terms. 
 
However in England parties cannot have recourse to administrative bodies because under 
the Regulations only courts can decide whether or not a term is unfair.825 Nonetheless the 
provisions of the UTCCR 1999 may benefit consumers collectively as their reg. 12 provides 
that the Director General of the Office of Fair Trading and qualifying bodies may apply for 
an injunction against any person who appears to be using or recommending the use of 
unfair terms in consumer contracts. Consequently such injunction does not aim to protect 
an individual consumer but all consumers who could be affected by an unfair term made 
for general use.  
 
The English legal system includes other examples of collective protection of consumers. 
For instance part 8 of the Enterprise Act 2002 enables enforcers to seek undertakings or 
enforcement orders for breach of community and domestic infringements that may harm 
the collective interests of consumers.826 More recently the Commission of the European 
                                                 
823 Manuela Pereira Savio, 'Ação Civil Pública e Ação Coletiva: Problema Terminológico' Páginas de Direito 
<http://tex.pro.br/tex/listagem-de-artigos/179-artigos-ago-2009/5631-acao-civil-publica-e-acao-coletiva-
problema-terminologico-> accessed 12 January 2011. 
824 According to art. 5, LXXIII (Federal Constitution) and Act 4717/1965 any citizen is entitled to propose a 
Popular Action to make void an act injurious to the public property, the administrative morality, the 
environment and the historic and cultural heritage. On the other hand, political parties and certain entities and 
associations can apply for a Collective Injunction to protect a clear legal right if conditions of art. 5, LXX 
(Federal Constitution) are satisfied. 
825 See reg. 12(3) of UTCCR. 
826 In addition s. 47B of the Competition Act 1998 provides that a specified body may bring proceedings 
before the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) which include consumer claims made on behalf of at least two 
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Communities presented a Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress827 that proposes a 
mechanism to seek redress when multiple consumers are harmed by the same or a similar 
practice of a trader. It ultimately aims to address ‘consumer mass claims’ which tend to 
increase with the growth of cross-borders transactions and online shopping.828 
 
It is possible to argue that collective actions have the potential to increase significantly 
the consumer protection in England. Beale contended that ‘individual challenges to unfair 
terms will always remain few because of the many obstacles to effective legal action by 
individual consumers (...) so we must look to supplementation of individual private 
remedies by public action or collective action’.829 
 
5.4.4. Specialised courts 
 
Beale suggested that perhaps cases which examine the unfairness of terms for general 
use in B2C contracts should be decided by specialised courts which would be able to build 
up experience and deal more efficiently with a large range of information required in 
those cases.830 However those decisions have currently been made by higher courts or 
county courts under reg. 12.831 
 
In Brazil article 5, IV of the Consumer Protection Code832 stipulated the creation of small 
claims courts and courts specialised in consumer protection.833 In line with this provision 
some Brazilian States such as São Paulo and Bahia established those specialised courts; 
which were however subsequently closed down834 because ‘in practice there was no 
                                                                                                                                                    
individuals. Furthermore, under rule 19.10 of the Schedule 2 of the Civil Procedure (Amendment) Rules 2000 
(SI 2000/221) the so-called Group Litigation Order (GLO) permits a number of claims, which has given rise to 
common or related issues (of fact or law), to be managed as a group. 
827 Commission, 'Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress’ COM (2008) 794 final. 
828 See <http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/collective_redress_en.htm#Green> accessed 10 
October 2011. 
829 Beale, 'Legislative Control of Fairness: The Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts' (n 333) 251. 
830 Ibid. 257. 
831 In the context of the present study there are decisions made by higher courts such as in Office of Fair 
Trading v Abbey National plc and Others [2009] UKSC 6, [2010] 1 AC 696, [2009] EWCA Civ 116 which 
clashed with the OFT’s views. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case is still surrounded by controversy. 
832 Article 5, IV provides that in order to execute the National Policy for Consumer Relations, the Government 
shall use as a tool the creation of Small Claims Courts and Specialised Courts to solve consumer disputes. 
833 Those specialised courts differs from the small claims courts because they deal mainly with collective 
claims (although they can also make decisions about individual claims). See Grinover and others (n 499) 135-
136. 
834 Some Brazilian States created specialised courts via internal legislation. For instance, art. 32, I of the 
Declaratory Statute 762/1994 of the State of São Paulo prescribed the creation of five specialised courts to 
deal with consumer relations and collective actions. Those courts were closed down a few years later by the 
Declaratory Statute 877/2000. Similarly, the State law 6982/1996 of Bahia determined the establishment of 
specialised courts to decide consumer cases involving values that exceed 40 minimum wages and that were 
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interest or motivation to implement such courts’.835 This represented an enormous 
setback in the development of a more effective consumer protection in Brazil because 
those courts would be competent to deal with individual as well as collective claims. More 
recently other States (including Salvador, Vitória, Aracaju and Maceió) established courts 
specialised in diffuses and collectives’ interests with a great focus on consumer 
protection;836 but there is still the need for the creation of specialised courts which tackle 
individual claims in this area. 
 
5.4.5. Pre-contractual liability  
 
In England there is no general rule which imposes liability to parties before they are 
actually bound by a contract. In other words parties can break off negotiations according 
to their convenience for the sake of freedom of contract.837 However there is case law 
which indicates a concern to offer some protection to parties at pre-contractual stage. For 
instance in Blackpool and Fylde Aero Club v Blackpool BC838 the Court of Appeal held that 
the plaintiff complied with the terms of the advertised procedure for the submission of 
tenders for the concession to operate pleasure flights from Blackpool airport. 
Consequently ‘if he submits a conforming tender before the deadline he is entitled, not as 
a matter of mere expectation but of contractual right’ to have his tender considered.839  
 
Brownsword observed that in the above case ‘the court followed the line taken in a 
number of other jurisdictions that the law of contract is capable of giving some protection 
to the interests of commercial parties who are working towards an exchange’;840 but the 
English contract law lacks express provisions which purport to protect parties at the 
negotiation stage. 
 
By comparison, as seen previously, in Brazil legal literature extended the application of 
the principle of good faith to negotiations and the Superior Tribunal of Justice recognised 
                                                                                                                                                    
outside the scope of the small claim courts. However, they were also subsequently closed down by the 
Resolution 18/2008 (Supreme Court of the State).  
835 Figueiredo and Figueiredo (n 272) 294. 
836 Grinover and others (n 34) 135-136. In addition to consumer protection other collective interests include 
environment and properties and rights of artistic, aesthetic, historical and touristic value in accordance with 
Act 7347/1985. 
837 See Walford v Miles [1992] 2 AC 128. 
838 [1990] 1 WLR 1195 (CA). 
839 Blackpool and Fylde Aero Club v Blackpool BC [1990] 1 WLR 1195 (CA), 1202. 
840 Brownsword, Contract Law: Themes for the Twenty-first Century (n 127) 145. 
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that parties must not act in bad faith at this stage.841 In addition it is possible to argue 
that the pre-contractual liability is implicitly recognised in the provision that prescribes 
extra-contractual liability for damages caused by voluntary act or omission.842  
 
5.4.6. Absence of a small business regime 
 
As discussed in chapter 4, neither the English nor the Brazilian legal system currently offer 
a special regime to protect small businesses against abusive clauses in their contractual 
dealings. The lack of statutory protection has left those businesses in a disadvantageous 
position in the face of larger businesses as the latter often take advantage of their 
stronger bargaining power to include provisions that benefit them unilaterally.  
 
For this reason the general protection available to businesses in B2B contracts is 
insufficient to protect the interests of SMEs; thus the inexistence of a special regime for 
small businesses is a major issue that should be addressed by both jurisdictions. While 
the Law Commission has already recommended the implementation of such regime to 
protect SMEs against unfair terms, in Brazil there is no indication of any proposals for 
similar provisions. 
 
5.5. Conclusion 
 
Although the legislation which tackles unfair terms in England and Brazil is not perfect, it 
still represents a major development towards a more comprehensive protection of the 
weaker party. It also demonstrates a concern of both countries over the imbalance of 
contractual relations which can give rise to abuses, in particular in contracts involving 
consumers. 
 
However notwithstanding the increasing control over unfair terms or abusive clauses in 
the above jurisdictions, ‘organisations continue to find it difficult to resist using what to 
them are conventional standard terms in order to protect their own position’.843 
Businesses benefit from the fact that most consumers or their weaker counterparties 
(e.g., SMEs) are usually not aware of their rights and only few of them may attempt to 
                                                 
841 REsp 49564/SP (24/04/2007). 
842 Article 186 of the Civil Code. Interpreters can also apply general rules of civil liability prescribed by articles 
389 and 927 of the Civil Code. See chapter 3. 
843 Bray and Pickford (n 352) 30. 
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negotiate better terms or recourse to courts. This justifies the risk assumed by sellers and 
suppliers of including unjust terms that aim to reduce costs and/or increase profits even if 
they may be declared ineffective afterwards.844  
 
Such lack of awareness regarding contractual rights will not be solved only by the 
proposal of new legislation or by amendments to the current one, but it may also require 
the introduction of new government’s policies845 and campaigns to increase the 
consciousness of the population about their rights as consumers.846 Nonetheless the 
enactment of a clearer and user-friendlier legislation would be invaluable to enhance the 
comprehension by consumers and vulnerable parties of the available mechanisms to 
protect their interests.  
 
English law is already looking for possible solutions to discrepancies within its internal 
legislation such as the unified regime for the control on unfair terms proposed by the Law 
Commission. The European Union has also shown a concern over the need to review its 
consumer acquis and European contract law. More recently the EU's Council of Ministers 
approved the adoption of the Directive on Consumer Rights (2011/83/EU) which aims to 
simplify and update ‘the applicable rules, removing inconsistencies and closing unwanted 
gaps in the rules’.847  
 
Equally in Brazil the adoption of codes purports to organise rules of a certain area (e.g., 
consumer protection) in a systematic way in order to facilitate their understanding and 
application. In addition, there are mechanisms to prevent and overcome apparent 
conflicts of law which enable interpreters to choose the most appropriate provision for an 
individual case. 
 
However it is not only the difficulties to understand and apply the legal provisions that 
have discouraged parties from recourse to the law. Many consumers and SMEs have been 
                                                 
844 Beale observed that ‘businesses continue to use even terms that are automatically invalid under the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act (...) presumably in the hope that the presence of the clause will deter consumers from 
seeking redress’. See Beale, 'Legislative Control of Fairness: The Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts' (n 333) 254. 
845 The Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) is a government department of the UK which 
team of ministers includes the Minister for Employment Relations, Consumer and Postal Affairs who is 
responsible for consumer policies and consumer affairs. 
846 In Brazil, Act 10504/2002 institutes the ‘National Day of the Consumer’ which is celebrated every 15th 
March and includes debates, lecturers and other events that aim to disseminate consumers’ awareness of 
their rights. 
847 See Recital 2 of the Directive on Consumer Rights (2011/83/EU). This Directive will be implemented in 
England by the Consumer Bill of Rights 
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driven away from courts due to high costs and long delays of legal procedures.848 In other 
words the time and money spent in a legal action may not be deemed worthwhile in 
relation to the benefits that consumers may derive from it and there is also the risk of an 
unfavourable result.849  
 
In an attempt to minimise such problems, both legislatures have prescribed alternative 
ways to deal with claims which involve low values which are simpler, faster and more 
cost-effective. In Brazil, the Small Claims Courts Act (Act 9099/1995) allows consumers to 
propose legal action against companies without the need of technical assistance (i.e., 
lawyers) when the value of the cause does not exceed the equivalent of 20 minimum 
wages.850 Article 2 of the same Act provides that the proceeding of these courts ‘will be 
guided by the criteria of orality, simplicity, informality, procedural economy and swiftness 
seeking where possible, a conciliation or deal’. Additionally article 6 of Act 10259/2001 
prescribes that in addition to natural persons, micro and small enterprises can also have 
recourse to federal small claims courts.851 
 
Similarly in England, consumers and small businesses may resort to county courts that 
have a simplified proceeding to tackle small claims which include cases of goods not 
supplied and faulty goods.852 There are also alternative ways to settle disputes such as 
arbitration, mediation and ombudsmen schemes which are called ‘Alternative Dispute 
                                                 
848 Junqueira de Azevedo contended that law has been developed through changes of paradigms. In the 
context of law the first paradigm was developed in the liberal state. It was entirely based on the law and on 
its security. The law was considered universal, general and complete; therefore judges were limited to repeat 
the legislation. In the social state, this paradigm was replaced by a system in which the pivot was the judge 
not the law. The legislation gave more freedom to judges to make their decisions through the adoption of 
indeterminate legal concepts and general clauses, such as good faith, social function, public order and public 
interest. However this paradigma may create too much uncertainty. Consequently nowadays there has been a 
shift to a new paradigm (called post-modern) that is the avoidance of courts. Parties have recourse to 
alternative ways to deal with conflicts, such as arbitration, due to high costs and delays of judicial 
proceedings. See Junqueira de Azevedo, 'Insuficiências, Deficiências e Desatualização do Projeto de Código 
Civil na Questão da Boa-Fé Objetiva nos Contratos' (n 801) 16 and Castello Miguel (n 256) 88-89. Kuhn 
defines ‘paradigms’ as ‘universally recognized scientific achievements that for a time provide model problems 
and solutions to a community of practitioners’. According to this author ‘Sciences have developed through 
changes of paradigms’. See Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd edn, University of 
Chicago Press 1970) vii. 
849 Lewis (n 323) 93. 
850 See article 9 of Act 9099/1995. Currently the minimum wages in Brazil is R$622; therefore 20 minimum 
wages is R$12,440 that is approximately £3,920. 
851 Federal small claims courts are competent to judge cases involving values up to 60 minimum wages 
(approximately £11,760) or minor offences which have as defendant the Union, the federal governmental 
agencies, foundations or public companies. 
852 For claims up to £5,000 (£1,000 for personal injury and disrepair claims). See Part 27 (‘the small claims 
track’) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998. 
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Resolution’ (ADR) schemes. They enable parties to avoid courts and opt for a more 
flexible, faster and less costly proceeding.853  
 
In summary the implementation of a more effective protection of consumers and weak 
parties will not depend solely on the identification and solution of problems of the current 
legislation. The awareness of parties about their rights is also essential to enable them to 
act against abuses and achieve practical results. Moreover legislatures should provide 
effective means to parties to ensure recourse to legal proceedings854 otherwise the 
legislation, no matter how perfect it is, may lose its meaning and purpose. 
                                                 
853 The European Commission is currently preparing a legislative proposal to promote Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR) schemes in the EU, including ‘the possible development of an EU-wide online dispute 
resolution system for e-commerce transactions covering both B2B and B2C situations’. See Commission, 
'Review of the "Small Business Act" for Europe' COM (2011) 78 final 12. 
854 Undoubtedly small claim courts and alternative means of redress have facilitated the access to courts, but 
such special proceedings are limited to claims that involve small amounts of money or specific situations. This 
leaves a high number of consumers and vulnerable parties depending on ordinary judicial proceedings that 
can be expensive and slow. Collective actions have a great potential to enhance the protection of parties who 
would not have adequate means to propose individual actions. 
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CHAPTER 6. COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE CONTROLS ON 
UNFAIRNESS IN B2B AND B2C CONTRACTS IN ENGLAND AND BRAZIL  
 
6.1. Context 
 
Traditionally comparatists have been interested in the study of western legal traditions, 
particularly in differences and similarities between common law and civil law systems.855 
The present study adopted this archetype as it involved the comparison between the 
English and the Brazilian legal systems, representing the above legal traditions. The 
popularity of the comparison of those legal systems may result from the fact that they are 
among the most widespread and influential in the world.856  
 
According to David the considerable expansion of common law and civil law throughout 
the globe was due to reception or colonisation.857 England gave origin to common law and 
disseminated it to its colonies. This legal system ‘tends to be case-centred and hence 
judge-centred, allowing scope for a discretionary, ad hoc, pragmatic approach to the 
particular problems that appear before the courts’;858 whereas the civil law derived from 
Roman law ‘tends to be a codified body of general abstract principles which control the 
exercise of judicial discretion’.859 Brazil inherited the civil law system from its time as a 
Portuguese colony. Since then the Brazilian legislation has been influenced by the 
European continental system of law which in particular has shaped its private law. 
 
As discussed in chapter 1, while England can be unquestionably adopted as a paradigm 
for a common law system in a comparative study; more traditional comparatists may 
contend that the Brazilian law is not suitable to represent a civil law system. Instead they 
would prefer to employ ‘mature legal systems’ such as France or Italy in the 
comparison.860 Nonetheless the peculiarity of the Brazilian legal system may be seemed as 
an advantage rather than a negative characteristic. Örücü observed that the future of 
comparative law consists in the ‘appreciation of diversity’; thus it is precisely on the 
                                                 
855 Örücü, 'Comparatists and Extraordinary Places' (n 55) 467. 
856 David and Brierley, Major Legal Systems in the World Today: An Introduction to the Comparative Study of 
Law (n 16) 27. 
857 David observed that in some countries which were not colonised there was a voluntary reception of the 
civil law and common law (e.g., some Muslim countries). See Ibid. 23-25.  
858 Slapper and Kelly (n 20) 5. 
859 Ibid.  
860 Zweigert and Kötz (n 48) 41. 
 - 177 -  
 
‘extraordinary’ nature of the Brazilian law where the importance of this comparison lies.861 
Furthermore Baxter and Ong maintained that ‘the wealth of creative ideas flowing from 
both the new and the developing worlds can at times be astonishing in its fecundity’.862 
 
The relevance of this study therefore is based on the examination of two distinct legal 
systems, which can provide unique insights about their rules. This comparison did not 
only identify the differences between them, but also highlighted their similarities.863 In 
fact this study also observed the existence of overlaps between the relevant law of 
England and Brazil.  
 
In England case law was the main source of law for centuries, but nowadays statutes 
(Acts of Parliament) are ‘the most important source of law, in the sense that they prevail 
over most of the other sources’.864 For instance the problem of contractual unfairness is 
addressed by pieces of legislation such as the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 and the 
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999; although they do not lessen the 
importance of judicial precedents as it can be observed from cases such as Director 
General of Fair Trading v First National Bank plc865 and Office of Fair Trading v Abbey 
National plc and Others.866 
 
By comparison although the main Brazilian legal sources are statutes and Codes, courts 
have adopted a more flexible approach to protect vulnerable parties. In Brazil much of the 
control on unfairness in the context of small businesses contracts has been made through 
the analogical application of the consumer protection by courts in the absence of 
statutory provisions.867 In addition more recently the binding judicial precedent was 
introduced into the Brazilian legal system prescribing that decisions made by the Supreme 
Federal Court bind lower courts and public administration.868 This provision was subject to 
                                                 
861 Örücü, 'Comparatists and Extraordinary Places' (n 55) 470.  
862 See Baxter and Ong (n 56) 89. 
863 David observed that due to the numerous contacts over the centuries among countries which adopt 
common law and civil law the differences between those legal traditions have diminished. David and Brierley, 
Major Legal Systems in the World Today: An Introduction to the Comparative Study of Law (n 16) 25. 
864 Catherine Elliott and Frances Quinn, English Legal System (10th edn, Longman 2009) 9. David observed 
that ‘the formulation of the legal rules tends more and more to be conceived in Common law countries as it is 
in the countries of the Romano-Germanic family’. See David and Brierley, Major Legal Systems in the World 
Today: An Introduction to the Comparative Study of Law (n 16) 25. 
865 [2001] UKHL 52, [2002] 1 AC 481. 
866 [2009] UKSC 6, [2010] 1 AC 696, [2009] EWCA Civ 116. 
867 See chapter 4. 
868 This binding judicial precedent (‘súmula vinculante’) was introduced by the Constitutional Amendment 45 
in 2004, which added the article 103-A to the Brazilian Federal Constitution and provides that the Supreme 
Federal Court may, ex officio or by provocation, by decision of two thirds of its members, following repeated 
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criticism because it gave law-making powers to the Judiciary which is an attribution that 
should be restricted to the legislature according to the ‘principle of the separation of 
powers’;869 but notwithstanding its application the statutory law still prevails in Brazil.  
 
From the analysis of the above considerations it is possible to argue that the different 
emphases that the above legal systems give to case law and statutes represent one of the 
main differences between them. Nevertheless legislation and judicial precedents are 
entwined in practice: the latter are the result of the interpretation of the former by courts 
and courts may create law through this interpretative process. Therefore despite formal 
distinctions between both legal systems, they may have similar practical implications. 
 
Although in civil law jurisdictions courts do not ‘deliberately set out to create law’;870 ‘prior 
judicial opinions’ have a ‘persuasive effect’ over future decisions even though they are still 
relegated as an ancillary source of law.871 For instance the Brazilian Superior Tribunal of 
Justice has published numerous ‘judicial precedents’ that summarise its prevailing 
understanding on specific topics which interpretation has already been laid down.872 
Although not binding, they serve as a guide to parties and judges of lower courts on how 
certain cases will be interpreted by this higher court.873 The Supreme Federal Court on the 
other hand can publish ‘binding judicial precedents’, as seen above, despite the 
inconsistency of the latter with the civilian tradition; but so far this court has not 
published any binding precedent concerning unfairness in contracts.874  
 
By comparison, common law courts apply the law to the facts through interpretation and 
create law ‘by making legal principles which courts lower down the hierarchy are bound to 
                                                                                                                                                    
decisions on constitutional matters, approve binding judicial precedent which, from its publication in the 
official press, will have binding effect on other bodies of the Judiciary and on the direct and indirect public 
Administration at federal, state and municipal level. This court can also revise or cancel binding judicial 
precedents as prescribed by law. See also Act 11417/06 which regulates article 103-A. 
869 According to the ‘principle of separation of powers’ the three branches of the government (Legislative, 
Executive and Judicial) are independent and each power should be limited to its own competences and 
prerogatives. See Moraes (n 134) 187. According to Scalia when judges apply the common law method of 
judging they inappropriately usurp the power that should belong to legislators. See Antonin Scalia, 'Common 
Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution 
and Laws' (The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1995) 86. 
870 Tamanaha (n 113) 190. 
871 Scalia (n 869) 83. 
872 In 2012 there were almost 500 precedents published by the Superior Court of Justice. See 
<http://www.stj.jus.br/SCON/sumulas/toc.jsp?livre=@docn&tipo_visualizacao=RESUMO&menu=SIM> 
accessed 05 September 2012. 
873 E.g., precedent 302 of this Court prescribes that a term of a health insurance contract is unfair when it 
limits the hospitalisation time of the insured and precedent 469 prescribes that the Consumer Protection Code 
is applicable to health insurance contracts. 
874 See <http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/cms/verTexto.asp?servico=jurisprudenciaSumulaVinculante> accessed 
06 August 2012. 
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follow’.875 Judicial decisions therefore are regarded as a significant source of law for this 
legal system.876 In the context of the present study however, English courts were limited 
to the examination of the scope of application of the relevant law; thus they did not 
create principles to govern the matter of unfairness.877  
 
6.1.1. Comparing the approaches of the Brazilian law and the English law 
towards the controls on unfairness in B2B and B2C contracts 
 
The different approaches of the Brazilian law and the English law towards the controls on 
unfairness in contracts reflect the differences between the hierarchies of legal values of 
their respective legal systems.878 For instance they attach distinct weights to values such 
as freedom of contract and good faith.  
 
In the context of business contracts, common law courts are mainly concerned to protect 
the freedom of contract of the parties and to ensure the enforcement of terms which 
were freely agreed in order to promote certainty of contractual relations.879 There is the 
prevalence of the market-individualism ideology and parties are expected to defend their 
own interests. English judges should only ‘correct or integrate’ contractual terms if 
‘specific statutory rules require them to do so’.880 Those legislative interferences are 
however more usual in the context of B2C contracts. 
 
On the other hand in Brazil the freedom of contract is limited by principles such as the 
social function of the contracts and good faith which also cover agreements between 
businesses.881 In fact this limitation to the freedom of contract by the social function of 
the contracts can only be found in the Civil Code of Brazil.882 Furthermore civilian judges 
in general ‘have a larger power to evaluate the fairness of the contract and intervene to 
                                                 
875 Ewan MacIntyre, Business Law (5th edn, Longman 2010) 9. 
876 Scalia observed that ‘an absolute prerequisite to common-law lawmaking is the doctrine of stare decisis - 
that is, the principle that a decision made in one case will be followed in the next. Quite obviously, without 
such a principle common-law courts would not be making any “law”; they would just be resolving the 
particular dispute before them.’ See Scalia (n 869) 83. 
877 See Smith v Eric S. Bush [1990] 1 AC 831 and Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank plc 
[2001] UKHL 52, [2002] 1 AC 481.  
878 Moura Vicente (n 290) 35. 
879 Moss (n 221) 68. 
880 Ibid. 68-69. 
881 See article 421 of the Civil Code. 
882 Tartuce (n 263) 244. 
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reinstate the balance of interests between the parties because they are guided by 
principles such as good faith.883 
 
To a certain degree the legal values of both legal systems converge in the context of B2C 
contracts. They are both in line with the consumer welfarism ideology as they regulate 
more attentively consumer contracts to prevent abuses of the consumer’s vulnerability in 
the marketplace. This position can be inferred from the analysis of pieces of legislation 
such as the UTCCR 1999 and the Brazilian Consumer Protection Code. However despite 
fundamental similarities between the English and Brazilian legislation which regulates B2C 
contracts, they still have differences that reflect the distinctions between their legal 
families. One of the main differences is the treatment given to the concept of good faith. 
Whilst it is regarded as a general principle in the Brazilian law its application is more 
restricted in English law, as will be examined later in this chapter. 
 
The present comparison so far aimed to provide an insight as to how the above legal 
systems address the problem of unfairness in B2B and B2C contracts and to allow an 
understanding of the reasons underpinning their similarities and differences. From this 
point the analysis will evaluate possible lessons that one system can learn from the 
other.884 
 
6.2. Evaluation of lessons that Brazilian law can learn from the English 
legislative controls on unfairness in business and consumer contracts  
 
Brazil adopts the civil law tradition which considers Codes one of its primary sources of 
law. As Codes are ‘authoritative, comprehensive and systematic collection of general 
clauses and legal principles’ judges should be confined to the application of their 
provisions;885 for this reason one could argue that the Brazilian legal system adopts a 
more formalist approach. According to the formalism ideology courts should follow 
uncritically the rule-book which is deemed a ‘closed logical system’ where there is no 
room for judicial discretion.886 In line with that, formalists judges: 
 
                                                 
883 Moss (n 221) 68-69. See article 422 of the Civil Code. 
884 According to Collins one of the objectives of comparative contract law is the identification of the best 
solutions to legal problems and the recommendation of their inclusion into the other jurisdiction. See Hugh 
Collins, 'Methods and Aims of Comparative Contract Law' (1991) 11(3) OJLS 396, 396-399. 
885 De Cruz (n 10) 46-48. 
886 Brownsword and Adams, Understanding Contract Law (n 127) 188-189. 
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[D]o not legislate, do not exercise discretion (...), have no truck with policy, and 
do not look outside conventional legal texts - mainly statutes, constitutional 
provisions, and precedents (authoritative judicial decisions) - for guidance in 
deciding new cases.887 
 
As seen in chapter 5, the introduction of general clauses in the Brazilian legal system, 
such as the principle of good faith, required a change of posture by courts from a 
formalist approach to what Amaral Junior called a teleological or finalist approach.888 The 
latter may be equated to the realist approach as both contend that judges should not be 
limited to a mechanical application of the rule to the fact, but instead they should 
consider the purposes and goals of the rule. In other words, courts should be more 
‘result-orientated’ than ‘rule-orientated’.889 The principle of the social function of the 
contracts in Brazil is a clear example of the adoption of this approach. This principle 
prescribes that contracts should be interpreted according to ‘the conceptions of the social 
milieu in which they are inserted’ and should ensure the balance between parties 
preventing unjust situations.890 
 
This ‘result-orientated’ attitude requires a higher level of judicial discretion which used to 
be atypical to civil traditions. For this reason according to Amaral Junior, Brazilian courts 
could learn from common law countries where this approach is widely disseminated.891 In 
England ‘most modern judges tend to adopt a realist approach’892 and they may bend the 
rules in favour of fairer decisions because differently from formalist judges, realist judges 
‘must act as custodians of practical justice and convenience, not simply as the keepers of 
the code’.893  
 
For instance in England courts can apply remedies in equity which are discretionary and 
based on maxims that purport to ensure that decisions are ‘morally fair’,894 such as ‘he 
who comes to equity must come with clean hands’.895 Therefore in spite of a considerable 
                                                 
887 Tamanaha (n 113) 181. 
888 Amaral Júnior (n 888) 32. 
889 Brownsword and Adams, Understanding Contract Law (n 127) 190. 
890 Tartuce (n 263) 239-240. In the words of article 2035, sole paragraph of the Civil Code: ‘no agreement 
shall prevail if it is contrary to rules of public order, such as those established by this Code to ensure the 
social function of the property and contracts’. See Rose (n 251) 433. 
891 Amaral Júnior (n 888) 32. 
892 Poole, Textbook on Contract Law (n 78) 10. 
893 Brownsword and Adams, Understanding Contract Law (n 886) 191. 
894 Elliott and Quinn (n 864) 118. Waddams observed that ‘courts of equity had often set aside contracts on a 
variety of grounds related (in general terms) to unfairness’. See Waddams (n 718) 26. 
895 D&C Builders Ltd v Rees [1966] 2 QB 617 (CA). 
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increase in the importance of statute law in England in the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries,896 English courts still make decisions based on equity.897 
 
Nonetheless this does not mean that decisions made by judges in common law are 
completely discretionary. Tamanaha observed that even in decisions involving open 
provisions such as fairness and reasonableness, judges ‘will often agree in their 
judgments because they have undergone a similar training in the legal tradition and its 
values, and many share social views that span other differences’.898 Furthermore 
according to the doctrine of judicial precedent ‘courts are bound to follow decisions of 
higher courts and, usually, previous decisions of their own’ which also provides 
consistency in their rulings.899 
 
The English system of precedents also has other advantages. It may be particularly 
beneficial in the context of B2B contracts as it ‘allows for excellent updating of the law in 
a way which can keep up with changing business trends’.900 Consequently this system 
may regulate business contracts more adequately than Codes and statutes typical of the 
civil law as the latter require a complex and often slow process to be modified which may 
not meet the needs of a changing market.901 
 
6.3. Evaluation of lessons that English law can learn from the Brazilian 
legislative controls on unfairness in business and consumer contracts 
 
As mentioned earlier although case law is still an integral part of the English legal system, 
currently its main source of law is statutes just like Brazil. However Steyn noted that ‘in 
the matter of high technique the jurisprudence [and statute law] of common law and civil 
law countries sharply differ’ and that at the heart of the differences is the ‘generality of 
legal rules’.902 Whereas statutes in England purport to provide ‘detailed and concrete 
regulation’, the legislation of civil law countries tend to state ‘broad principles’.903 Indeed 
general principles, such as good faith, play an important role in the Brazilian legal system. 
                                                 
896 Slapper and Kelly (n 20) 7. 
897 Following the Judicature Acts of 1873–75 courts can apply common law and equity rules; in fact ‘now both 
systems have been effectively subsumed under the one term: common law’. See Ibid. 6-7. 
898 Tamanaha (n 113) 192. 
899 Routledge (ed), English Legal System Lawcards 2010-2011 (7th edn, Routledge 2010) 25. 
900 MacIntyre (n 875) 27. 
901 Ibid. 
902 Johan Steyn, 'The Role of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Contract Law: A Hair-Shirt Philosophy' (1991) 6 
Denning LJ 131, 131.  
903 Ibid. 
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In line with Steyn J’s observation, in Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v Stilleto Visual 
Programmes Ltd904 Bingham LJ noted that: 
 
In many civil law systems, and perhaps in most legal systems outside the common 
law world, the law of obligations recognises and enforces an overriding principle 
that in making and carrying out contracts parties should act in good faith (...) 
English law has, characteristically, committed itself to no such overriding principle 
but has developed piecemeal solutions in response to demonstrated problems of 
unfairness. 
 
In other words English law did not adopt a general principle of good faith as civil law 
jurisdictions did; instead it developed its own controls on unfairness that have similar 
outcomes.905 According to this neutral approach there is no need to rewrite the English 
doctrine as either the latter is equivalent to a broad principle of good faith or there is no 
practical difference between the application of those piecemeal solutions and such a 
general clause.906 
 
Nonetheless Brownsword contended that if the outcomes are equivalent, then the 
adoption of good faith as an overriding principle by English law would be preferable 
because it would enable a ‘doctrine harmonisation’ with other European legal systems.907 
Furthermore the scope of this principle is wider than the English solutions.  
 
Although there are statutory controls in England over unfairness, such as UCTA and 
UTCCR 1999, they are limited to certain types of terms (e.g., exemption clauses, non-
negotiated terms) and are applicable mainly to consumer contracts. A general principle of 
good faith in its turn may be applied to B2B and B2C contracts and covers terms in 
general. Furthermore this principle can be extended to protect parties at the negotiation 
stage in a way which operates differently from the English approach which rejects the 
application of a general rule of pre-contractual liability.908  
 
                                                 
904 [1989] QB 433, 439. 
905 Chen-Wishart observed that other common law jurisdictions (e.g., Australia and the USA) ‘developed a 
general principle against unfairness in contract formation’ ‘under the banner of unconscionability’ and civilian 
jurisdictions ‘under the banner of good faith’, but ‘this has been resisted by English courts’. See Chen-Wishart 
(n 3) 400. 
906 Brownsword, 'Individualism, Cooperativism and an Ethic for European Contract Law' (n 81) 629. See also 
Brownsword, Contract Law: Themes for the Twenty-first Century (n 127) 120. 
907 Brownsword, 'Individualism, Cooperativism and an Ethic for European Contract Law' (n 81) 629.  
908 See Walford v Miles [1992] 2 AC 128. See also Carter and Furmston, 'Good Faith and Fairness in the 
Negotiation of Contracts Part II' (n 224) 117-118. 
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Good faith may also comprise secondary duties such as transparency and information 
which in Brazil imply that sellers and suppliers are prohibited from omitting information 
about the products or services when doing so they may mislead the consumer;909 whereas 
the English legal system did not recognise a ‘duty of disclosure for a party who knows 
that the other party is ignorant of a critical fact’.910 Therefore such duty to inform could 
have allowed a fairer solution in cases such as L'Estrange v F Graucob Ltd.911 In this case 
an exemption clause was included in an order form which was written in small print in a 
poor quality paper. The buyer did not read the document, but because she signed it, the 
High Court held that she was bound by its terms in the absence of fraud or 
misrepresentation due to the ‘primacy of signature’.912  
 
It is noteworthy that this decision would have been different following the enactment of 
the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. Under s. 6(3) the above clause could have been 
deemed unenforceable because the liability for breach of the implied term that goods are 
fit for purpose ‘can be excluded or restricted’ as ‘against a person dealing otherwise than 
as consumer’ only if the exemption clause satisfies the requirement of reasonableness.913 
In addiction Schedule 2(c) of the same Act stipulates that the assessment of such 
reasonableness should take into account ‘whether the customer knew or ought reasonably 
to have known of the existence and extent of the term’. 
 
Nevertheless the application of the above piecemeal solution is still not as straightforward 
as the application of good faith. Moreover it may not protect adequately a small business 
because the latter will be generally regarded as ‘a person dealing otherwise than as 
consumer’; hence the standards of reasonableness may not take into consideration its 
vulnerable position. In the Brazilian context as the buyer was a small business, courts 
could have protected her through the analogical application of the consumer protection 
rules according to which in order to be valid, terms of standard form contracts shall be 
drafted in plain and legible font.914 Moreover clauses that imply a limitation on consumer 
rights should be highlighted to draw the consumer attention to their significance to ensure 
                                                 
909 See Nobre Júnior, 'A Proteção Contratual no Código do Consumidor e o Âmbito de sua Aplicação' (n 469) 
282. See also See REsp 586316/MG (19/03/2009) and articles 31 and 46 of the Consumer Protection Code. 
910 Ole Lando, 'Is Good Faith an Over-Arching General Clause in the Principles of European Contract Law?' 
(2007) 15(6) ERCL 841, 850. Similarly Cockburn CJ contended in Smith v Hughes that ‘the question is not 
what a man of scrupulous morality or nice honour would do under such circumstances (...) there was plainly 
no legal obligation in the plaintiff in the first instance to state whether the oats were new or old.’ Smith v 
Hughes (1871) L.R. 6 QB 597, 603-604. 
911 [1934] 2 KB 394. 
912 L'Estrange v F Graucob Ltd [1934] 2 KB 394 , 403. 
913 Poole, Casebook on Contract Law (n 150) 204. 
914 Article 54, paragraph 3 of the Consumer Protection Code. 
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that the consumer or the vulnerable party will make an informed decision aware of all 
possible consequences.915  
 
A similar protection is available to consumers in England, but currently such protection is 
not extended to small businesses. For instance under reg. 7(1) ‘a seller or supplier shall 
ensure that any written term of a contract is expressed in plain, intelligible language’. In 
addition more recently reg. 6(1) of the ‘Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading 
Regulations 2008’ (CPRs) prescribes that a commercial practice is a misleading omission if 
it ‘omits or hide material information; provides material information in a manner which is 
unclear, unintelligible, ambiguous or untimely’ and as a result ‘it causes or is likely to 
cause the average consumer to take a transactional decision he would not have taken 
otherwise’.916  
 
One of the reasons why English courts reject the application of general clauses (such as 
good faith) in B2B contracts is because the adoption of vague concepts may threaten the 
certainty of commercial relationships.917 For this reason in Union Eagle Ltd v Golden 
Achievement Ltd918 the Privy Council dismissed the specific performance of an agreement 
concerning the sale of a flat in Hong Kong in which the buyer was only ten minutes late in 
tendering the purchase price. Lord Hoffman contended that the non-enforcement of the 
contract ‘on the ground that this would be “unconscionable” is sufficient to create 
uncertainty’ in a rising and volatile market.919  
 
By comparison in Brazil the application of good faith as an overarching principle could 
have led to a different outcome in this case. In line with this legal system as the buyer 
was trying to complete the contract according to the agreed terms, the vendor would not 
be allowed to rescind the agreement and forfeit the deposit based on such insignificant 
                                                 
915 Article 54, paragraph 4 of the Consumer Protection Code. 
916 In March 2012 the Law Commission published a Report on Consumer Redress for Misleading and 
Aggressive Practices and recommended a limited reform to the CPRs according to which ‘traders should not 
be liable for omissions as a specific category, but should be liable where the overall presentation of a product 
or service would be likely to mislead the average consumer’. See Law Commission, Consumer Redress for 
Misleading and Aggressive Practices (Law Com No 332, 2012) para 7.36. 
917 See Lando (n 910) 848. 
918 [1997] AC 514. 
919 Nonetheless Lord Hoffman added that ‘the same need for certainty is not present in all transactions and 
the difficult cases have involved attempts to define the jurisdiction in a way which will enable justice to be 
done in appropriate cases without destabilising normal commercial relationships.’ See Union Eagle Ltd v 
Golden Achievement Ltd [1997] AC 514, 519. 
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delay as he would be acting against good faith.920 It is unlikely that a delay of ten minutes 
would harm the interests of the vendor in the context of the sale of a property.921 In 
addition, the buyer would be protected by the principle of the social function of contracts 
according to which the fulfilment of the agreement’s purpose would be more important 
than the strict interpretation of the terms.922 
 
In another case, Arcos Ltd v EA Ronaasen & Son,923 a buyer who made a bad bargain 
could reject timbers which were perfectly fit for their purpose only because they were 
slightly thicker than the description.924 In Brazil the buyer would not be allowed to take 
advantage of the situation because the interpretation of the contract should be done ‘in 
conformity with good faith’.925 Therefore as the supplier fulfilled his side of the bargain, 
the buyer’s attitude would be deemed as bad faith; thus the latter would not be entitled 
to reject the goods. 
 
A more concrete example on how good faith may be efficiently applied to prevent unfair 
outcomes in a B2B contract can be found in the comparison between Baird Textile 
Holdings Limited v Marks & Spencer Plc926 and the Brazilian ‘case of tomatoes’. As seen in 
chapter 4, in this Brazilian case a large company (Cica) used to purchase the tomatoes 
cultivated by small producers. However with no reasonable notice it decided to stop 
buying the farmer’s crops which caused the loss of the production. The local court 
considered that Cica was in breach of a duty of good faith and ordered it to pay damages 
to the farmers.927  
 
By comparison in the Baird Textile case a retailer company (M&S) cancelled a supply 
arrangement made with a textile company which was ongoing for thirty years. As a result 
the latter sought damages on the basis that there was an implied contractual obligation 
that parties were dealing in good faith and that such arrangement would only be 
                                                 
920 The high value of the deposit H.K.$420,000 (approximately £34,500) may indicate a non-honourable 
reason to terminate the contract. Additionally the Civil Code prescribes that juridical transactions shall be 
interpreted in conformity with good faith. See articles 112 and 113 of the Civil Code. 
921 Although the scenario would be different, for instance, in the sale of shares where each minute is crucial. 
922 Tartuce (n 263). See also articles 240 and 421 of the Civil Code. 
923 [1933] AC 470 (HL). 
924 Atkin LJ observed that ‘the right view is that the conditions of the contract must be strictly performed. If a 
condition is not performed the buyer has a right to reject’. Arcos Ltd v EA Ronaasen & Son [1933] AC 470 
(HL), 480. See also Lando (n 910) 850. As Poole observed this case dealt with a ‘strict contractual obligation’, 
thus even an insignificant failure of performance of the obligation may imply a breach of contract. See Poole, 
Textbook on Contract Law (n 78) 281. 
925 Articles 112 and 421 of the Civil Code. 
926 [2001] EWCA Civ 274. 
927 See TJ/RS, Embargos Infringentes 591083357, Rel. Des. Adalberto Libório Barros (01/11/1991).  
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terminated upon a reasonable notice of three years.928 The Court of Appeal however 
rejected the above argument and Mance LJ observed that in English law there is a 
‘general refusal’ to recognise the duty of good faith as an implied contractual term;929 
differently from the Brazilian law where an implied general clause of good faith can be 
inferred from articles 4, III and 51, XV of the Consumer Protection Code as seen in 
chapter 3.  
 
In addition the fact that there was not an express contract between the parties 
aggravated the uncertainty of the terms.930 Although in the Brazilian ‘case of tomatoes’ an 
express contract was also absent, the principle of good faith is applicable as a general 
clause at the pre-contractual stage and there is also the provision of extra-contractual 
liability931 which allow judges to protect vulnerable parties in this situation.  
 
Those examples indicate that piecemeal solutions in England may not tackle unfairness as 
efficiently as countries that adopt good faith as an overriding principle. Moura Vicente 
noted that ‘the protection afforded to parties by English law during the negotiation and 
formation of the contracts is far inferior to the protection provided by the legislation of 
Portugal, Italy, Germany and now also of Brazil’, due to the absence of good faith as a 
general clause in contracts in England.932 Nonetheless an English lawyer may disagree 
with such point of view and contend that solutions which favour the certainty of 
commercial agreements should prevail over the application of this principle.933 
 
Another disadvantage of the non-adoption of good faith as an overarching clause is the 
discrepancy that it may create between the law of England and other EU Member States. 
For instance article 1:201(1) of Principles of European Contract Law (PECL), article 1:103 
of the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) and article 2(1) of the Proposal for a 
Regulation on a Common European Sales Law (CESL) expressly prescribe that parties 
must act in accordance with ‘good faith and fair dealing’ which reflect the approach of 
                                                 
928 Poole, Casebook on Contract Law (n 150) 163-164. 
929 Baird Textile Holdings Ltd v Marks & Spencer Plc [2001] EWCA Civ 274 [68]. 
930 Poole, Casebook on Contract Law (n 150) 163-164. 
931 Article 186 of the Civil Code. 
932 Moura Vicente (n 290) 35. 
933 According to Law Commission, An Optional Common European Sales Law: Advantages and Problems 
(Advice to the UK Government) (2011) ‘all systems of commercial contract law must grapple with the tension 
between certainty and fairness. English and Scots law have a reputation for leaning towards the certainty end 
of the scale. By contrast, the CESL is firmly towards the fairness end. It sets high standards of good faith and 
fair dealing and provides many discretionary remedies to a party who has suffered from a lack of good faith’. 
See <http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/Common_European_Sales_Law_Summary.pdf> accessed 13 
July 2012.  
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continental European countries. For those civil law jurisdictions ‘good faith and fair 
dealing’ is ‘penicillin [that] permeates all parts of the system and kills all the pernicious 
germs’; whereas the British ‘only wish to operate on parts of the system’.934 
 
However Beale suggested that the aforementioned provisions may not prescribe a general 
clause of good faith; otherwise the inclusion of other articles which also stipulate for the 
application of good faith in PECL, DCFR and CESL would be meaningless.935 Nonetheless 
there is no reason why general and specific provisions prescribing good faith cannot 
coexist.936 For instance the Brazilian Civil Code prescribes general clauses of good faith in 
the interpretation and performance of the contracts937 concurrently to the application of 
this principle in specific provisions related to abuse of rights, insurance contract, 
possession of properties and so forth.938  
 
6.3.1. Evaluation of the acceptance and recognition of the concept of good 
faith as a mechanism for controlling the fairness of contractual terms in 
England 
 
As observed above, the piecemeal solutions offered by English doctrine may be not as 
efficient as the application of a general principle of good faith. Nevertheless there is still a 
considerable opposition to the adoption of such principle by English lawyers.939 Due to the 
‘well known aversion to general principles that is a feature of common law reasoning’,940 
‘British courts have energetically rejected this doctrine on several occasions treating it like 
a contagious disease of alien origin’.941 Brownsword enumerated recurrent negative 
arguments which will be examined as follow.942 
 
                                                 
934 Lando (n 910) 853. Although is possible to argue that the above definition of ‘good faith and fair dealing’ 
may be consistent with the idea of ‘fair and open dealing’ of Director General of Fair Trading v First National 
Bank plc [2001] UKHL 52, [2002] 1 AC 481. 
935 Hugh Beale, 'General Clauses and Specific Rules in the Principles of European Contract Law' in S 
Grundmann and D Mazeaud (eds), General Clauses and Standards in European Contract Laws: Comparative 
Law, EC Law and Contract Law Codification (Kluwer Law International 2006) 211-213. 
936 Lando (n 910) 853. 
937 Articles 113 and 422 of the Civil Code. 
938 See articles 187, 765, 878 and 1202 of the Civil Code. 
939 Brownsword, Contract Law: Themes for the Twenty-first Century (n 127) 114-115. 
940 Willett, 'General Clauses and the Competing Ethics of European Consumer Law in the UK' (n 9) 432. 
941 Gunther Teubner, 'Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New 
Differences' (1998) 61 MLR 11, 11. 
942 Brownsword, Contract Law: Themes for the Twenty-first Century (n 127) 114-120. 
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First of all the adoption of the doctrine of good faith is inconsistent with the individualist 
ethic of English contract law943 because it implies that contracting parties should take into 
consideration the legitimate expectations or interests of the other party.944 It may also 
affect the ‘self-reliance ethic’ typical of the market trading according to which parties 
should be entitled to pursue their own interests.945 Furthermore the autonomy of the 
parties and the freedom of contract may be considerably impinged by good faith because 
courts may interfere in bargains agreed by parties when the latter act against this 
principle.946  
 
Other drawbacks of good faith were already examined in chapter 2 and are directed at 
B2B contracts. The main arguments against this doctrine revolve around the idea that this 
concept would create uncertainty in commercial agreements; because it is unclear the 
extent of the limitations that good faith imposes on the parties’ freedom of contract and 
such restrictions may involve questions of a moral nature that cannot be objectively 
defined.947 It may also be difficult to determine whether or not a party acted in good or 
bad faith because this evaluation may involve the analysis of the parties’ reasons or state 
of mind which also can give rise to uncertainties.948 Furthermore a general clause may be 
inappropriate in certain contracting situations which require a more specific regulation and 
where opportunistic behaviour is expected, such as in commodities contracts.949 
 
Even the adherents of the neutral view may ultimately agree with the above negative 
view because if the English legal system already offers solutions to the problem of 
unfairness in contracts then there is no need to replace them with a general doctrine of 
good faith.950 Indeed all those arguments created a sceptical approach concerning the 
adoption of good faith as an overarching principle in English contract law and ‘no more 
                                                 
943 Ibid. 123. 
944 ‘In its classical expression English contract law presupposes an individualistic ethic’. See Brownsword, 
'Individualism, Cooperativism and an Ethic for European Contract Law' (n 81) 631. 
945 Brownsword and Adams, Understanding Contract Law (n 127) 194, 195. See Suisse Atlantique Société 
d'Armement Maritime S.A. Appellants v N.V. Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale Respondents [1967] 1 AC 361, 
392 where the House of Lords favoured the freedom of contract and the parties’ intentions. Also in Walford v 
Miles [1992] 2 AC 128, 138 Ackner LJ contended that ‘each party to the negotiations is entitled to pursue his 
(or her) own interest, so long as he avoids making misrepresentations’. 
946 Brownsword, Contract Law: Themes for the Twenty-first Century (n 127) 115. 
947 Ibid. 115. See also Moss (n 221) 70. 
948 See Regalian Properties Plc v London Docklands Development Corp [1995] 1 WLR 212. See also 
Brownsword, Contract Law: Themes for the Twenty-first Century (n 127) 116-117. 
949 Ibid. 119. See also Bridge (n 221) 147. 
950 Brownsword, Contract Law: Themes for the Twenty-first Century (n 127) 122. 
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than a minority of English lawyers’ supports its incorporation into the domestic legal 
system.951 
 
Despite the current prevalence of the negative view there are some compelling arguments 
that support the adoption of such general clause by English law. Powell contended that 
good faith addresses the problem of unfairness in a more direct and transparent way 
rather than having recourse to ‘contortions and subterfuges’ such as ‘implied promises’ to 
give effect to a sense of justice to a case.952 More recently the Proposal for a Regulation 
on a Common European Sales Law (CESL)953 adopted a position in line with the above 
proposition as it prescribes that parties should behave in accordance with ‘good faith and 
fair dealing’ which is defined as ‘a standard of conduct characterised by honesty, 
openness and consideration for the interests of the other party to the transaction or 
relationship in question’ (art. 2). Therefore it expressly purports to prevent unfairness in a 
more straightforward manner.  
 
Furthermore English law incorporated the provisions of the Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive (UCPD)954 via the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 
(CPRs).955 According to them, ‘traders will have to comply with a standard of professional 
diligence, which requires consideration of honest market practices and good faith’956 
whether the commercial practice occur ‘before, during or after a commercial transaction 
(if any) in relation to a product’.957 Therefore it is possible to suggest that currently 
traders in England should observe good faith in all contractual stages under the CPRs.958  
 
This principle may also work as an ‘umbrella principle’ which could give the legal ground 
that courts need to achieve fairer results where specific doctrines (e.g., duress) cannot be 
                                                 
951 Ibid. 123. 
952 Powell (n 86) 26. See also Ingham v Emes [1955] 2 QB 366 (CA). 
953 Article 2 of the Commission, 'Proposal for a Regulation on a Common European Sales Law' COM (2011) 
635 final. 
954 European Parliament and Council Directive 2005/29/EC of 11 May 2005 on Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive [2005] OJ L149/22. 
955 SI 2008/1277. 
956 Christian Twigg-Flesner and others, An Analysis of the Application and Scope of the Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive: A Report for the Department of Trade and Industry (May 2005) iii. 
957 See reg. 2(1)(b) of the CPRs. 
958 According to Willet ‘there is a “cradle to grave” regime covering practices such as advertising, persuasion 
and negotiation at the pre-contractual stage; post contractual alterations or variations; performance, delivery 
etc by the trader; performance, payment etc by the consumer; complaint handling; after sales service; and 
enforcement by either party’. See Willett, 'General Clauses and the Competing Ethics of European Consumer 
Law in the UK' (n 9) 418. 
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applied.959 The examples in the preceding section illustrate those propositions. In 
L'Estrange v F Graucob Ltd960 Maugham LJ admitted that ‘I regret the decision to which I 
have come, but I am bound by legal rules and cannot decide the case on other 
considerations’.961 
 
Furthermore courts would be able to provide a better protection to the expectations of 
the parties if there was an implied duty to act in good faith.962 In Philips Electronique 
Grand Public SA v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd963 if such duty could have been implied 
then the Court of Appeal could have inferred that the parties’ expectations were of 
cooperation and equal distribution of risks in a joint venture which could have allowed a 
different outcome.964  
 
Therefore there are indications that the English legal system would benefit from the 
introduction of a general clause of good faith. This principle has been applied efficiently in 
the Brazilian legal system and reservations raised by the negative view did not materialise 
in the context of this jurisdiction. Good faith did not create uncertainties; on the contrary 
it provided more stability to contractual relationships as parties can trust each other. 
Furthermore the application of this principle by courts is not completely discretionary but 
it is made in accordance with the other terms of the contract and the circumstances of 
the individual case, thus generally parties are able to predict its outcomes and know 
where they stand.965  
 
6.4. Conclusion 
 
Comparative law has a number of significant functions and aims. In the present study this 
methodology was employed to compare the English and Brazilian legal systems in order to 
ascertain their ‘likenesses and differences’ as well as to analyse ‘objectively and 
                                                 
959 Summers (n 455) 198-199 and 215. Brownsword, Contract Law: Themes for the Twenty-first Century (n 
127) 124. 
960 [1934] 2 KB 394. 
961 L'Estrange v F Graucob Ltd [1934] 2 KB 394, 405. 
962 Brownsword, Contract Law: Themes for the Twenty-first Century (n 127) 124-128. Steyn LJ contended 
that the protection of the reasonable expectations of the parties ultimately performs the same function as the 
principle of good faith. See Steyn, 'Contract Law: Fulfilling the Reasonable Expectations of Honest Men' (n 
125) 459. 
963 [1995] EMLR 472 (CA).  
964 Brownsword, Contract Law: Themes for the Twenty-first Century (n 127) 126-127. 
965 For instance ‘the duty to negotiate in good faith simply imposes a minimal standard of behavior on the 
negotiating parties and not some highly idealistic and unachievable moral standard’. See David I Bristow and 
Reva Seth, 'Good faith in Negotiations' (Nov 2000-Jan 2001) 55(4) Disp Resol J 16, 21. 
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systematically the solutions which the various systems offer for a given legal problem’,966 
i.e. ‘unfairness’ in B2B and B2C contracts. The inclusion of a foreign system in the search 
for ways of resolving a legal problem provides a ‘much richer range of model solutions’ 
than it would be available in the study of one’s own jurisdiction.967 
 
The application of comparative law is not unfamiliar to English and Brazilian courts. They 
have used ‘foreign law and foreign legal ideas as a means of shaping national law when 
this is unclear, contradictory, or otherwise in need of reform’.968 In England, for instance, 
Lord Bingham observed in Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd:969 
 
If, however, a decision is given in this country which offends one’s basic sense of 
justice, and if consideration of international sources suggests that a different and 
more acceptable decision would be given in most other jurisdictions, whatever 
their legal tradition, this must prompt anxious review of the decision in question. 
 
Nonetheless the application of civil law as a parameter to solve common law cases is not 
unanimous. In White v Jones970 Lord Goff asserted that:  
 
Strongly though I support the study of comparative law, I hesitate to embark in an 
opinion such as this upon a comparison, however brief, with a civil law system; 
because experience has taught me how very difficult, and indeed potentially 
misleading, such an exercise can be.971 
 
Such reservation is understandable in view of potential problems that may affect an 
adequate use of concepts and rules from one legal system to another.972 Gutteridge 
pointed out that one of the main barriers is the language and ‘conceptual differences of 
legal terminologies’ (e.g., the expression ‘equity’ can have a different connotation in a civil 
law jurisdiction).973 Furthermore the unfamiliarity with the other legal system may result 
in an inappropriate use of one’s own legal conceptions and expectations due to cultural 
differences between the systems.974  
 
                                                 
966 Walther Hug, 'The History of Comparative Law' (1931-1932) 45 Harv L Rev 1027, 1027. 
967 Zweigert and Kötz (n 48) 15. 
968 Basil S. Markesinis, Comparative law in the Courtroom and Classroom: the Story of the Last Thirty-five 
Years (Hart 2003) 157. See Greatorex v Greatorex [2000] EWHC 223 (QB). 
969 [2002] UKHL 22, [2003] 1 AC 32.  
970 [1995] 2 AC 207. 
971 White v Jones [1995] 2 AC 207 , 263. 
972 ‘The House made clear that, while these materials were helpful and could support legal argument, they 
were not to be regarded as determinative or binding on the court in any way (...) to preserve the conventions 
of the English court and hierarchy of the binding precedent’. See De Cruz (n 10) 22. 
973 Harold C Gutteridge, 'Comparative Aspects of Legal Terminology' (1937-1938) 12 Tul L Rev 401, 401-405. 
974 De Cruz (n 10) 219-230. 
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Those problems however can be avoided with a proper application of comparative 
methods which may address those ‘perils and pitfalls’;975 therefore the latter should not 
prevent the use of comparative law when it can provide a fairer solution to an individual 
case. Mayss contended that ‘an underlying reason for applying a foreign law, rather than 
English law, is to serve the interests of the parties to the case and achieve justice’;976 
hence one could suggest that courts in England ‘are now invoking continental law to a 
remarkable degree’977 when civil law can reach a more satisfactory outcome.  
 
The Brazilian legal system in its turn has not been opposed to the application of 
comparative law when its legislation does not expressly regulate the matter.978 In fact 
under article 4 of the Law of Introduction to the Brazilian Civil Code979 ‘when the 
legislation is silent, the judge shall decide the case according to analogy, customs and the 
general principles of law’.980 This open provision may allow judges to look for solutions in 
foreign jurisdictions in the silence of the national law because they cannot abstain from 
deciding. It is possible to argue that it may be more natural to Brazilian courts to make 
references to foreign legal systems than their English counterparts because the law of 
Brazil was inspired by alien legislation (mainly European),981 whereas England gave origin 
to its own legal system (common law).  
 
Another indication of the acceptance of comparative law by the Brazilian legal system is 
the express reference to its use in article 8 of the Consolidated Labour Laws982 which 
prescribes that: 
 
Administrative authorities and Labour Courts, in the absence of legal or 
contractual provisions shall decide as appropriate according to case law, analogy, 
                                                 
975 Ibid. 219. 
976 Abla J Mayss, Principles of Conflict of Laws (3rd edn, Principles of Law Series, Cavendish 1999) 4. Similarly 
North and Fawcett observed that ‘there is no sacred principle that pervades all decisions but, when the 
circumstances indicate that the internal law of a foreign country will provide a solution more just, more 
convenient and more in accord with the expectations of the parties than the internal law of England, the 
English judge does not hesitate to give effect to the foreign rules.’ See Peter North and J. J. Fawcett, Cheshire 
and North’s Private International Law (12th edn, Butterworths 1992) 39. 
977 Zweigert and Kötz (n 48) 19. 
978 There are a number of decisions of the Superior Court of Justice which make reference to comparative law 
such as REsp 1174235/RJ (28/02/2012); REsp 302906/SP (01/12/2010); REsp 1149529/RJ (12/03/2010); 
REsp 963686/RS (27/08/2009) and REsp 4138/PR (03/12/1990). Equally the Supreme Federal Court also 
refers to comparative law in various decisions: RE 477554/MG (26/08/2011); HC 109544/BA (31/08/2011); MI 
708/DF (31/10/2008); RHC 90376/RJ (17/05/2007); AI 529694/RS (11/03/2005); HC 76060/SC (15/05/1998) 
and so forth. 
979 Decree-law 4657/1942. 
980 Rose (n 251) 2. 
981 The Consumer Protection Code was substantially influenced by the French ‘Projet de Code de la 
Consommation’ and the Civil Code by the Italian Civil Code. See Grinover and others (n 34) 7. 
982 Decree-law 5452/1943. 
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equity, other principles and general rules of law, especially labour law, and yet, 
comparative law according to customs and traditions.  
 
In line with this provision Justice Rosa Maria Weber of the Superior Labour Court 
observed that ‘we can find in comparative law a fertile source of experiences that can be 
used as example of possible solutions to the problem’.983 
 
Therefore comparative law has played an important function in the context of national 
legal systems (such as England and Brazil) and its importance can be also extended to the 
context of ‘international trade regimes’.984 For instance in the European Union there has 
been an increasing interaction between common law and civil law which has required the 
harmonisation of its law.985 Such harmonisation is ‘designed to effect an approximation or 
co-ordination of different legal provisions or systems by eliminating major differences and 
creating minimum requirements or standards’.986 This function of comparative law has 
been also employed in the Mercosul as its resolutions have to reconcile the legislation of 
all its Member States.987  
 
Comparative law can be employed to achieve distinct aims at national or international 
level and may have different rationales. In line with Collins, the rationale of the present 
study can be classified as positivist or utilitarian because it sought the best solutions to a 
legal problem through the comparison of rules and techniques of distinct jurisdictions 
(England and Brazil) and recommended lessons that those legal systems can learn from 
each other as examined in the preceding sections.988 This work also contained a more 
indirect rationale which was to allow a better understanding of one’s own legal system 
through the analysis of doctrines of a foreign jurisdiction.989 Comparatists may have a 
better understanding of the logic behind the concepts and rules of their national system 
while examining the reasons why they differ from the other legal system.990  
 
                                                 
983 Proceeding RR - 108100-45.2007.5.04.0009 (23/04/2010). 
984 Those trade regimes are outside or above the national ones and include: the EU, the Mercosul, NAFTA, 
etc. See Mathias Reimann, 'Beyond National Systems: A Comparative Law for the International Age' (2000-
2001) 75 Tul L Rev 1103, 1107. 
985 De Cruz (n 10) 23-26 and Zweigert and Kötz (n 48) 28-29. 
986 See W. J. Kamba, 'Comparative Law - A Theoretical Framework' (1974) 23 ICLQ 485, 501.  
987 In the context of the Mercosul the comparison of the law of its Member States is in principle more 
straightforward than in the EU because all members adopt the civil law tradition. However as seen previously 
their legislation has some significant differences such as distinct levels of consumer protection. 
988 Collins, 'Methods and Aims of Comparative Contract Law' (n 884) 397. 
989 Ibid. 398-399. 
990 Ibid. 399. The differences in the application of good faith for instance reflect more fundamental 
distinctions between the English and Brazilian legal systems. 
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION 
 
7.1. Context 
 
Ordinary people and businesses are daily exposed to contracts which may contain unfair 
provisions. Those unfair terms are often imposed in standard form contracts which are 
drafted by the party who holds a greater bargaining strength; hence the weaker party 
usually faces a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ situation and is unable to negotiate its contents.991  
 
The widespread use of ‘contracts of adhesion’ and the frequent inclusion of unjust terms 
or unreasonable exemption clauses made imperative the establishment of limits to them. 
Distinct jurisdictions developed different ways to prevent or tackle those unfair terms. The 
solutions applied to the problem of unfairness may vary between jurisdictions because 
they are invariably influenced by their legal traditions (e.g., common law or civil law) and 
other characteristics of their milieu (e.g., cultural, social and economic).   
 
The prime objective of this study was to compare how two distinct jurisdictions (England 
and Brazil) deal with contractual unfairness through the imposition of legislative 
controls.992 This comparison enabled the identification of major issues and weaknesses of 
the relevant legislation in both legal systems, as well as strengths and lessons that may 
be derived from each system and applied to the other.  
 
This work also examined the differences in the extent to which unfair terms are imposed 
on businesses (including small businesses) and consumers. Businesses parties are 
normally in a better position to negotiate terms with their counterparties as often they 
share a similar bargaining power. In addition, in B2B contracts the inclusion of exemption 
clauses or harsh terms may be compensated by terms which offer additional benefits 
(e.g., better prices and allocation of insurance). However this assumption of parity 
between parties cannot be extended to small businesses because they are often in a 
disadvantageous position in the face of large businesses. For similar reasons consumers 
commonly have to accept terms imposed by sellers and suppliers. 
                                                 
991 As Lord Reid observed ‘in the ordinary way the customer has no time to read [the standard terms 
contracts], and if he did read them he would probably not understand them. and if he did understand and 
object to any of them, he would generally be told he could take it or leave it. and if he then went to another 
supplier the result would be the same. Freedom to contract must surely imply some choice or room for 
bargaining.’ See Suisse Atlantique Société d'Armement Maritime S.A. Appellants v N.V. Rotterdamsche Kolen 
Centrale Respondents [1967] 1 AC 361, 406. 
992 More precisely in B2C, B2B and small business contracts. 
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As a result of the above differences the level of protection afforded by legislation to 
businesses and consumers will vary according to their needs. Both the English and 
Brazilian legal systems allow more leeway to business parties to define the terms of their 
agreements because they normally are able to protect their own interests. B2C contracts 
however are more closely regulated by the law of both jurisdictions because usually 
consumers are in a more vulnerable position in the market and require a special 
protection. Small businesses, just like consumers, are more exposed to disadvantageous 
terms but presently there is no special regime either in England or Brazil which offers a 
specialised protection to them. For this reason Brazilian courts have adopted a more 
interventionist approach to protect their interests and avoid the exploitation of their 
vulnerability; whereas the Law Commission has proposed a special regime for SMEs. 
 
Although in the past decades significant developments could be observed in England and 
Brazil concerning the prevention of contractual unfairness (largely in the context of 
consumer agreements)993 the current legislation still needs to be improved. As seen in 
chapter 5 there are overlaps and conflicts within the internal legislation of both 
jurisdictions (e.g., UCTA and UTCCR; Civil Code and Consumer Protection Code) and their 
provisions may be insufficient to deal with all situations of unfairness (e.g., in England 
there is no general rule of pre-contractual liability and in Brazil small businesses are not 
satisfactorily protected against abusive clauses). 
 
Part of the solution to issues of the unfair terms legislation in England and Brazil may be 
found within their own jurisdictions. For instance in England the Law Commission 
proposed a unified regime to tackle unfair terms in contracts;994 whereas the Brazilian 
legal system prescribes criteria to deal with conflicts of law.995 However there are 
problems which cannot be adequately addressed by the internal law of those jurisdictions; 
therefore they may find better ways to tackle them in another legal system via 
comparative law. As examined in chapter 6, the English legal system could benefit from 
the example set by the Brazilian law which has efficiently applied good faith as a general 
clause to deal with unfairness at all contractual stages. On the other hand the Brazilian 
legal system could learn from the English system of precedents which allow the law to 
                                                 
993 E.g., Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 and Consumer Protection Code. 
994 See chapters 2 and 3. 
995 Criteria of anteriority, speciality and hierarchy. See chapter 5. 
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adapt to new situations more readily than Codes;996 hence it would be more 
advantageous for B2B contracts. 
 
7.2. Review of aims and objectives 
 
This work purported to analyse pieces of legislation which regulate terms on the basis of 
their ‘unfairness’ and are not limited to the ‘legislative regulation of specific terms’.997 In 
addition they make use of ‘general clauses’ such as good faith and reasonableness to 
tackle abusive clauses.998 Chapters 2, 3 and 4 examined those legislative controls on 
unfair terms in the English and Brazilian legal systems in the context of B2B, B2C and 
small business contracts respectively. The understanding of the relevant legislation and 
case law in the context of England and Brazil was a prerequisite for the comparative 
analysis which was ultimately the essence of this research. 
 
Zweigert and Kötz observed that ‘whoever reads or uses a work on comparative law must 
be familiar with the basic material, or he will be in no position to make the necessary 
comparisons’.999 For this reason the comparative examination between those legal 
systems was made at the final part of each of the above chapters following the 
examination of the English law and Brazilian law separately. The comparison highlighted 
their differences and similarities in the context of the distinct types of contracts.  
 
Nonetheless the main aim of the thesis had an evaluative nature which in the words of 
Cryer, Hervey and Sokhi-Bulley means to assess the way that the legal world is, and 
subject the law to appraisal.1000 According to them ‘where shortfalls are identified’ 
evaluative scholarship may suggest ‘how things might be improved’.1001 In line with that, 
this work identified and examined the existing problems of the above controls in chapter 5 
and evaluated in chapter 6 lessons that the Brazilian law may learn from English law and 
vice versa.  
 
This work applied the comparative law methodology because it was deemed the most 
appropriate to achieve the above aims of the proposed research. The choice of the 
                                                 
996 MacIntyre (n 875) 27. 
997 Poole, Textbook on Contract Law (n 6) 244. 
998 Willett, 'General Clauses and the Competing Ethics of European Consumer Law in the UK' (n 9) 412. 
999 Zweigert and Kötz (n 48) 43. 
1000 Cryer, Hervey and Sokhi-Bulley (n 52) 9. 
1001 Ibid. 
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methodology, theory and approaches however may be a ‘matter of personal style. Our 
choice of style reflects our professional and personal goals’.1002 Although this work was 
conducted in the most objective way possible, the fact that the researcher is a Brazilian 
lawyer arguably directed the study to emphasise the need for consumer protection, which 
is the dominant view in Brazil. This may also have influenced the researcher to adopt a 
more positive approach towards the application of good faith as an overriding principle in 
English law as this concept is already widely accepted as such in civil law jurisdictions. 
 
7.3. Limitations 
 
As seen in chapter one, this work was a micro-comparison limited to the analysis of 
statutory controls of unfair terms and exemption clauses in B2B, B2C and small 
businesses contracts because it would not be feasible to analyse all types of contracts or 
the entire legal systems in question. In the same chapter it was discussed that some 
comparatists may criticise the choice of the Brazilian legal system for a comparative study 
with the English legal system because it is not regarded as a ‘mature legal system’. 
Nevertheless as already discussed in chapter 6, the ‘extraordinariness’ of the Brazilian law 
is actually what enriched the proposed comparison as it enabled the analysis of the 
research problem from a distinct perspective.1003 
 
One could also contend that this work did not cover all mechanisms for controlling 
unfairness in contracts. However as acknowledged from the beginning, the scope of this 
study was limited to ‘legislative controls’ for practical reasons. The study of all controls on 
unfairness would be excessively wide as it would include common law concepts such as 
fraud, misrepresentation, duress and undue influence; which in a comparative study with 
the Brazilian law would require the analysis of numerous provisions of the Civil Code that 
deal with defects of juridical transactions (mistake, ignorance, wrongful conduct, coercion, 
state of peril, lesion and fraud against creditors).1004 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1002 Ibid. 8-9. 
1003 Örücü, 'Comparatists and Extraordinary Places' (n 55) 470 and Baxter and Ong (n 56) 89. 
1004 Articles 138 to 165 of the Brazilian Civil Code (Act 10406/2002). 
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7.4. Contributions of the research 
 
There are a number of studies which tackle directly or indirectly the problem of 
contractual unfairness and/or which evaluate different ways to deal with this problem.1005 
Some of these studies encompass a comparative component involving more than one 
jurisdiction and there is a considerable amount of work dedicated to the comparison 
between English law and the law of the Continental Member States. England is often 
referred as a paradigm for a common law jurisdiction which may experience problems 
integrating with other EU Member States that adopt a civilian tradition1006 and the 
harmonisation of the EU law has been a popular topic in the most recent literature.1007 
 
There are no works however which compare the English legal system with the Brazilian 
legal system in this context. A possible reason for the absence of comparisons involving 
the Brazilian law is that more traditional comparatists would prefer to exam ‘mature legal 
systems’ rather than ‘affiliated legal systems’ as seen previously.1008 Furthermore the 
insufficient knowledge of the law of an ‘extraordinary place’ such as Brazil and of its 
language (Portuguese) is another barrier which may have prevented or discouraged the 
inclusion of this jurisdiction in a comparative analysis with a European jurisdiction. The 
fact that the researcher is a Brazilian lawyer provided the means to overcome this 
problem and to carry out a reliable analysis of this legal system.1009 
 
Another probable reason for the non-existence of studies involving the above jurisdictions 
is that arguably comparisons tend to be circumscribed to countries which share more 
common features. Therefore comparative studies with English law may either include 
other common law jurisdictions (e.g., USA)1010 or the law of other EU Member States; 
                                                 
1005 For example: Beale, 'Legislative Control of Fairness: The Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts' 
(n 333); Bright, 'Winning the Battle against Unfair Contract Terms' (n 434); Macdonald, 'Mapping the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act 1977 and the Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts' (n 766). 
1006 Miller (n 373). 
1007 Horst Eidenmuller and others, 'The Common Frame of Reference for European Private Law - Policy 
Choices and Codification Problems' (2008) 28(4) OJLS 659; Simon Whittaker, 'A Framework of Principle for 
European Contract Law?' (2009) 125(Oct) LQR 616; Ewan Mckendrick, 'Harmonisation of European Contract 
Law: The State We Are In' in S Vogenauer and S Weatherill (eds), The Harmonisation of European Contract 
Law: Implications for European Private Laws, Business and Legal Practice (Hart 2006); Reiner Schulze (ed), 
Common Frame of Reference and Existing EC Contract Law (Sellier 2008). 
1008 Zweigert and Kötz (n 48) 41. See chapter 6. 
1009 This will avoid certain problems which can affect comparisons such as ‘the possible lack of a deep level of 
knowledge of languages, pitfalls related to translation, especially translation of culture-specific concepts, and 
cultural deficit’. See Örücü, 'Methodology of Comparative Law' (n 49) 450. 
1010 R Reed, ‘Foreign Precedents and Judicial Reasoning: the American Debate and British Practice’ (2008) 124 
LQR 253; Patrick S. Atiyah and Robert S. Summers, Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law: A 
Comparative Study in Legal Reasoning, Legal Theory, and Legal Institutions (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991). 
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whereas comparisons with the Brazilian law may include other civil law jurisdictions (e.g., 
Germany and Portugal)1011 or the law of other members of the Mercosul (e.g., 
Argentina).1012  
 
Yet the uniqueness of this work consisted precisely in placing side-by-side those two legal 
systems which at first sight did not have much in common since they were developed in 
countries with distinct backgrounds. The understanding of their contrasting 
characteristics, or even of their resemblances, enabled a reflective exercise on the 
reasons why each of the systems developed its legislative controls on unfairness into the 
present state.  
 
Despite belonging to two distinct legal families, both jurisdictions recognised that 
consumers are in no position to protect their own interests; hence the responsibility for 
protecting them has fallen upon their governments.1013 As a consequence the latter have 
enacted special legal provisions to this end. Although this study highlighted some 
noticeable differences between the legislation of England and Brazil in this context, in 
essence the law of both countries is consistent with the consumer welfarist ideology as 
seen in chapter 1.1014  
 
There are also fundamental similarities between the English and Brazilian law in the 
context of B2B contracts as both prescribe fewer restrictions to business parties and 
arguably are more in line with the dynamic market-individualism ideology. Nonetheless 
the degree of freedom of contract given to parties is to some extent different in England 
and Brazil. Whereas ‘the commercial culture of England (...) obviously is founded more 
                                                 
1011 Luiz G. S. Adolfo, ‘Estudo Comparado do Direito de Sequência na Legislação Autoral de Brasil, Alemanha, 
Espanha, França e Portugal’ (1998) São Leopoldo, set/dez, v. 31, n. 83 Estudos Jurídicos 15; Lúcio G. 
Gouveia, ‘O Dever de Cooperação dos Juízes e Tribunais com as Partes: uma Análise sob a Ótica do Direito 
Comparado (Alemanha, Portugal e Brasil)’ (2000) Recife, jan/jun, v. 5. n. 11, Revista da Esmape 247. 
1012 José Inácio G. Franceschini, ‘Legislação de Defesa da Concorrência Comparada: Brasil-Argentina, 
Contribuição ao Tratado Mercosul’ (1992) Brasília, out/dez, n. 7 Boletim de Integração Latino-Americana 26; 
Fernando Rezende, ‘Harmonização Tributária no Mercosul - Brasil x Argentina’ (1993) Brasília, abr/jun, v. 2. n. 
4 Tributação em Revista 9. 
1013 Brownsword and Adams, Understanding Contract Law (n 127) 177.  
1014 See UTCCR 1999 and the Brazilian Consumer Protection Code. As seen earlier the industrialisation of 
England and Brazil led to the development of the modern mass production and consumption in large scale. 
The latter in its turn implied in a widespread use of standard form contracts which facilitate the inclusion of 
unfair terms by the stronger party of the contract, in particular in B2C contracts. This required the 
development of a special regime for consumer protection to prevent the abuses of the vulnerability of 
consumers in both jurisdictions. 
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directly on the play of market forces’,1015 in Brazil business are limited by principles such 
as good faith and the social function of the contracts which define their behaviour.  
 
Such concept of good faith was used in this work as an apposite example that reflects 
fundamental differences between the English and Brazilian legal systems. For instance, as 
examined above, the Brazilian law can afford more protection to business parties through 
the application of this concept and in this jurisdiction good faith has the status of a 
general principle which should be observed at all contractual stages including 
negotiations. By comparison in English law the application of good faith is limited to B2C 
contracts and to the performance stage;1016 hence it is does not cover parties during 
negotiations in line with Walford and Miles.1017  
 
7.5. Recommendations 
 
The present work identified in chapter 5 issues that negatively affect the efficiency of the 
law of England and Brazil regarding the control on unfair terms and unreasonable 
exemption clauses. One of the main problems is the internal inconsistencies and conflicts 
within their legal systems. In Brazil there are already mechanisms in place that deal with 
those conflicts of law (the criteria of anteriority, speciality and hierarchy); whereas in 
England the Law Commission proposed in 2005 a unified regime to replace UCTA 1977 
and UTCCR 1999 which are the main pieces of legislation that tackle contractual 
unfairness.1018 
 
Although the Law Commission’s recommendations were already accepted by the 
Government, their implementation were on hold awaiting for the outcome of the Proposal 
for a Directive on Consumer Rights1019 which purported to repeal four existing consumer 
directives (including the Directive 93/13/EEC) and to introduce more consistent 
provisions. Nonetheless when the Directive on Consumer Rights was approved by the EU’s 
Council of Ministers in October 2011 the only change made to the Directive on Unfair 
                                                 
1015 Geraint Howells and Thomas Wilhelmsson, 'EC Consumer Law: Has it Come of Age?' (2003) 28(3) EL Rev 
370, 385. 
1016 See reg. 5(1) of UTCCR 1999. 
1017 [1992] 2 AC 128. 
1018 Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Contracts (Law Com No 292, 2005). 
1019 Commission, 'Proposal for a Directive on Consumer Rights' COM (2008) 614 final. See also 
<http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/areas/unfair-terms-in-contracts.htm> accessed 02 February 2012. 
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Terms in Consumer Contracts was a small amendment to its article 8.1020 However due to 
the time elapse since 2005 and the developments in the case law during this time, the 
Law Commission proposed in July 2012 a review and update of its recommendations 
which is open for consultation until 25 October 2012. 
 
The Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) in its turn proposed a Consumer 
Bill of Rights in September 2011 which aims to implement the Directive on Consumer 
Rights and reform the current consumer legislation in the UK.1021 As mentioned earlier it is 
not clear how the Law Commission recommendations will interact with the proposed 
Consumer Bill of Rights because the scope of the former is wider than of the latter as it 
includes provisions which cover B2B and small business contracts. On the other hand the 
above Bill deals with aspects of the consumer relations other than unfairness in contracts, 
such as the rights of the consumers concerning ‘faulty goods and poor services’ and it 
also aims to ‘update the law to clarify rights in relation to digital content’.1022 Nevertheless 
BIS and the Law Commission should coordinate the development of both initiatives in a 
way that their provisions regarding consumer contracts are consistent and in harmony.1023 
 
Although the new Law Commission’s recommendations aim to update its original 
proposals they still persist in rejecting the application of ‘good faith’ in favour of a ‘fair and 
reasonable’ test.1024 This study however disagrees with the position adopted by the Law 
Commission towards the concept of ‘good faith’. Instead of taking into account all 
advantages and improvements that this concept could offer to the English legal system, it 
seemed that the Law Commission preferred to avoid controversies. It suggested that the 
‘requirement of reasonableness’ of UCTA 1977 and the ‘fairness test’ of UTCCR 1999 
should be combined and replaced by the above ‘fair and reasonable test’ with no express 
reference to ‘good faith’, on the grounds that this concept is unfamiliar and confusing to 
                                                 
1020 This amendment requires that Member States shall inform the European Commission if they adopt most 
stringent provisions that ensure a higher degree of consumer protection. See article 32 of the Directive on 
Consumer Rights (2011/83/EU). The new rules have to be transposed only by 13 December 2013. 
1021 See <http://www.bis.gov.uk/policies/consumer-issues/consumer-rights> accessed 01 October 2011. 
1022 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), Enhancing Consumer Confidence by Clarifying 
Consumer Law: Consultation on the Supply of Goods, Services and Digital Content (July 2012) 6. 
1023 The fact that the Law Commission consultation will be followed by an Advice to the Department for 
Business Innovation and Skills (BIS) in spring 2013 may assist the consistency between both initiatives. See 
<http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/areas/unfair_terms_in_contracts.htm> accessed 26 July 2012. 
1024 The consultation launched in July 2012 only questioned if consultees agree that courts should take into 
account ‘the extent to which it was transparent; the substance and effect of the term; and all the 
circumstances existing at the time it was agreed’ when deciding if a term is ‘fair and reasonable’. See Law 
Commission, Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts: A New Approach? (Law Com No 292, 2012) paras 9.47 and 
9.50. 
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English lawyers and that each Member State can choose the ‘form and method’ of 
implementation of EU Directives.1025  
 
However the researcher shares the same concerns as those respondents who did not 
agree with the Law Commission’s opinion.1026 According to our view the intended result of 
the Directive 93/13/EEC will not be achieved with the exclusion of good faith from the 
‘fairness test’, as this concept is regarded a fundamental principle in civilian systems 
which influenced the making of the Directive in question.1027 For this reason it cannot be 
simply ignored by the English law and substituted by a ‘fair and reasonable test’ as they 
are not equivalents according to the EU law. For instance the ‘Principles of European 
Contract Law’ (PECL) make reference to the duties of ‘good faith and fair dealing’ and it 
refers to the requirement of ‘reasonableness’ in a separate provision.1028 
 
Another reason against the exclusion of good faith is that overall this concept may bring 
more advantages than disadvantages to the English legal system as discussed in chapter 
6. Additionally the acceptance and implementation of concepts and rules typical of civil 
law is an inevitable part of the process of harmonisation between the English law and the 
law of the other Member States. Furthermore as this work previously proposed the 
application of good faith as an overriding principle may allow English courts to make fairer 
decisions where the existing piecemeal solutions are not satisfactory. 
 
In this respect, this study recommended that the English courts and interpreters should 
look at a civilian jurisdiction for a better comprehension of the scope and extent of this 
concept. It therefore employed the Brazilian law as a model or comparator of a legal 
system which has efficiently applied good faith as a general principle in the context of B2C 
and B2B contracts.  
 
The present work also recognises that the Law Commission’s recommendations have their 
merits and that ‘this draft legislation will inevitably be a great improvement on the current 
                                                 
1025 Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Contracts (Law Com No 292, 2005) para 3.86. See also Article 288 (ex 
Article 249 TEC) of the Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union: ‘A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each 
Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and 
methods.’ 
1026 Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Contracts (Law Com No 292, 2005) para 3.88. 
1027 The Law Society observed that ‘any reform has to be undertaken carefully, in order to make sure the 
original provisions of the Directive are given effect and EU law is not breached’. See Response by the Law 
Society to Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts: A New Approach? Issues Paper (Law Com 
No 292, 2012) para 15. 
1028 See articles 1:201 and 1:302 of PECL.  
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law’.1029 Perhaps one of the most significant additions would be the introduction of a 
special regime for small businesses because, as analysed in chapter 4, SMEs would 
benefit greatly from an extra protection. As previously noted, by comparison with the 
English legal system there is no indication that the Brazilian legal system is concerned to 
enact special protections to small businesses against abusive clauses in their dealings. 
Arguably this jurisdiction may consider sufficient the protection provided by its general 
provisions even though courts’ decisions have consistently pointed in the opposite 
direction as they have protected SMEs through the analogous application of the provisions 
of the Consumer Protection Code. 
 
For this reason the Brazilian legal system should emulate the recommendations of the 
Law Commission and propose a special contractual regime for small businesses which 
meet their specific needs. The interventionist approach adopted by Brazilian courts to 
protect vulnerable businesses should be deemed as an interim measure applied only in 
the absence of adequate legislation. As a jurisdiction which adopts the civil law tradition, 
it is particularly important to the Brazilian law to cover situations which have been subject 
to litigation as its legal system should be comprehensive and free of gaps. 
 
7.5.1. Suggestions for further research 
 
A comparison similar to the present one could also be made between the Brazilian law 
and the American law.1030 The United States of America inherited the common law 
tradition from England, but they developed a system with its own characteristics. There is 
a general acceptance of good faith in this jurisdiction1031 which is expressly prescribed in 
the Uniform Commercial Code and in the American Institute’s Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts.1032 This doctrine has been applied ‘in a wide variety of situations’ in the 
USA;1033 thus case law of this country may be a rich source for research and may provide 
distinct insights concerning the application of good faith in a different common law 
system.  
                                                 
1029 Poole, Textbook on Contract Law (n 78) 277. 
1030 Although there are works which involve the Brazilian law and the American law, they do not have the 
same purpose of the present study. E.g., Quagliato (n 82); Anelize S. Aguiar, ‘The Law Applicable to 
International Trade Transactions with Brazilian Parties: A Comparative Study of the Brazilian Law, the CISG, 
and the American Law about Contract Formation’ (2011) 17(3) Law and Business Review of the Americas 487. 
1031 E. Allan Farnsworth, 'Good Faith in Contract Performance' in J Beatson and D Friedmann (eds), Good faith 
and Fault in Contract Law (Oxford University Press 1997) 155. 
1032 See § 1-201 (19) and § 1-203 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and §205 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts. 
1033 See Farnsworth (n 1031) 159. 
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Additional resources for further research may be also found in the ongoing legislative 
proposals relevant to this study, such as the Consumer Bill of Rights and the new Law 
Commission recommendations.1034 If implemented they may introduce significant changes 
in this area and give rise to different issues in the forthcoming years.  
 
Similarly if the proposed special regime for small businesses comes into force, it will be a 
prominent area of study especially in view of the peculiarities of SMEs and their 
importance to the economy. For those who are concerned with an excessive 
fragmentation of contract law that may result from the implementation of yet another 
special regime, there is a more recent position in the legal literature which proposes a 
general protection of the weaker party in ‘asymmetric contracts’1035 and seems to be a 
fertile area to be explored. 
 
There is still also plenty of room for comparative studies between the common law of 
England and the civil law systems of the Continental Member States as part of the 
harmonisation process of the EU law. There are also questions related to the scope of 
harmonisation such as whether it should be limited to cross-border transactions or also 
extended to internal contracts and whether it should cover only B2B or B2C contracts or 
both.1036  
 
Recently the European Commission proposed an optional Regulation on a Common 
European Sales Law1037 which prescribes a ‘single set of rules’ for cross-border contracts 
involving EU Member States.1038 The purpose of this Regulation is to increase the level of 
consumer protection and to facilitate the transactions across the European Union. 
Although the availability of one common regime of contract law for all Members States 
has its merits, it effectiveness may be limited by the fact that it is applicable on a 
‘voluntary basis, upon an express agreement of the parties’.1039 Therefore only after its 
implementation it will be possible to examine its relevance and impact on the contractual 
relations in the context of the EU. Further comparative analysis may be required to allow 
adjustments to its rules in order to meet the different realities of the Member States. 
                                                 
1034 Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts: A New Approach? (Law Com No 292, 2012). 
1035 Roppo (n 597). 
1036 See Picat and Soccio (n 365) 408. 
1037 See Commission, 'Proposal for a Regulation on a Common European Sales Law' COM (2011) 635 final. 
1038 Ibid. 4. 
1039 Ibid. 8. 
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Finally the above harmonisation of the EU law leads to another question which is the 
viability of the creation of a European Civil Code. This would be a long term project which 
would need to be carefully developed in order to reasonably satisfy the needs of the 
Members States and to respect their cultural differences. Although there are some 
arguments in favour of the creation of this Code such as that it would strengthen the 
trade of the EU internally and in the international market,1040 it mainly faces a great deal 
of opposition. Members States will not replace their domestic law in favour of an EU Code 
unless they can identify clear advantages in doing that. Comparative studies can provide 
more compelling arguments which can support both sides (for and against) and may 
enable Member States to decide whether it is a project which is worthy to be pursued or 
whether it should be scrapped altogether.  
                                                 
1040 In addition Picat and Soccio contended that although objections to this Code are based on the argument 
that ‘legal pluralism constitutes the strength of Europe’, ‘cultural pluralism does not make Europe an economic 
force capable of rivalling other economic powers such as the United States, the emerging countries, Russia, 
Brazil, China, India, etc.’ See Picat and Soccio (n 365) 399-407. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977  
 
UNFAIR CONTRACT TERMS ACT 1977 
 
1977 CHAPTER 50 
 
An Act to impose further limits on the extent to which under the law of England and 
Wales and Northern Ireland civil liability for breach of contract, or for negligence or other 
breach of duty, can be avoided by means of contract terms and otherwise, and under the 
law of Scotland civil liability can be avoided by means of contract terms 
 
[26th October 1977] 
 
BE IT ENACTED by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and 
consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament 
assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:– 
 
PART I 
 
AMENDMENT OF LAW FOR ENGLAND AND WALES AND NORTHERN IRELAND 
 
Introductory 
 
1. Scope of Part I 
 
(1) For the purposes of this Part of this Act, “negligence” means the breach— 
(a) of any obligation, arising from the express or implied terms of a contract, to 
take reasonable care or exercise reasonable skill in the performance of the 
contract; 
(b) of any common law duty to take reasonable care or exercise reasonable skill 
(but not any stricter duty); 
(c) of the common duty of care imposed by the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957 or the 
Occupiers’ Liability Act (Northern Ireland) 1957. 
 
(2) This Part of this Act is subject to Part III; and in relation to contracts, the operation of 
sections 2 to 4 and 7 is subject to the exceptions made by Schedule 1. 
 
(3) In the case of both contract and tort, sections 2 to 7 apply (except where the contrary 
is stated in section 6(4)) only to business liability, that is liability for breach of obligations 
or duties arising— 
(a) from things done or to be done by a person in the course of a business 
(whether his 
own business or another’s); or 
(b) from the occupation of premises used for business purposes of the occupier; 
and references to liability are to be read accordingly [but liability of an occupier of 
premises for breach of an obligation or duty towards a person obtaining access to the 
premises for recreational or educational purposes, being liability for loss or damage 
suffered by reason of the dangerous state of the premises, is not a business liability of the 
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occupier unless granting that person such access for the purposes concerned falls within 
the business purposes of the occupier]. 
 
(4) In relation to any breach of duty or obligation, it is immaterial for any purpose of this 
Part of this Act whether the breach was inadvertent or intentional, or whether liability for 
it arises directly or vicariously. 
 
2. Negligence liability 
 
(1) A person cannot by reference to any contract term or to a notice given to persons 
generally or to particular persons exclude or restrict his liability for death or personal 
injury resulting from negligence. 
 
(2) In the case of other loss or damage, a person cannot so exclude or restrict his liability 
for negligence except in so far as the term or notice satisfies the requirement of 
reasonableness. 
 
(3) Where a contract term or notice purports to exclude or restrict liability for negligence 
a person’s agreement to or awareness of it is not of itself to be taken as indicating his 
voluntary acceptance of any risk. 
 
3. Liability arising in contract 
 
(1) This section applies as between contracting parties where one of them deals as 
consumer or on the other’s written standard terms of business. 
 
(2) As against that party, the other cannot by reference to any contract term— 
(a) when himself in breach of contract, exclude or restrict any liability of his in 
respect of the breach; or 
(b) claim to be entitled— 
(i) to render a contractual performance substantially different from that 
which was reasonably expected of him, or 
(ii) in respect of the whole or any part of his contractual obligation, to 
render no performance at all,  
except in so far as (in any of the cases mentioned above in this subsection) the contract 
term satisfies the requirement of reasonableness. 
 
4. Unreasonable indemnity clauses 
 
(1) A person dealing as consumer cannot by reference to any contract term be made to 
indemnify another person (whether a party to the contract or not) in respect of liability 
that may be incurred by the other for negligence or breach of contract, except in so far as 
the contract term satisfies the requirement of reasonableness. 
 
(2) This section applies whether the liability in question— 
(a) is directly that of the person to be indemnified or is incurred by him 
vicariously; 
(b) is to the person dealing as consumer or to someone else. 
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Liability arising from sale or supply of goods 
 
5. "Guarantee" of consumer goods 
 
(1) In the case of goods of a type ordinarily supplied for private use or consumption, 
where loss or damage— 
(a) arises from the goods proving defective while in consumer use; and  
(b) results from the negligence of a person concerned in the manufacture or 
distribution of the goods,  
liability for the loss or damage cannot be excluded or restricted by reference to any 
contract term or notice contained in or operating by reference to a guarantee of the 
goods. 
 
(2) For these purposes— 
(a) goods are to be regarded as “in consumer use” when a person is using them, 
or has them in his possession for use, otherwise than exclusively for the purposes 
of a business; and 
(b) anything in writing is a guarantee if it contains or purports to contain some 
promise or assurance (however worded or presented) that defects will be made 
good by complete or partial replacement, or by repair, monetary compensation or 
otherwise. 
 
(3) This section does not apply as between the parties to a contract under or in 
pursuance of which possession or ownership of the goods passed. 
 
6. Sale and hire-purchase 
 
(1) Liability for breach of the obligations arising from— 
(a) [section 12 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979] (seller’s implied undertakings as to 
title, etc); 
(b) section 8 of the Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973 (the corresponding 
thing in relation to hire-purchase),  
cannot be excluded or restricted by reference to any contract term. 
 
(2) As against a person dealing as consumer, liability for breach of the obligations arising 
from— 
(a) [section 13, 14 or 15 of the 1979 Act] (seller’s implied undertakings as to 
conformity of goods with description or sample, or as to their quality or fitness for 
a particular purpose); 
(b) section 9, 10 or 11 of the 1973 Act (the corresponding things in relation to hire 
purchase),  
cannot be excluded or restricted by reference to any contract term. 
 
(3) As against a person dealing otherwise than as consumer, the liability specified in 
subsection (2) above can be excluded or restricted by reference to a contract term, but 
only in so far as the term satisfies the requirement of reasonableness. 
 
(4) The liabilities referred to in this section are not only the business liabilities defined by 
section 1(3), but include those arising under any contract of sale of goods or hire-
purchase agreement. 
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7. Miscellaneous contracts under which goods pass 
 
(1) Where the possession or ownership of goods passes under or in pursuance of a 
contract not governed by the law of sale of goods or hire-purchase, subsections (2) to (4) 
below apply as regards the effect (if any) to be given to contract terms excluding or 
restricting liability for breach of obligation arising by implication of law from the nature of 
the contract. 
 
(2) As against a person dealing as consumer, liability in respect of the goods’ 
correspondence with description or sample, or their quality or fitness for any particular 
purpose, cannot be excluded or restricted by reference to any such term. 
 
(3) As against a person dealing otherwise than as consumer, that liability can be excluded 
or restricted by reference to such a term, but only in so far as the term satisfies the 
requirement of reasonableness. 
 
[(3A) Liability for breach of the obligations arising under section 2 of the Supply of Goods 
and Services Act 1982 (implied terms about title etc in certain contracts for the transfer of 
the property in goods) cannot be excluded or restricted by references to any such term.] 
 
(4) Liability in respect of— 
(a) the right to transfer ownership of the goods, or give possession; or 
(b) the assurance of quiet possession to a person taking goods in pursuance of the 
contract,  
cannot [(in a case to which subsection (3A) above does not apply)] be excluded or 
restricted by reference to any such term except in so far as the term satisfies the 
requirement of reasonableness. 
 
(5) [...] 
 
Other provisions about contracts 
 
8. [...] 
 
9. Effect of breach 
 
(1) Where for reliance upon it a contract term has to satisfy the requirement of 
reasonableness, it may be found to do so and be given effect accordingly notwithstanding 
that the contract has been terminated either by breach or by a party electing to treat it as 
repudiated. 
 
(2) Where on a breach the contract is nevertheless affirmed by a party entitled to treat it 
as repudiated, this does not of itself exclude the requirement of reasonableness in relation 
to any contract term. 
 
10. Evasion by means of secondary contract 
 
A person is not bound by any contract term prejudicing or taking away rights of his which 
arise under, or in connection with the performance of, another contract, so far as those 
rights extend to the enforcement of another’s liability which this Part of this Act prevents 
that other from excluding or restricting. 
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Explanatory provisions 
 
11. The "reasonableness" test 
 
(1) In relation to a contract term, the requirement of reasonableness for the purposes of 
this Part of this Act, section 3 of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 and section 3 of the 
Misrepresentation Act (Northern Ireland) 1967 is that the term shall have been a fair and 
reasonable one to be included having regard to the circumstances which were, or ought 
reasonably to have been, known to or in the contemplation of the parties when the 
contract was made. 
 
(2) In determining for the purposes of section 6 or 7 above whether a contract term 
satisfies the requirement of reasonableness, regard shall be had in particular to the 
matters specified in Schedule 2 to this Act; but this subsection does not prevent the court 
or arbitrator from holding, in accordance with any rule of law, that a term which purports 
to exclude or restrict any relevant liability is not a term of the contract. 
 
(3) In relation to a notice (not being a notice having contractual effect), the requirement 
of reasonableness under this Act is that it should be fair and reasonable to allow reliance 
on it, having regard to all the circumstances obtaining when the liability arose or (but for 
the notice) would have arisen. 
 
(4) Where by reference to a contract term or notice a person seeks to restrict liability to a 
specified sum of money, and the question arises (under this or any other Act) whether 
the term or notice satisfies the requirement of reasonableness, regard shall be had in 
particular (but without prejudice to subsection (2) above in the case of contract terms) 
to— 
(a) the resources which he could expect to be available to him for the purpose of 
meeting the liability should it arise; and 
(b) how far it was open to him to cover himself by insurance. 
 
(5) It is for those claiming that a contract term or notice satisfies the requirement of 
reasonableness to show that it does. 
 
12. "Dealing as consumer" 
 
(1) A party to a contract “deals as consumer” in relation to another party if— 
(a) he neither makes the contract in the course of a business nor holds himself out 
as doing so; and 
(b) the other party does make the contract in the course of a business; and 
(c) in the case of a contract governed by the law of sale of goods or hire-
purchase, or by section 7 of this Act, the goods passing under or in pursuance of 
the contract are of a type ordinarily supplied for private use or consumption. 
 
[(1A) But if the first party mentioned in subsection (1) is an individual paragraph (c) of 
that subsection must be ignored.] 
 
[(2) But the buyer is not in any circumstances to be regarded as dealing as consumer— 
(a) if he is an individual and the goods are second hand goods sold at public 
auction at which individuals have the opportunity of attending the sale in person; 
(b) if he is not an individual and the goods are sold by auction or by competitive 
tender.] 
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(3) Subject to this, it is for those claiming that a party does not deal as consumer to show 
that he does not. 
 
13. Varieties of exemption clause 
 
(1) To the extent that this Part of this Act prevents the exclusion or restriction of any 
liability it also prevents— 
(a) making the liability or its enforcement subject to restrictive or onerous 
conditions; 
(b) excluding or restricting any right or remedy in respect of the liability, or 
subjecting a person to any prejudice in consequence of his pursuing any such right 
or remedy; 
(c) excluding or restricting rules of evidence or procedure;  
and (to that extent) sections 2 and 5 to 7 also prevent excluding or restricting liability by 
reference to terms and notices which exclude or restrict the relevant obligation or duty. 
 
(2) But an agreement in writing to submit present or future differences to arbitration is 
not to be treated under this Part of this Act as excluding or restricting any liability. 
 
14. Interpretation of Part I 
 
In this Part of this Act— 
“business” includes a profession and the activities of any government department 
or local or public authority; 
“goods” has the same meaning as in [the Sale of Goods Act 1979]: 
“hire-purchase agreement” has the same meaning as in the Consumer Credit Act 
1974; 
“negligence” has the meaning given by section 1(1); 
“notice” includes an announcement, whether or not in writing, and any other 
communication or pretended communication; and 
“personal injury” includes any disease and any impairment of physical or mental 
condition. 
 
PART II 
AMENDMENT OF LAW FOR SCOTLAND 
 
[...] 
 
PART III 
PROVISIONS APPLYING TO WHOLE OF UNITED KINGDOM 
 
Miscellaneous 
 
26. International supply contracts 
 
(1) The limits imposed by this Act on the extent to which a person may exclude or restrict 
liability by reference to a contract term do not apply to liability arising under such a 
contract as is described in subsection (3) below. 
 
(2) The terms of such a contract are not subject to any requirement of reasonableness 
under section 3 or 4: and nothing in Part II of this Act shall require the incorporation of 
the terms of such a contract to be fair and reasonable for them to have effect. 
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(3) Subject to subsection (4), that description of contract is one whose characteristics are 
the following— 
(a) either it is a contract of sale of goods or it is one under or in pursuance of 
which the possession or ownership of goods passes; and 
(b) it is made by parties whose places of business (or, if they have none, habitual 
residences) are in the territories of different States (the Channel Islands and the 
Isle of Man being treated for this purpose as different States from the United 
Kingdom). 
 
(4) A contract falls within subsection (3) above only if either— 
(a) the goods in question are, at the time of the conclusion of the contract, in the 
course of carriage, or will be carried, from the territory of one State to the territory 
of another; or 
(b) the acts constituting the offer and acceptance have been done in the territories 
of different States; or 
(c) the contract provides for the goods to be delivered to the territory of a State 
other than that within whose territory those acts were done. 
 
27. Choice of law clauses 
 
(1) Where the [law applicable to] a contract is the law of any part of the United Kingdom 
only by choice of the parties (and apart from that choice would be the law of some 
country outside the United Kingdom) sections 2 to 7 and 16 to 21 of this Act do not 
operate as part [of the law applicable to the contract]. 
 
(2) This Act has effect notwithstanding any contract term which applies or purports to 
apply the law of some country outside the United Kingdom, where (either or both)— 
(a) the term appears to the court, or arbitrator or arbiter to have been imposed 
wholly or mainly for the purpose of enabling the party imposing it to evade the 
operation of this Act; or 
(b) in the making of the contract one of the parties dealt as consumer, and he was 
then habitually resident in the United Kingdom, and the essential steps necessary 
for the making of the contract were taken there, whether by him or by others on 
his behalf. 
 
(3) In the application of subsection (2) above to Scotland, for paragraph (b) there shall be 
substituted— 
“(b) the contract is a consumer contract as defined in Part II of this Act, and the 
consumer at the date when the contract was made was habitually resident in the 
United Kingdom, and the essential steps necessary for the making of the contract 
were taken there, whether by him or by others on his behalf.”. 
 
28. Temporary provision for sea carriage of passengers 
 
(1) This section applies to a contract for carriage by sea of a passenger or of a passenger 
and his luggage where the provisions of the Athens Convention (with or without 
modification) do not have, in relation to the contract, the force of law in the United 
Kingdom. 
 
(2) In a case where— 
(a) the contract is not made in the United Kingdom, and 
(b) neither the place of departure nor the place of destination under it is in the 
United Kingdom,  
 - 226 -  
 
a person is not precluded by this Act from excluding or restricting liability for loss or 
damage, being loss or damage for which the provisions of the Convention would, if they 
had the force of law in relation to the contract, impose liability on him. 
 
(3) In any other case, a person is not precluded by this Act from excluding or restricting 
liability for that loss or damage— 
(a) in so far as the exclusion or restriction would have been effective in that case 
had the provisions of the Convention had the force of law in relation to the 
contract; or 
(b) in such circumstances and to such extent as may be prescribed, by reference 
to a prescribed term of the contract. 
 
(4) For the purposes of subsection (3)(a), the values which shall be taken to be the 
official values in the United Kingdom of the amounts (expressed in gold francs) by 
reference to which liability under the provisions of the Convention is limited shall be such 
amounts in sterling as the Secretary of State may from time to time by order made by 
statutory instrument specify. 
 
(5) In this section,— 
(a) the references to excluding or restricting liability include doing any of those 
things in relation to the liability which are mentioned in section 13 or section 25 
(3) and (5); and 
(b) “the Athens Convention” means the Athens Convention relating to the Carriage 
of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea, 1974; and 
(c) “prescribed” means prescribed by the Secretary of State by regulations made 
by statutory instrument;  
and a statutory instrument containing the regulations shall be subject to annulment in 
pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament. 
 
29. Saving for other relevant legislation 
 
(1) Nothing in this Act removes or restricts the effect of, or prevents reliance upon, any 
contractual provision which— 
(a) is authorised or required by the express terms or necessary implication of an 
enactment; or 
(b) being made with a view to compliance with an international agreement to 
which the United Kingdom is a party, does not operate more restrictively than is 
contemplated by the agreement. 
 
(2) A contract term is to be taken— 
(a) for the purposes of Part I of this Act, as satisfying the requirement of 
reasonableness; and  
(b) for those of Part II, to have been fair and reasonable to incorporate,  
if it is incorporated or approved by, or incorporated pursuant to a decision or ruling of, a 
competent authority acting in the exercise of any statutory jurisdiction or function and is 
not a term in a contract to which the competent authority is itself a party. 
 
(3) In this section— 
“competent authority” means any court, arbitrator or arbiter, government 
department or public authority; 
“enactment” means any legislation (including subordinate legislation) of the United 
Kingdom or Northern Ireland and any instrument having effect by virtue of such 
legislation; and 
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“statutory” means conferred by an enactment. 
 
30. [...] 
 
General 
 
31. Commencement; amendments; repeals 
 
(1) This Act comes into force on 1st February 1978. 
 
(2) Nothing in this Act applies to contracts made before the date on which it comes into 
force; but subject to this, it applies to liability for any loss or damage which is suffered on 
or after that date. 
 
(3) The enactments specified in Schedule 3 to this Act are amended as there shown. 
 
(4) The enactments specified in Schedule 4 to this Act are repealed to the extent specified 
in column 3 of that Schedule. 
 
32. Citation and extent 
 
(1) This Act may be cited as the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. 
 
(2) Part I of this Act extends to England and Wales and to Northern Ireland; but it does 
not extend to Scotland. 
 
(3) Part II of this Act extends to Scotland only. 
 
(4) This Part of this Act extends to the whole of the United Kingdom. 
 
 
SCHEDULE 1 
SCOPE OF SECTIONS 2 TO 4 AND 7 
 
Section 1(2) 
 
1. 
Sections 2 to 4 of this Act do not extend to— 
(a) any contract of insurance (including a contract to pay an annuity on human 
life); 
(b) any contract so far as it relates to the creation or transfer of an interest in 
land, or to the termination of such an interest, whether by extinction, merger, 
surrender, forfeiture or otherwise; 
(c) any contract so far as it relates to the creation or transfer of a right or interest 
in any patent, trade mark, copyright [or design right], registered design, technical 
or commercial information or other intellectual property, or relates to the 
termination of any such right or interest; 
(d) any contract so far as it relates— 
(i) to the formation or dissolution of a company (which means any body 
corporate or unincorporated association and includes a partnership), or 
(ii) to its constitution or the rights or obligations of its corporators or 
members; 
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(e) any contract so far as it relates to the creation or transfer of securities or of 
any right or interest in securities. 
 
2. 
Section 2(1) extends to— 
(a) any contract of marine salvage or towage; 
(b) any charterparty of a ship or hovercraft; and 
(c) any contract for the carriage of goods by ship or hovercraft;  
but subject to this sections 2 to 4 and 7 do not extend to any such contract except in 
favour of a person dealing as consumer. 
 
3. 
Where goods are carried by ship or hovercraft in pursuance of a contract which either— 
(a) specifies that as the means of carriage over part of the journey to be covered, 
or 
(b) makes no provision as to the means of carriage and does not exclude that 
means,  
then sections 2(2), 3 and 4 do not, except in favour of a person dealing as consumer, 
extend to the contract as it operates for and in relation to the carriage of the goods by 
that means. 
 
4. 
Section 2(1) and (2) do not extend to a contract of employment, except in favour of the 
employee. 
 
5. 
Section 2(1) does not affect the validity of any discharge and indemnity given by a 
person, on or in connection with an award to him of compensation for pneumoconiosis 
attributable to employment in the coal industry, in respect of any further claim arising 
from his contracting that disease. 
 
 
SCHEDULE 2 
"GUIDELINES" FOR APPLICATION OF REASONABLENESS TEST 
 
Sections 11(2), 24(2) 
 
The matters to which regard is to be had in particular for the purposes of sections 6(3), 
7(3) and (4), 20 and 21 are any of the following which appear to be relevant— 
(a) the strength of the bargaining positions of the parties relative to each other, 
taking into account (among other things) alternative means by which the 
customer’s requirements could have been met; 
(b) whether the customer received an inducement to agree to the term, or in 
accepting it had an opportunity of entering into a similar contract with other 
persons, but without having to accept a similar term; 
(c) whether the customer knew or ought reasonably to have known of the 
existence and extent of the term (having regard, among other things, to any 
custom of the trade and any previous course of dealing between the parties); 
(d) where the term excludes or restricts any relevant liability if some condition is 
not complied with, whether it was reasonable at the time of the contract to expect 
that compliance with that condition would be practicable; 
(e) whether the goods were manufactured, processed or adapted to the special 
order of the customer. 
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SCHEDULE 3 
[...] 
 
SCHEDULE 4 
[...] 
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Appendix 2: Directive 93/13/EEC on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
 
COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993  
on unfair terms in consumer contracts 
 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 
 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, and in 
particular Article 100 A thereof, 
 
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission (1), 
 
In cooperation with the European Parliament (2), 
 
Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee (3), 
 
Whereas it is necessary to adopt measures with the aim of progressively establishing 
the internal market before 31 December 1992; whereas the internal market comprises 
an area without internal frontiers in which goods, persons, services and capital move 
freely; 
 
Whereas the laws of Member States relating to the terms of contract between the 
seller of goods or supplier of services, on the one hand, and the consumer of them, on 
the other hand, show many disparities, with the result that the national markets for the 
sale of goods and services to consumers differ from each other and that distortions of 
competition may arise amongst the sellers and suppliers, notably when they sell and 
supply in other Member States; 
 
Whereas, in particular, the laws of Member States relating to unfair terms in consumer 
contracts show marked divergences; 
 
Whereas it is the responsibility of the Member States to ensure that contracts 
concluded with consumers do not contain unfair terms; 
 
Whereas, generally speaking, consumers do not know the rules of law which, in 
Member States other than their own, govern contracts for the sale of goods or 
services; whereas this lack of awareness may deter them from direct transactions for 
the purchase of goods or services in another Member State; 
 
Whereas, in order to facilitate the establishment of the internal market and to 
safeguard the citizen in his role as consumer when acquiring goods and services under 
contracts which are governed by the laws of Member States other than his own, it is 
essential to remove unfair terms from those contracts; 
 
Whereas sellers of goods and suppliers of services will thereby be helped in their task 
of selling goods and supplying services, both at home and throughout the internal 
market; whereas competition will thus be stimulated, so contributing to increased 
choice for Community citizens as consumers; 
 
Whereas the two Community programmes for a consumer protection and information 
policy (4) underlined the importance of safeguarding consumers in the matter of unfair 
terms of contract; whereas this protection ought to be provided by laws and 
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regulations which are either harmonized at Community level or adopted directly at that 
level; 
 
Whereas in accordance with the principle laid down under the heading 'Protection of 
the economic interests of the consumers', as stated in those programmes: 'acquirers of 
goods and services should be protected against the abuse of power by the seller or 
supplier, in particular against one-sided standard contracts and the unfair exclusion of 
essential rights in contracts'; 
 
Whereas more effective protection of the consumer can be achieved by adopting 
uniform rules of law in the matter of unfair terms; whereas those rules should apply to 
all contracts concluded between sellers or suppliers and consumers; whereas as a 
result inter alia contracts relating to employment, contracts relating to succession 
rights, contracts relating to rights under family law and contracts relating to the 
incorporation and organization of companies or partnership agreements must be 
excluded from this Directive; 
 
Whereas the consumer must receive equal protection under contracts concluded by 
word of mouth and written contracts regardless, in the latter case, of whether the 
terms of the contract are contained in one or more documents; 
 
Whereas, however, as they now stand, national laws allow only partial harmonization 
to be envisaged; whereas, in particular, only contractual terms which have not been 
individually negotiated are covered by this Directive; whereas Member States should 
have the option, with due regard for the Treaty, to afford consumers a higher level of 
protection through national provisions that are more stringent than those of this 
Directive; 
 
Whereas the statutory or regulatory provisions of the Member States which directly or 
indirectly determine the terms of consumer contracts are presumed not to contain 
unfair terms; whereas, therefore, it does not appear to be necessary to subject the 
terms which reflect mandatory statutory or regulatory provisions and the principles or 
provisions of international conventions to which the Member States or the Community 
are party; whereas in that respect the wording 'mandatory statutory or regulatory 
provisions' in Article 1 (2) also covers rules which, according to the law, shall apply 
between the contracting parties provided that no other arrangements have been 
established; 
 
Whereas Member States must however ensure that unfair terms are not included, 
particularly because this Directive also applies to trades, business or professions of a 
public nature; 
 
Whereas it is necessary to fix in a general way the criteria for assessing the unfair 
character of contract terms; 
 
Whereas the assessment, according to the general criteria chosen, of the unfair 
character of terms, in particular in sale or supply activities of a public nature providing 
collective services which take account of solidarity among users, must be 
supplemented by a means of making an overall evaluation of the different interests 
involved; whereas this constitutes the requirement of good faith; whereas, in making 
an assessment of good faith, particular regard shall be had to the strength of the 
bargaining positions of the parties, whether the consumer had an inducement to agree 
to the term and whether the goods or services were sold or supplied to the special 
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order of the consumer; whereas the requirement of good faith may be satisfied by the 
seller or supplier where he deals fairly and equitably with the other party whose 
legitimate interests he has to take into account; 
 
Whereas, for the purposes of this Directive, the annexed list of terms can be of 
indicative value only and, because of the cause of the minimal character of the 
Directive, the scope of these terms may be the subject of amplification or more 
restrictive editing by the Member States in their national laws; 
 
Whereas the nature of goods or services should have an influence on assessing the 
unfairness of contractual terms; 
 
Whereas, for the purposes of this Directive, assessment of unfair character shall not be 
made of terms which describe the main subject matter of the contract nor the 
quality/price ratio of the goods or services supplied; whereas the main subject matter 
of the contract and the price/quality ratio may nevertheless be taken into account in 
assessing the fairness of other terms; whereas it follows, inter alia, that in insurance 
contracts, the terms which clearly define or circumscribe the insured risk and the 
insurer's liability shall not be subject to such assessment since these restrictions are 
taken into account in calculating the premium paid by the consumer; 
 
Whereas contracts should be drafted in plain, intelligible language, the consumer 
should actually be given an opportunity to examine all the terms and, if in doubt, the 
interpretation most favourable to the consumer should prevail; 
 
Whereas Member States should ensure that unfair terms are not used in contracts 
concluded with consumers by a seller or supplier and that if, nevertheless, such terms 
are so used, they will not bind the consumer, and the contract will continue to bind the 
parties upon those terms if it is capable of continuing in existence without the unfair 
provisions; 
 
Whereas there is a risk that, in certain cases, the consumer may be deprived of 
protection under this Directive by designating the law of a non-Member country as the 
law applicable to the contract; whereas provisions should therefore be included in this 
Directive designed to avert this risk; 
 
Whereas persons or organizations, if regarded under the law of a Member State as 
having a legitimate interest in the matter, must have facilities for initiating proceedings 
concerning terms of contract drawn up for general use in contracts concluded with 
consumers, and in particular unfair terms, either before a court or before an 
administrative authority competent to decide upon complaints or to initiate appropriate 
legal proceedings; whereas this possibility does not, however, entail prior verification 
of the general conditions obtaining in individual economic sectors; 
 
Whereas the courts or administrative authorities of the Member States must have at 
their disposal adequate and effective means of preventing the continued application of 
unfair terms in consumer contracts, 
 
HAS ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE: 
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Article 1 
 
1. The purpose of this Directive is to approximate the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of the Member States relating to unfair terms in contracts 
concluded between a seller or supplier and a consumer. 
 
2. The contractual terms which reflect mandatory statutory or regulatory provisions 
and the provisions or principles of international conventions to which the Member 
States or the Community are party, particularly in the transport area, shall not be 
subject to the provisions of this Directive. 
 
Article 2 
 
For the purposes of this Directive: 
 
(a) 'unfair terms' means the contractual terms defined in Article 3; 
 
(b) 'consumer' means any natural person who, in contracts covered by this Directive, is 
acting for purposes which are outside his trade, business or profession; 
 
(c) 'seller or supplier' means any natural or legal person who, in contracts covered by 
this Directive, is acting for purposes relating to his trade, business or profession, 
whether publicly owned or privately owned. 
 
Article 3 
 
1. A contractual term which has not been individually negotiated shall be regarded as 
unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in 
the parties' rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the 
consumer. 
 
2. A term shall always be regarded as not individually negotiated where it has been 
drafted in advance and the consumer has therefore not been able to influence the 
substance of the term, particularly in the context of a pre-formulated standard 
contract. 
 
The fact that certain aspects of a term or one specific term have been individually 
negotiated shall not exclude the application of this Article to the rest of a contract if an 
overall assessment of the contract indicates that it is nevertheless a pre-formulated 
standard contract. 
 
Where any seller or supplier claims that a standard term has been individually 
negotiated, the burden of proof in this respect shall be incumbent on him. 
 
3. The Annex shall contain an indicative and non-exhaustive list of the terms which 
may be regarded as unfair. 
 
Article 4 
 
1. Without prejudice to Article 7, the unfairness of a contractual term shall be 
assessed, taking into account the nature of the goods or services for which the 
contract was concluded and by referring, at the time of conclusion of the contract, to 
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all the circumstances attending the conclusion of the contract and to all the other 
terms of the contract or of another contract on which it is dependent. 
 
2. Assessment of the unfair nature of the terms shall relate neither to the definition of 
the main subject matter of the contract nor to the adequacy of the price and 
remuneration, on the one hand, as against the services or goods supplies in exchange, 
on the other, in so far as these terms are in plain intelligible language. 
 
Article 5 
 
In the case of contracts where all or certain terms offered to the consumer are in 
writing, these terms must always be drafted in plain, intelligible language. Where there 
is doubt about the meaning of a term, the interpretation most favourable to the 
consumer shall prevail. This rule on interpretation shall not apply in the context of the 
procedures laid down in Article 7 (2). 
 
Article 6 
 
1. Member States shall lay down that unfair terms used in a contract concluded with a 
consumer by a seller or supplier shall, as provided for under their national law, not be 
binding on the consumer and that the contract shall continue to bind the parties upon 
those terms if it is capable of continuing in existence without the unfair terms. 
 
2. Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the consumer does 
not lose the protection granted by this Directive by virtue of the choice of the law of a 
non-Member country as the law applicable to the contract if the latter has a close 
connection with the territory of the Member States. 
 
Article 7 
 
1. Member States shall ensure that, in the interests of consumers and of competitors, 
adequate and effective means exist to prevent the continued use of unfair terms in 
contracts concluded with consumers by sellers or suppliers. 
 
2. The means referred to in paragraph 1 shall include provisions whereby persons or 
organizations, having a legitimate interest under national law in protecting consumers, 
may take action according to the national law concerned before the courts or before 
competent administrative bodies for a decision as to whether contractual terms drawn 
up for general use are unfair, so that they can apply appropriate and effective means 
to prevent the continued use of such terms. 
 
3. With due regard for national laws, the legal remedies referred to in paragraph 2 may 
be directed separately or jointly against a number of sellers or suppliers from the same 
economic sector or their associations which use or recommend the use of the same 
general contractual terms or similar terms. 
 
Article 8 
 
Member States may adopt or retain the most stringent provisions compatible with the 
Treaty in the area covered by this Directive, to ensure a maximum degree of protection 
for the consumer. 
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Article 9 
 
The Commission shall present a report to the European Parliament and to the Council 
concerning the application of this Directive five years at the latest after the date in 
Article 10 (1). 
 
Article 10 
 
1. Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions necessary to comply with this Directive no later than 31 December 1994. 
They shall forthwith inform the Commission thereof. 
 
These provisions shall be applicable to all contracts concluded after 31 December 
1994. 
 
2. When Member States adopt these measures, they shall contain a reference to this 
Directive or shall be accompanied by such reference on the occasion of their official 
publication. The methods of making such a reference shall be laid down by the 
Member States. 
 
3. Member States shall communicate the main provisions of national law which they 
adopt in the field covered by this Directive to the Commission. 
 
Article 11 
 
This Directive is addressed to the Member States. 
 
Done at Luxembourg, 5 April 1993. 
 
For the Council 
 
The President 
N. HELVEG PETERSEN 
 
(1) OJ No C 73, 24. 3. 1992, p. 7. 
(2) OJ No C 326, 16. 12. 1991, p. 108 and OJ No C 21, 25. 1. 1993. 
(3) OJ No C 159, 17. 6. 1991, p. 34. 
(4) OJ No C 92, 25. 4. 1975, p. 1 and OJ No C 133, 3. 6. 1981, p. 1. 
 
ANNEX 
 
TERMS REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 3 (3) 1. Terms which have the object or effect of: 
 
(a) excluding or limiting the legal liability of a seller or supplier in the event of the 
death of a consumer or personal injury to the latter resulting from an act or omission 
of that seller or supplier; 
 
(b) inappropriately excluding or limiting the legal rights of the consumer vis-à-vis the 
seller or supplier or another party in the event of total or partial non-performance or 
inadequate performance by the seller or supplier of any of the contractual obligations, 
including the option of offsetting a debt owed to the seller or supplier against any 
claim which the consumer may have against him; 
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(c) making an agreement binding on the consumer whereas provision of services by 
the seller or supplier is subject to a condition whose realization depends on his own will 
alone; 
 
(d) permitting the seller or supplier to retain sums paid by the consumer where the 
latter decides not to conclude or perform the contract, without providing for the 
consumer to receive compensation of an equivalent amount from the seller or supplier 
where the latter is the party cancelling the contract; 
 
(e) requiring any consumer who fails to fulfil his obligation to pay a disproportionately 
high sum in compensation; 
 
(f) authorizing the seller or supplier to dissolve the contract on a discretionary basis 
where the same facility is not granted to the consumer, or permitting the seller or 
supplier to retain the sums paid for services not yet supplied by him where it is the 
seller or supplier himself who dissolves the contract; 
 
(g) enabling the seller or supplier to terminate a contract of indeterminate duration 
without reasonable notice except where there are serious grounds for doing so; 
 
(h) automatically extending a contract of fixed duration where the consumer does not 
indicate otherwise, when the deadline fixed for the consumer to express this desire not 
to extend the contract is unreasonably early; 
 
(i) irrevocably binding the consumer to terms with which he had no real opportunity of 
becoming acquainted before the conclusion of the contract; 
 
(j) enabling the seller or supplier to alter the terms of the contract unilaterally without 
a valid reason which is specified in the contract; 
 
(k) enabling the seller or supplier to alter unilaterally without a valid reason any 
characteristics of the product or service to be provided; 
 
(l) providing for the price of goods to be determined at the time of delivery or allowing 
a seller of goods or supplier of services to increase their price without in both cases 
giving the consumer the corresponding right to cancel the contract if the final price is 
too high in relation to the price agreed when the contract was concluded; 
 
(m) giving the seller or supplier the right to determine whether the goods or services 
supplied are in conformity with the contract, or giving him the exclusive right to 
interpret any term of the contract; 
 
(n) limiting the seller's or supplier's obligation to respect commitments undertaken by 
his agents or making his commitments subject to compliance with a particular 
formality; 
 
(o) obliging the consumer to fulfil all his obligations where the seller or supplier does 
not perform his; 
 
(p) giving the seller or supplier the possibility of transferring his rights and obligations 
under the contract, where this may serve to reduce the guarantees for the consumer, 
without the latter's agreement; 
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(q) excluding or hindering the consumer's right to take legal action or exercise any 
other legal remedy, particularly by requiring the consumer to take disputes exclusively 
to arbitration not covered by legal provisions, unduly restricting the evidence available 
to him or imposing on him a burden of proof which, according to the applicable law, 
should lie with another party to the contract. 
 
2. Scope of subparagraphs (g), (j) and (l) 
 
(a) Subparagraph (g) is without hindrance to terms by which a supplier of financial 
services reserves the right to terminate unilaterally a contract of indeterminate 
duration without notice where there is a valid reason, provided that the supplier is 
required to inform the other contracting party or parties thereof immediately. 
 
(b) Subparagraph (j) is without hindrance to terms under which a supplier of financial 
services reserves the right to alter the rate of interest payable by the consumer or due 
to the latter, or the amount of other charges for financial services without notice where 
there is a valid reason, provided that the supplier is required to inform the other 
contracting party or parties thereof at the earliest opportunity and that the latter are 
free to dissolve the contract immediately. 
 
Subparagraph (j) is also without hindrance to terms under which a seller or supplier 
reserves the right to alter unilaterally the conditions of a contract of indeterminate 
duration, provided that he is required to inform the consumer with reasonable notice 
and that the consumer is free to dissolve the contract. 
 
(c) Subparagraphs (g), (j) and (l) do not apply to: 
- transactions in transferable securities, financial instruments and other products or 
services where the price is linked to fluctuations in a stock exchange quotation or index 
or a financial market rate that the seller or supplier does not control; 
- contracts for the purchase or sale of foreign currency, traveller's cheques or 
international money orders denominated in foreign currency; 
 
(d) Subparagraph (l) is without hindrance to price-indexation clauses, where lawful, 
provided that the method by which prices vary is explicitly described. 
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Appendix 3: Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 
 
THE UNFAIR TERMS IN CONSUMER CONTRACTS REGULATIONS 1999 
 
Whereas the Secretary of State is a Minister designated for the purposes of section 2(2) 
of the European Communities Act 1972 in relation to measures relating to consumer 
protection: 
 
Now, the Secretary of State, in exercise of the powers conferred upon him by section 2(2) 
of that Act, hereby makes the following Regulations:- 
 
1. Citation and commencement 
 
These Regulations may be cited as the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 
1999 and shall come into force on 1st October 1999. 
 
2. Revocation 
 
The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1994 are hereby revoked. 
 
3. Interpretation 
 
(1) In these Regulations- 
"the Community" means the European Community; 
"consumer" means any natural person who, in contracts covered by these 
Regulations, is acting for purposes which are outside his trade, business or 
profession; 
"court" in relation to England and Wales and Northern Ireland means a county 
court or the High Court, and in relation to Scotland, the Sheriff or the Court of 
Session; 
"Director" means the Director General of Fair Trading; 
"EEA Agreement" means the Agreement on the European Economic Area signed at 
Oporto on 2nd May 1992 as adjusted by the protocol signed at Brussels on 17th 
March 1993; 
"Member State" means a State which is a contracting party to the EEA Agreement; 
"notified" means notified in writing; 
"qualifying body" means a person specified in Schedule 1; 
"seller or supplier" means any natural or legal person who, in contracts covered by 
these Regulations, is acting for purposes relating to his trade, business or 
profession, whether publicly owned or privately owned; 
"unfair terms" means the contractual terms referred to in regulation 5. 
 
(2) In the application of these Regulations to Scotland for references to an "injunction" or 
an "interim injunction" there shall be substituted references to an "interdict" or "interim 
interdict" respectively. 
 
4. Terms to which these Regulations apply 
 
(1) These Regulations apply in relation to unfair terms in contracts concluded between a 
seller or a supplier and a consumer. 
 
(2) These Regulations do not apply to contractual terms which reflect- 
 - 239 -  
 
(a) mandatory statutory or regulatory provisions (including such provisions under 
the law of any Member State or in Community legislation having effect in the 
United Kingdom without further enactment); 
 
(b) the provisions or principles of international conventions to which the Member 
States or the Community are party. 
 
5. Unfair Terms 
 
(1) A contractual term which has not been individually negotiated shall be regarded as 
unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the 
parties' rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the 
consumer. 
 
(2) A term shall always be regarded as not having been individually negotiated where it 
has been drafted in advance and the consumer has therefore not been able to influence 
the substance of the term. 
 
(3) Notwithstanding that a specific term or certain aspects of it in a contract has been 
individually negotiated, these Regulations shall apply to the rest of a contract if an overall 
assessment of it indicates that it is a pre-formulated standard contract. 
 
(4) It shall be for any seller or supplier who claims that a term was individually negotiated 
to show that it was. 
 
(5) Schedule 2 to these Regulations contains an indicative and non-exhaustive list of the 
terms which may be regarded as unfair. 
 
6. Assessment of unfair terms 
 
(1) Without prejudice to regulation 12, the unfairness of a contractual term shall be 
assessed, taking into account the nature of the goods or services for which the contract 
was concluded and by referring, at the time of conclusion of the contract, to all the 
circumstances attending the conclusion of the contract and to all the other terms of the 
contract or of another contract on which it is dependent. 
 
(2) In so far as it is in plain intelligible language, the assessment of fairness of a term 
shall not relate- 
(a) to the definition of the main subject matter of the contract, or 
(b) to the adequacy of the price or remuneration, as against the goods or services 
supplied in exchange. 
 
7. Written contracts 
 
(1) A seller or supplier shall ensure that any written term of a contract is expressed in 
plain, intelligible language. 
 
(2) If there is doubt about the meaning of a written term, the interpretation which is most 
favourable to the consumer shall prevail but this rule shall not apply in proceedings 
brought under regulation 12. 
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8. Effect of unfair term 
 
(1) An unfair term in a contract concluded with a consumer by a seller or supplier shall 
not be binding on the consumer. 
 
(2) The contract shall continue to bind the parties if it is capable of continuing in 
existence without the unfair term. 
 
9. Choice of law clauses 
 
These Regulations shall apply notwithstanding any contract term which applies or 
purports to apply the law of a non-Member State, if the contract has a close connection 
with the territory of the Member States. 
 
10. Complaints - consideration by Director 
 
(1) It shall be the duty of the Director to consider any complaint made to him that any 
contract term drawn up for general use is unfair, unless- 
(a) the complaint appears to the Director to be frivolous or vexatious; or 
(b) a qualifying body has notified the Director that it agrees to consider the 
complaint. 
 
(2) The Director shall give reasons for his decision to apply or not to apply, as the case 
may be, for an injunction under regulation 12 in relation to any complaint which these 
Regulations require him to consider. 
 
(3) In deciding whether or not to apply for an injunction in respect of a term which the 
Director considers to be unfair, he may, if he considers it appropriate to do so, have 
regard to any undertakings given to him by or on behalf of any person as to the 
continued use of such a term in contracts concluded with consumers. 
 
11. Complaints - consideration by qualifying bodies 
 
(1) If a qualifying body specified in Part One of Schedule 1 notifies the Director that it 
agrees to consider a complaint that any contract term drawn up for general use is unfair, 
it shall be under a duty to consider that complaint. 
 
(2) Regulation 10(2) and (3) shall apply to a qualifying body which is under a duty to 
consider a complaint as they apply to the Director. 
 
12. Injunctions to prevent continued use of unfair terms 
  
(1) The Director or, subject to paragraph (2), any qualifying body may apply for an 
injunction (including an interim injunction) against any person appearing to the Director 
or that body to be using, or recommending use of, an unfair term drawn up for general 
use in contracts concluded with consumers. 
 
(2) A qualifying body may apply for an injunction only where- 
(a) it has notified the Director of its intention to apply at least fourteen days 
before the date on which the application is made, beginning with the date on 
which the notification was given; or 
(b) the Director consents to the application being made within a shorter period. 
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(3) The court on an application under this regulation may grant an injunction on such 
terms as it thinks fit. 
 
(4) An injunction may relate not only to use of a particular contract term drawn up for 
general use but to any similar term, or a term having like effect, used or recommended 
for use by any person. 
 
13. Powers of the Director and qualifying bodies to obtain documents and 
information 
 
(1) The Director may exercise the power conferred by this regulation for the purpose of- 
(a) facilitating his consideration of a complaint that a contract term drawn up for 
general use is unfair; or 
 
(b) ascertaining whether a person has complied with an undertaking or court order 
as to the continued use, or recommendation for use, of a term in contracts 
concluded with consumers. 
 
(2) A qualifying body specified in Part One of Schedule 1 may exercise the power 
conferred by this regulation for the purpose of- 
(a) facilitating its consideration of a complaint that a contract term drawn up for 
general use is unfair; or 
(b) ascertaining whether a person has complied with- 
(i) an undertaking given to it or to the court following an application by 
that body, or 
(ii) a court order made on an application by that body, 
as to the continued use, or recommendation for use, of a term in contracts 
concluded with consumers. 
 
(3) The Director may require any person to supply to him, and a qualifying body specified 
in Part One of Schedule 1 may require any person to supply to it- 
(a) a copy of any document which that person has used or recommended for use, 
at the time the notice referred to in paragraph (4) below is given, as a pre-
formulated standard contract in dealings with consumers; 
(b) information about the use, or recommendation for use, by that person of that 
document or any other such document in dealings with consumers. 
 
(4) The power conferred by this regulation is to be exercised by a notice in writing which 
may- 
(a) specify the way in which and the time within which it is to be complied with; 
and 
(b) be varied or revoked by a subsequent notice. 
 
(5) Nothing in this regulation compels a person to supply any document or information 
which he would be entitled to refuse to produce or give in civil proceedings before the 
court. 
 
(6) If a person makes default in complying with a notice under this regulation, the court 
may, on the application of the Director or of the qualifying body, make such order as the 
court thinks fit for requiring the default to be made good, and any such order may 
provide that all the costs or expenses of and incidental to the application shall be borne 
by the person in default or by any officers of a company or other association who are 
responsible for its default. 
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14. Notification of undertakings and orders to Director 
 
A qualifying body shall notify the Director- 
(a) of any undertaking given to it by or on behalf of any person as to the 
continued use of a term which that body considers to be unfair in contracts 
concluded with consumers; 
(b) of the outcome of any application made by it under regulation 12, and of the 
terms of any undertaking given to, or order made by, the court; 
(c) of the outcome of any application made by it to enforce a previous order of the 
court. 
 
15. Publication, information and advice 
 
(1) The Director shall arrange for the publication in such form and manner as he 
considers appropriate, of- 
(a) details of any undertaking or order notified to him under regulation 14; 
(b) details of any undertaking given to him by or on behalf of any person as to the 
continued use of a term which the Director considers to be unfair in contracts 
concluded with consumers; 
(c) details of any application made by him under regulation 12, and of the terms 
of any undertaking given to, or order made by, the court; 
(d) details of any application made by the Director to enforce a previous order of 
the court. 
 
(2) The Director shall inform any person on request whether a particular term to which 
these Regulations apply has been- 
(a) the subject of an undertaking given to the Director or notified to him by a 
qualifying body; or 
(b) the subject of an order of the court made upon application by him or notified 
to him by a qualifying body; 
and shall give that person details of the undertaking or a copy of the order, as the case 
may be, together with a copy of any amendments which the person giving the 
undertaking has agreed to make to the term in question. 
 
(3) The Director may arrange for the dissemination in such form and manner as he 
considers appropriate of such information and advice concerning the operation of these 
Regulations as may appear to him to be expedient to give to the public and to all persons 
likely to be affected by these Regulations. 
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SCHEDULE 1 
 
QUALIFYING BODIES 
 
Regulation 3 
 
PART ONE 
 
1. The Information Commissioner. 
 
2. The Gas and Electricity Markets Authority. 
 
3. The Director General of Electricity Supply for Northern Ireland. 
 
4. The Director General of Gas for Northern Ireland. 
 
5. The Director General of Telecommunications. 
 
6. The Director General of Water Services. 
 
7. The Rail Regulator. 
 
8. Every weights and measures authority in Great Britain. 
 
9. The Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment in Northern Ireland. 
 
10. The Financial Services Authority. 
 
PART TWO 
 
11. Consumers' Association. 
 
SCHEDULE 2 
 
INDICATIVE AND NON-EXHAUSTIVE LIST OF TERMS WHICH MAY BE 
REGARDED AS UNFAIR 
 
Regulation 5(5) 
 
1. Terms which have the object or effect of- 
 
(a) excluding or limiting the legal liability of a seller or supplier in the event of the 
death of a consumer or personal injury to the latter resulting from an act or 
omission of that seller or supplier; 
 
(b) inappropriately excluding or limiting the legal rights of the consumer vis-à-vis 
the seller or supplier or another party in the event of total or partial non-
performance or inadequate performance by the seller or supplier of any of the 
contractual obligations, including the option of offsetting a debt owed to the seller 
or supplier against any claim which the consumer may have against him; 
 
(c) making an agreement binding on the consumer whereas provision of services 
by the seller or supplier is subject to a condition whose realisation depends on his 
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own will alone; 
 
(d) permitting the seller or supplier to retain sums paid by the consumer where 
the latter decides not to conclude or perform the contract, without providing for 
the consumer to receive compensation of an equivalent amount from the seller or 
supplier where the latter is the party cancelling the contract; 
 
(e) requiring any consumer who fails to fulfil his obligation to pay a 
disproportionately high sum in compensation; 
 
(f) authorising the seller or supplier to dissolve the contract on a discretionary 
basis where the same facility is not granted to the consumer, or permitting the 
seller or supplier to retain the sums paid for services not yet supplied by him 
where it is the seller or supplier himself who dissolves the contract; 
 
(g) enabling the seller or supplier to terminate a contract of indeterminate 
duration without reasonable notice except where there are serious grounds for 
doing so; 
 
(h) automatically extending a contract of fixed duration where the consumer does 
not indicate otherwise, when the deadline fixed for the consumer to express his 
desire not to extend the contract is unreasonably early; 
 
(i) irrevocably binding the consumer to terms with which he had no real 
opportunity of becoming acquainted before the conclusion of the contract; 
 
(j) enabling the seller or supplier to alter the terms of the contract unilaterally 
without a valid reason which is specified in the contract; 
 
(k) enabling the seller or supplier to alter unilaterally without a valid reason any 
characteristics of the product or service to be provided; 
 
(l) providing for the price of goods to be determined at the time of delivery or 
allowing a seller of goods or supplier of services to increase their price without in 
both cases giving the consumer the corresponding right to cancel the contract if 
the final price is too high in relation to the price agreed when the contract was 
concluded; 
 
(m) giving the seller or supplier the right to determine whether the goods or 
services supplied are in conformity with the contract, or giving him the exclusive 
right to interpret any term of the contract; 
 
(n) limiting the seller's or supplier's obligation to respect commitments undertaken 
by his agents or making his commitments subject to compliance with a particular 
formality; 
 
(o) obliging the consumer to fulfil all his obligations where the seller or supplier 
does not perform his; 
 
(p) giving the seller or supplier the possibility of transferring his rights and 
obligations under the contract, where this may serve to reduce the guarantees for 
the consumer, without the latter's agreement; 
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(q) excluding or hindering the consumer's right to take legal action or exercise any 
other legal remedy, particularly by requiring the consumer to take disputes 
exclusively to arbitration not covered by legal provisions, unduly restricting the 
evidence available to him or imposing on him a burden of proof which, according 
to the applicable law, should lie with another party to the contract. 
 
2. Scope of paragraphs 1(g), (j) and (l) 
 
(a) Paragraph 1(g) is without hindrance to terms by which a supplier of financial 
services reserves the right to terminate unilaterally a contract of indeterminate 
duration without notice where there is a valid reason, provided that the supplier is 
required to inform the other contracting party or parties thereof immediately. 
 
(b) Paragraph 1(j) is without hindrance to terms under which a supplier of 
financial services reserves the right to alter the rate of interest payable by the 
consumer or due to the latter, or the amount of other charges for financial 
services without notice where there is a valid reason, provided that the supplier is 
required to inform the other contracting party or parties thereof at the earliest 
opportunity and that the latter are free to dissolve the contract immediately. 
 
Paragraph 1(j) is also without hindrance to terms under which a seller or supplier 
reserves the right to alter unilaterally the conditions of a contract of indeterminate 
duration, provided that he is required to inform the consumer with reasonable 
notice and that the consumer is free to dissolve the contract. 
 
(c) Paragraphs 1(g), (j) and (l) do not apply to: 
- transactions in transferable securities, financial instruments and other 
products or services where the price is linked to fluctuations in a stock 
exchange quotation or index or a financial market rate that the seller or 
supplier does not control; 
- contracts for the purchase or sale of foreign currency, traveller's cheques 
or international money orders denominated in foreign currency; 
 
(d) Paragraph 1(l) is without hindrance to price indexation clauses, where lawful, 
provided that the method by which prices vary is explicitly described. 
 
 
